國人自我贈禮的風氣方興未艾，但在資源的束縛與傳統價值觀的影響下，使得消費者不免陷於困窘之境，而本研究即欲探討消費者自我贈禮與消費罪惡感之間的關係。本研究目的有四：其一，瞭解國人引發自我贈禮的主要背景情境與動機，並試圖對自我贈禮加以分類，以求得主要的背景情境與動機所對應之自我贈禮類型；其二，發展消費罪惡感之構面與發生時機；其三，瞭解不同自我贈禮類型與消費罪惡感的對應關係；其四，探討在不同產品類型的影響之下，自我贈禮與消費罪惡感的對應關係是否有所不同。 本研究以關鍵事件法設計問卷，透過三次前測得到正式問卷，針對60位消費者進行訪談及問卷施測，共收集了60個自我贈禮事件。經資料分析過後，得到研究結果可歸納成四大方向： 首先在自我贈禮方面，背景情境按發生頻次多寡依序為：發生重大事件、有成就感、工作辛苦、壓力負荷、心情低落、有額外資源、週期性自我回饋；背景情境與動機之間呈現一對一的關係，分別是為了留下紀念、犒賞自己、慰勞自己、抒解壓力、愉悅自己、維持好心情、對自己好一點。另外，若依照產品導向程度的強弱以及資訊準備程度的高低針對自我贈禮進行分類，國人進行最不常發生的自我贈禮類型為「高度產品導向—低度資訊準備」—驚鴻一瞥型。 其次在消費罪惡感方面，其構面為猶豫感、金錢疼惜感、愧疚感，時機為購買之前的預期性罪惡感，購買當下的進行性罪惡感，以及購買之後的反應性罪惡感，而雖然各時機都會有各構面的成分，但預期性罪惡感最主要的構面為猶豫感，進行性罪惡感最主要的構面為疼惜感，反應性罪惡感最主要的構面為愧疚感。 接著在自我贈禮與消費罪惡感之關係方面，當消費者進行週期性自我回饋時，會感受到程度最高的預期性罪惡感；而當消費者因有成就感或心情低落時所進行之自我贈禮，其感受到的是程度最低的預期性罪惡感。至於，若是屬於高度產品導向類型者，其表現在消費罪惡感上的類型最主要為財務類罪惡感；若是屬於低度產品導向類型者，比較有可能不會產生消費罪惡感。 最後，若是受到不同產品類型影響的情況下，由於自我贈禮之禮物類型皆為奢侈品，因此以功能型與享樂型產品做為產品分類的標準。對於購買功能型奢侈品做為自我贈禮禮物的消費者而言，無論是高度產品導向或是低度產品導向類型者，其表現在消費罪惡感上，最主要的類型為財務類罪惡感；對於購買享樂型奢侈品做為自我贈禮禮物的消費者而言，若是高度產品導向類型者，其表現在消費罪惡感上，最主要的類型為財務類罪惡感；若是低度產品導向者，則傾向完全沒有罪惡感。 整體而言，本研究不僅為國人自我贈禮的背景情境與動機之先導研究，亦開啟了消費罪惡感研究之先河，並建立消費罪惡感的構面與時機，著實為後續研究奠定了相當的基礎。 / People in Taiwan have tended to buy themselves gifts recently. However, under the constraints of resources and the influence of traditional values, they would hesitate to buy or not to buy. This study focuses on this interesting theme-the relationship between consumers’ self-gift giving and consumer guilt. The objectives of this study are to explore consumers’ motivations of self-gifts, the dimensions and evolution of consumer guilt, and the relationship between consumers’ self-gift giving and consumer guilt. Product categories are also under the consideration of this study to examine the effects of different products on the relationship between consumers’ self-gift giving and consumer guilt. This research employed the critical incident techniques. A questionnaire was first designed and pre-tested three times before the main field work. Through collecting, sorting and analyzing 60 self-gift giving events, the results pointed out four main parts as followed. To begin with, the results indicated that consumers will buy gifts for themselves when the important events happened, something achieved, some hard work finished, feeling stressed, being depressed, gaining some extra resources, and purchasing periodically. These situations were one-to-one corresponding to some motivations, respectively to remember, to reward, to compensate, to relieve, to revive, to keep in a good mood, and to be nice to oneself. In addition, self-gift giving behavior might be divided into four types by the degree of product-oriented (high vs. low) and the degree of information-prepared (high vs. low). However, few Taiwanese were classified by “high product-oriented and low information-prepared”, called “Glance”. Secondly, the consumer guilt had three dimensions-hesitation, anguish, and remorse. Also, it had three moments of occurrence. The anticipatory guilt occurred before purchasing; the proceeding guilt occurred when purchasing; and the reactive guilt occurred after purchasing. Although each moment of consumer guilt included three dimensions meanwhile, what’s more important, the major dimension of anticipatory guilt was hesitation, the major dimension of proceeding guilt was anguish, and the major dimension of reactive guilt was remorse. As for the relationship between consumers’ self-gift giving and consumer guilt, consumers had the highest degree of anticipatory guilt when they bought gifts for themselves under periodical purchase. However, consumers had the lowest degree of anticipatory guilt if they bought self-gifts under achievements or depression. Besides, if self-gift giving behavior was highly product-oriented, consumers would have financial consumer guilt. Moreover, if self-gift giving behavior was lowly product-oriented, consumers would have no consumer guilt. Finally, this study concerned the functional/hedonic products moderating the relation between self-gift giving and consumer guilt. For those who bought themselves functional gifts, no matter this self-gift giving behavior belonged to highly or lowly product-oriented, consumers would have financial consumer guilt. For those who bought themselves hedonic gifts, if this self-gift giving behavior was highly product-oriented, consumers would have financial consumer guilt; however, if this self-gift giving behavior was lowly product-oriented, consumers would have no consumer guilt.

本文討論民事侵害名譽權之法律責任，從釋字第509號解釋之合理查證義務與美國法上的真實惡意原則進行分析與比較，本文第一章為緒論，第二章就現行司法院大法官解釋第509號解釋、第656號解釋、第689號解釋進行介紹並且分析之，而最主要著重於釋字第509號解釋蘇俊雄大法官與吳庚大法官之協同意見書，其見解接近於美國法上真實惡意原則和觀念自由市場之理論。 第三章就美國法「真實惡意」原則的意義及其適用範圍進行探討，並從1964年蘇利文案以下美國法各個誹謗案例進行分析與討論並且類型化表格，並且討論原告是否為公眾人物與系爭言論是否攸關於公共利益進行分析。第四章討論民事侵害名譽權之成立要件、阻卻違法性事由以及有責性事由，本文就民事侵害名譽權之各個要件進行討論，其中最主要討論是刑事阻卻違法事由，可否類推適用於民事阻卻違法事由？另外探討如何區分系爭言論係屬事實陳述抑或是意見表達？ 第五章就「真實惡意」原則和釋字第509號解釋「合理查證義務」適用於民事名譽權侵權行為進行分析，兩者之差異為何？通說認為最主要差別在於我國未如同美國法真實惡意原則一般，區分原告身分是否為公眾人物和系爭言論之不實性須由何方當事人舉證證明之，並且就現行我國、日本、美國對於民事侵害名譽權之新趨勢做出介紹，我國部分是案例分析數字統計表，美國部分是最新的史奈德案，並且本文會就史奈德案後，美國法對於真實惡意原則的發展及其省思，以及本文對於史奈德案的看法，都會在本章探討。 第六章是民事侵害名譽權之救濟手段，本文分別就民事實體法之事前防止損害手段(民法第18條第1項)、民事訴訟法之事前防止損害手段(民事訴訟法第522條、第532條、第538條)、事後填補損害手段、英美法上對於民事侵害名譽權所生損害賠償之種類進行討論，而本文在慰撫金部分建議引進日本的民事名譽權慰撫金算定之標準作為我國法院審酌民事侵害名譽權慰撫金之依據，而最主要理由是因為參考因素一致和最高損害賠償金額相近。 第七章是結論，如同布瑞南大法官所說的，國旗獨特地象徵著思想的自由、平等和寬容的想法等思想，而在歷史上這些係美國人始終熱情地捍衛這些價值並且為其辯論。國旗體現了我們國家為這些理想付出的精神。因此國旗所傳播的訊息並未強化我們意見上的歧異，除非是將意見上的歧異解釋為對於相同理想的不同詮釋。國旗的象徵意義並不對特定的政策進行判斷，當這些政策係受到國旗所象徵之自由和平等精神所啟發時，他們應當受到尊重。對世界而言，國旗是我們將繼續努力為這些理想奮鬥的承諾。對我們來說，國旗是同時在提醒我們不應停止為自由和平等持續的努力，而且我們應有對於公民寬容和尊重的義務，這些公民當然包括與我們意見相歧異者，即使那些想法是令人不愉快或感覺受到侮辱的。綜上所述，本文認為對於公眾人物和公共利益之相關系爭言論，要給予最大的尊重與包容，所以對於言論自由與名譽權的利益權衡，從以前到現在與未來，如同一盤未下完的棋而繼續走著，在可預見的未來仍然是個難解的習題，本文試圖找出其平衡點，同時能夠兼顧言論自由與名譽權之保障，使民主社會散發出蓬勃的氣息，帶領著我們邁向更光明燦爛的明天。

2001年911恐怖攻擊事件之後，美國重新調整全球戰略，而其戰略重心的東移，相對牽動了亞太及台海的戰略布局，美國在戰略部署上的一連串舉措，諸如「反恐戰爭」的進行、「四年期國防總檢報告」的發布、宣布退出「反彈道飛彈條約」，乃至於小布希的東亞之行與「核武態勢評估」將原有的三個「邪惡軸心」擴大為七個「不排除動用核武」的國家，顯見美國小布希政府在軍事與戰略上的重大轉變。 就美國的安全評估，東亞地區可能對美軍及其盟邦發動攻擊的國家中，無論是短、中、長程彈道飛彈，均危及美國在東亞之戰略利益，其中以中共及北韓最令美國擔憂。 針對北韓的核武危機與中共崛起的威脅潛伏，美國建構了亞太「戰區飛彈防禦系統」，台灣應如何相對調整國防戰略、兵力結構與國防現代化，與因應中共的彈道飛彈威脅，台灣飛彈防禦應有的積極作為、建立第二擊的反擊力量，以及推動兩岸建立軍事互信機制、謀求兩岸雙贏的策略，本篇論文提出研究的發現與建議。

本篇論文旨在探討中共與伊朗在各層面關係的演變，及兩國關係發展的限制。本論文的研究途徑係採取系統理論，透過國際環境、國內環境與決策者因素的探討，以瞭解中伊各項關係受到哪些因素的影響。 基本上，中伊兩國以「經貿互利、權力與安全」為主軸，分別進行各種層面關係的互動。首先，在中伊關係特點上，中伊政治外交關係的特點包括推動「反對霸權主義」、「反對單極國際體系」及追求「互利合作」。軍事關係的特點在於獲取政治與商業利益，降低伊朗研發武器的成本。能源關係的特點在於平衡兩國的貿易關係、確保能源安全。經貿與科技關係的特點在於創造對中伊兩國互利的經貿利益，促進伊朗科技發展。 以政策目標來看，中共對伊朗的政策目標在於推動與伊朗的國際議題合作；兩伊戰爭期間維持平衡的外交策略；促成兩伊戰爭的和平解決；鞏固中共對伊朗的政治影響力；推動中伊兩國在中東地區的議題合作；基於反對單極國際體系的理念，推動國際議題合作；推動與伊朗的國際議題合作；防範中亞地區分裂主義及基本教義主義擴張；增加中伊兩國在中東地區的議題合作；增加中共對伊朗核問題的影響力。在軍事關係上，中共對伊朗的政策目標包括提供伊朗所需武器，抵禦國外勢力的攻擊；避免伊朗遭受區域強權或國際大國的安全威脅；維護伊朗和平使用核能的權利。在能源關係上，中共對伊朗的政策目標包括平衡中伊兩國的貿易逆差；探詢與伊朗進行能源合作的機會；增加從伊朗進口的能源數量；爭取在伊朗的能源探勘計畫；增加中伊雙方能源合作的領域；增加從伊朗進口原油的數量；爭取在伊朗的能源探勘機會；增加中伊雙方能源合作的領域。在經貿與科技關係上，中共對伊朗的目標包括加強中伊雙邊貿易；增加與伊朗經濟合作的項目；促進中伊兩國的科技合作。 本文以政治外交、軍事、能源、經貿與科技作為實務分析的面向，並以三個時期為區分，分別是鄧小平時期(1979年至1988年)、江澤民時期(1989年至2002年)、胡錦濤時期(2003年至2008年)。在鄧小平主政期間，中伊關係以國家安全及權力平衡為主軸。中伊關係最重要的面向就是軍事關係。江澤民主政期間，中伊關係則以經貿互利及權力平衡為主軸。此時期經貿與科技關係、能源關係及政治外交關係則是雙方發展的重點層面。在胡錦濤主政期間，中共與伊朗關係改以「互利合作」作為主軸。此時期中伊的能源關係、經貿與科技互動成為雙方關係的重點，政治外交關係及軍事關係則退居其後。 綜觀中共與伊朗伊斯蘭政府關係的基礎，建立在中伊雙方國家利益考量。對中共而言，伊朗戰略地理位置重要，與中共同屬第三世界開發中國家，兩國歷史情誼淵源已久，都是促成因素之一。其次，在中東地區以親美政府為主的國家中，伊朗伊斯蘭政府反其道而行，抱持反美且不親蘇的立場，此外，伊朗能源蘊藏豐富，因此伊朗成為中共在中東地區的重要據點。 對伊朗政府而言，中共在以阿議題上，屬於少數較為同情巴勒斯坦立場的國際大國，同時中共反對現有的以美國為主導的國際體系、以第三世界開發中國家與伊朗立場相近。此外，中共在國際政治或區域議題上具有舉足輕重的地位，在國際議題上更具有實質影響力。 從中伊關係的發展，可以發現幾個大趨勢：第一、中伊關係的發展中，主導權越來越操之在中共的手中；第二、中共在盱衡整體國家利益下，對於伊朗的強硬態度，已經無法給予強力支持；第三、中共與伊朗關係發展中，能源、經貿等實質利益，已經逐漸取代政治與戰略利益的重要性。第四、中共有意透過國際組織的力量，給予伊朗適當的壓力；第五、中伊雙方互動在遇到歧見時，向來秉持「求同存異」、「各取所需」的精神，以不傷害彼此既有關係的前提下，以獲取各自最大的利益。 展望未來中、伊兩國關係發展的前景，中伊兩國仍會維持各關係層面的議題式合作關係。中伊兩國政治外交關係的未來的動向，將取決於伊朗內部政治的演變與伊朗及美國關係的發展，如果伊朗國內的激進派持續在外交政策上採取不退讓的立場，美國對伊朗的政策將趨於強勢，如此，中共與伊朗關係的發展很難繼續突破。但是，面對伊朗豐富的能源儲量與產量，加上維護能源安全已經是中共的外交要項，美國倘若對伊朗採取強制作為，中共絕不可能默許。至於伊朗方面，它必須仰賴具有傳統友誼基礎，又是聯合國常任安理國的中共在各項議題上為其執言。因此，即使中共在某些議題的立場上向美國靠攏，但是伊朗也不敢斷然與中共反目成仇。其次，對伊朗而言，無論在經貿科技上或者能源上，中共是個較能信賴的國家，伊朗不願讓這些實質關係倒退。短期內中共與伊朗關係仍將以經貿、能源為主，政治外交關係將退居其次。此外，中共也將持續維持伊朗成為中東地區制衡美國勢力過度擴張的據點。 / The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the development of China and Iran relations and to understand the factors contributing to the adjustment of bilateral relations. The writer intends to introduce system theory as analytical approach. The finding of this study is that the bilateral relationship between China and Iran is established on the mutually economic benefits, power and security. On the diplomatic dimension, China and Iran relationship is characterized by anti-hegemony, anti-unipolar international system, mutually benefits and cooperation. On the military dimension China and Iran relationship is characterized by enhancing Iran’s sovereignty and national security. China and Iran relationship is characterized by balancing mutual trade imbalance and ensuring energy security. On the economic technological dimension, China and Iran relationship is characterized by creating mutual interests for both nations and advancing Iran’s technological development. In terms of policy objectives, China’s objectives are many folds. On diplomatic dimension China’s objective toward Iran comprises promoting issue cooperation with Iran, supporting Iran’s independent foreign policy, fending off foreign intervention in Iran’s domestic affairs, ensuring Iran’s status as a regional power. On military dimension China’s objective toward Iran comprises helping establish Iran’s national defense power, helping stave off potential security threats directed toward Iran. On energy dimension China’s objective toward Iran comprises balancing mutual trade imbalance. On economic dimension China’s objective toward Iran comprises enhancing mutual trade and tapping into Iran’s market. In terms of policy instrument, China and Iran try to achieve policy objective via the use of a variety of policy instruments, ranging from diplomatic bargaining, high ranking officers visits, arms sales, military cooperation, military officers visits, negotiation on Iran nuclear issue, energy trade, nuclear technological cooperation, energy joint development, economic and trade bargaining, engineering contract, assistance in technology and funding. This analysis is conducted from several different dimensions of China and Iran relations, that is, diplomatic, military, energy, economic and trade dimensions. For the analytical needs, this analysis is mainly divided into three periods, from 1979 to 1988, 1989 to 2002 and 2003 to 2008. From 1979 to 1988 the central pillar of China Iran relations is on military dimension featured by national security and balance of power. From 1989 to 2002 the central pillar of China Iran relations is on economic-trade, energy and diplomatic dimensions featured by mutually economic benefits and balance of power. From 2003 to 2008 the central pillar of China Iran relations is on economic-trade, energy and diplomatic dimensions featured by mutually benefits and oooperation. From the track of China and Iran relations, several trends can be inductively identified. First the leverage is more favorable to China. Secondly China has reduced its all-out support for Iran’s militant foreign policy. Thirdly the substantive interests such as energy and economic ones have surpassed economic and strategic ones in terms of importance. Fourthly China try to press Iran to readjust the latter’s policy through the force of international organizations. Fifthly China and Iran will adopt the principle of ‘put aside the difference and pursue the consensus’ and ‘to serve one’s own need’ if there is conflicting opinion between China and Iran. From the process of China and Iran relations, some major limitations can also be identified. First the international environment factor, particularly U.S. factor, is a critical source of limitation. China has to strike a balance in its relationship between Iran and U.S. Secondly China’s decision maker’s policy adjustment is also a source of limitation. In the process of its peacefully rising as a responsible great power, China chooses to abide by international regimes and keep cautious in dealing with Iran’s contentious issues. Thirdly China’s long standing principle of non-involvement in highly disputed issues also hamper China-Iran relationship. Fourthly the dominance of Iran’s conservative faction has indirectly impeded China-Iran relation. The future of China and Iran diplomatic relations will depend on the development of Iran’s domestic politics and U.S.-Iran relations. China will not allow U.S. to take military actions against and Iran will not give up China as a reliable great power. Over the short term, China and Iran relations will prosper on substantive issues, while political issues will lose its importance.