Malgré son échec sur le plan militaire, l'offensive lancée par les communistes vietnamiens lors de la trêve du Têt de 1968 entraîne une véritable crise politique aux États-Unis. Le fait que les troupes ennemies puissent mener un assaut d'une telle envergure sur les villes sud-vietnamiennes suscite alors de graves interrogations par rapport à la progression de la guerre et à sa gestion par l'administration Johnson. Cette crise couvre la période du 31 janvier, date du déclenchement de l'offensive, au 31 mars, jour où le président Lyndon Johnson surprend ses concitoyens en annonçant sa décision d'amorcer un désengagement d'Asie du Sud-Est, ainsi que son intention de ne pas briguer un nouveau mandat. Ce mémoire respecte les mêmes balises temporelles et s'attarde aux réactions des pouvoirs exécutif et législatif américains à la suite de ces attaques urbaines. L'accent est mis sur la position des « colombes » et des « faucons » en ce qui a trait à la manière de régler le conflit vietnamien et sur le désaccord qui règne entre ces deux groupes antagonistes au sujet des effectifs militaires et des bombardements. Son principal apport découle d'un usage systématique du Congressional Record en lien avec la question, par ailleurs fort documentée, de l'offensive du Têt.

This study argues that despite the basic inertia in U.S. China policy during the Kennedy and Johnson years, the period nonetheless witnessed a fundamental evolution in the strategic presumptions underlying Washington’s approach to the China “problem.” By increments, U.S. policymakers began to seriously question the wisdom of a policy predicated on the idea that the containment of the People’s Republic of China necessitated its political and economic isolation. Inversely, a basic consensus emerged in interested corners of the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy that considered attempts to engage the Chinese—on levels bilateral and multilateral, official and unofficial—could serve to socialise China’s revolutionaries, thereby facilitating a reduction in Sino-American tensions and paving the way to a bilateral rapprochement. Critically, in this analysis “engagement” was seen as a means of enhancing, rather than simply supplanting, the larger effort to contain China. The dynamics involved in the emergence of this consensus are manifold and complex, and cannot be properly understood without close reference to changes in both the international strategic environment and the domestic political context through the 1960s. At the heart of this process, however, were advocates of policy moderation within the U.S. bureaucracy, mediating external pressures for policy movement, and championing the case for a more conciliatory approach to Sino-American relations. The growing acceptance of what was sometimes articulated as “containment without isolation”—shorthand for a policy framework that implicitly rejects the either/or choice between containment and engagement—found expression in, and was in turn fostered by, basic adjustments in Washington’s posture toward Mao’s China. By the end of 1968 senior U.S. officials had repeatedly signalled that Washington was reconciled to the reality of a Communist-controlled mainland China, and would in fact welcome expanded efforts toward bilateral accommodation and even cooperation. These postural shifts may not have been matched by concrete policy changes, yet they remain significant. In the most immediate sense, the less provocative posture toward China enhanced Washington’s capacity to communicate U.S. intent to China’s leadership, thereby helping avert a direct Sino-American conflict in the 1960s, even as the two sides pursued antithetical objectives in the Asian region. In a longer-term frame of reference, the more flexible posture adopted in the 1960s played an important role in challenging the domestic politicisation of China policy, while establishing a rhetorical framework and conceptual foundation for more substantive policy movement. In the course of tracing these developments, this study also provides new interpretative insights on a number of specific issues pertaining to U.S. China policy in the Kennedy and Johnson years, including the policy preferences, relationships, and roles of key U.S. officials in shaping the policy process; the impact of domestic politics, alliance politics, and various Cold War strategic concerns on policy outcomes; the question of how to deal with China’s nuclear development; and the manner in which major China-related events and developments in the 1960s—such as the failure of Mao’s Great Leap Forward, the 1962 Taiwan Strait crisis, the Sino-Indian border war, China’s involvement in Vietnam, and the Cultural Revolution— were interpreted by U.S. officials, and, in turn, shaped understandings of and responses to the China problem. / http://proxy.library.adelaide.edu.au/login?url= http://library.adelaide.edu.au/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?BBID=1330812 / Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Adelaide, School of History and Politics, 2008

PORTO, Márcio de Souza. Dom Delgado na igreja de seu tempo (1963 – 1969). 2007. 215f. Dissertação (Mestrado em História) - Universidade Federal do Ceará, Departamento de História, Programa de Pós-Graduação em História Social, Fortaleza-CE, 2007. / Submitted by Raul Oliveira (raulcmo@hotmail.com) on 2012-06-27T16:13:21Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2007_Dis_MSPorto.pdf: 16072367 bytes, checksum: c5ba0b6d28410e0cd5516076eed44b5a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Josineide Góis(josineide@ufc.br) on 2012-07-20T13:56:48Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2007_Dis_MSPorto.pdf: 16072367 bytes, checksum: c5ba0b6d28410e0cd5516076eed44b5a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-07-20T13:56:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2007_Dis_MSPorto.pdf: 16072367 bytes, checksum: c5ba0b6d28410e0cd5516076eed44b5a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 / O recudescimento da cultura política autoritária na década de 60 no Brasil coincidiu com a realização do Concílio Vaticano II (1962 - 1965), a mais importante reforma do catolicismo no século XX. O Concílio ao tentar responder às problemáticas resultantes do pós-guerra, reformulou a doutrina da Igreja, aprovou novidades como padres operários, a missa em língua vernácula e privilegiou a participação dos leigos nas pastorais. Aqui buscamos problematizar as vicissitudes do catolicismo no Ceará na década de 1960, período de renovação do pensamento social cristão a partir da determinação da libertação social do pobre como imperativo teológico e ético. Tomando como referencial o episcopado de Dom José de Medeiros Delgado, nos interessa perceber os deslocamentos que foram se operacionalizando no catolicismo no Ceará, no recorte cronológico aqui estabelecido (1963 - 1969). Por um lado, interpretaremos como a Igreja foi alterando o seu perfil institucional, a sua imagem tradicional e, por outro, explicitaremos os condiconamentos históricos que possibilitaram uma maior articulação da Igreja com o universo social.