In this thesis I recount the historical relationship between settlement and food lands in Southern Ontario. Informed by landscape and food regime theory, I use a landscape approach to interpret the history of this relationship to deepen our understanding of a pertinent, and historically specific problem of land access for sustainable farming. This thesis presents entrenched barriers to landscape renewal as institutional legacies of various layers of history. It argues that at the moment and for the last century Southern Ontario has had two different, parallel sets of determinants for land-use operating on the same landscape in the form of agricultural policy and urban planning. To the extent that they are not purposefully coordinated, not just with each other but with the social and ecological foundations of our habitation, this is at the root of the problem of land access for sustainable farming.

In this thesis I recount the historical relationship between settlement and food lands in Southern Ontario. Informed by landscape and food regime theory, I use a landscape approach to interpret the history of this relationship to deepen our understanding of a pertinent, and historically specific problem of land access for sustainable farming. This thesis presents entrenched barriers to landscape renewal as institutional legacies of various layers of history. It argues that at the moment and for the last century Southern Ontario has had two different, parallel sets of determinants for land-use operating on the same landscape in the form of agricultural policy and urban planning. To the extent that they are not purposefully coordinated, not just with each other but with the social and ecological foundations of our habitation, this is at the root of the problem of land access for sustainable farming.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Sue Zschoche / In 1942, the U.S. Army and Navy announced the creation of their respective women’s military services: the WAAC/WAC and the WAVES. Although American women had served alongside the military in past conflicts, the creation of women’s military corps caused uproar in American society. Placing women directly into the armed services called into question cultural expectations about “masculinity” and “femininity.” Thus, the women’s corps had to be justified to the public in accordance with American cultural assumptions regarding proper gender roles. “Fashioning Femininity for War: Material Culture and Gender Performance in the WAC and WAVES during World War II” focuses on the role of material culture in communicating a feminine image of the WAC and WAVES to the American public as well as the ways in which servicewomen engaged material culture to fashion and perform a feminine identity compatible with contemporary understandings of “femininity.” Material culture served as a mechanism to resolve public concerns regarding both the femininity and the function of women in the military. WAC and WAVES material culture linked their wearers with stereotyped characteristics specifically related to contemporary meanings of “femininity” celebrated by American society, while at the same time associating them with military organizations doing vital war work. Ultimately, the WAVES were more successful in their manipulations of material culture than the WAC, communicating both femininity and function in a way that was complementary to the established gender hierarchy. Therefore, the WAVES enjoyed a prestigious position in the mind of the American public. This dissertation also contributes to the ongoing historiographical debate regarding World War II as a turning point for women’s liberation, arguing that while the seeds of women’s liberation were sown in women’s wartime activities, those same wartime women were firmly convinced that their rightful place was in the private rather than the public sphere. The war created an opportunity to reevaluate gender roles but it would take some time before those reevaluations bore fruit.

Master of Arts / Department of History / Mark P. Parillo / Detachment 101's experiences provide a microcosm view of the evolutionary nature of warfare, and also demonstrates the understanding of Fourth Generational Warfare concepts by the Detachment.

Master of Arts / Department of History / Charles W. Sanders, Jr. / This thesis examines the reasons Union soldiers voted overwhelmingly for Abraham Lincoln in the presidential election of 1864. This thesis bridges the gap between the emerging disagreements within the historiography of the soldier vote in 1864. The disagreements thus far deal with the role of emancipation in the Union soldier’s decision-making process versus the role of other issues, particularly whether or not the war effort should have been continued on to ultimate victory. By extension, the argument also deals with whether or not Union soldiers adhered to the Republican Party’s ideology in making their decision. Through analysis of primary sources including Union soldiers’ letters and diaries, the answer that emerges is that Union soldiers adhered to Republican ideology as outlined by Republican campaign materials as well as their party platform in making their decision for president. This thesis ultimately concludes that a focus on any one reason or another that soldiers chose Lincoln misses the larger picture.

Master of Arts / Department of History / David R. Stone / This paper examines the influence of Hannibal of Carthage on the art of war over time. Hannibal’s war with Rome provides a complex example of strategic and tactical successes and failures that have been modeled and studied throughout military history in one fashion or another. The method of research was a literature review organized into chapters with relevant examples from ancient through modern history. The primary finding was that Hannibal’s examples have been interpreted according to the needs of each observer. There was no uniform conclusion of lessons drawn from Hannibal’s campaigns. Perceptions were drawn by each author based on time and particular circumstances. For instance, Machiavelli pillories Hannibal’s use of mercenaries as the antithesis of a virtuous society. Alfred von Schlieffen studied the tactical battle of Cannae and attempted to construct a strategic level plan for war in Europe based on lessons drawn from his study. Victor Hanson cites Hannibal’s war with Rome as a metaphor for the West’s current conflict with Islam, implying that the West will be ultimately victorious in this latest confrontation owing to the superiority of its institutions. The main conclusion that can be drawn is that Hannibal’s successes and failures are still relevant for study by historians and practitioners of the military arts even though there is no one set of definitive lessons learned.

Master of Arts / Department of History / Robert D. Linder / After years of selecting, editing, omitting, reducing and correcting what would become printed as over fourteen thousand pages of devotional literature for a young Methodist movement in the wake of the English Evangelical Revival, John Wesley pronounced his A Christian library: consisting of extracts from, and abridgments of, the choicest Pieces of practical divinity which have been published in the English tongue in fifty volumes (1749-1755) an underappreciated treasure and an overtaxing expenditure. Taking their lead from Wesley’s comments, scholars and historians of Wesley studies and Methodism have neglected to take a closer look at the ways the library may have been successful. This study argues that despite being initially a marketing disappointment and an expensive liability, John Wesley’s Christian library was influential in helping to shape the spiritual lives of “serious readers” within Methodism, particularly from 1752-1778. In the preface to the Christian library, Wesley revealed his standard for measuring the influence of the Library. However, despite offering a premature and partial assessment of the library in his journal entry at the end of 1752, providing some public responses to criticisms of the library in 1760 and again in the early 1770s, and writing some personal letters that recommended the library to others in the 1780s, Wesley did not publish an evaluation of what he believed the Christian library had accomplished during his life. Thus, based on the collaborative evidence gathered from the personal accounts of early Methodist preachers and the final address of Francis Asbury to American Methodists, this study makes the case that Wesley’s Christian library had a substantial positive influence on Methodism.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Mark Parillo / America forged a successful way of war that relied on adaptation, and this trait was not simply an adjunct to industrial might as a reason why the Allies won World War II. An American penchant for organization and corporate management allowed for mass production of war material, which clearly contributed to Axis defeat. However, to claim that the Axis Powers were merely overwhelmed by an avalanche of weapons and supply is reductionist. This dissertation contends that adaptability was as much an American way of war as mass production and overwhelming firepower. The particular nature of American adaptability and its contribution to Allied victory are exhibited in the Army’s use of animal power during a conflict synonymous with mechanized warfare and advanced technology. The application of pre-modern technology in a modern, machine-driven war was not archaic. On the contrary, the nature of American adaptability allowed the Army to move forward by retreating down a culturally constructed hierarchy of modernity and employing the traditional mode of animal transportation. The Army’s technological regression from motors to mules in North Africa, the Mediterranean, and China-Burma-India during World War II is the focus of this work. Americans possessed material abundance in campaigns across Western Europe and the Central Pacific in 1944 and 1945, as German and Japanese prisoners attested. Mountains of artillery shells, fuel, and food, however, did not exist in the backwater “sideshows.” American military success on the periphery was not due to material abundance, nor to a greater sense of determination. America won the backwater campaigns because the nature of American adaptability was cultivated over the centuries and converted from a way of life to an American way of war.

Doctor of Philosophy / Security Studies / Dale R. Herspring / Since the late 1970s Saudi Arabia has experienced transnational terrorism in sporadic waves whose character has evolved over time. While most of the literature on these waves of terrorism focuses on religious extremism this dissertation argues that terrorism in Saudi Arabia, although framed in religious terms, is not the result of religious factors alone, but more importantly a function of external variables. Taking the role of religious extremism into consideration, this dissertation underlines the importance of external factors on the mobilization of transnational terrorist groups throughout the Islamic world and particularly in Saudi Arabia. It argues that religious extremist terrorism cannot be examined in isolation from the context of the developments that ignite it and revolutionize its doctrine. This dissertation examines three key regional political developments – the Iranian revolution, the 1990 Gulf war, and the 2003 Iraq war – together with terrorist violence in their aftermath to show how the significant political events transformed extremist worldviews from passive to violent to organized terrorism. Though the character of these three political events and the terrorist acts that they unleashed differ widely in context, scope, and character, there are common threads among all three that illuminate how different dynamics contribute to the evolution of transnational terrorist mobilization. The dissertation identifies how the development of a politico-religious ideology, shaped and revolutionized by the presence of political crises, became a driving force behind much of the terrorism following these major political events. By exploring the interplay of popular perceptions, political entrepreneurs, and state responses, this dissertation seeks to better understand the complex dynamics involved in the evolution of transnational terrorism in Saudi Arabia.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Donald J. Mrozek / This dissertation examines how changes in training after Vietnam altered the Air Force’s way of war. Specifically, the rise of realistic training exercises in the U.S. Air Force, particularly in the Tactical Air Command, after the end of the Vietnam conflict in 1975 ushered in a drastic increase in the use of tactical fighter aircraft to accomplish Air Force missions. Many scholars, including Benjamin Lambeth and Richard Hallion, have emphasized the primacy of technological developments in the renaissance of air power between Vietnam and the Gulf War. This neglects the importance of developments in training in the Tactical Air Command during the same period. This dissertation demonstrates that throughout the 1970s and 1980s Air Force leaders reconsidered some of their long-held assumptions about air power’s proper use and re-cast older ideas in ways that they considered more realistic and better justified by past experience. Realistic training exercises led to better tactics and doctrines and, when combined with technological advancement, changed the way the Air Force waged war. Tactical assets became the weapons of preference for Air Force planners for several reasons including their ability to precisely deliver munitions onto targets and their ability to penetrate and survive in high-threat environments. Tactical assets could accomplish these missions precisely because of the changes that occurred in training. At the same time, the rise of tactical assets to equality with strategic assets directly led to the demise of both Tactical Air Command and Strategic Air Command and the creation of the single Air Combat Command. The conventional view that a massive technological revolution in military affairs took place in the 1980s and led to success in Desert Storm is conceptually too limiting. That interpretation places too much emphasis on the technological advancements used to prosecute war and slights the experiences of the airmen themselves in the development of the training exercises that helped change how the U.S. Air Force waged war.