政治學理中，將政黨定義為「具相同利益，以爭取政治權力為目標的團體」。政黨壟斷政治精英的甄補，藉由對公職候選人的提名競選以獲取權力。政治菁英透過黨公職歷練，形塑並推動黨綱的政治主張，並經由選舉取得政治權力。由此觀之，政黨菁英對政黨與政府決策發展、以及「認同政治」等研究議題而言，具有重要的關鍵影響力，也一直是重要的研究議題。 　　是故，那些人能為菁英？菁英如何獲取權位和政治權力？臺灣政治菁英的背景與甄補途徑，從威權至民主轉型以迄兩次政黨輪替至今又有何發展？本文嘗試從菁英理論出發，以國民黨籍第十四屆中常委至第十七屆中常委（1993-2008）為研究對象，藉由釐清民主化後至今的菁英甄補發展之脈絡，以分析國民黨籍菁英特質與甄補方式。 　　本文研究結果顯示，國民黨政治菁英甄補來源由早期黨職、公職選舉、考試、軍隊等四種途徑，隨本土化政策於1970年代轉變為本省籍技術官僚，至1986年民主化後在黨內權力鬥爭和在野黨競爭下，漸由民選政治菁英入主決策核心。政黨輪替後，國民黨中常會更由中央民代藉選舉實力及換票聯盟的運作而掌握多數席次，並漸有第二代繼承家族事業的發展趨勢。然而在菁英甄補來源日趨多元化的同時，其準黨國威權體制架構下的甄補機制民主化程度依然有限，促使國民黨將持續推動後續的改革。 / The political Elites obtain the power by elections through promoting the political opinion of the party platform and operation of the leading factor and national development. The Importance of the Elites has been an important research issue. Therefore, who will be the Elite? How do the elites take the power? What is the development of the elites of Taiwan from the authoritarian regime to now? Rested on the theories of Elite Recruitment. The thesis try to explore and analysis the background of the member and the recruitment mechanism of the members of the Kuomintang central committee form 14th to 17th (1993-2008). After The Party Transformation, the KMT legislators gain the most committee seats by their strength of electing and strategic alliance. There also have a transition within Political Family, However, as the more pluralism the member was, the demarcations of internal-party and the mechanism of recruitment wa insufficiency, by the way , the democratically reform of KMT both the mechanism of internal election and recruitment is necessary.

吳玉山提出「後極權資本主義發展國家」的概念來形容為何中國在維持高速經濟發展的同時，依然保有對國家機器的控制與公民社會的滲透，他認為中國大陸發展趨勢乃是揉合了蘇東和東亞模式，經改上的亮眼表現雖然帶來政治參與的壓力，但中共卻能夠有效轉化這些壓力，回應外界挑戰並且持續執政、鞏固一黨領導。隨著中國大陸擴展國際視野，具有留學背景的菁英也逐漸在高層政治中嶄露頭角，然而海歸菁英由於曾經接觸西方民主思潮，因此成為政治甄用對象中最有可能產生價值矛盾的族群。依循這樣的思路，本文試圖從政治菁英甄補（political recruitment）的面向，解釋中共如何在推動經濟成長的同時延續國家統治的絕對優勢。本文發現海歸派在政治領域中發揮諮詢的功能並扮演執行的角色，主要集中在學術單位與政府職能部門。在仕途發展方面，除了在原生系統升遷之外，海歸官員於不同升遷渠道間的水平流動，以「政府機關往人大政協」的晉升為主。我們認為造成這種現象的原因，乃是中共致力於推動現代化建設，但另一方面又擔心西方民主思想滲透動搖共產黨領導的結果。 / The party control over state apparatuses and civil society has remained strong during China’s rapid economic rise. The approach China has taken after economic reform has been an amalgamation of the Soviet/Eastern European and East Asian models, which is the Post-Totalitarian Capitalist Developmental State, provided by Yu-Shan Wu. Foreign-educated returnees have already emerged in China’s political arena as a distinguished political elite group, as characterized by the skills for external communication and technical knowledge that they posses. Furthermore, for the foreign-educated political elite, the experience of oversea studies also may cause tension between the one-party dictatorship thinking and the western democratic ideals in their mind. We attempt to explain how the CCP simultaneously promotes economic growth and maintains political domination from the dimension of political recruitment. There are two main findings in this paper: First, most of the returnees work in academic units and professional departments in government. They play the role of consultants or executives during decision making processes. Second, for career paths the most obvious political mobility of the foreign-educated elites among recruitment channels is the “Government toward NPC and CPPCC”. To conclude, this reveals that the Chinese leaders are determined on preventing the penetration of western democratic ideals on one hand, and accelerating the modernization of China on the other.

改革開放以來，哪些菁英受到中共高層的重用？菁英流動的特性為何？背後是否具有一致的運作邏輯？本論文主要目的在於探索與釐清中國大陸菁英流動演變的型態，以及背後運作的邏輯。 在理論上，本論文從共黨政權演變的視角出發，採用組織理論的脈絡建構中共的菁英甄補邏輯。在組織邏輯下，本文認為改革開放的「經濟發展」路線，是中共為維持「專政」生存的工具性目標。而由於江澤民、胡錦濤依序接班後仍依循鄧小平改革開放的基本路線，這使得改革開放至今中國大陸政治菁英甄補與流動模式具有相當一致性的邏輯：即彰顯「專政」生存目的與「發展」工具性目的的政權演變特性。中共將依外在環境與組織目標的改變來調整內部成員，但調整的幅度與廣度將不會危害其執政地位，使得菁英流動呈現「有限活化」（limited renewal）的特色。 為了檢驗中共「有限活化」菁英體制的研究假設，本研究針對1978年3月至2008年3月曾任黨政正省部級職務（含以上）政治菁英進行系統性的實證分析。實證結果發現中共黨政菁英在納入新甄補元素的過程裡，的確具有專政地位維持的生存考量，符合本研究的理論預期。另一方面，雖然近年來外界強調中國菁英技術官僚的特質，但本文發現能夠在黨政領導職務任職時間較長，以及較快晉升至領導人職務的政治菁英，大多是前一個層級出身或具有黨職領導經歷者。這表示中共透過各級黨職歷練的規範，來確保這些領導菁英與黨意識型態路線或利益一致性。值得注意的是如此的甄補邏輯，改革開放至今並無系統性的改變。 最後，本論文也嘗試以菁英途徑解釋中國大陸未來的政體發展走向。透過有限活化菁英體制的現象檢證，我們認為菁英甄補的組織邏輯，應是中國大陸自80年代以來之所以能在快速經濟發展下維持共黨專政的重要因素。以此，本文認為中共在發展出以「黨職經歷」為重要資格的更替與晉升遊戲規則，短期內高層領導人應不至出現菁英分裂與衝突。而本文透過菁英流動課題來釐清中共「專政」與「發展」目的之邏輯本質，或許也能作為外界進一步闡述中共推行政治改革措施的思路。 / What kinds of political elites have been recruited and promoted by the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the Reform Era? What are the characteristics of elite mobility in China? Is there a consistent inner-logic governing the selection and promotion of Chinese elites? To answer these questions, the thesis explores the continuity and change of political elite mobility in Mainland China, from 1978 to 2008. Theoretically, the author reveals the inner-logic of elite recruitment throughout China’s reform era by using the explanatory framework of organizational theory against the background of communist regime transition. According to the organization logic, “economic development” is merely a functional tool serving the higher ends of “one-party dictatorship” - the survival prerequisite for the CCP. Therefore, due to Jiang and Hu’s succession of party courses set by Deng, China’s elite recruitment and mobility have consistently embodied this organizational logic: While balancing between the survival prerequisite of one-party dictatorship and the functional target of economic development, the CCP has, on the one hand, adjusted its membership configuration in response to changing environment and organizational goals; whereas on the other hand, controlled the adjustment to a degree posting no threat to its ruling position, hence produced the characteristics of limited renewal within China’s elite mobility. To attest the theoretical hypothesis of limited renewal, the author conducts the systematic empirical studies on all the political elites who have worked on province and ministry level positions (and above) within the Chinese government and communist party from March, 1978 to March, 2008. As the empirical result shows, and consequently, confirms the hypothesis: the CCP did have assigned significant weight to the survival consideration in the process of elite recruitment. At the same time, despite the recent scholars focus on the rise of Chinese technocrats, the author however finds that, among the rising elites, those who worked longer in, or promoted faster to, the government and/or party positions, the crucial similarity they share lies not in the technocratic background but their party-position appointments on a lower level immediately before their promotions to leadership positions. This pattern of promotion demonstrated that the CCP has been using the party-positions experience as a required qualification for promotion, so as to ensure the elites’ alliance with party interest and loyalty to party ideology. Moreover, these recruiting and promoting principles have undergone no systematic changes throughout the period of the Reform Era. Finally, from the perspective of elite mobility, the author attempts to depict the potential direction of China’s regime development in the future. Having approved the pattern of limited renewal in China’s elite configuration and mobility, the author believes that the current recruiting criteria and the underlying organizational logic have significantly contributed to the success of the CCP in maintaining one-party dictatorship amid rapid economic development. Therefore, the author predicts that the likelihood for elite conflicts would remain fairly low, if the promotion requirement of party-position experience continues to function. But nevertheless, the research of elite mobility would uncover the inner logical relationship between the apparently-contradictory goals of dictatorship and development, which paved the way for the survival and the success of the CCP.

在中共「以黨領政」的黨國體制下，中共菁英政治的演變一向為研究中共政治的一門重要課題，菁英流動的模式與規則化則是為評析中共菁英甄補的主要觀察項目。本文的研究旨趣乃從菁英甄補的視角出發，以中國中央級國有企業高階領導幹部作為實證對象，個案產業則涵蓋石油石化、電力以及電信等三大產業共13家央企。藉由對央企領導幹部個人簡歷的查察，梳理國有企業領導幹部的晉升與流動路徑，以充實中共菁英政治研究在國有企業領導幹部此一區塊上的觀察。 本文發現，儘管國有企業歷經長時改革的過程，但在幹部人事晉用的層次上，中共黨國專制性的角色並未出現鬆動，改變只發生在企業徵用人員時，領導幹部個人所繫有之任用年齡年輕化、專業與學歷要求門檻的提高。在仕途發展方面，「企業黨組領導職務」與「產業類別」則為決定企業領導幹部個人流動與能否取得晉升機會的關鍵。以前者言，若國企領導幹部具有企業黨組書記、副書記的任職經驗，則相對具備有明顯的仕途競爭優勢。就後者而論，本文則提出一套中共操作國有企業菁英幹部甄補的規則：任職於石油石化產業的央企領導幹部，若於任內兼任黨組書記或黨組副書記一職，可以期待未來離任企業領導後，將具有較強的競爭力轉入政府部門副部級以上職位述職。電力及電信業央企領導幹部，若於任內兼任黨組書記或黨組副書記一職，則以轉任業內其他央企更高領導職位作為主要出路，並且作為幹部在個人離退前的最後一項職務。總結來說，「企業黨組領導職務」決定升遷的「准入機會」，「產業類別」則攸關晉升的部門流向。