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本文主要探討產物保險公司如何以自身的風險管理及內部的流程控制來達到有效的控管和預測，進而創造更高的業主權益報酬率，確保被保險人的權益，以維繫公司的永續經營發展為研究的目的。 身為風險管理工具之一的保險公司，必須瞭解自身於經營上面對的風險所在。首先論述如何建立保險公司風險管理程序，並從風險中深入分析，得知不適當的定價是造成保險公司喪失清償能力最主要的原因，建立完善的核保風險機制據以發展保險公司本身的核心價值，特以火險為例詳細說明其建制的過程與細節。 除介紹如何利用核保財務分析模型（Underwriting Financial Model）來解決適當訂價的問題，並配合運用風險資本額的公式求出各險種之風險資本額、各險種之業主權益分配額、各險種之可運用資金、各險種之自留綜合率、各險種業主權益報酬率、以預測來年之營運績效，另外尚討論信用風險與風險累積的控制，運用創新的觀念及技術來管理公司的業務量。 最後建議保險公司應設立風險管理專責單位，對於風險管理的流程與運作提早規劃準備，保險公司應有意願提昇風險管理的專業能力並嚴格自律及確實執行，俾強化公司自身風險觀念瞭解到公司真正有此需求。 關鍵字：風險管理、業主權益報酬、風險資本額、核保、產物保險經營 / The main theme of this research is to explore the issues related to the ways of risk management and internal operation control for insurance companies. The insurance companies could be efficiently controlled and projected to create higher return on equity, to guarantee the insured’s benefit, and to maintain the company’s long-term operation by implementing risk management process. Insurance companies, as one of the tools for risk management, are required to realize their own risks in operation. Firstly they must explore how to build up a process of risk management and to recognize that inadequate price is one of the main reasons to cause insurance company’s insolvency. Secondly they should explore how to build up an adequate underwriting risk mechanism to develop the core value of insurance companies, and to illustrate its process and detail of the building-up with Fire insurance business. Insurance companies are also required to know how to solve inadequate price by using Underwriting Financial Model, and how to calculate Risk Base Capital, Capital Allocation, Asset Allocation, Combined Ratio, Return on Equity for each line of business to predict business results for the coming year. This paper also discusses the importance of credit risk and risk accumulation in order that insurance companies can manage their own business by using innovating concept and technique. Finally Insurance companies are recommended to set up a risk management unit that should plan and prepare for the process of risk management. They ought to show their high wiliness to increase the capability of risk management, and to exercise high discipline and put into work in order to enhance the concept and need of risk management. Key Words： Risk Management, Return on Equity, Risk Base Capital, Underwriting, Insurance Operation.

台灣原住民族有平埔原住民族（簡稱平埔族）及高山原住民族（簡稱高山族）二大族群，西拉雅族為平埔族群之一，鳳山八社為西拉雅族之支系。從財產權的制度變遷得知，自然資源權屬是從開放性共用資源、共有財產以迄私有財產制度之形成，人類經濟活動從狩獵採集轉變為定居農業時，正式形成私有財產的產權型態。荷蘭據臺以前，臺灣島上全屬番地，而分布於臺灣南部屏東平原的鳳山八社，以狩獵、漁撈及游耕為其主要之經濟活動，對於土地並無所有權的觀念，土地是共有的，頗為類似「封閉的共用資源」，已略具排他性質。在清治以後，由於漢移民不斷湧入，荒埔地逐漸減少，為提高番地之生產效能及維持社番基本生計，鳳山八社傳統之經濟活動，當須配合改變，然而，生產型態及技術之改變，不僅形成水田稻作農業，亦導致番社土地由共有型態轉變為地權私有化。 清治時期，分割地權或一田二主制為屏東平原傳統地權制度之一，分割地權是將所有權區分為業主權（大租權）與田主權（小租權），清廷為保護社番之地權，禁止漢人私墾荒埔地，鼓勵社番自行墾耕番地，如社番不自墾，准許番社或社番將番地租與〈給墾或佃批〉漢人，漢人以「代番輸餉」方式合法取得番地小租權，而番社仍保有大租權，爾後並形成在同一番地上存有大租權與小租權，而且可以各自分別處分其權利。另者，部分番地大小租權皆屬社番所有，社番因乏銀費用而典賣小租權，番業主僅剩收租權。因社番在經濟上屬於弱勢者，如以番租做擔保，向漢銀主典押或借貸，當期限期滿時，社番常無法清償，番租則繼續歸漢銀主收租，形成社番「地權虛有化」，本研究將以自行繪製之「清治時期鳳山八社番租分布圖」及「清朝晚期鳳山八社社番人口分布圖」予以驗證番業主地權虛有化的事實。 質言之，本文係從制度變遷理論，配合西拉雅族番契，探討西拉雅族番社地權從傳統共有地權、私有地權形成至虛有地權之變遷過程。本文共分六章，第一章為緒論，第二章文獻評述及建立分析之理論基礎。第三章從清康熙及乾隆年間臺灣輿圖與日據初期之調查圖中，說明鳳山八社之傳統領域範圍，並以文獻史料、部分番契內容，探討鳳山八社傳統地權制度。第四章是以誘發性技術變遷及強致性制度變遷，探討鳳山八社共有地權變遷為私有地權之過程。第五章從番契內容分析地權結構之演變，以實際案例計算番大小租權價格差距，並證明地權虛有化的事實。第六章為結論與建議。 / In Taiwan aborigines have Pingpu people and Mountain people. Siraya is one of Pingpu people, Feng-Shan eight tribes are branches of it. The property-rights configuration of natural resources had transited from open access common resources into closed access common property, and then from latter into private ownership from the view of institutional change of property rights. It had formed common property into private ownership, when people’s livelihood changed from hunting and gathering into settled agriculture. Before Dutch occupying, all Taiwan was aborigines’ land, Feng-Shan eight tribes’ population spread in Pingtung Plain of southern Taiwan. Hunting, fishing and farming were Siraya’s livelihood mostly, there was no concept of ownership, and land was used in common. As the land area was used only by village man, it was similar to “the closed–access common resources” which had the feature of exclusive communal property. After Ching Dynasty, owing to Han Chinese had moved into the southwestern Taiwan, wild plains decreased gradually. To improve the productivity efficiency of tribal land and sustain basic needs of living, Feng-Shan eight tribes’ people must change their traditional livelihood. As rapid growth of Han Chinese and Siraya people, and the diffusion of technology for paddy rice farming, the tribal land rights had transited from common property into private ownership. Split ownership or two tiers of owners was one of the traditional system of land tenure in Pingtung Plain in Ching era, it distinguished what were called large-rent and small-rent rights. In order to protect tribal land rights and encourage village aborigines to plant their land, Ching Government prohibited Han Chinese from developing wild plains illegally. However, if aborigines did not need to develop the tribal land, Ching Government permitted Han Chinese to rent tribal land. Han Chinese obtained small-rent rights of tribal land by paying the tribal tax, the tribe only kept residual large-rent rights. Therefore, the tribal land rights were divided into split ownership which was called large-rent and small-rent rights. Any owner of those rights could either manage them by themselves or sold them out. Otherwise, large-rent and small-rent rights of some tribal lands belong to village aborigines, some of them sale small-rent right for lack of money. Village aborigines had left nothing but right for collecting rent. Because village aborigines were very poor, they had to borrow some money from Han lender and mortgage their rent to lender. Village aborigines could not amortise the debt usually, if the appointed pay off date reached. As a result, the right of collecting rent belonged to Han lender continually. Formally village aborigines had the large-rent rights, but they were deprived gradually, the large-rent rights turned out empty. This research will prove that by the spread drawing of tribal rent in Ching era and spread drawing of tribes’ population in late Ching period. In short, the purpose of this research is to explore institutional change of land rights of Feng-Shan eight tribes by institutional change theory. Through deliberation of Siraya private documents, we can conclude the property rights of village aborigines were transited from communal right into private ownership and turned out to be emptiness or only face right. This research is divided into six chapters. Chapter one is introduction. Chapter two is literature review and theory deliberation. Chapter three explains the traditional territory of Feng-Shan eight tribes by Taiwan maps of K’ang-hsi and Ch’ien-lung period and investigation map in early period of Japanese occupation, and explores the traditional land right system of them to utilize historical article and folk contract. Chapter four explores their land rights had transited from common property into private ownership from induced institutional change and imposed institutional change theory. Chapter five analyzes evolution of tribal land rights, calculates difference of values between large-rent and small-rent rights and proves that the large-rent rights were turned out empty from folk contracts. Chapter six is conclusion and suggestion.

銀行獲利能力影響因素的研究上，有以個體觀點出發的市場力量(market power)理論，其中一個假說為結構－行為－績效(S-C-P)假說，其認為整體產業結構之市場集中度愈高，銀行將有較高的獲利率，另一假說為相對市場力量(RMP)假說，該假說認為個別銀行市場占有率較高，獲利能力亦較高；以總體觀點出發的效率結構(efficiency structure)理論，其中一假說為以X-efficiency為出發點之管理效率結構(ESX)假說，其認為公司較佳的管理效率，將提高公司獲利能力，另一假說為規模經濟效率結構(ESS)假說，該假說認為個別銀行藉規模經濟的達成、降低成本提高利潤。 　　本研究根據國內外相關文獻，參考國內金融環境的變化、公民營型態的不同，收集民國70年至83年上市、上櫃及公開發行共34家商業銀行之相關資料，將樣本做不同的分組，觀察金融產業結構及經營效率與獲利能力是否具關聯性。實證結果如下： 　　一、以ROA為獲利能力指標之實證結果 　　1.　70至83年之所有銀行：結構－行為－績效(SCP)假說成立，市場占有率(MS)與ROA為負向關係、且達顯著水準，與預期不符。 　　2.　70至83年之公營銀：結構－行為－績效(SCP)假說、規模經濟效率結構(ESS)假說成立，管理效率(XEFF)亦有相當影響力。 　　3.　70至83年之民營銀行：結構－行為－績效(SCP)假說、相對市場力量(RMP)假說、管理效率結構(ESX)假說成立。 　　4.　70至80年之所有銀行：結構－行為－績效(SCP)假說成立，市場占有率(MS)與ROA為負向關係、且達顯著水準，與預期不符。 　　5.　81至83年之所有銀行：無解釋能力。 　　6.　70至80年之公營銀行：結構－行為－績效(SCP)假說成立，市場占有率(MS)與ROA為負向關係、上達顯著水準，與預期不符。 　　7.　70至80年之民營銀行：相對市場力量(RMP)假說成立，效率值與ROA呈負向關係。 　　8.　81至83年之公營銀行：市場集中度較具解釋力（與ROA為負向關係），但亦未達顯著水準。 　　9.　81至83年之民營銀行：相對市場力量(RMP)假說成立。 　　二、以ROE為獲利能力指標之實證結果 　　1.　70至83年之所有銀行：結構－行為－績效(SCP)假說、相對市場力量(RMP)假說、規模經濟效率結構(ESS)假說成立，管理效率(XEFF)亦有相當影響力。 　　2.　70至83年之公營銀行：管理效率結構(ESX)假說、規模經濟效率結構(ESS)假說成立。 　　3.　70至83年之民營銀行：結構－行為－績效(SCP)假說、相對市場力量(RMP)假說成立。 　　4.　70至80年之所有銀行：無解釋能力。 　　5.　81至83年之所有銀行：相對市場力量(RMP)假說。規模經濟效率結構(ESS)假說成立。 　　6.　70至80年之公營銀行：無解釋能力。 　　7.　70至80年之民營銀行：相對市場力量(RMP)假說、規模經濟效率結構(ESS)假說成立，但管理效率(XEFF)與ROA為負向關係、且達顯著水準，與預期不符。 　　8.　81至83年之公營銀行：市場集中度(CONC)與ROE負向關係、且達顯著水準，與預期不符。 　　9.　81至83年之民營銀行：相對市場力量(RMP)假說。規模經濟效率結構(ESS)假說成立。