區域經濟整合為 1990年代國際經濟發展之主要潮流，其中尤以歐洲聯盟 之演變最引人注目。歐洲聯盟正進行中之貨幣單一化乃區域經濟整合之最 高目標，亦為其未來政治聯盟之基礎與成敗關鍵所繫。就目前情況來看， 歐洲單一貨幣的實施遭遇若干阻礙，但不論此目標能否如期達成，其勢必 會對國際金融市場與全球經濟造成重大影響。由於我國之經濟發展與對外 貿易之成長息息相關，因此對於此種區域貨幣整合之形成有必要加以深入 瞭解。對參加貨幣同盟之各會員國而言，貨幣整合之利弊兼而有之。本論 文將由組成貨幣同盟之成本效益問題出發，探討能使各會員國在加入貨幣 同盟後獲得淨效益之條件；並就歐洲聯盟推動貨幣單一化過程中所遭遇之 問題，例如：貨幣同盟應採取何種貨幣整合方式、各會員國之財政政策應 扮演何種角色、貨幣整合時所選擇之貨幣兌換率將對貨幣同盟造成何種影 響、以及為維繫各會員國之貨幣整合關係不致瓦解，貨幣同盟於共同決策 方面將形成何種權力分配等，作一整理分析。

《穩定暨成長協定》（Stability and Growth Pact, SGP）作為歐洲經濟暨貨幣同盟（Economic and Monetary Union, EMU）財政紀律框架之核心規範，其有效實行是確保EMU會員國財政穩定並使EMU穩健運作之重要關鍵。本研究之研究目的，即在於透過對SGP的立法背景、實行成效與SGP在2005年及2010年經歷的兩次改革內容進行分析，以了解EMU財政紀律發展趨勢及政策啟示。 本研究之研究成果顯示，自1997年SGP制定至今，EMU財政規範始終是以「補漏洞」的方式進行。歐盟非中央化的財政政策是EMU財政規範的有效實行必須期待各會員國善意遵守的根本原因。這項缺陷也使得部分EMU會員國重新思考建立財政同盟的可能。然由於財政同盟代表的是要求EMU各會員國進一步放棄國家主權中的財政自主權，在仍有會員國對此表示疑慮的前提下，歐盟財政治理未來的發展趨勢仍值得吾人持續觀察。 / As a key rule of the fiscal governance frameworks of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the effective implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) is a guarantee of both the fiscal stability of the EMU Member States and the well-function of the EMU. The main purpose of this thesis is to explore the trends of the EMU fiscal disciplines and the messages the EMU fiscal policies deliver through analysis of the background of the SGP, the practice of the SGP and the two modifications to SGP in 2005 and 2010 respectively. The result of this thesis shows that the EMU fiscal governance has been keeping fixing problems ex post facto since the SGP entered into force. And the decentralised fiscal policies explain why the effective implementation of SGP is relying on the willingness of the EMU Member States to follow the rules. This defect makes some of the EMU Member States to reconsider to build a fiscal union, which means to yield the fiscal sovereignty to the EU. Since there are still some EMU Member States concerning over the idea, the future of the EMU fiscal governance is still developing.

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自從2008年全球經濟衰退以來，歐元區經濟顯著的衰退，特別是歐元區各成員國的經濟表現有明顯的差異。在本文中，我們試就成員國「貿易開放程度」和「財政基本面」這兩個重要特徵，來詮釋歐元區經濟穩定這個議題。在第二章中，我們在貿易開放程度不同的國家下，比較貨幣同盟制度與浮動匯率制度對於負向衝擊產生的影響。我們發現當貨幣當局愈重視產出穩定時，相較於浮動匯率制度，貨幣同盟制度將使產出下降的更多。在第三章中，我們將短期私人債券及長期政府債券引入貨幣同盟的兩國DSGE模型。我們推斷，歐洲央行(ECB)的公共部門債券購買計劃（PSPP），對於不同財政狀況的成員國，有著不對稱的總體經濟影響。在第四章中，我們建立貨幣同盟經濟的最適貨幣政策模型。我們發現成員國間經濟差異，將影響貨幣同盟的整體福利水準。相較於傳統零利率最適貨幣政策文獻，本研究的結果顯示不論是權衡或承諾制度，增加公共部門債券購買將緩和貨幣同盟的經濟波動。 / Since the global recession in 2008, the economic performance of the Euro area has declined significantly. In particular, there have been great differences in the economic performance among member states in the Euro area. In this dissertation, we attempt to address the issue of economic stability by focusing on two key features: the trade openness and the fiscal fundamentals among member states. In Chapter 2, we compare the impacts of the adverse shocks on countries with different degrees of openness under the monetary union regime, and our finding shows that the monetary union will result in a greater decline in output if the monetary authority attaches a higher weight to output stabilization. In Chapter 3, we build a two-country DSGE model representing a monetary union with both short-term and long-term government bonds. We deduce that the ECB’s public sector purchase programme (PSPP) has asymmetric macroeconomic effects on member states under different fiscal fundamentals. In Chapter 4, we set up an optimal monetary policy model of a monetary union. We find that the differences in the economic performance of individual member states will influence the union-wide welfare. Comparing our results with classical literature of optimal monetary policy at zero lower bound, by adding the PSPP, our study indeed reflects lower volatility of the union-wide economy under either discretion or commitment.