In October 1863 the United States Army's Rio Grande Expedition left New Orleans, bound for the Texas coast. Reacting to the recent French occupation of Mexico, President Abraham Lincoln believed that the presence of U.S. troops in Texas would dissuade the French from intervening in the American Civil War. The first major objective of this campaign was Brownsville, Texas, a port city on the lower Rio Grande. Its capture would not only serve as a warning to the French in Mexico; it would also disrupt a lucrative Confederate cotton trade across the border. The expedition had a mixed record of achievement. It succeeded in disrupting the cotton trade, but not stopping it. Federal forces installed a military governor, Andrew J. Hamilton, in Brownsville, but his authority extended only to the occupied part of Texas, a strip of land along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. The campaign also created considerable fear among Confederate soldiers and civilians that the ravages of civil war had now come to the Lone Star State. Although short-lived, the panic generated by the Rio Grande Expedition left an indelible mark on the memories of Texans who lived through the campaign. The expedition achieved its greatest success by establishing a permanent Federal presence in Texas as a warning against possible French meddling north of the Rio Grande.

It is the purpose of this thesis to present the problem of Greeley's efforts to influence Abraham Lincoln, with specific emphasis upon the Illinoisian's nomination, his election, his attitude toward secession before his inauguration, and his Presidential policies during the four years that he served as chief executive in the White House.

This thesis studies the issue of unionism in Texas during the era of the Civil War.

"This thesis describes the art of logistics practiced by Santa-Anna and his staff in the marches from Northern Mexico to San Jacinto and Goliad, and the subsequent withdrawal. The method, or methods, employed to keep such an army in fighting condition are analyzed as it moved slowly and uncertainly across the desert and semi-desert areas, over burnt-out prairies and flooding rivers. To obtain the most complete picture of the Mexican army's movements and needs, the letters and diaries of the outstanding Mexican participants were used. Whenever possible American sources were studied to substantiate any seemingly questionable information in the Mexican accounts...As this thesis is primarily concerned with logistics, battles are not covered in detail. In cases where a conflict between American and Mexican sources exists concerning any phase of the Mexican military movements during the Texan revolution, both sides are presented, and an attempt made to evaluate them objectively." -- leaf x.

庄星來. / "2005年12月" / 論文(哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2005. / 參考文獻(leaves 155-171). / "2005 nian 12 yue" / Abstracts also in English. / Zhuang Xinglai. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2005. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 155-171). / 內容提要（中文） --- p.iv / 内容提要（英文） --- p.II / 致謝 --- p.III / Chapter 第一章 --- 研究介紹 --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- 聞一多及其譯作《白郎寧夫人的情詩》的介紹 --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- 聞一多詩歌翻譯的研究現狀 --- p.9 / Chapter 1.3 --- 研究思路及論文架構 --- p.11 / Chapter 第二章 --- 《白郎寧夫人的情詩》發表的背景 --- p.14 / Chapter 2.1 --- 《白郎寧夫人的情詩》在聞一多新格律詩探索過程中的位置 --- p.14 / Chapter 2.2 --- 新月書店及《新月》月刊的組織經營情況 --- p.25 / Chapter 2.3 --- 新月同人之間的分歧及聞一多「刻意」的努力 --- p.27 / Chapter 2.4 --- 小´ب結 --- p.34 / Chapter 第三章 --- 《白郎寧夫人的情詩》及聞一多的選材目的 --- p.36 / Chapter 3.1 --- 原作者及作品介紹 --- p.39 / Chapter 3.2 --- 選材的目的 --- p.43 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- 《白郎寧夫人的情詩》的愛情 --- p.44 / Chapter 3.2.2 --- 《白郎寧夫人的情詩》的形式 --- p.51 / Chapter 3.3 --- 小結 --- p.55 / Chapter 第四章 --- 聞譯《白郎寧夫人的情詩》分析 --- p.56 / Chapter 4.1 --- 譯詩形式特點 --- p.58 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- 聞一多對十四行詩形式的認識 --- p.58 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- 韻式 --- p.60 / Chapter 4.1.3 --- 行式(兼談跨行現像) --- p.65 / Chapter 4.1.4 --- 章式 --- p.76 / Chapter 4.1.5 --- 與譯詩形式相關的翻譯選擇 --- p.75 / Chapter 4.1.5.1 --- 增加成分 --- p.79 / Chapter 4.1.5.2 --- 詞句的改動 --- p.85 / Chapter 4.1.5.3 --- 外國人名的處理 --- p.87 / Chapter 4.1.5.4 --- 詩行内容的對應情況 --- p.94 / Chapter 4.2 --- 聞一多譯詩的内容及風格 --- p.98 / Chapter 4.3 --- 聞譯《白郎寧夫人的情詩》的特點總結 --- p.117 / Chapter 第五章 --- 總結：譯詩與創作的關係 --- p.119 / 附錄一、聞一多譯詩簡表 --- p.129 / 附錄二、SONNETS FROM THE PORTUGUESE XIV --- p.135 / 附錄三、聞一多譯〈白郎寧夫人的情詩〉校訂 --- p.140 / 附錄四、聞一多譯〈白郎寧夫人的情詩〉的腳韻格式 --- p.151 / 附錄五、聞一多譯〈白郎寧夫人的情詩〉每行字數及音組數 --- p.153 / 參考書目 --- p.155

No description available.

No description available.

This study investigates the development of large unit command and control in the United States Army prior to the American Civil War. It examines the results of this development in one early campaign of the war. The paper's theme is that the excessive casualties suffered during the early stages of the war were not only a result of the improvements in weapons technology, the size of the armies or the personalities of the individual commanders. Another, and potentially more serious cause was the inability of the Union commanders to command, control, and maneuver these units to achieve campaign objectives.The paper begins by describing how war is organized into three levels: strategy, operations, and tactics; and defining the concepts related to command and control. The influences on the development of the Civil War leadership are next examined. These include: Napoleonic Warfare, the teachings of Jomini, Mahan, and Halleck; the the formal and informal educational experiences of the officers. Next command and control doctrine within the Union Army is examined.The case study used for examining operational command and control during the early period of the Civil War is the Maryland Campaign of 1862 which culminated at the Battle of Antietam in September of that year. Throughout the thesis, the education and performance of the Army of the Potomac's commander, George B. McClellan is examined.The conclusion of the paper is that the United States Army was poorly prepared for the conduct of large unit operations. This poor preparation, and performance, could not be blamed on any single individual, including McClellan. It was the result of complex educational, experiential, and organizational factors which shaped the pre-war Army.Finally, this paper concludes that General McClellan's inability to decisively maneuver the forces at his disposal was a significant factor in the outcome of the engagement at Sharpsburg, Maryland on 17 September, 1862.

No description available.

No description available.