工業區開發乃是促進國家與地方經濟發展的重要手段之一，而工業區開發政策之內容亦必須隨著國家發展政策的變更加以調整。本文之研究乃以產權理論為基礎，分析編定工業區開發合作關係中的人力要素及非人力要素的配置問題及各個生產要素投入的特性及與剩餘索取權的關連。開發者是人力的投入者，政府為非人力的投入者，開發者於公開甄選程序後，取得開發案的控制權，主導著開發案的走向，然而在產權結構上，卻採固定式報酬的代工模式，開發者人力沒有隨著開發案的開發成效愈好而得到愈高的報酬。本文試圖檢核在工業區開發產權結構中，開發者人力因沒有受到激勵，剩餘索取權配置所發生的問題與盲點，提出應以合作開發關係取代委託開發關係，開發者以勞務出資方式分享剩餘索取權，避免開發者機會主義的行為，以為健全未來工業區開發制度之參考。 / 本文第二章工業區開發制度之產權結構：概述工業區開發契約意義與利益分配，闡述團隊生產活動的本質、不完全契約及剩餘索取權，鏈結工業區開發與產權理論的關係；第三章，是我國編定工業區開發制度沿革，首先簡介工業區開發制度，其次論及開發問題與困境，再者進行開發課題的分析；第四章，以開發個案之探討為例，配合產權理論，深入探究剩餘索取權分配及歸屬。 / 第五章結論與建議，除了綜理產權理論應用於編定工業區的結果外，亦針對我國現行編定工業區提出改進的方向：第一、編定工業區開發制度設計應朝激勵制設計：現行編定工業區開發中，工業區委託生產關係無法激勵開發者去努力工作，因為生產率愈高，報酬卻沒有增加，所以未來在工業區相關制度設計上，應朝激勵制的方向修正，讓投入要素者都擁有剩餘索取權，相互監督，互享利益；第二、開發者報酬應與生產效率緊密地連繫：代辦費的大小係立基於開發規模的大小而定，代工性質濃厚，無法分享剩餘利益，實在不甚合理；第三、規劃設計單位亦須給予激勵：由於規劃設計單位知悉如何監督的Know How，這種專業知識亦難衡量，而必須賦予剩餘索取權，激化其認真監督的動機；第四、開發土地之定價改採市場定價：整個代辦費給付制度係從「懲罰」的角度來思維，開發者的報酬與生產效率不相對應，開發者實際上獲取高於其承擔風險的適當報酬，開發者才會願意投入開發，不符合公平正義，應讓市場來決定開發者的報償多寡，也可利用市場來測定開發者對開發到底投入多少人力，從而決定其應該可得多少回報，故土地的定價方式應從原先的成本法轉為比較法，以剩餘索取權的分配來促進開發。最後提出後續研究建議，首先，在沒有激勵制度下，開發者為何仍願意投入工業區開發案；而採用市場定價法後，仍有一些可供政策上應用的手段，這些都值再深入研究探討，但因非本文研究之重點，僅點到為止。而本文希望為工業區開發帶來新的機制設計，進一步更廣泛應用於其他的開發機制上。

都市的發展隨著時間而不斷地演變，都市內會不斷產生不能適應今日都市生活活動需求的地區，所以需要更新之地區會不斷的產生。從都市有限的土地資源來看，都市更新是要促進土地使用的合理化與使用強度的提高，所以都市更新是土地資源的一種再生型態。都市更新為現代台灣不動產開發之主流，為改善都市早期發展的舊城市，及促進都市的永續發展，都市更新將是未來都市發展政策的必然趨勢。然而，「都市更新不是目標，而是工具」。增進都市機能，改善生活環境，促進都市健全發展，才是都市更新的主要目的，惟應經由何種方式(工具)，方能順利達成上述目標，厥為都市更新所應關注之重點。而權利變換是實施都市更新的方式之一，本研究是從產權理論之產權結構的觀點出發來探討它在權利變換制度實務操作上的影響。 本論文主要在說明，從都市更新條例(以下簡稱本條例)第3條有關權利變換的定義來看，更新單元內之土地所有權人、合法建築物所有權人、他項權利人及實施者是一種「合夥」的關係，但依本條例第30、31條的規定，實施者則又成了代工者，然而在實務操作上實施者掌握了整個權利變換的控制權，在實施者追求利潤或利益極大化的前題下，實施者只好隱藏利潤於費用之中，以獲取剩餘利益。本研究以產權結構的理論為基礎，用已完成之案例來分析，以說明上述現象的存在事實，以為後續修法的參考。 本研究的論述重點，主要是在說明權利變換的生產要素經整合後組成了一個新的產權，而這個新產權是由參與權利變換的權利人所共有，而產權結構裡的控制權與剩餘收入權，是由實施者掌握了控制權，而土地所有權人則擁有剩餘收入權，在實施者與土地所有權人不能同時控制權與剩餘收入權的情形下，所產生的利益衝突現象，以致造成實施者與土地所有權人的利益目標或利益函數不一致，制度的設計應該是將資源分配的私下協議的障礙降至最低，換言之，應該要設計成實施者與土地所有權人的利益目標或利益函數一致，才會使實施者與土地所有權人為這個事業共同去努力，這樣才有助於都市更新事業的推動。 本研究透過理論與實證只是證明目前權利變換存在的不合理現象，至於權利變換的性質或定性應該是屬何種，例如：合夥、代理(承攬)或互易，則非本研究的範圍，有待後續的先進繼續探討。 / The development of urban is proceeding with the time, there are areas that can not accommodate the needs of urban life activities nowadays in the urban, thus those areas need to renew are continually generated. We could see from the view that land resource in the urban are limited, urban renewal help forward rationalize land use and raise the use intensity, thus urban renewal is one kind of revive types of land resource. Urban renewal is the mainstream in the development of modern Taiwan real estate; in order to improve the old town in the early urban development, and promote the sustainable urban development, urban renewal will be the consequential trend in the urban development policy in the future. However, “Urban renewal is not a goal, it is a tool.” The main goals of urban renewal shall be building up urban function, improving living environment and advancing well-balanced urban development. The emphasis of urban renewal shall be in which way (tool) to achieve the above goals. Right transformation is one kind of ways to improve urban renewal, in this study we use the view from the structure of property rights in Property Theory to discuss its effects in the Right transformation system manipulation. This essay is mean to explain that form the Urban Renewal Act (The Act for short) clause 3 about right transformation definition, the land owner, legal building owner, other owner and implementer are kind of “partnership” relation in renewal unit, but according to the rules in The Act 30 and 32 clauses, implementer become OEM command the control right in the whole rights transformation in manipulation process, implementer pursuits benefit or in the premise of maximize profit, implementer has to hide the benefit behind the cost, to obtain the residual benefit. Property right structure theory is the basis of this study, analyzed by the finished case study to explain the above exist fact for the reference of amendment hereafter. The emphasis of this study is to explain there is a new property right generated after integrating the produce factors in rights transformation, and this new property right is co-owned by the oblige who participated the right transformation. As the control right and the residual income right in the right structure, the implementer command the control right and the land owner command the residual income right, when implementer and the land owner can not command the control right and the residual income right at the same time, the benefit conflict will make the different profit goal or the different profit function between the implementer and the land owner. The system should be designed to minimize the obstacle of private negotiated resource allocation. In other words, it should be designed as a same profit goal or function to make the implementer and the landowner to exert themselves for this career, thus make for the advance of the urban renewal career. Through the theory and real demonstration in this study is only to prove the existing unreasonable phenomena in rights transformation, as for the character or the qualitative of right transformation shall be, for example, partnership, agent（to take full charge of responsibility）or trade, is not in the study range, and need the fellow successor to discuss about .

「成功、成熟且領導中的既有企業為何失敗？」從Christensen 1997年發表書中定義創新者的兩難(The Innovator’s Dilemma) :「管理階層為企業成功所做出的理性而智慧的決策，正是促使企業失去領導地位的主因」，說明既有企業高階經理人將資源分配給主流高階市場，忽略新進企業從非主流市場進入的破壞性創新(disruptive innovation)的取代性，導致既有企業的產品逐漸被取代而失去領導地位。後續補充破壞式創新的文獻，認為除了資源依賴與分配外，動態能耐、組織文化是重要的補充研究構面，但仍缺乏相關企業產權議題構面的探討。 本研究以Milgrom(1992)及李仁芳(1993, 1999a,b)的企業產權理論，補充創新者兩難理論中對企業產權解釋的不足，在企業的管理權與所有權的過度分離下，會讓經理人自利的理性決策偏向企業短期收益，而損害長期股東權益，這樣讓破壞式創新對企業產生無法妥協的組織兩難衝突，才是導致企業無法存活在破壞式創新的浪潮中的原因之一。 為驗證本研究的理論推理，藉由軟片產業及電腦顯示器產業作跨產業多個案的實證研究。比較柯達軟片、富士軟片在軟片產業中受到數位顯影技術的取代衝擊，以及我國CRT電腦顯示器廠商誠洲、中強、碧悠、源興、美格、華映、瑞軒及皇旗受到LCD技術的取代衝擊，在相同破壞式創新下區分成功轉型及失敗消失的兩組對照，比較策略因應與對應產權結構的差異。 研究發現企業所有權與管理權集中者容易為破壞式創新的適應者；相對的所有權與管理權分離者，容易成為破壞式創新的淘汰者。企業的產權結構差異影響了決策過程，造成不同策略選擇，是影響企業面對破壞式創新轉型成功的關鍵因素之一。在實務上，意涵企業平時的產權結構就應未來的技術發展做因應規劃，而在面對破壞式創新威脅時刻，更應積極透過股權結構再造的方式讓所有權與管裡權有某種程度的重疊，這是因應破壞式創新浪潮轉型的重要力量來源。 / Why successful, mature and leading incumbent companies fail? From the definition of “The Innovator’s Dilemma” in Christensen’s book (1997), what management makes rational and intelligent decision is the cause firms lose their leading position, which may explain that management level of established firms allocate resource on high margin market by following main customers and ignore low margin from “disruptive innovation” market by new entrant firms. In addition to resource dependence and allocation, the extant literature pertaining to disruptive innovation has been categorized into organizational structure, organizational culture and dynamic capability. However, the impact of enterprise ownership structure on disruptive innovation rarely has been studied. This study tried to complement innovation dilemma theory with ownership theory. The over separation of ownership and management of corporation would contribute to self-interest management decision tending to short-term revenue rather than long term development of firms, which cause unbalanced organizational dilemma under disruptive innovation condition. It would be one of main reason that leading firms fail to transform in the wave of disruptive innovation. In order to test the organizational dilemma theory, this study comprised multiple cases research method of 2 multinational film companies and 8 computer monitor manufacturers in Taiwan. Comparing two film makers, Kodak with Fujifilm, under digital camera technology replacement and 8 Taiwan CRT computer monitor manufacturers under LCD technology replacement their coping strategy and corresponding ownership structure. One of major findings of this study is that integration of ownership and management would easily adapt to disruptive innovation wave. On the contrary, the separation of ownership and management would be eliminated from disruptive innovation wave. The ownership structure of enterprise influences decision making process and choice of coping strategy, which play major role in transforming firms successfully into disruptive innovation. In practice, the implication of this research is that ownership structure of firms is corresponding to future technology development. While facing the disruptive innovation emerging, the necessary of integration between ownership and management is critical by financial restructure, which would be main power to transform firms into new disruptive innovation.