陶國璋. / 手稿本(cops. 2-3複印本) / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學. / Shou gao ben (cops. 2-3 fu yin ben) / Includes bibliographical references: leaves i-x, 1-20 (5th & 6th group) / Tao Guozhang. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue. / 緒言 --- p.i / Chapter 第一章 --- 道德價值的意義 / Chapter 一 --- 行為科學對人的了解 --- p.1 / Chapter 二 --- 分析倫理學的道德進路 --- p.10 / Chapter 三 --- 人的價值現象 --- p.21 / Chapter 第二章 --- 康德的道德哲學 / Chapter 第一部 --- 康德哲學的架構性 / Chapter 一 --- 前言 --- p.26 / Chapter 二 --- 康德哲學的主要課題 --- p.29 / Chapter 三 --- 康德哲學的指導性原則 --- p.33 / Chapter 四 --- 第一批判的對象問題 --- p.42 / Chapter 第二部 --- 第二批判的理論內部 / Chapter 一 --- 前言 --- p.54 / Chapter 二 --- 純粹實踐理性的原則 --- p.56 / Chapter 三 --- 檢討康德道德哲學的進度 --- p.71 / Chapter 四 --- 第二批判的分析部的總結 --- p.83 / Chapter 五 --- 實踐理性的對象問題 --- p.88 / Chapter 第三章 --- 康德哲學的檢討 / Chapter 一 --- 康德安立道德的分位 --- p.95 / Chapter 二 --- 康德道德哲學的局限 --- p.100 / Chapter 三 --- 康德系統的理論後果 --- p.112 / Chapter 四 --- 牟宗三先生對現象與物自身區分的重新規定 --- p.122 / Chapter 四之一： --- 萊布尼茲的現象與自身的區分 --- p.123 / Chapter 四之二： --- 洛克的現象與物自身的區分 --- p.128 / Chapter 四之三： --- 康德的現象與物自身的區分 --- p.129 / Chapter 五 --- 「物自身」一詞的釐清 --- p.135 / Chapter 六 --- 牟宗三先生對現象與物自身的分判 --- p.140 / Chapter 第四章 --- 佛家般若智（智的直覺）的意義 / Chapter 一 --- 佛家的基本心態 --- p.159 / Chapter 二 --- 般若經的性格 --- p.163 / Chapter 三 --- 中道觀 --- p.173 / Chapter 四 --- 「八相」與「八不」 --- p.182 / Chapter 五 --- 般若三智義 --- p.190 / Chapter 六 --- 本章總結 --- p.201 / Chapter 第五章 --- 道德的形上學 / Chapter 一 --- 康德對「形上學全部系統」的分判 --- p.207 / Chapter 二 --- 康德對智的直覺的規定 --- p.214 / Chapter 三 --- 智的直覺與物自身的能所關係 --- p.220 / Chapter 四 --- 儒家的良知與康德的「良心」比較 --- p.224 / Chapter 五 --- 儒家對知體明覺（智的直覺）的肯定 --- p.229 / Chapter 六 --- 本心之無對性、虛靈性和涵蓋性 --- p.233 / Chapter 七 --- 儒家的道德的形上學(Moral Metaphysics) --- p.237 / Chapter 八 --- 總結 --- p.245

吳宏基. / "二零零零年一月三十日" / 論文 (哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2000. / 參考文獻 (leaves 114-121) / 附中英文摘要. / "Er ling ling ling nian yi yue san shi ri" / Wu Hongji. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2000. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 114-121) / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / Chapter 第一章 --- 題目析義與問題之提出 --- p.4 / Chapter 第一節 --- 緒言 --- p.4 / Chapter 第二節 --- 題目析義 --- p.8 / Chapter 第三節 --- 硏究目的及意義 --- p.10 / Chapter 第二章 --- 硏究方法與文獻 --- p.13 / Chapter 第一節 --- 硏究方法 --- p.13 / Chapter ´一Ø --- 哲學思辨 / Chapter ´二Ø --- 硏究步驟 / Chapter 第二節 --- 文獻回顧 --- p.18 / Chapter 第三節 --- 硏究限制 --- p.21 / Chapter 第三章 --- 幾個道德學說對道德本質之論述 --- p.26 / Chapter 第一節 --- 社會學派論社會乃道德之根本 --- p.26 / Chapter 第二節 --- 功利主義論道德乃幸福之趨求 --- p.29 / Chapter 第三節 --- 基督教論道德乃人神關之成果 --- p.33 / Chapter 第四節 --- 孟子論道德乃本心之自律 --- p.35 / Chapter ´一Ø --- 道德之本義 / Chapter ´二Ø --- 仁義內在之辨說 / Chapter ´三Ø --- 性善之確立 / Chapter ´四Ø --- 小結 / Chapter 第五節 --- 論道德之本質涵義 --- p.40 / 一從外在法則之內在化至意志之自律 / Chapter 第四章 --- 康德道德教育之基本路向 --- p.49 / Chapter 第一節 --- 康德的哥白尼式革命 --- p.49 / Chapter 第二節 --- 康德的道德教育目標 --- p.50 / Chapter ´一Ø --- 格準之界定 / Chapter ´二Ø --- 方法論之界定 / Chapter 第五章 --- 康德對道德本質之辨析 --- p.57 / 一使主觀地決意的格準直接地爲客觀的自由法則所決定 / Chapter 第一節 --- 由道德之根源以論說善的觀念 --- p.58 / Chapter 第二節 --- 論道德之義務性及其律令 --- p.61 / Chapter 一 / Chapter 二 / Chapter 第三節 --- 論道德行動乃依自由法則之決意 --- p.67 / Chapter ´一Ø --- 實踐道德之必然性 / Chapter ´二Ø --- 自由法則之決意 / Chapter 第四節 --- 小結 --- p.73 / Chapter 第五節 --- 回應批評 --- p.75 / Chapter 第六章 --- 康德論自律人格之培養 --- p.83 / 一使客觀地實踐的理性成爲亦是主觀地實踐的 / Chapter 第一節 --- 實踐道德之動力 --- p.83 / Chapter 第二節 --- 違背道德之性癖 --- p.86 / Chapter 第三節 --- 向善能力之恢復 --- p.89 / Chapter 第四節 --- 品格培養之步驟 --- p.91 / Chapter ´一Ø --- 消極性的道德教育原則 / Chapter ´二Ø --- 積極性的道德教育原則 / Chapter 第五節 --- 小結 --- p.96 / Chapter 第六節 --- 回應批評 --- p.98 / Chapter 第七章 --- 總結及建議 --- p.103 / Chapter 第一節 --- 總結：道德本質涵義之辨解和道德教育基本原則之建構 --- p.103 / Chapter 第二節 --- 總結：德性發展與道德教育 --- p.106 / Chapter 第二節 --- 建議 --- p.111 / 參考書目 --- p.114

Chong-Fuk Lau. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 123-127). / Abstract --- p.3 / Chapter 1. --- Introduction --- p.7 / Chapter 1.1. --- The General Problem of Transcendental Philosophy --- p.10 / Chapter 1.2. --- The Concept of Method --- p.14 / Chapter 1.3. --- The Concept of Transcendental Method --- p.17 / Chapter 1.4. --- The Under-Thematized Problem --- p.20 / Chapter 2. --- Kant's Transcendental Method --- p.23 / Chapter 2.1. --- Negative Elucidation --- p.23 / Chapter 2.1.1. --- The Hypothetical Interpretation --- p.23 / Chapter 2.1.2. --- The Analytic Interpretation --- p.26 / Chapter 2.2. --- Positive Elucidation --- p.33 / Chapter 2.2.1. --- Illumination from the Doctrine of Method --- p.38 / Chapter 2.2.1.1. --- Mathematical and Philosophical Method --- p.39 / Chapter 2.2.1.2. --- The Guide of Possible Experience --- p.42 / Chapter 2.2.1.3. --- The Criteria of Transcendental Method --- p.48 / Chapter 2.2.2. --- The Structure of Self-Referentiality --- p.53 / Chapter 2.2.3. --- Kant's Program of Deduction --- p.63 / Chapter 2.2.4. --- The Problem of Reflection --- p.69 / Chapter 2.3. --- Transition to the Under-Thematized Problem --- p.71 / Chapter 3. --- The Problem of Self-Consciousness --- p.76 / Chapter 3.1. --- A Brief Review of the History of the Problem --- p.78 / Chapter 3.2. --- Kant's Explicit Doctrine of Self-Consciousness --- p.81 / Chapter 3.2.1. --- The Doctrine of Inner Sense --- p.84 / Chapter 3.2.2. --- The Criticism of Rational Psychology --- p.90 / Chapter 3.3. --- Approaching a Coherent Interpretation --- p.95 / Chapter 3.3.1. --- The Apparent Conflict and the Clue to Its Solution --- p.95 / Chapter 3.3.2. --- The Concept of Consciousness in Self-Consciousness --- p.99 / Chapter 3.3.2.1. --- Consciousness versus Experience --- p.100 / Chapter 3.3.2.2. --- Consciousness versus Cognition --- p.105 / Chapter 3.3.3. --- The Concept of Self in Self-Consciousness --- p.108 / Chapter 3.3.4. --- The Problem of Reflection Revisited --- p.112 / Chapter 3.4. --- The Need of Further Exploration --- p.116 / Chapter 4. --- Conclusion --- p.121 / Chapter 5. --- Bibliography --- p.123 / Chapter 5.1. --- Kant's Works in German Original --- p.123 / Chapter 5.2. --- English Translations and Abbreviations of Kant's Works --- p.123 / Chapter 5.3. --- English References --- p.124 / Chapter 5.4. --- Chinese References --- p.127 / Chapter 6. --- Indices --- p.128 / Chapter 6.1. --- Index of Names --- p.128 / Chapter 6.2. --- Index of Citations from Kant's Texts --- p.129

The primary focus of this dissertation is the problem of the roles of the moral and the political in political philosophy as exemplified in the philosophies of Kant and Rawls. The research question which intrigues me in the subject matter is whether and to what extent morality has a role in political philosophy. As I argue in this dissertation, while Kant's political philosophy is grounded by his moral philosophy, Rawls holds the opposite view that a political conception of justice should not be derived from any specific moral doctrine. Their contrasting views are further complicated by the fact that Rawls is often regarded as a Kantian due to his partial assimilation of Kant in his theory of justice. A comparative study of their views on the roles of the moral and the political in philosophy is thus particularly instructive in answering the above research question. This dissertation therefore approaches the subject matter from four different angles. In the first chapter, I start with a holistic interpretive account of Kant's moral and political philosophy that is quite different from those in the current literature. Not only do I argue that Kant's moral philosophy is unmistakably an indispensable ground of his political philosophy, but I also argue for a positive duty in politics that is moral by nature. In the second chapter, I shift my focus to Rawls and examine his understanding of morality as reflected in his moral conception of the person in his political philosophy. I argue that the conception is the result of an intended reformulation of Kant's notion of autonomy that is in turn based on an unintended misreading of the same. I go on to relate several weaknesses in Rawls's theory to his understanding of morality and argue that their resolutions require an accurate understanding of the relationship between the moral and the political. The third chapter is a Kantian appraisal of the four roles of political philosophy proposed by Rawls. It is relevant to the subject of this dissertation because the four roles are designed with a strict separation between the political and the moral in mind. If the four roles turn out to be defensible, it would amount to an important defense for such a separation. The fourth chapter offers an alternative for those who are more accustomed to the political than to the moral by proposing a new interpretive approach to Kant's philosophy starting from the political and ending with the moral. By ending this dissertation with this alternative, I hope my research is not merely a comparative study but can also offer a new perspective for a more in-depth understanding of the relationship between the moral and the political in philosophy.

黃浩麒. / "2003年8月". / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2003. / 參考文獻 (leaves 97-98). / 附中英文摘要. / "2003 nian 8 yue". / Huang Haoqi. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2003. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 97-98). / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / 摘要 --- p.4 / Abstract --- p.5 / 康德原著縮寫 --- p.7 / 康德原著引文的翻譯 --- p.8 / 引言 --- p.10 / Chapter 第一章 --- ´ؤ´ؤ簡述反省性判斷力 --- p.18 / Chapter 第二章 --- ´ؤ´ؤ在可能性與現實性之間 --- p.30 / 可能性與現實性 --- p.31 / 曲行的悟性與直觀的悟性 --- p.36 / 實然及應然 --- p.42 / 實在性及其在實踐上的指示 --- p.47 / 人文世界之建立 --- p.56 / Chapter 第三章 --- 吾人的界域 --- p.59 / 康德的界域理論 --- p.59 / 理性的建築術 --- p.62 / 「經驗最大可能的延續及擴展性的原則」 --- p.66 / 「域」、「境」、「界」及實在性之人文意涵 --- p.71 / 「神」所統治下的世界作爲最闊的界域 --- p.74 / Chapter 第四章 --- ´ؤ´ؤ結論：反省性判斷力與人的定位 --- p.83 / 人文世界之闡釋 --- p.84 / 人作爲自然與自由的連結者之意涵 --- p.89 / 參考書目 --- p.97

康德在《單純理性範圍內的宗教》一書中非常重視「思慮品格」(Gesinnung)這個概念，並把它視為所有行動的「終極基本格準」。首先，他認為一個人或道德行動者為善或是惡取決於這種「傾向」。再者，「思慮品格」在康德的行動理論中亦扮演非常重要的角色，它解釋了理性行動者作惡的可能條件。故此，「思慮品格」是評價康德關於「根本惡」以及理性行動理論的重要概念。進一步說，「道德完整」的可能性以及「道德歷程」的可理解性也都建基於此概念。因此，「思慮品格」對於康德道德哲學的整體計劃而言也甚為關鍵。儘管康德在《道德底形上學之基礎》及《實踐理性批判》兩本書中曾數度提及「思慮品格」，但這概念在康德《單純理性範圍內的宗教》之前的著作中卻似未受到充分的重視。本文將要指出，康德並非在其後期作品中才突然提出「思慮品格」這概念，事實上，在許多較早的著作中，這個關鍵的概念早已留下重要的理論線索。 / 本文嘗試指出，康德在討論《實踐理性之批判》裡的「自由範疇」理論，特別是論及「道德人格」範疇時，早已舖排有關「思慮品格」的理論。「道德人格」範疇與「思慮品格」分別為道德罪責提供智性及心理根據，而後者正是以前者作為根據。對康德而言，「道德人格」並非一個心理概念，而是實踐判斷的先驗形式，正如「實體/屬性」這個在時間中連結不同直覺之基礎的「自然範疇」一般，作為它的同位範疇 (isomorphic category)，「道德人格」是關聯個別實踐判斷的基礎。然而，我們仍然需要解釋，行動的證成理由如何推動我們的意志，因為對「有限理性行動者」而言，純粹理性並不一定具有實踐性，或者說，一個行動的證成理由並不一定是我們的動力。康德正是以「思慮品格」這個概念來闡明採納「格準」的心理基礎。當我們釐清了採納「格準」的心理基礎後，便能明白人在甚麼意義下要為自己的行動負責。本文希望能夠清楚闡明「思慮品格」與「道德人格」的關係，更希望由此說明這兩個概念以及「自由範疇表」的理論關係，並對有關問題引起更多關注和討論。 / In religion within the limit of reason alone Kant deliberately proposes the concept Gesinnung and regards it as the “ultimate underlying maxim“ of all actions. Firstly, whether a certain person or a moral agent should be regarded as good or evil depends on this ‘disposition’. Moreover, Gesinnung assumes an important role in Kant's theory of action, namely to explain how it is possible for a rational agent to act evil. It is thus an important aspect of evaluating Kant's account of radical evil and rational agency. Furthermore, the possibility of moral integrity and the intelligibility of moral progress also lie in this concept, rendering it important also in Kant's whole project of moral philosophy. Although Gesinnung appears in Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason for a few times, very little had been said about the use of the term until Religion was written. It would be strange to for Kant to propose this important concept all of a sudden without any previous clues. I shall argue that the clues can already be found in the discussion of Categories of Freedom (the category of Personality) in the Critique of Practical Reason. This thesis aims to demonstrate that the category “personality“ and Gesinnung serve to provide the rational and psychological grounds of moral imputation respectively, and that the latter arises from the foundation built from the former. The category “personality“ is not a psychological concept but an a priori form of practical judgment: as isomorphic to the categories, “personality“ serves as the ground of relating discrete practical judgments just as “subsistence and inherence“ in categories of nature serves as the ground of relating intuitions in time. But we also need a psychological ground for moral imputation to explain how the justifying reason motivates our will, as for a finite rational agent pure reason may not always be practical, i.e. the justifying reasons for certain actions may not always be our motivation for the actions. Kant uses Gesinnung as a conceptual apparatus to explain the psychological ground for the adoption of maxims and hence how we impute our actions. Through this essay, I hope that I have explained the relation between Gesinnung and “personality“ clearly and more importantly, shown that the theoretical significance of these two concepts and the table of the Categories of Freedom deserve closer attention. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Ng, Yat Kan. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 120-121). / Abstracts also in Chinese. / Abstract --- p.i / Table of contents --- p.v / Chapter 0.1 --- Prelude: structure of the essay --- p.1 / Chapter 1.01 --- Searching for the unchanged in the midst of changes- legacy of western philosophy --- p.3 / Chapter 1.1 --- Kant and the category of Subsistence and Inherence --- p.5 / Chapter 1.11 --- The ‘placement problem’ in the Categories of the Understanding --- p.5 / Chapter 1.111 --- Mathematical categories as a priori conditions of intuition --- p.10 / Chapter 1.2 --- “Substance and its transcendental time-determination --- p.15 / Chapter 1.3 --- Kant’s critique of the a-temporal treatment of Substance --- p.20 / Chapter 2 --- Kant’s on the problem of the personal identity: Transcendental “I“, Refutation of Idealism and brief remarks on “personality“ in the Critique of Pure Reason --- p.26 / Chapter 2.1 --- Transcendental apperception --- p.26 / Chapter 2.11 --- Kant’s refutation of idealism --- p.30 / Chapter 2.2 --- Preliminary remark: “Person and its genealogy --- p.38 / Chapter 2.21 --- Personality: Remarks from Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason --- p.41 / Chapter 3 --- Interlude: Brief accounts on the Moral Law and Autonomy --- p.45 / Chapter 3.1 --- The Moral Law 45 / Chapter 3.2 --- On autonomy: an explication on the role of “self“ in “self-legislation“ --- p.51 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Wood’s etymological mistake --- p.52 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- Kant’s distinction on the “author and the “legislator“ of the law --- p.53 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- Typic as a “procedure and the significance of “autos --- p.57 / Chapter 3.3 --- Intelligible noumenal character and the Empirical phenomenal character --- p.61 / Chapter 4 --- “Personality“ in Kant’s moral philosophy --- p.69 / Chapter 4.1 --- Overview of the problem --- p.69 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Categories of Freedom: a complete failure? --- p.71 / Chapter 4.3 --- “Personality as the “substratum of moral actions 85 / Chapter 5 --- The Analysis of the Will and Radical Evil --- p.94 / Chapter 5.1 --- Introduction: The Good Will and the Absolutely Good Will --- p.94 / Chapter 5.11 --- The Good and the Evil --- p.95 / Chapter 5.2 --- Autonomy part two: Wille and Willkür --- p.101 / Chapter 5.3 --- The Gesinnung --- p.104 / Chapter 5.31 --- Gesinnung and Personality: the psychological and rational grounds of moral imputation --- p.105 / Chapter 5.32 --- Gesinnung and Radical Evil --- p.110 / Chapter 6 --- Concluding remarks --- p.118 / Chapter 7 --- Bibliography --- p.120

Publicación a texto completo no autorizada por el autor / El documento digital no refiere asesor / Manifiesta que la ética discursiva surgió como un esfuerzo por atender a las críticas hegelianas contra ética kantiana. Mediante el descenso epistemológico del imperativo categórico al ámbito práctico se pretendió conciliar el dualismo kantiano: el mundo nouménico y el fenoménico. Sin embargo la distancia entre Habermas y Apel, sus máximos representantes, yace en la interpretación que cada uno le da al descenso del imperativo categórico y tiene consecuencias en la forma en cada uno de ellos justifica su aplicación y la fundamentación normativa de los principios morales universales. Entonces la ética del discurso dista mucho de constituir una unidad, La estructura del sujeto trascendental kantiano es muy diferente a la del sujeto insular cartesiano, ya no se trata de la introspección metafísica confinada a un espacio privado incomunicable y ajeno al mundo. Mientras que Descartes basaba la certeza del sujeto epistemológico en su irrebasabilidad al permanecer fuera del mundo, en la forma de una substancia pensante, para la cual no era necesario un pensador. Para Kant, el sujeto dejó de ser una substancia, sino que es una conciencia que se determina al proyectarse en el mundo tanto en el plano especulativo como en el práctico. La conciencia trascendental, el “yo soy” permanece indeterminada, en el uso especulativo de la razón se determina mediante el tiempo, al permitir la adecuación entre las categorías y las intuiciones, entonces es su proyección cognoscitiva, el conocimiento de las cosas, lo que le permite determinarse como “yo pienso”. En el plano práctico de la moral, la conciencia trascendental se determina por medio de la acción judicativa, al ponerse a sí misma confrontada a sus pasiones y deseos, que juzga cuándo un deber es adecuado a una determinada situación. Entonces la determinación del agente moral se produce en consideración a la situación particular, en su proyección al mundo de la vida. / Tesis

La présente recherche porte en bonne partie sur le premier chapitre de l'Analytique des concepts, également désigné par Kant comme étant la déduction métaphysique. Pour l'essentiel, ce chapitre présente deux tables, celle des formes logiques du jugement et celle des concepts purs de l'entendement. Notre objectif est de tenter de voir en quoi les formes logiques du jugement peuvent nous amener à déduire les concepts purs de l'entendement, ce qui est la prétention de Kant. Notre hypothèse est qu'un rapport déductif peut être envisagé entre les deux tables dans la mesure où on tient compte du type de jugement impliqué et des diverses significations qu'on peut donner à «déduction métaphysique». Au premier chapitre, nous analysons les types de logique chez Kant pour comprendre la nature exacte de la logique formelle et son rôle dans la déduction mètaphysique. Nous concluons que celui-ci consiste à clarifier les règles fondamentales de l'entendement et que, ce faisant, l'analyse de ces «lois» peut certainement fournir des indications sur les concepts purs. Notre étude des types de jugement nous amène par ailleurs à conclure que, selon toute vraisemblance, il ne peut s'agir dans la déduction métaphysique que du jugement déterminant. Le deuxième chapitre est d'ailleurs consacré à la structure interne du jugement déterminant et à ses diverses fonctions. La première partie conclut que l'acte de détermination temporelle est au coeur de notre problème et la seconde partie qu'il existe des liens inéquivoques entre le jugement et le concept en général. Si les deux premiers chapitres sont surtout analytiques et explicatifs, le troisième chapitre est plutôt évaluatif. Il propose une évaluation des critiques de Strawson, Heidegger et Longuenesse. Cette dernière étape permet de prendre du recul sur la signification de la déduction métaphysique et de considérer notre question en dehors de son cadre strict. Au terme de notre recherche, nous concluons qu'il semble impossible de parvenir à déduire les concepts purs des simples formes logiques du jugement, sans l'éclairage de la déduction transcendantale et du schématisme. En ce sens, il faut plutôt considérer le premier chapitre de l'Analytique des concepts comme le début d'une explication qui trouve son achèvement au terme de l'Analytique transcendantale. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Kant, Jugement, Logique, Formes, Catégories, Déduction.

No description available.

No abstract available. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Durban-Westville, 1979.