This dissertation has two aims. The first is to contribute toward our knowledge of changes in contemporary Anatolia in a coherent way, the second to provide the first systematic ethnographic account of the Alevi, a Shiite minority living in rural Turkey. From March 1988 until November 1989, I conducted fieldwork in a sub-province in the north-eastern part of central Anatolia, and returned for a brief visit in August 1990. The population of the sub-province is approximately 70,000; about 12,000 live in the only town, the remainder dispersed among 96 villages. I lived in one village but made frequent visits to others, and to the town. The people are Muslim, divided into two sects, Alevi and Sunni. 74 villages are Sunni and 20 Alevi, 2 villages contain both Alevi and Sunni. The town I estimare to be 90 per cent Sunni. The finding which I discuss in my dissertation is that the Sunni villages are more successful than the Alevi villages at moving into the modern world. More specifically, though most Sunni villages are declining in size, some are growing larger, and even turning into small towns. In striking and direct contrast to this, all the Alevi villages are losing population, so much so that the total Alevi population of the sub-province has diminished by more than half over the years 1980-1990. Similarly, whilst most Sunni men continue to confirm their faith, many Alevi men are becoming sceptical, some even doubting the existence of God. The model which I use to account for these findings suggests that the social order within the Sunni villages is compatible with being absorbed gradually into the national, centralised administrative system. In contrast to this, traditional Alevi culture is based on the idea that they have offered submission to an authority which is not that of the central government, but another which lies outside the jurisdiction of the central state. As the Alevi internalise their membership of modem Turkey, the right to solve disputes becomes transferred from indigenous mediators, whose position is supported by the traditional myths, to figures whose authority is sanctioned by central government. In addition, the Alevi settlements are much smaller than the Sunni; a number of them together are declared a village by the state, causing conflicts of loyalty, ownership and identity within their communities. In short, the dispersed nature of Alevi traditional settlement patterns and their uneasy relationship with central authority means that their communities cannot become part of modern Turkey without undergoing fatal disruption. In spite of the great upheavals in their communities, the Alevi do not become violent. Rather, their religion, which might be described as 'Shi'ite mystical Islam', loses it force as an instrument of social control, and, fused with Kemalism, becomes a secular humanitarian ethic by which they can lead their lives in the cities.

The Iraqi Shi'ites' revival post-2003 and the rise of communal identity make an increasing need to study the roots of their political identities. This study surveys literature written about the political behavior of Shi'ites at different historical eras in the 20th century (to be specific, from the 1920s to 2003). In this study, my aim is to evaluate, based on the collected evidence, the Shi'ites' sense of identity during these historical eras, how they viewed themselves, and with whom they affiliated? Particularly, I delve into these research questions: Did the Shi'ites behave as a homogenous group? Did they have a single dominant identity that defines them as Shi'ite political identity? Did the political behavior of different Shi'ite Islamic groups originate from their religious and communal identities, or did it come from their national aspiration as Iraqis? I apply a history of political thought/ ideology approach, implementing critical historical hermeneutics. The analysis of the evidence indicates that Shi'ites show different senses of belonging at different historical eras and political events. The findings suggest that the communal and political identity was developed at a later stage of Iraq's 20th-century history. It also shows the diverse identities Shi'ites have and how their political behavior differs according to these diverse identities. / Master of Arts / This thesis discusses the development of the Iraqi Shi'ites' political and religious identities since the founding of the modern state in Iraq in 1921. It tackles three overlapping historical periods in which the Iraqi Shi'ites' political identity crystallized and formed during these periods. The findings reveal that the Iraqi Shi'ites did not have a unified sectarian political identity, but they affiliated with multiple political entities and ideologies. The research suggests the absence of a unifying term to embrace Shi'ites' political behavior, and the terminology "Shi'ite" or "Shi'ites" should not be generalized to encompass all Iraqi Shi'ites' political behavior. Therefore, the sectarian Shi'ite political parties and groups that claim to represent the Shi'ites after 2003 still do not represent a broad spectrum of the Shi'ite society.

The fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 is the one of the most important events in the history of Iran-Iraq relations. Prior to the US-led invasion, Iran and Iraq were by no means friends and fought each other bitterly for eight years in the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. The enmity continued throughout the following decade, as Iran and Iraq developed intimate relationships with each others' dissidents and exiles. When Coalition forces finally toppled Saddam Hussein's government on April 9, 2003, the slate was cleared for Shi'ites and Kurds to assume power for the first time in Iraq's 80 year history. For leadership in the new Iraq, Shi'ites and Kurds turned to the organizations that struggled against the Ba'athists. Thus, Iran's Iraqi allies were able to fill Baghdad's power vacuum through elections and, at times, by force. As a result of regime change, Iran-Iraq relations have improved considerably. Despite some clear progress though, several contentious issues still remain.

This dissertation explores the ways in which religious knowledge was produced and transmitted in Safavid madrasas, particularly in Isfahan, during the later Safavid period—from the reign of Shāh Abbās II (1642–66) to the end of Shāh Sulṭān Ḥusayn’s reign (1694–1722). It argues that Safavid madrasas functioned as multifaceted cultural centres that disseminated religious knowledge, preserved the Shi‘ite intellectual heritage, and played an important role in reconstructing, re-articulating, and contextualizing or contemporizing the past. Safavid madrasas, which were established thanks largely to the largesse and piety of the Safavid shahs, very often acted on behalf of the established political power. However, due to the flexible, inclusive, and personal character of Islamic pedagogy, Shi‘ite learning, like that of the wider Muslim community, could occur in a wide variety of places, from the houses of scholars to any mosque or shrine. After surveying Shi‘ite scholarship and its institutions from the early decades of Islamic history until the mid-seventeenth century, this study contextualizes the Madrasa-yi Sulṭānī, or Royal Madrasa, of late Safavid Isfahan within its political, social, and religious setting. This particular madrasa exemplifies the ways in which religious knowledge was transmitted in early modern Iran. By analyzing the deeds of endowment (waqfiyyas) of the Madrasa-yi Sulṭānī and other madrasa-mosque institutions built by Shāh Sulṭān Ḥusayn and members of the Safavid elite, this study sheds light on the organizing mechanisms and structures for such educational and charitable foundations. Based on the large number of extant ijāzas that were issued by Safavid scholars, and other primary sources, including waqfiyyas and autobiographies, this study reconstructs the curriculum of the Safavid madrasa and describes the pedagogical methods that Safavid scholars employed to transmit religious knowledge to their students. It also discusses the major problems facing Shi‘ite higher learning by examining the critiques of such scholars as Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1635 or 1640), the Safavid philosopher, Muḥsin-i Fayḍ Kāshānī (d. 1679), a renowned traditionalist, and Muḥammad Bāqir Khurāsānī, known as Muḥaqqiq-i Sabzawārī (d. 1679), the Shaykh al-Islam of Isfahan and a prominent mujtahid. Finally it examines the life and career of Sayyid Mīr Muḥammad Bāqir Khātūnābādī (d. 1715), the first Safavid mullā-bāshī (head of religious scholars) and the first rector and professor of the Madrasa-yi Sulṭānī.

This dissertation explores the ways in which religious knowledge was produced and transmitted in Safavid madrasas, particularly in Isfahan, during the later Safavid period—from the reign of Shāh Abbās II (1642–66) to the end of Shāh Sulṭān Ḥusayn’s reign (1694–1722). It argues that Safavid madrasas functioned as multifaceted cultural centres that disseminated religious knowledge, preserved the Shi‘ite intellectual heritage, and played an important role in reconstructing, re-articulating, and contextualizing or contemporizing the past. Safavid madrasas, which were established thanks largely to the largesse and piety of the Safavid shahs, very often acted on behalf of the established political power. However, due to the flexible, inclusive, and personal character of Islamic pedagogy, Shi‘ite learning, like that of the wider Muslim community, could occur in a wide variety of places, from the houses of scholars to any mosque or shrine. After surveying Shi‘ite scholarship and its institutions from the early decades of Islamic history until the mid-seventeenth century, this study contextualizes the Madrasa-yi Sulṭānī, or Royal Madrasa, of late Safavid Isfahan within its political, social, and religious setting. This particular madrasa exemplifies the ways in which religious knowledge was transmitted in early modern Iran. By analyzing the deeds of endowment (waqfiyyas) of the Madrasa-yi Sulṭānī and other madrasa-mosque institutions built by Shāh Sulṭān Ḥusayn and members of the Safavid elite, this study sheds light on the organizing mechanisms and structures for such educational and charitable foundations. Based on the large number of extant ijāzas that were issued by Safavid scholars, and other primary sources, including waqfiyyas and autobiographies, this study reconstructs the curriculum of the Safavid madrasa and describes the pedagogical methods that Safavid scholars employed to transmit religious knowledge to their students. It also discusses the major problems facing Shi‘ite higher learning by examining the critiques of such scholars as Mullā Ṣadrā (d. 1635 or 1640), the Safavid philosopher, Muḥsin-i Fayḍ Kāshānī (d. 1679), a renowned traditionalist, and Muḥammad Bāqir Khurāsānī, known as Muḥaqqiq-i Sabzawārī (d. 1679), the Shaykh al-Islam of Isfahan and a prominent mujtahid. Finally it examines the life and career of Sayyid Mīr Muḥammad Bāqir Khātūnābādī (d. 1715), the first Safavid mullā-bāshī (head of religious scholars) and the first rector and professor of the Madrasa-yi Sulṭānī.

The fundamental question I have tried to answer in this thesis is how the Ni‘matullāhī ‎masters were successful in reviving Ni‘matullāhī Sufism in Shi‘ite Persia during the ‎early nineteenth century. This study investigates the revival of the Ni‘matullāhī Sufi ‎order in Persia after the death of the last Indian Ni‘matullāhī master, Riḍā ‘Alī Shāh (d. ‎‎1214/1799) in the Deccan. Meticulous attention is given to the role of Ḥusayn ‘Alī ‎Shāh (d. 1234/1818), Majdhūb ‘Alī Shāh (d. 1239/1823) and Mast ‘Alī Shāh (d. ‎‎1253/1837), who were the masters (quṭbs) of the Ni‘matullāhī order after Riḍā ‘Alī ‎Shāh. The Ni‘matullāhī Sufi order flourished as a Persian Sufi order in 8th/14th century. ‎During the Safavid era most of the Sufi orders in Persia became inactive or ‎systematically suppressed. With the advent of the Safavids, the Ni‘matullāhī order ‎moved to Hyderabad in India, and gradually became less important in the mystical ‎milieu of Persia. After the fall of the Safavids, the revival movement of the Ni‘matullāhī ‎order began with the arrival of the enthusiastic Indian Sufi master Ma‘ṣūm ‘Alī Shāh ‎during the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Later Persian masters of the ‎Ni‘matullāhī order in the beginning of the early nineteenth century solidified the ‎order’s place in the mystical and theological milieu of Persia.‎ Ma‘ṣūm ‘Alī Shāh and his disciples soon spread their mystical and ecstatic beliefs all ‎over Persia. They succeeded in converting a large mass of Persians to Sufi teachings ‎despite the opposition and persecution they faced from Shi‘ite clerics, who were ‎politically and socially the most influential class in Persia. The clerics were able to turn ‎the political powers against the Sufis to a certain extent, such that Āqā Muḥammad ‘Alī ‎Bihbihānī, principal champion of this oppression, largely succeeded in his persecution ‎of Ma‘ṣūm ‘Alī Shāh and his disciples. The question of the Ni‘matullāhī Sufis’ survival ‎in Persia after Maṣūm ‘Alī Shāh is evaluated here by using the biographies and ‎writings of later masters and modern scholars. ‎ The conclusion is reached that Ḥusayn ‘Alī Shāh, Majdhūb ‘Alī Shāh and Mast ‘Alī ‎Shāh were able to consolidate the social and theological role of the Ni‘matullāhī order ‎by reinterpreting and articulating classical Sufi teachings in the light of Persian Shi‎‘ite ‎mystical theology.‎

This study examines the decision making process in Washington which led to the current non-existence of political and economic relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States. The study examines the U.S.-Iran relationship at three levels-of-analysis: the individual, state, and system levels. From a geopolitical perspective, Iran and the United States have often been natural allies that pursued similar policy goals. After 9/11, the U.S. entered Afghanistan and Iraq which further necessitated the reengagement of Tehran. Iranian regional clout would play a vital role in stabilization of Iraq and Afghanistan and without Iran's assistance; peace will not likely be realized in those states. Amongst the most compelling reasons for Washington to engage in meaningful dialogue with Tehran are: terrorism, the war on drugs, the Iranian sponsorship of militant groups, and Tehran's pursuit of a nuclear program. The study concludes that rapprochement should occur in two phases. The first being cooperation in areas of mutual concern such as the war on drugs. The second phase promoting confidence building methods, which would lead to a strategic partnership based on mutual interests.