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The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers
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論康德的第二版〈純粹知性概念之推證〉 / On Kant's "Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding" in the second edition林正昊, Lin, Cheng Hao Unknown Date (has links)
論文摘要
〈論純粹知性概念之推證〉一章可以說是《純粹理性批判》當中最重要的章節之一。康德在這個章節中企圖證明完全根源於知性自身的純粹知性概念（也就是範疇）運用到經驗對象上的可能性，並藉此劃定認知的有效範圍。這是《純粹理性批判》企圖解決形上學紛爭的一個重要關鍵。然而，這個章節同時也是康德宣稱他花費了最大心力，並在第二版《純粹理性批判》當中完全改寫的篇章之一，在這個短短的五六十頁的篇幅當中卻包含了許多詮釋上的爭議。而本論文則以第二版〈推證〉為主要討論範圍，並嘗試回答其中三個詮釋上的問題：1. 〈推證〉是否包含了一個反懷疑論的論證？2. 第二版〈推證〉可區分出的兩個部份分別負擔了什麼任務？3. 先驗統覺在〈推證〉中扮演了什麼角色？並在確立對以上幾個問題的觀點之後，提供一個的對第二版〈推證〉的細部解釋。
為了回答這幾個問題，筆者比較了Paul Guyer、Dieter Henrich、Henry Allison等幾個詮釋者的觀點。而本論文總共包含了五個章節。第一章作為導論，介紹筆者在本論文中所欲處理的問題以及對論文所安排的架構。在第二章當中，筆者以Guyer作為一個反懷疑論式詮釋〈推證〉的類型，並指出這種詮釋方式與文本的不合之處。在第三章當中，筆者將介紹Henrich針對第二版〈推證〉所提出的「一個證明兩個步驟」的詮釋架構以及對兩個步驟的詮釋，並藉由Allison的批評，介紹另一種同樣在「一個證明兩個步驟」下且筆者認為更適當的詮釋方式。在第四章當中，筆者嘗試回答關於解釋統覺的諸問題，它們包括了統覺的含義、統覺與雜多表象的關係、統覺原理的邏輯地位、統覺原理在〈推證〉中起的作用等。在確立了以上諸觀點後，筆者在第四章和第五章當中，按照兩個步驟的架構提供一個對第二版〈推證〉的完整解釋。 / Abstract
"On the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of Understanding" is widely agreed to be the most important chapter in the Critique of the Pure Reason. In this chapter Kant attempts to demonstrate that the pure concepts of understanding, namely, categories, which completely stem from understanding itself, can be applied to empirical objects and thereby define the boundary of cognition. This is critical to resolve the dispute in the metaphysics of his predecessors. However, Kant also claims that this chapter is the part, which costs him the greatest effort and which he entirely rewrites in the second edition of the Critique. There are so many controversial interpretations related to this chapter, which is yet only complied up to 50-60 pages. In this thesis I focus on Deduction in the second edition of the Critique and try to answer the following three questions about these controversies: 1. Whether the Deduction contains an anti-skeptical argument? 2. What are the tasks of the two parts respectively that can be distinguished in B-Deduction? 3. What is the role that transcendental apperception plays in the Deduction? After establishing these answers, I will contribute a detailed explanation of whole B-Deduction.
In order to answer the questions, I compare the perspectives of three interpreters of Kant, namely, Paul Guyer, Dieter Henrich and Henry E. Allison. This article is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 is the introduction, in which I introduce the problems that I hope to resolve and the structure of the thesis. In Chapter 2, I introduce Guyer's interpretation of Deduction, which is an anti-skeptical Model, and I will indicate that his interpretation doesn't conform to the Kant's text. In Chapter 3, I introduce Henrich's famous thesis about the structure of the B-Deduction, namely, the thesis of two-steps-in-one-proof, and his interpretation of the contents of the two steps.Then I introduce Allison's criticism against Henrich and his alternative interpretation of B-Deduction under the frame of two-steps-in-one-proof. I believe this interpretation is more consistent and more conformable to the text. In Chapter 4, I try to answer the questions about the interpretation of apperception, where the issues such as the meaning of apperception, the relation between apperception and manifold, the principle of apperception's logical status, the apperception's role in the Deduction etc. will be discussed. After establishing my perspectives about these interpretative problems, I will present a complete and detailed explanation of B-Deduction according to the two-step structure.
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論胡塞爾現象學之主體性悖論 / ON PARADOX OF SUBJECTIVITY IN HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGY江偉峰, Chiang,Wei-Feng Unknown Date (has links)
主體性，是作為相對於客體性而言之主觀存在，且同時是作為在客體性中的客觀存在。如此一種普遍地可能存在於一切認識活動中的雙重存在狀態，正是所謂的「主體性的悖論」。而根據胡塞爾現象學式的沈思回溯考察，這樣一種可能的悖論形態之形成的原因，無非就出於主體多少偏執「客觀存在性先行存在」作為認識活動的理所當然性的前提之故。因為此種由主體對客體性存在與否具有著強烈興趣而產生出的偏執，總是讓主體在對「客觀存在性如何先行存在」此一問題少有深思的情形下，或是有所盲目或是有所扭曲地將自身多少誤解為關聯於客體而共同存在於客體性之中，且同時還多少將此種主體-客體的關聯當作兩者間具有某種平行類比意義的根據，甚而多少誤解主體是客體的類比存在性且可來自於對客體的存在性進行抽象而得之補充抽象的東西。如此一來，不僅主體固有的本質存在方式多少被化約遮蔽地客體化了，客體作為主觀的被給予東西的意義也多少被片面地簡化了，甚至還有那種由最深刻的不可理解的悖論危險性，所帶來之「客觀存在性如何能被主觀地認識」此一非比尋常的認識活動/知識（真理）之謎。而根據胡塞爾現象學式的沈思回溯考察，唯有通過徹底的「懸擱」來全面克制對客體性存在與否的強烈興趣，主體的目光才能完全解除指向客觀存在性的束縛，而以自由的反思活動來真正深入自身的主觀存在性之中，「無悖論地」揭示出自身「如何」以固有的本質存在方式主觀地認識到一切作為客觀存在性之主觀被給予的「事物本身」。
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