This study analyses the way that legal positivists from HLA Hart onwards have responded to Lon L Fuller’s challenge to positivism from the idea of the rule of law. The main thesis is that Hart and contemporary legal positivists working in the Hartian tradition have yet to adequately respond to Fuller’s Challenge. I argue that the reason for this is the approach they take to dealing with Fuller’s principles of the rule of law, which either (i) proceeds on the basis of the positivist perspective without engaging with Fuller’s wider anti-positivist arguments, or else (ii) accepts Fuller’s claim that the rule of law is part of our concept of law but does not acknowledge any effect of this on what determines legal validity (the content of legal norms). In both cases, I argue that tensions and problems result from a lack of engagement with Fuller’s anti-positivism. On the one hand, positivists have failed to show why their account of the nature of law better reflects our understanding of law than Fuller’s. On the other, the concessions that positivists have made to Fuller’s arguments are often detached from other elements in their theories, raising the question of whether the positivist response to Fuller is coherent. In addition, by closely analysing the major positivist accounts of the rule of law, this study challenges a number of orthodox interpretations that confuse our understanding of the positivist response to Fuller. I show that most positivists accept that there is something morally valuable about a legal system’s conformity to the principles of the rule of law, and that there is always some kind of at least minimal conformity to those principles in any legal system. By noticing what concessions positivists have made to Fuller’s understanding of the rule of law, I aim to both (i) shift the debate to the remaining disputes with the Hartian positivists, particularly on issues such as the ‘derivative approach’ and the ‘validity Social thesis’, and (ii) identify areas of fruitful engagement with Fuller, such as the question of judges’ moral obligations to law.

Although international law requires States to protect the marine environment and conserve marine living resources, human activities are still threatening marine species and its survival. In view of limited scientific knowledge of marine ecosystems, fragility of ecosystems and insufficient mechanisms of protection, marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction is at risk. Increasing attention has been given to the need to conserve this important and vulnerable biodiversity. The international community has begun to recognize the importance of marine protected areas (MPAs) as key tool to ensure sustainable use and preservation of biodiversity. However, the adequacy of the current legal framework related to the conservation of marine biodiversity through the establishing of high seas MPAs raises debates. Disagreements about the existence of inadequacies and need for an implementing agreement remain. My study seeks to determine whether the international legal framework is adequate for the establishment of MPAs or whether further measures are required.

The traditional approach to corporate governance in Canada has centered on shareholders. This model of governance is commonly referred to as shareholder primacy. The shareholder primacy model has recently been rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in Peoples v. Wise and BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders. This paper will be argued that directors should be required to focus exclusively on increasing shareholder value in the change of control context. It is within the change of control context that shareholders most require fiduciary protection. In addition, the shareholder primacy rule provides an enforceable standard for evaluating the actions of directors. As stakeholders have a variety of mechanisms to ensure that their interests are not disregarded, they are not in need of fiduciary protection. In contrast, shareholders face greater risks, which validate a need to be protected by an exclusive fiduciary duty in the change of control context.

While the mining industry provides numerous benefits to the society, it also has negative impacts on communities. This thesis will discuss various voluntary policies employed by mining companies and the developmental attempts at legislative changes to enforce mandatory regulations. The primary focus will be on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), in particular Bill C-300, which required “Corporate Accountability for the Activities of Mining, Oil or Gas Corporations in Developing Countries”. The Bill had effective key points to ensure that Canadian extractive companies followed human rights and environmental practices while operating overseas. Although the Bill was defeated, it is believed to be critical with respect to CSR. Moreover, Dodd-Frank, the 2010 United States legislation with similar provisions of CSR, will be discussed. The differences in the two will be elaborated to determine why Bill C-300 was rejected and answer whether it would have succeeded had the provisions been drafted similarly to Dodd-Frank.

The 2009 reform of China’s health care system attempts to lower the burden of medical costs and provide universal access to health care. This thesis focuses on a particular access and equity gap within the health care system that faced by internal migrants, and explores the potential value of a legally enforceable and justiciable right to health care in the Chinese context to address such gaps. Despite recent advances in the health care reform, lack of a framework of health care rights could be a limiting factor to current health care initiatives which are falling short of their promises of universality in some way. In the long run, establishment of such framework could be a direction that deserves further research.

Traditional scholarship on corporate law evidences the lack of analysis undertaken to understand the interconnectivity between businesses and the societies in which they operate where , scholarship and case law had favored shareholder primacy. However, an analysis of Section 122 of the Canadian Business Corporations Act (CBCA), reveals that the ambiguous language of director’s duties under the CBCA allows for the courts to continue modernize the law inclusive of stakeholder rights without requiring statutory amendments. Therefore, this thesis argues that courts have the flexibility to interpret that directors are within their duties to balance the rights of both shareholders and stakeholders. In fact, this thesis argues that stakeholder theory is superior to shareholder theory in consideration of law and morality. By concluding that stakeholder theory is the new accepted standard in Canadian Corporate law, this paper offers directors guidance on how to perform their role in accordance with the CBCA.

This dissertation argues that the novels of Henry James offer a conception of personhood and of human freedom better able to explain and unify private law than the conceptions currently dominant in private law theory. I begin by laying out the two conceptual frameworks that now dominate private law theory: Kantian right and the feminist ethic of care. I argue that Kantian right‟s exclusive focus on respect for freedom of choice makes it unable to explain private law doctrines founded upon concern for human well-being, including unjust enrichment, unconscionability, and liability for negligence. However, feminism‟s ethic of care, which can be understood as a response to the Kantian abstraction from considerations of well-being and need, is also incomplete, because its understanding of the person as essentially connected to others fails to respect human separateness. I then offer readings of James‟ novels—The Portrait of a Lady, What Maisie Knew, and The Ambassadors—that show how vindicating individual worth requires both respect for abstract agency‟s separateness and freedom to choose, on the one hand, and concern for the dependent individual‟s well-being and autonomous flourishing, on the other. I argue that these two ideas are complementary parts of a complete understanding of human dignity and freedom. Finally, I argue that this understanding illuminates doctrines of private law that remain mysterious on the Kantian account while avoiding feminism‟s tendency to immerse private law in public law.

This study analyses the way that legal positivists from HLA Hart onwards have responded to Lon L Fuller’s challenge to positivism from the idea of the rule of law. The main thesis is that Hart and contemporary legal positivists working in the Hartian tradition have yet to adequately respond to Fuller’s Challenge. I argue that the reason for this is the approach they take to dealing with Fuller’s principles of the rule of law, which either (i) proceeds on the basis of the positivist perspective without engaging with Fuller’s wider anti-positivist arguments, or else (ii) accepts Fuller’s claim that the rule of law is part of our concept of law but does not acknowledge any effect of this on what determines legal validity (the content of legal norms). In both cases, I argue that tensions and problems result from a lack of engagement with Fuller’s anti-positivism. On the one hand, positivists have failed to show why their account of the nature of law better reflects our understanding of law than Fuller’s. On the other, the concessions that positivists have made to Fuller’s arguments are often detached from other elements in their theories, raising the question of whether the positivist response to Fuller is coherent. In addition, by closely analysing the major positivist accounts of the rule of law, this study challenges a number of orthodox interpretations that confuse our understanding of the positivist response to Fuller. I show that most positivists accept that there is something morally valuable about a legal system’s conformity to the principles of the rule of law, and that there is always some kind of at least minimal conformity to those principles in any legal system. By noticing what concessions positivists have made to Fuller’s understanding of the rule of law, I aim to both (i) shift the debate to the remaining disputes with the Hartian positivists, particularly on issues such as the ‘derivative approach’ and the ‘validity Social thesis’, and (ii) identify areas of fruitful engagement with Fuller, such as the question of judges’ moral obligations to law.

Although international law requires States to protect the marine environment and conserve marine living resources, human activities are still threatening marine species and its survival. In view of limited scientific knowledge of marine ecosystems, fragility of ecosystems and insufficient mechanisms of protection, marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction is at risk. Increasing attention has been given to the need to conserve this important and vulnerable biodiversity. The international community has begun to recognize the importance of marine protected areas (MPAs) as key tool to ensure sustainable use and preservation of biodiversity. However, the adequacy of the current legal framework related to the conservation of marine biodiversity through the establishing of high seas MPAs raises debates. Disagreements about the existence of inadequacies and need for an implementing agreement remain. My study seeks to determine whether the international legal framework is adequate for the establishment of MPAs or whether further measures are required.

The traditional approach to corporate governance in Canada has centered on shareholders. This model of governance is commonly referred to as shareholder primacy. The shareholder primacy model has recently been rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in Peoples v. Wise and BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders. This paper will be argued that directors should be required to focus exclusively on increasing shareholder value in the change of control context. It is within the change of control context that shareholders most require fiduciary protection. In addition, the shareholder primacy rule provides an enforceable standard for evaluating the actions of directors. As stakeholders have a variety of mechanisms to ensure that their interests are not disregarded, they are not in need of fiduciary protection. In contrast, shareholders face greater risks, which validate a need to be protected by an exclusive fiduciary duty in the change of control context.