本文主旨是要說明：就《道德形上學》的論述而言，康德在何種意義上能夠被視為一個契約論思想家。本文將從兩條線索出發來理解康德所提出的契約論，這兩條線索分別是：康德的財產權理論、以及契約論中處理政治權威正當性時所必須面對的統一性問題。 本文認為：康德所提出的作為理念的原初契約，是一種提供給已處身在政治社會之下的個人，去設想當下所面對的法律強制力之正當性的方式。藉由康德在《純粹理性批判》之中對於「理念」的界定，可以將賦予原初契約一個確實的契約作用：人民的同意。儘管是一個被想像的同意，但康德賦予它積極的意義即形塑公民為一個自主、自律的主體，因此，在這個面向上，本文認為康德提出了儘管與霍布斯、洛克、盧梭迥異但卻仍然極富意義的契約論。 / The purpose of this thesis is that Kant should be seen as a theorist of the social contract theory in the discourse of the Metaphysics of Morals. This thesis will perceive the social contract theory provided by Kant in accordance to two clues, including the theory of property and the problem of unity. The main point of the thesis is that the original social contract as an idea of reason is the method providing for the individual existing in the civil society of constructing the legitimacy of the political authority. By definition of “Idea” in Critique of Pure reason, Kant gives the original social contract a meaningful function: the consent of people. Though the consent is a concept imagined by the people, Kant gives it a positive meaning of forming the people to the independent subject in politics. In conclusion, this thesis claims that Kant provided a meaningful social contract theory different from other theorists in the social contract tradition, such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau.

論文摘要 〈論純粹知性概念之推證〉一章可以說是《純粹理性批判》當中最重要的章節之一。康德在這個章節中企圖證明完全根源於知性自身的純粹知性概念（也就是範疇）運用到經驗對象上的可能性，並藉此劃定認知的有效範圍。這是《純粹理性批判》企圖解決形上學紛爭的一個重要關鍵。然而，這個章節同時也是康德宣稱他花費了最大心力，並在第二版《純粹理性批判》當中完全改寫的篇章之一，在這個短短的五六十頁的篇幅當中卻包含了許多詮釋上的爭議。而本論文則以第二版〈推證〉為主要討論範圍，並嘗試回答其中三個詮釋上的問題：1. 〈推證〉是否包含了一個反懷疑論的論證？2. 第二版〈推證〉可區分出的兩個部份分別負擔了什麼任務？3. 先驗統覺在〈推證〉中扮演了什麼角色？並在確立對以上幾個問題的觀點之後，提供一個的對第二版〈推證〉的細部解釋。 為了回答這幾個問題，筆者比較了Paul Guyer、Dieter Henrich、Henry Allison等幾個詮釋者的觀點。而本論文總共包含了五個章節。第一章作為導論，介紹筆者在本論文中所欲處理的問題以及對論文所安排的架構。在第二章當中，筆者以Guyer作為一個反懷疑論式詮釋〈推證〉的類型，並指出這種詮釋方式與文本的不合之處。在第三章當中，筆者將介紹Henrich針對第二版〈推證〉所提出的「一個證明兩個步驟」的詮釋架構以及對兩個步驟的詮釋，並藉由Allison的批評，介紹另一種同樣在「一個證明兩個步驟」下且筆者認為更適當的詮釋方式。在第四章當中，筆者嘗試回答關於解釋統覺的諸問題，它們包括了統覺的含義、統覺與雜多表象的關係、統覺原理的邏輯地位、統覺原理在〈推證〉中起的作用等。在確立了以上諸觀點後，筆者在第四章和第五章當中，按照兩個步驟的架構提供一個對第二版〈推證〉的完整解釋。 / Abstract "On the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding" is widely agreed to be the most important chapter in the Critique of the Pure Reason. In this chapter Kant attempts to demonstrate that the pure concepts of understanding, namely, categories, which completely stem from understanding itself, can be applied to empirical objects and thereby define the boundary of cognition. This is critical to resolve the dispute in the metaphysics of his predecessors. However, Kant also claims that this chapter is the part, which costs him the greatest effort and which he entirely rewrites in the second edition of the Critique. There are so many controversial interpretations related to this chapter, which is yet only complied up to 50-60 pages. In this thesis I focus on Deduction in the second edition of the Critique and try to answer the following three questions about these controversies: 1. Whether the Deduction contains an anti-skeptical argument? 2. What are the tasks of the two parts respectively that can be distinguished in B-Deduction? 3. What is the role that transcendental apperception plays in the Deduction? After establishing these answers, I will contribute a detailed explanation of whole B-Deduction. In order to answer the questions, I compare the perspectives of three interpreters of Kant, namely, Paul Guyer, Dieter Henrich and Henry E. Allison. This article is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction, in which I introduce the problems that I hope to resolve and the structure of the thesis. In Chapter 2, I introduce Guyer's interpretation of Deduction, which is an anti-skeptical Model, and I will indicate that his interpretation doesn't conform to the Kant's text. In Chapter 3, I introduce Henrich's famous thesis about the structure of the B-Deduction, namely, the thesis of two-steps-in-one-proof, and his interpretation of the contents of the two steps.Then I introduce Allison's criticism against Henrich and his alternative interpretation of B-Deduction under the frame of two-steps-in-one-proof. I believe this interpretation is more consistent and more conformable to the text. In Chapter 4, I try to answer the questions about the interpretation of apperception, where the issues such as the meaning of apperception, the relation between apperception and manifold, the principle of apperception's logical status, the apperception's role in the Deduction etc. will be discussed. After establishing my perspectives about these interpretative problems, I will present a complete and detailed explanation of B-Deduction according to the two-step structure.