The foreign policy of the United States in the Middle East has taken many twists and turns since the first American citizens were taken captive by North African pirates in 1784. These foreign lands are a constant presence for contemporary Americans. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the United States has been continuously at war. “Tellingly, the Asian greens that once camouflaged the fatigues of U.S. troops have burnished to Arabian browns and yellows, and Arabic has supplanted Russian as the lingua sancta of the intelligence services.”Unfortunately, constantly shifting motivations for US foreign policy in the Middle East has led to a situation that emboldens our enemies, weakens our allies trust, and makes us an unpredictable player in the Middle East. This thesis will examine the conflict between idealism and pragmatism in American relations with the Middle East, specifically during the 1950s under the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Before launching into this task, it is essential to answer basic questions that will guide the reader through this thesis: How has the ‘Middle East’ been defined as a geographic area and a zone of contention? Why does this thesis identify the 1950s as thecrucial period for exploring the tenets of US Foreign Policy in relation to this zone? And how does the conflict between idealism and pragmatism emerge as the key tension in US rhetoric and action related to the Middle East?

abstract: When the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency recently declassified documents relating to the 1953 Coup in Iran, it was discovered that American involvement was much deeper than previously known. In fact, the CIA had orchestrated the coup against democratically-elected Mohammed Mossadegh. This action was sold to the United States public as being essential to democracy, which seems contradictory to its actual purpose. U.S. political leaders justified the coup by linking it to what Charles Mills calls “racial liberalism,” a longstanding ideological tradition in America that elevates the white citizen to a place of power and protection while making the racial noncitizens “others” in the political system. Political leaders in the United States relied on bribing the American media to portray the Shah as the white citizen and Mossadegh as a racial other, the white citizen was restored to power and the racial other was overthrown. / Dissertation/Thesis / Masters Thesis Social Justice and Human Rights 2016

<p>University of Växjö, School of Social Sciences</p><p>Course: PO 5363, Political Science, G3</p><p>Title: the Role of the USA’s and Great Britain in the Coup d'Etat, Iran 1953</p><p>Author: Ashkan Panahirad</p><p>Supervisor: Lennart Bergfeldt</p><p>The purpose of this study is to examine Great Britain’s and US’ motives and action alternatives in regards to the Coup d'état against the iranian regime under Mossadegh in 1953.</p><p>The method used is motive analysis (investigates the actors motives). The theories used are Rational actors model and Governmental politics. Rational actor model allows states to choose among a set of alternatives displayed in a particular situation in order to achieve their goals. Governmental politics explains what happens in states as a result of bargaining games between important actors in the government.</p><p>Analysis from the rational actor model shows that the motives behind the Coup d'état were oil, economical reasons, Iran and communism. Coup d'état was the most rational action for them to achieve their goals. Governmental politics reveal the shifting of policies from one administration to another. While Clement Attlee’s government and Harry Truman’s administration where more moderate, Winston Churchill’s and Eisenhower’s where more eager to replace Mossadegh, which finally lead to a Coup d'état</p>

University of Växjö, School of Social Sciences Course: PO 5363, Political Science, G3 Title: the Role of the USA’s and Great Britain in the Coup d'Etat, Iran 1953 Author: Ashkan Panahirad Supervisor: Lennart Bergfeldt The purpose of this study is to examine Great Britain’s and US’ motives and action alternatives in regards to the Coup d'état against the iranian regime under Mossadegh in 1953. The method used is motive analysis (investigates the actors motives). The theories used are Rational actors model and Governmental politics. Rational actor model allows states to choose among a set of alternatives displayed in a particular situation in order to achieve their goals. Governmental politics explains what happens in states as a result of bargaining games between important actors in the government. Analysis from the rational actor model shows that the motives behind the Coup d'état were oil, economical reasons, Iran and communism. Coup d'état was the most rational action for them to achieve their goals. Governmental politics reveal the shifting of policies from one administration to another. While Clement Attlee’s government and Harry Truman’s administration where more moderate, Winston Churchill’s and Eisenhower’s where more eager to replace Mossadegh, which finally lead to a Coup d'état

This thesis examines how the press of the erstwhile German Democratic Republic represented Iran in the years from 1949 – the year of the GDR’s formation – until 1989, the last complete year before its demise on 3 October 1990. The study focuses on key events in Iranian history such as the overthrow of the Mossadegh government in 1953, the White Revolution, the Islamic Revolution of 1979, and the Iran-Iraq war. It will be shown that although news and articles were based on selected facts, they still presented a picture of Iran that was at best distorted, the distortions and misrepresentations amounting to what could be described as 'factual fiction'. Furthermore, clear evidence will be provided that economical and political relations with Iran were a primary concern of the GDR’s leadership, and thus also of the GDR’s press and have therefore dominated the reporting on Iran. Whatever ideological concerns there may have been, they were hardly ever allowed to get in the way of amicable relations with the Shah or later with the Islamic Republic. Only in periods where the two countries enjoyed less amicable or poor relations, was the press free to critically report events in Iran and to openly support the cause of the SED’s communist Iranian sister party, the Tudeh. Despite East Germany’s diametric ideological environment and despite the fundamentally different role that the GDR’s political system had assigned to the press and to journalism, East Germany’s press was as reliant on the input of the global news agencies as any Western media. The at times almost complete reliance on Western news agencies as sources for news on Iran challenged more than just the hermeneutic hegemony the SED and the GDR’s press wanted to establish. After all, which news and information were made available by the news agencies to the media in both East and West was primarily determined by the business interests of said agencies. The study makes a contribution to three fields: Modern Iranian history, (East-) German history and media studies. The most valid findings were certainly made in the latter.

This study examines the decision making process in Washington which led to the current non-existence of political and economic relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States. The study examines the U.S.-Iran relationship at three levels-of-analysis: the individual, state, and system levels. From a geopolitical perspective, Iran and the United States have often been natural allies that pursued similar policy goals. After 9/11, the U.S. entered Afghanistan and Iraq which further necessitated the reengagement of Tehran. Iranian regional clout would play a vital role in stabilization of Iraq and Afghanistan and without Iran's assistance; peace will not likely be realized in those states. Amongst the most compelling reasons for Washington to engage in meaningful dialogue with Tehran are: terrorism, the war on drugs, the Iranian sponsorship of militant groups, and Tehran's pursuit of a nuclear program. The study concludes that rapprochement should occur in two phases. The first being cooperation in areas of mutual concern such as the war on drugs. The second phase promoting confidence building methods, which would lead to a strategic partnership based on mutual interests.