El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar justamente la Ciencia de la Lógica, texto en el que Hegel por primera vez presenta formalmente su método dialéctico (al cual llama, justamente, el Método, en la última parte del Libro III), el cual no es otra cosa que una manera de visualizar la realidad que, siguiendo fundamentalmente los planteamientos de Heráclito, se muestra como una total alternativa a la lógica tradicional de Aristóteles. Las palabras recién citadas de Ernst Bloch, ya adelantan la peculiaridad del pensamiento del filósofo que aquí se comienza a estudiar.

Call number: LD2668 .R4 1966 L373

This dissertation examines the use of argumentum ad baculum in preaching in general and the sermons of George Whitefield in particular. Argumentum ad baculum has traditionally been considered an informal fallacy of relevance. The fallacy can be defined as an appeal to force or an appeal to fear. Chapter 1 discusses the relationship of argumentum ad baculum with the empirical study of fear appeals and the rhetorical use of pathos. Attention is also given to the preaching of Whitefield and his place in the history of preaching as an innovator. Whitefield's role in the shift to a more passionate and emotional sermon style is noted. The chapter also addresses the challenges a study of Whitefield's sermons presents. Chapter 2 is devoted to defining argumentum ad baculum, examining the history of the phrase, the two ways it has been defined, the nature of it as a fallacy, and fear appeals as a part of the definition. The chapter includes a discussion of source credibility in relation to fear appeals. Chapter 3 analyses the sermons of Whitefield to identify his use of fear appeals. The types of fear appeals he used in his sermons are listed along with evidentiary sermon material. The types of material Whitefield used to formulate the appeals are also discussed. Chapter 4 gives attention to the effect of Whitefield's fear appeals on his auditors. In order for an appeal to be effective, it must first arouse fear in the recipients of the appeal. Historical narratives are examined from Whitefield himself, eyewitness accounts, and personal testimonies of those who were present at his meetings. The chapter provides evidence of the general and specific effect of Whitefield's fear appeals. Chapter 5 concerns the ethicality of Whitefield's appeals. The chapter surveys a number of standards for ethical judgment. The chapter argues that Whitefield's use of fear in his published sermons was ethical, primarily because of the intention with which he used them. Chapter 6 offers guidelines for the contemporary use of argumentum ad baculum in preaching. Modern audiences are unaccustomed to the use of fear for persuasive means. However, this type of argumentation can be used ethically and effectively.

My dissertation concerns Hegel’s mature theoretical philosophy. I focus on the role of logic, meant here in a much more conventional sense of the term than is usually thought relevant to Hegel’s thought. I argue that Hegel’s main achievement in logic is to attempt a noncircular derivation of its laws and materials. Central to my interpretation is a sympathetic treatment of Hegel’s claim that Kant did not have a comparably rigorous justification for logic. In Hegel’s view, the critical philosophy’s pervasive reliance on logic precludes it from evaluating the latter in a non-question-begging way. As a result, Kant is forced to ground logic psychologically (though not “psychologistically” in Frege’s sense). For Hegel, Kant’s critical philosophy is insufficiently self-critical with respect to its own logical foundations. It is therefore vulnerable to criticism on logical grounds — especially from a Hegelian direction. As I also hope to show, Hegel rejects Kant’s critique of metaphysics, arguing that its logical presuppositions are unfounded. Once those presuppositions are overhauled, the true source of the metaphysical tradition’s impasses becomes apparent, and a non-Kantian-idealist, metaphysical solution is at hand. The lesson is that metaphysics is an enduring possibility, provided it is based on secure logical foundations.

This dissertation defends a Hegelian model of our relationship to social roles. This model functions both as a new interpretation of Hegel’s own view, and as a contribution to the contemporary debate about role obligations. On this model, it is constitutive of our agency, and therefore obligatory, to carry out our social roles. Yet, ‘carrying out’ our roles also necessarily involves that we persistently develop our roles, and the social order of which they are part, towards realizing the human good. In that process, we are required to lead society through a process of social evolution, whose basic structure mirrors the development of natural life at a higher, self-conscious level. From the standpoint of Hegel scholarship, the main upshot of my interpretation is that Hegel’s vision of social participation does not only leave room for social critique, as commentators have recently argued, but rather centrally requires such critique. In fact, I argue that Hegel has – what I will call – a Neo-Aristotelian model of social critique (centered around the idea of ‘living unity’) that is an essential component of his account of how we should relate to social roles, but that has been hitherto overlooked. From the standpoint of the contemporary debate on role obligations, the main upshot of my interpretation is that Hegel offers an account that neither limits the normativity of social roles to those roles we have actually accepted, nor to the roles that are reflectively acceptable. Instead, Hegel develops an account on which even reflectively unacceptable roles give us obligations – namely obligations to evolve them, through a process of social experimentation, into something better. It is this view – and the central function that it attributes to social evolution as part of our role obligations – that make Hegel an interesting, but often overlooked, contributor to the debate about role obligations today.

Informe de Seminario para optar al grado de Licenciada en Filosofía / [...] Como un ejemplo de esta constante víctima de sacrificio o subestimación es como hallamos al infinito hegeliano. Aunque en los estudiosos de Hegel este concepto no ha pasado desapercibido, la importancia se le ha otorgado más bien por la originalidad de esta idea en la historia de la filosofía que por sus repercusiones en el mismo pensamiento hegeliano. Es cierto, esta idea del infinito, con toda la complejidad y multiplicidad de facciones que posee, es una idea única e innovadora. En el presente trabajo veremos cómo ésta, nutriéndose de los conceptos más peculiares del pasado, supera las anteriores nociones que tenían los filósofos de lo infinito. Sin embargo, aunque necesitamos entender este concepto a partir de sus antecedentes —y esta es la principal razón por la que aquí nos remitiremos a la historia del concepto antes de Hegel—, no deberá entenderse que este es el foco de la tesis. El propósito primordial de esta tesis se dirige a destacar la importancia que tiene este concepto en el mismo sistema hegeliano. Nos proponemos desvelar una nueva lectura de Hegel, que no se abra a partir de necesidades personales o circunstanciales de la época o contexto del lector, sino que se inicie a partir del mismo Hegel, como una necesidad oculta del mismo sistema. Esta nueva lectura se caracterizará por poner un acento en la infinitud, considerándola no sólo como un concepto interesante y novedoso de Hegel, sino como el concepto que le da el sentido y que necesita para la sobrevivencia el movimiento dialéctico.

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The Italianate Wordsworth is a study of William Wordsworth's enduring interest in Italian literature and culture -- an important aspect of his intellectual life and creativity to which no previous book has been devoted. Of all the first-generation Romantics, Wordsworth was the most influenced by Italian poetry and aesthetics. The roots of his passion for the Italian language stretch back to the earliest stages of his imaginative development and extend throughout his life. His voluminous reading of and recurrent engagement with Italian texts -- as translator and imitator -- began in the late 1780s, when he was under the tutelage of Agostino Isola at Cambridge University. Wordsworth translated works by Petrarch, the paradigmatic Italian sonneteer, in 1789-90; by Ludovico Ariosto, the master of epic romance, between 1789 and 1795, in 1802, and in 1815; by Pietro Metastasio, author of popular songs and melodramas, in 1802-1803; by Michelangelo Buonarroti, the artist, poet, and polymath, in 1804 and again in 1839-1840; and by Gabriello Chiabrera, the epitaphist, in 1809-10 and 1837. Wordsworth's immersion in Italian culture became complete in 1837 when, at the age of sixty-seven, he made an extended visit to Italy. During the four months of this sojourn he was able, after years of dedicated reading and translation of major Italian texts from the foundational Trecento to the pre-Romantic Enlightenment, to realize fully his connection with Italy. In the period that followed, he composed poems that addressed various aspects of Italian history, politics, and culture; and in the last collection of poetry he published in his lifetime, Poems, Chiefly of Early and Late Years (1842), he included a series of twenty-eight poetic reflections entitled "Memorials of a Tour in Italy." This dissertation sheds light not only on Wordsworth's debt to Italian culture but also on our inherited ideas about the English Romantic relationship to Italy. Given the emphasis traditionally placed on the Italianate leanings of the second-generation Romantics, the impact of Italian literature on the mind and writings of a first-generation poet like Wordsworth has been largely forgotten. Thus the "Italianate Wordsworth" comes as something of a surprise. Time and again, he expresses his veneration for the style and sensibility of Italian poets from Dante to Tasso, often going so far as to emulate their techniques and adopt their cadences in his original English verse. As a poet, scholar, translator, and traveler, he is receptive to all that Italian civilization provides.

The thesis investigates the prophetic in Wordsworth's ‘golden decade' (1798-1808). It establishes the following arguments: the prophetic in Wordsworth should not be treated of only incidental interest; it is a mode of his self-fashioning, as well as a mode of his writing, channelling the poet's anxieties about his authorship, readership, reception and posterity. The thesis contains an introduction and a short conclusion, with two main sections amounting to 7 chapters. Chapter 1 to 3 form Part I, focusing on the prophetic as a mode of self-fashioning. Chapter 1 re-examines The Prelude, arguing that self-doubts and struggle are inherent to Wordsworth's prophetic aspirations. Chapter 2 discusses three major reasons that make Wordsworth's self-fashioning as a poet of prophetic quality possible: personal aspirations, knowledge economy, and prophetic discourse of his time. Chapter 3 investigates anxieties generated in self-fashioning: anxiety of influence and anxiety about reception. Chapter 4 to 7 form Part II, exploring the prophetic as a mode of writing. Chapter 4 studies the apocalyptic vision of the rupture in human history in Lyrical Ballads. Chapter 5 looks into Wordsworth's concern with the nation in ‘Sonnets Dedicated to Liberty'. Chapter 6 focuses on the dual prophetic quality of The White Doe of Rylstone and its links to discourse of duty and Catholic Emancipation. Chapter 7 studies the prophet-like speaker and the prophetic nature of the narrative in Peter Bell. It also considers the discrepancy between the poet's ideal reader and his actual reader as the reason why the poem fails to appeal. The claim to innovation in the thesis is that it offers a corrective reading of the prophetic as a mode of self-fashioning and a mode of writing in Wordsworth. It also sheds new light on the poet's acclaimed major works such as Lyrical Ballads, as well as widely criticised minor ones such as Peter Bell.