This thesis explores the manifest content of the U.S. Executive framing effort intended to persuade the U.S. Congress, United Nations Security Council, and the American people that there was no greater threat to US national security than the continuing reign of Saddam Hussein\'s regime in Iraq. Through analysis of individual and group contributions to the three dominant themes created by the executive leadership, namely, the link between the regime of Saddam Hussein and terrorism, the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, and the status of the regime and Saddam Hussein as an outlaw, I illuminate the process used to gain support for the unprecedented policy of preemptive war. The results of my analysis differ with previous literature on the subject which primarily considers the Bush administration\'s effort to be a campaign of lies, intended to lead the American people and the international community to believe a threat existed that the Bush Administration knew was not credible. In contrast to that conclusion, my analysis of the framing effort indicates that the marketing campaign for the Iraq War capitalized on world events, timing, the credibility of the particular speaker and their office and the amplifying effect of the media, making a campaign of lies unnecessary and the process they used replicable. Therefore, this analysis may justify heightened scrutiny for comparable policies in the future, even when the statements and argumentation an administration makes are primarily accurate and verifiable. / Master of Arts

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / Why and how did Saddam Hussein and the Ba'th Party maintain their authority in Iraq for so long in contrast to their predecessors? Based on an archival study of recently opened internal Ba'th Party documents, this study argues that Hussein and the Ba'th used a strategic policy of Ba'thification to trap Iraqis within an environment created by a series of controls that channeled their behavior into avenues supportive of the regime. With a monopoly over state power, Hussein and the Ba'th Party used violence and surveillance to eliminate enemies, monitor state and society, and engender fear. Equally important, the Ba'thist State doled out benefits connected to a system of awards and official statuses bestowed upon Iraqis who exhibited allegiance. This combination of terror and enticement offered Iraqis a stark choice between opposing and supporting the regime, and the consequences of an individual's behavior extended to his family, providing a further incentive for loyalty. Additionally, Hussein and the Ba'th "organized" state and society by recruiting individuals into the party and its proxies and co-opting or replacing the leaderships of government and social institutions with loyalists. Simultaneously, Hussein used the Ba'th Party to take over the Iraqi state--to transform it into the Ba'thist State. He then utilized the Ba'thist State's resources to either obliterate and build anew existing civil and social institutions or reform and incorporate them into the government's legal and administrative frameworks. In the process, Hussein transformed these institutions' raisons d'être into support for himself, the party, and the Iraqi nation: the three primary symbols of his regime. Finally, Hussein infused classical Ba'thist ideology with his personality cult to rationalize his emergence as "the Leader." Through propaganda, indoctrination, ritual, mass ceremonies, and myth the Ba'thist State applied the political ideas of this Husseini Ba'thism to all aspects of public and private life in an attempt to reorient Iraqis' conceptions of what constituted a just and "natural" society to conform to the Ba'thist reality. Combined, the boundaries these controls placed on permissible action and thought forced Iraqis to subordinate their traditional loyalties to the regime, making them complicit in it.

No description available.

The fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 is the one of the most important events in the history of Iran-Iraq relations. Prior to the US-led invasion, Iran and Iraq were by no means friends and fought each other bitterly for eight years in the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. The enmity continued throughout the following decade, as Iran and Iraq developed intimate relationships with each others' dissidents and exiles. When Coalition forces finally toppled Saddam Hussein's government on April 9, 2003, the slate was cleared for Shi'ites and Kurds to assume power for the first time in Iraq's 80 year history. For leadership in the new Iraq, Shi'ites and Kurds turned to the organizations that struggled against the Ba'athists. Thus, Iran's Iraqi allies were able to fill Baghdad's power vacuum through elections and, at times, by force. As a result of regime change, Iran-Iraq relations have improved considerably. Despite some clear progress though, several contentious issues still remain.

Cloaked in the ambition of the "war on terror" and buoyed by the unwavering post-9/11 support, the United States engaged in a bombing campaign in Iraq followed by an invasion in March 2003. In preparation for the 2003 invasion, the United States built a complicated case for war based on several problematic bodies of evidence and then presented this evidence to the American people and the international community; this disputed evidence was collected to justify the invasion of Iraq. The tenets of the case for war included: the connection of Saddam Hussein to the events of 9/11, the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and the unknown motives and future actions of an evil dictator. The United States is now over five years into the war, and the overarching sentiment among the American people is that the war in Iraq was based on faulty information and that "evidence" used to justify the war was either mostly unfounded or even fabricated. Given this problematic evidence to support the official justifications for war, the research question is "Why did the United States still invade Iraq in March 2003?" Clearly, there is not a definitive answer to the research question. The variables for engaging in war are very complex. Often times the benefit of time passage will allow scholars to obtain a more focused understanding of "why" a sovereign power engaged in a particular war. We are not yet at a point where we can write definitively about "why" the US invaded Iraq in 2003. However, it is possible to present an analytical case regarding the reasons used in the time leading up to the US invasion of Iraq. In this thesis, the evidence has been explored, and the result is a presentation, an assessment of the evidence to make a case for why the US invaded Iraq. Many different political opinions and theories have been advanced to explain why the United States entered this war. Several credible scholars and journalists have made meaningful contributions to the study of this war and the justifications used by the White House for it. It is possible to provide a preliminary framework for understanding why the United States invaded Iraq by using current events literature, official documents and other available sources to document the war in the absence of the official, classified documents. Based on an assessment of available evidence, this thesis proposes that one of the primary reasons for the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 centers on oil; the US was interested in protecting its oil interests and what the White House saw as US geo-strategic position in the Middle East. / Master of Arts

<p>The aim of this paper is to try to explain how specific, foreign policy decisions are made, and why one state decides to use violence against another state. A qualitative method is used, and text and documents are analysed. The two theoretical points of departure are central within foreign policy analysis: realism´s theories on external threats and constructivism´s theories on ideas´ policy influence. The empirical case chosen is the US decision to use military violence against Iraq. The paper investigates whether the real threat from Saddam Hussein´s Iraq was the cause of the American military attacks, or whether the ideas of leading politicians in the USA were decisive for the decision to invade the country. The main theoretical assumption is that politicians´ ideas – rather than real, external threats – influence their actions. </p><p>The differences between President Clinton´s benevolent Iraq policy and President Bush´s aggressive Iraq policy can be summarized as a result of a combination of a changed external environment and differences in ideas on the use of military violence. The general conclusion is that politicians´ ideas – rather than real, external threats – influence their decision-making on specific foreign policy decisions.</p>

The aim of this paper is to try to explain how specific, foreign policy decisions are made, and why one state decides to use violence against another state. A qualitative method is used, and text and documents are analysed. The two theoretical points of departure are central within foreign policy analysis: realism´s theories on external threats and constructivism´s theories on ideas´ policy influence. The empirical case chosen is the US decision to use military violence against Iraq. The paper investigates whether the real threat from Saddam Hussein´s Iraq was the cause of the American military attacks, or whether the ideas of leading politicians in the USA were decisive for the decision to invade the country. The main theoretical assumption is that politicians´ ideas – rather than real, external threats – influence their actions.  The differences between President Clinton´s benevolent Iraq policy and President Bush´s aggressive Iraq policy can be summarized as a result of a combination of a changed external environment and differences in ideas on the use of military violence. The general conclusion is that politicians´ ideas – rather than real, external threats – influence their decision-making on specific foreign policy decisions.

This paper sets itself upon analyzing the Iraq War of 2003 through the lens of modern Just War Theory. We will begin with a curt summary of Iraq’s history, focusing particularly on its determinedly odious leader, Saddam Hussein. Thereon, we will be analyzing a pro-war security argument, the aim of which is to assess the threat of Hussein’s weaponry ambitions and what that threat meant to the world. Next, we will be going over the tenets of Just War Theory itself, tracing its history from Rome to the modern doorstep, and applying the security argument to its dictum. Afterwards, we move into the anti-war segment and shall unpack the subject of Iraq's oil resources and whether or not the United States' actions disqualify the intervention from achieving Just War status. Then, our next section shall be addressing the same question of potential disqualification, only this time from the angle of the war’s questionable legality. Finally, we shall conclude on the ultimate query of this paper: was the U.S. decision to intervene in 2003’s Iraq compatible with the modern principles of Just War Theory?

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2002. / AD-A405 987. Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-65). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Glenn F. Robinson, Harold D. Blanton. Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-65). Also available online.