The main objective of this thesis is to estimate and evaluate the impact of the Egyptian petroleum sector on the Egyptian economy during the period 1962-1982 within both micro and macro-economic approaches. On the basis of the empirical findings of the study, the oil sector comes out fairly well as a good leading sector in the Egyptian economy. The study has also revealed that the domestic consumption of oil has dramatically increased at a high rate of growth as well as the oil production/reserves ratio is relatively high in Egypt comparing to a country which has a huge amount of oil reserves. Considering the above three facts, Egypt can face the following problems: 1) The uncertainty of oil discovery and 2) The gains in the terms of trade are limited due to the decrease or the slight increase in oil prices. In this case, it can be anticipated not only the impact of the oil sector to fall but also Egypt can be expected to be a net oil importer in the very near future. Therefore, the study has investigated both oil demand and oil supply sides in Egypt in order to determine the main factors which affect them and which in turn affect the role of the oil sector in the economy in an attempt to reach some policy recommendations which might help policy makers in planning and controlling petroleum activities in Egypt in such a way that their contributions can be maximized. On the basis of such investigation, it has been concluded that reconsidering the domestic pricing policy of oil in Egypt is very crucial in order to decrease and rationalize domestic oil consumption in particular the analysis of the subsidy system of petroleum products in Egypt has revealed that the system has not achieved its main goals. Examining the main determinants of oil supply in Egypt, it seems very important to intensify investment in oil exploration activities in order to secure and increase oil reserves and which in turn lead to secure oil supply. Also, it seems reasonable that the relatively optimal policy of oil production in a country at a stage of rebuilding and developing her economy such as Egypt is that policy which produces on a level sufficient to be exchanged for a financial resource and which in turn could be invested in capital formation and thus developing the basic productive sectors. Such policy is thus taking account of future generations by directing oil revenues to future welfare through investment channels.

No description available.

No description available.

Autobiography. Present in Georges Perec's writings but only in a profoundly revisionary way. In order to get a genuine understanding of his works, we must begin by recognizing the centrality of the Jewish genocide, the Shoah, in the writer's existence as well as in his activity. / Unprovided with a story of his own, the writer surely felt the imbalance between what the autobiographical tradition offered him and his need to fashion the ephemeral recollections of his past. Hence, he had to destabilize the very idea of autobiographical narrative by writing out his story in a singular and distinct manner. / While reversing the traditional pattern of autobiography, Georges Perec tries to find the most appropriate literary form to record the enormity of the human loss caused by the event. Despite the fact that he is neither a victim nor a survivor, the writer has succeeded in replying to the Holocaust threat to impose silence, by writing a text that occupies a legitimate place in this literature.

Orientador: Decio Azevedo Marques de Saes / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-23T13:48:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DuranGil_Aldo_M.pdf: 15685816 bytes, checksum: 091ac72e690261b78f1409ff567f47c2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1998 / Resumo: Esta dissertação discute o funcionamento do Estado boliviano no período 1978-1982, tendo como objeto de análise a relação do Estado com as classes dominantes. Num primeiro momento, procura-se entender, de um lado, as razões que levaram o Estado boliviano a funcionar como um Estado burguês relativamente mais modernizado ¿ apesar de seu alto índice de atraso e dependência -; e de outro, pretende-se determinar as principais características, bem como a performance desse Estado ao longo do regime militar de Banzer (1971-1978). Em seguida, faz-se uma caracterização do Estado boliviano sob os governos efêmeros instaurados no período em questão, buscando determinar as principais contradições e crises do Estado; sendo essas últimas agravadas pelas lutas entre frações dominantes com o fim de controlar o aparelho estatal através do golpe de Estado e impor, dessa maneira, a política estatal determinada pela prática da maximização do lucro no curto prazo ¿ esse fator tornou-se um dos elementos importantes de instabilidade política do período, marcado pelos golpes e contra-golpes de Estado. A dissertação utiliza como conceito-chave o ¿conceito de Estado capitalista¿ proposto por Nicos Poulantzas em Poder Político e Classes Sociais. Tal conceito, que está imbricado com um elenco de conceitos correlatos, permite determinar, entre outros fatores, tanto o funcionamento complexo do Estado como a relação entre o aparelho estatal, as classes e frações dominantes (bloco no poder) e as classes dominadas, no período em consideração. Neste estudo, contesta-se a tese largamente difundida no âmbito acadêmico boliviano segundo a qual o Estado boliviano formado em 1952 teria entrado num processo de ¿queda gradativa¿ entre 1978 e 1982; em 1985 ele teria caído definitivamente, erguendo-se um novo Estado mais democrático e modernizado. A tese defendida nesta dissertação é a de que o Estado de 1952 não entrou em queda no período pós-78 (nem caiu em 1985). O que caiu foi o regime militar e seu correspondente Estado militar, cujo colapso foi provocado por um conjunto de fatores e contradições internas (fatores principais) e por causa das lutas das massas populares (fator determinante) / Abstract: Not informed. / Mestrado / Mestre em Ciência Política

Perestroika, unlike previous attempts at economic reform, represents the beginning of a new era in post-war Soviet politics. If one were to categorize the major Soviet leaders since Stalin it would be more accurate to term Khrushchev a liberal Stalinist, Brezhnev a conservative Stalinist, and Gorbachev, may be properly classified as an anti-Stalinist. Gorbachev's accession to power represents the beginning of what might be termed post-post-Stalin reform. To illustrate the uniqueness of perestroika, this thesis is structured around a comparison of Gorbachev's economic, political, and social reforms with those of Nikita Khrushchev. A contrast with Khrushchev is necessary because it is impossible to determine the uniqueness of perestroika and to draw informed conclusions about Gorbachev unless the record of the first-post Stalin reformer is examined. Because Gorbachev and Khrushchev are both reformers, it is to be expected that they should share certain common objectives. But the similarities are far less significant than the differences. The differences between Gorbachev's and Khrushchev's approaches to reform are a function both of substantive policy differences and historical circumstance. Historical Context Khrushchev came to power at a time when the Soviet Union was weak relative to the United States. Externally, the most pressing need was for the Soviet Union to achieve military parity with the United States. Internally, Khrushchev's first years were ones of struggle for absolute leadership with other Politburo figures who had differing notions of reform. The world that Brezhnev and his successors bequeathed to Gorbachev bore little resemblance to the one which Stalin left to Khrushchev. By the time of Gorbachev's accession to power, the Soviet Union had become the military equal of the United States. Political Reform Khrushchev's main objective was to weaken the power of the bureaucracy largely in order to enhance his own personal power. Gorbachev's focus is less Stalin than it is the Stalinist system. The lack of subordination of political and economic reform to the pursuit of personal one-man rule marks perestzoika as a distinct improvement over de-Stalinization. Economic Reform In economic policy, Khrushchev followed Stalin's practice of meeting economic problems with administrative measures. Although Khrushchev made his reputation by denouncing Stalin's leadership, he did nothing to address the root of the Soviet Union's troubles—the Stalinist economic system. Perestroika is theoretically superior to de-Stalinization because Gorbachev eschews administrative tinkering in favour of economic change. Gorbachev has rediscovered the co-operative socialism and limited tolerance for free-enterprise of the 1920s. The implication of this return to 'Leninism' is an admission that the Stalinist system is a failure. CONCLUSION The essence of Khrushchev's reforms, and their subsequent failure, can be traced to his fixation with appearance over substance. For all of his 'liberal' reforms, Khrushchev is essentially a 'Stalinist' politician. Perestzoika is superior to de-Stalinization both because of historical circumstance and substantive philosophical differences. Gorbachev's return to Leninist principles effectively ends the period of reformed Stalinism. But the objective need for reform does imply its necessary success. There are many obstacles to effecting deep change in the Soviet Union, obstacles which cannot be surmounted soon. It cannot be expected that a people will cast off the habits of a lifetime. Nonetheless, Gorbachev's reforms are rigorous and potentially longlasting, as opposed to Khrushchev's 'administrative' changes which did not really address the flaws of the Soviet system. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The Kamerun Plebiscites of 1959-1961 were crucial to the rise and development of Western Kamerun nationalism. Some of the factors which shaped the events connected with that phenomenon can be traced' back to the pre-colonial period. Others emerged from the activities of the colonizers in the region during the colonial and trust period. But, it was against the British activities that a few Western-educated Southern Kamerunians, the political leaders, reacted and, in the 1940s, developed a nationalist movement. In 1953, these new leaders, who had made little headway in their demands of the British, involved the traditional leaders, the a-Fon, in the nationalist movement. The a-Fon who commanded the loyalty and support of most of the region's inhabitants, significantly strengthened and influenced the movement henceforth. During that crucial period, however, the movement witnessed several conflicts over policy regarding the future of Western Kamerun. In Northern Kamerun, the local authorities advocated integration with Nigeria while some dissident local Fulani and the a-Fon demanded secession from it. In Southern Kamerun, some political leaders stressed integration with Nigeria, others favoured secession from it and ultimate reunification of Kamerun, and, yet, others emphasized immediate secession and reunification. On the other hand, the a-Fon requested secession without reunification. Thus, there were fundamental differences among the political leaders and between them and the traditional rulers. During this period, the political leaders defined and redefined their varying programmes in an effort to win over the Crowned Princes who refused to budge. Realizing the firmness of the a-Fon, backed by massive support from the electorate, the organizers concentrated their efforts at the United Nations where they manipulated, confused, and engineered a split within its members. The division within the United Nations and among the organizers forced that organization to concentrate on reaching a compromise rather than finding out what the majority of the Western Kamerunians desired. The outcome of this approach was adverse decisions: in the case of Northern Kamerun, where the electorate, after the first plebiscite, had mistaken the reformed local administration for secession from Nigeria, the United Nations refused to postpone the second plebiscite, and, in the case of Southern Kamerun, it left out secession without reunification, the most popular view, from the plebiscite despite numerous appeals and protests from both regions. In the ensuing confusion in the North and dissatisfaction in the South, the electorate asked and answered their own questions at the plebiscites, interpreting the United Nations' questions to suit their local conditions and circumstances. This interpreting process was to be expected. In most plebiscites and elections, electors ask and answer their own questions, often with little reference to the larger issues, but the timing of the second plebiscite in the North and the unfortunate wording of the plebiscite questions in the context of politics in the South, contributed not only a good deal of confusion to the proceedings, but also significantly impeded the process of self-determination. Moreover, the conduct of the plebiscites, themselves, was characterized by the abuse of power by those interested groups in and out of authority, and by suspicion and accusation which were sometimes justifiable and sometimes not. Furthermore, the plebiscite undermined the Concert of the Crowned Princes, the symbol of Southern Kamerun unity, and left sections of the region standing at a distance from, and threatening, each other. Not only had the trust system ended in Western Kamerun on an uncertain note, but the United Nations had been less than effective in applying the principle of self-determination. / Arts, Faculty of / History, Department of / Graduate

Orientador : Carlos Lessa / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Economia / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-16T08:54:25Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Goldenstein_Lidia_M.pdf: 5200107 bytes, checksum: 313ab47c6a20e11f80d15587172ccb73 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1985 / Resumo: Não informado / Abstract: Not informed. / Mestrado / Mestre em Economia

In this minor dissertation the coastal states rights, jurisdiction and control in respect of wrecks, specifically historic wrecks, situated on the continental shelf are examined in relation to the current state of the law applicable to this area, both customary and conventional. Discussion and argument are developed under the following headings. THE TWILIGHT ZONE This part constitutes the introduction to the subject matter and includes a brief description of the evolution of International Customary Law relating to the continental shelf which resulted in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention definition which specified rights to natural resources. BOUNDARIES OF THE CONTINENTAL SHELF Area is clarified and distances of outer limit from-baseline (200 nautical miles extending to a possible 350 nautical miles under certain circumstances) is discussed. Necessity for coastal state to inform the Commission on the limits of the Continental Shelf of the limits of its continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles is noted. Article 303(2) relating to the contiguous zone and historical objects is referred to and the effects of its provisions on the area under examination is discussed. The starting point of the area is 24 nautical miles from the baseline as explained. Mention is also made of the overlapping of the exclusive economic zone with the sea bed and subsoil of the continental shelf and attention is drawn to the provisions of art 59 relating to the settlement of disputes over non attributed rights in the exclusive economic zone.

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.