Thesis (M.A.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1966. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Texte remanié de: Väitöskirja--Historia--Turun yliopisto, 2006. / Bibliogr. p. 456-463.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Sydney, 2007. / Title from title screen (viewed 28 March 2008). Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Dept. of History, Faculty of Arts. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print form.

Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 122-134). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

I samband med vinterkriget mellan Finland och Sovjetunionen 1939 uppnådde de finska förbandenstora framgångar på taktisk nivå, framförallt vid striderna på det norra frontavsnittet.Terrängen vid fronten norr om Ladoga karakteriserades av en begränsad infrastruktur innehållandeett fåtal vägar. Striderna genomfördes också under svåra klimatförhållanden medmycket låga dygnstemperaturer och rikligt med snö.Syftet med uppsatsen är att med utgångspunkt i den teoretiska modellen om de sex grundläggandeförmågorna, ledning, underrättelser och information, verkan, skydd, rörlighet och uthållighet,identifiera orsakerna till de stora finska framgångarna på taktisk nivå i ovan nämndaterräng. Detta har gjorts genom att genomföra två fallstudier av den finska 9:e divisionen ochdess agerande vid två olika krigsskådeplatser. Studierna omfattar tidpunkten då 9:e divisionenpåbörjade sin verksamhet mot den längs Raatevägen framryckande sovjetiska 44:e divisionenden 11 december 1939 intill krigsslutet den 13 mars 1940.Analysen visar att det finska agerandet var präglat av en balans mellan de olika förmågorna. Desovjetiska förbanden hade också svårt att påverka de finska förmågorna utifrån sitt agerande.Avslutningsvis diskuteras resultatet av den genomförda analysen gentemot de inledande frågeställningarna.Ett antal slutsatser dras och ett antal nya frågeställningar förs fram. / In the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union in 1939 Finnish units achieved greatsuccess on a tactical level in the battles in northern Finland. The terrain at the front north ofthe lake Ladoga was characterized by a limited infrastructure with very few roads. The combatat the northern front was very difficult to conduct because of the extremely unfavourableclimatic conditions, with very low temperatures and overabundant snow.The main purpose of this essay is to identify the causes behind the great Finnish success on atactical level in a terrain with bad infrastructure. This essay will examine the following threequestions:• Which capacities were especially important for the Finnish success?• How did the Soviet capacities influence the results Finland achieved in the battles?• The six capacities interact with each other. How did Finnish action demonstrate this?The method for this study has been to use the dynamic model of the six capacities describedin Swedish military doctrines: command and control, mobility, protection, effect, intelligenceand staying power. This dynamic model has been used to analyse two case studies of the actionof the Finnish 9th Division. The study begins when the 9th Division begins to take actionagainst the advancing Soviet 44th Division on the Raateroad in December 1939 to the end ofthe war in March 1940. The results of this analysis will be discussed in the conclusion of thisessay. Some conclusions from the analysis and some new research questions will also be presented.The study shows that Finnish action was characterised by a balance between the differentcapacities. The 9th Division was very successful in its action against the capacities of the differentSoviet divisions. Moreover, the Soviet units encountered difficulties reacting againstthe Finnish capacities. Numerous examples of how the Finnish capacities interacted with eachother appear in the analysis / Avdelning: ALB - Slutet Mag 3 C-upps.Hylla: Upps. ChP 04-06

L'armée française a conduit une bataille victorieuse sur les Alpes en juin 1940. C'est sans aucun doute, encore aujourd'hui, l'aspect le plus méconnu des combats qui se sont déroulés en mai-juin 1940. Une étude générale des relations franco-italiennes et du contexte géopolitique permet de comprendre pourquoi, après d'aussi longues relations complexes et passionnées, l'Italie a déclaré la guerre à la France. Les aspects spécifiques de la guerre en montagne, en particulier les fortifications des Alpes, la création de troupes adaptées au milieu ainsi que les plans d'opérations sont étudiés, afin d'expliquer le contexte de préparation de la bataille de chaque côté de la frontière. L'étude précise des combats porte sur le front central des Alpes, c'est-à-dire sur les secteurs géographiques du Briançonnais, du Queyras et de l'Ubaye. La défense de ce front de plus de 120 kilomètres, modifiée en profondeur durant toute la période de la drôle de guerre, est finalement confiée à seulement deux grandes unités du 14ème corps d'armée, le secteur fortifié du Dauphiné et la 64ème division d'infanterie, qui vont être opposées à plus de 6 divisions italiennes. Les forces en présence, leurs tactiques, leurs atouts et leurs faiblesses sont présentés ; l'enchaînement détaillé des opérations est restitué dans le détail puis analysé. Un bilan permet de comprendre les nombreuses causes de l'échec des forces italiennes. Enfin, des enseignements humains, tactiques et politiques sont tirés avant que soit abordée en conclusion la portée de ces évènements / The french army led a victorious battle in the Alps on june, 1940. It is undoubtedly, even today, the most unrecognized aspect of various fights which happened on may-june, 1940. A general study of french-italian relationships and geopolitical context allows to understand why Italy declared war on France after such complex and passionate relationships. In order to explain the context of preparation of the battle on each side of the border, this essay will focus on the specific aspects of war in mountains, in particular the fortifications of the Alps, the training of troops well suited to the environment as well as the plans of operations. The precise study of the fightings is centered on the middle front of the alps, specifically on the geographical areas of Briançonnais, Queyras and Ubaye. the defense of this front of more than 120 kilometres, amended in depth throughout the period of the phoney war, is finally entrusted to only two large units of 14th army corps, the dauphiné fortified sector and the 64th infantry division, which will be opposed to more than 6 italian divisions. Both armis, their tactics, their force and weakness are presented ; the detailed sequence of operations is returned in details and analysed. A balance sheet allows understanding the many causes of italian forces failure. Finally, human, tactic and policy lessons are learned before tackling the various consequences of these events

In both western and Russian historiography the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-40 enjoys, at best, only a passing reference in any narrative of the period and is poorly integrated into existing scholarly analyses of the Soviet regime under Stalin. It is my contention that this conflict offers an invaluable opportunity to test for continuity and change in the form and function of the Stalinist system. Between the disastrous efforts of its forces and the condemnation of the international community, the Kremlin was confronted with the serious challenge of how to portray the events of the war in the media, while managing domestic and international opinion over the course of the fighting. This thesis examines the extent to which the Soviet regime under Stalin had the institutions and agents in place at the close of the 1930s to cope with the crisis of war in Finland; to be in command of the military campaign, while simultaneously controlling the direction of the official narrative about the fighting; and to censor conflicting interpretations, experiences and information channels, which might expose the Red Army's woeful performance on Finnish territory. This mobilisation of press, propaganda and censorship organs in the face of widespread international condemnation and domestic disquiet constituted a significant challenge for a regime still dealing with the sudden reorientation of the Communist International, required after the Soviet Union's conclusion of a non-aggression treat with Nazi Germany in August 1939. An international perspective is central to this thesis, with a view towards assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the public face and private practice of Soviet information controls.

Disputats, Uppsala universitet, 2007. / Findes også på internet (PDF-format): http://www.diva-portal.org/diva/getDocument?urn_nbn_se_uu_diva-7902-2__fulltext.pdf.