This study examines the decision making process in Washington which led to the current non-existence of political and economic relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States. The study examines the U.S.-Iran relationship at three levels-of-analysis: the individual, state, and system levels. From a geopolitical perspective, Iran and the United States have often been natural allies that pursued similar policy goals. After 9/11, the U.S. entered Afghanistan and Iraq which further necessitated the reengagement of Tehran. Iranian regional clout would play a vital role in stabilization of Iraq and Afghanistan and without Iran's assistance; peace will not likely be realized in those states. Amongst the most compelling reasons for Washington to engage in meaningful dialogue with Tehran are: terrorism, the war on drugs, the Iranian sponsorship of militant groups, and Tehran's pursuit of a nuclear program. The study concludes that rapprochement should occur in two phases. The first being cooperation in areas of mutual concern such as the war on drugs. The second phase promoting confidence building methods, which would lead to a strategic partnership based on mutual interests.

本篇論文旨在探討中共與伊朗在各層面關係的演變，及兩國關係發展的限制。本論文的研究途徑係採取系統理論，透過國際環境、國內環境與決策者因素的探討，以瞭解中伊各項關係受到哪些因素的影響。 基本上，中伊兩國以「經貿互利、權力與安全」為主軸，分別進行各種層面關係的互動。首先，在中伊關係特點上，中伊政治外交關係的特點包括推動「反對霸權主義」、「反對單極國際體系」及追求「互利合作」。軍事關係的特點在於獲取政治與商業利益，降低伊朗研發武器的成本。能源關係的特點在於平衡兩國的貿易關係、確保能源安全。經貿與科技關係的特點在於創造對中伊兩國互利的經貿利益，促進伊朗科技發展。 以政策目標來看，中共對伊朗的政策目標在於推動與伊朗的國際議題合作；兩伊戰爭期間維持平衡的外交策略；促成兩伊戰爭的和平解決；鞏固中共對伊朗的政治影響力；推動中伊兩國在中東地區的議題合作；基於反對單極國際體系的理念，推動國際議題合作；推動與伊朗的國際議題合作；防範中亞地區分裂主義及基本教義主義擴張；增加中伊兩國在中東地區的議題合作；增加中共對伊朗核問題的影響力。在軍事關係上，中共對伊朗的政策目標包括提供伊朗所需武器，抵禦國外勢力的攻擊；避免伊朗遭受區域強權或國際大國的安全威脅；維護伊朗和平使用核能的權利。在能源關係上，中共對伊朗的政策目標包括平衡中伊兩國的貿易逆差；探詢與伊朗進行能源合作的機會；增加從伊朗進口的能源數量；爭取在伊朗的能源探勘計畫；增加中伊雙方能源合作的領域；增加從伊朗進口原油的數量；爭取在伊朗的能源探勘機會；增加中伊雙方能源合作的領域。在經貿與科技關係上，中共對伊朗的目標包括加強中伊雙邊貿易；增加與伊朗經濟合作的項目；促進中伊兩國的科技合作。 本文以政治外交、軍事、能源、經貿與科技作為實務分析的面向，並以三個時期為區分，分別是鄧小平時期(1979年至1988年)、江澤民時期(1989年至2002年)、胡錦濤時期(2003年至2008年)。在鄧小平主政期間，中伊關係以國家安全及權力平衡為主軸。中伊關係最重要的面向就是軍事關係。江澤民主政期間，中伊關係則以經貿互利及權力平衡為主軸。此時期經貿與科技關係、能源關係及政治外交關係則是雙方發展的重點層面。在胡錦濤主政期間，中共與伊朗關係改以「互利合作」作為主軸。此時期中伊的能源關係、經貿與科技互動成為雙方關係的重點，政治外交關係及軍事關係則退居其後。 綜觀中共與伊朗伊斯蘭政府關係的基礎，建立在中伊雙方國家利益考量。對中共而言，伊朗戰略地理位置重要，與中共同屬第三世界開發中國家，兩國歷史情誼淵源已久，都是促成因素之一。其次，在中東地區以親美政府為主的國家中，伊朗伊斯蘭政府反其道而行，抱持反美且不親蘇的立場，此外，伊朗能源蘊藏豐富，因此伊朗成為中共在中東地區的重要據點。 對伊朗政府而言，中共在以阿議題上，屬於少數較為同情巴勒斯坦立場的國際大國，同時中共反對現有的以美國為主導的國際體系、以第三世界開發中國家與伊朗立場相近。此外，中共在國際政治或區域議題上具有舉足輕重的地位，在國際議題上更具有實質影響力。 從中伊關係的發展，可以發現幾個大趨勢：第一、中伊關係的發展中，主導權越來越操之在中共的手中；第二、中共在盱衡整體國家利益下，對於伊朗的強硬態度，已經無法給予強力支持；第三、中共與伊朗關係發展中，能源、經貿等實質利益，已經逐漸取代政治與戰略利益的重要性。第四、中共有意透過國際組織的力量，給予伊朗適當的壓力；第五、中伊雙方互動在遇到歧見時，向來秉持「求同存異」、「各取所需」的精神，以不傷害彼此既有關係的前提下，以獲取各自最大的利益。 展望未來中、伊兩國關係發展的前景，中伊兩國仍會維持各關係層面的議題式合作關係。中伊兩國政治外交關係的未來的動向，將取決於伊朗內部政治的演變與伊朗及美國關係的發展，如果伊朗國內的激進派持續在外交政策上採取不退讓的立場，美國對伊朗的政策將趨於強勢，如此，中共與伊朗關係的發展很難繼續突破。但是，面對伊朗豐富的能源儲量與產量，加上維護能源安全已經是中共的外交要項，美國倘若對伊朗採取強制作為，中共絕不可能默許。至於伊朗方面，它必須仰賴具有傳統友誼基礎，又是聯合國常任安理國的中共在各項議題上為其執言。因此，即使中共在某些議題的立場上向美國靠攏，但是伊朗也不敢斷然與中共反目成仇。其次，對伊朗而言，無論在經貿科技上或者能源上，中共是個較能信賴的國家，伊朗不願讓這些實質關係倒退。短期內中共與伊朗關係仍將以經貿、能源為主，政治外交關係將退居其次。此外，中共也將持續維持伊朗成為中東地區制衡美國勢力過度擴張的據點。 / The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the development of China and Iran relations and to understand the factors contributing to the adjustment of bilateral relations. The writer intends to introduce system theory as analytical approach. The finding of this study is that the bilateral relationship between China and Iran is established on the mutually economic benefits, power and security. On the diplomatic dimension, China and Iran relationship is characterized by anti-hegemony, anti-unipolar international system, mutually benefits and cooperation. On the military dimension China and Iran relationship is characterized by enhancing Iran’s sovereignty and national security. China and Iran relationship is characterized by balancing mutual trade imbalance and ensuring energy security. On the economic technological dimension, China and Iran relationship is characterized by creating mutual interests for both nations and advancing Iran’s technological development. In terms of policy objectives, China’s objectives are many folds. On diplomatic dimension China’s objective toward Iran comprises promoting issue cooperation with Iran, supporting Iran’s independent foreign policy, fending off foreign intervention in Iran’s domestic affairs, ensuring Iran’s status as a regional power. On military dimension China’s objective toward Iran comprises helping establish Iran’s national defense power, helping stave off potential security threats directed toward Iran. On energy dimension China’s objective toward Iran comprises balancing mutual trade imbalance. On economic dimension China’s objective toward Iran comprises enhancing mutual trade and tapping into Iran’s market. In terms of policy instrument, China and Iran try to achieve policy objective via the use of a variety of policy instruments, ranging from diplomatic bargaining, high ranking officers visits, arms sales, military cooperation, military officers visits, negotiation on Iran nuclear issue, energy trade, nuclear technological cooperation, energy joint development, economic and trade bargaining, engineering contract, assistance in technology and funding. This analysis is conducted from several different dimensions of China and Iran relations, that is, diplomatic, military, energy, economic and trade dimensions. For the analytical needs, this analysis is mainly divided into three periods, from 1979 to 1988, 1989 to 2002 and 2003 to 2008. From 1979 to 1988 the central pillar of China Iran relations is on military dimension featured by national security and balance of power. From 1989 to 2002 the central pillar of China Iran relations is on economic-trade, energy and diplomatic dimensions featured by mutually economic benefits and balance of power. From 2003 to 2008 the central pillar of China Iran relations is on economic-trade, energy and diplomatic dimensions featured by mutually benefits and oooperation. From the track of China and Iran relations, several trends can be inductively identified. First the leverage is more favorable to China. Secondly China has reduced its all-out support for Iran’s militant foreign policy. Thirdly the substantive interests such as energy and economic ones have surpassed economic and strategic ones in terms of importance. Fourthly China try to press Iran to readjust the latter’s policy through the force of international organizations. Fifthly China and Iran will adopt the principle of ‘put aside the difference and pursue the consensus’ and ‘to serve one’s own need’ if there is conflicting opinion between China and Iran. From the process of China and Iran relations, some major limitations can also be identified. First the international environment factor, particularly U.S. factor, is a critical source of limitation. China has to strike a balance in its relationship between Iran and U.S. Secondly China’s decision maker’s policy adjustment is also a source of limitation. In the process of its peacefully rising as a responsible great power, China chooses to abide by international regimes and keep cautious in dealing with Iran’s contentious issues. Thirdly China’s long standing principle of non-involvement in highly disputed issues also hamper China-Iran relationship. Fourthly the dominance of Iran’s conservative faction has indirectly impeded China-Iran relation. The future of China and Iran diplomatic relations will depend on the development of Iran’s domestic politics and U.S.-Iran relations. China will not allow U.S. to take military actions against and Iran will not give up China as a reliable great power. Over the short term, China and Iran relations will prosper on substantive issues, while political issues will lose its importance.