Uppsatsen behandlar det förstärkta laglottsskyddet i 7:4 ÄB som är en viktig del av den svenska successionsrätten samtidigt som den är svår att tillämpa i praktiken. Det är därför av vikt att bringa klarhet i detta komplexa rättsområde. Syftet med uppsatsen är därav att utreda gällande rätt kring denna rättsregel och påvisa samt analysera de praktiska tillämpningssvårigheter rättsregeln ger upphov till för domstolen med avsikt att undersöka om den är i behov av en reform av något slag. För att uppnå detta syfte används en rättsdogmatisk metod, där rättspraxis har en framträdande betydelse i uppsatsen. När någon avlider ska dennes kvarlåtenskap fördelas genom den legala arvsordningen om inget testamente har upprättats. En arvlåtare kan fritt testamentera bort den ena halvan av arvslotten medan den andra halvan utgörs av bröstarvingarnas laglott. En bröstarvinge är alltid berättigad att utfå sin laglott, vilket föranleder att en bröstarvinge kan påkalla jämkning av ett testamente som inskränker hens laglott. Det förstärkta laglottsskyddet ger bröstarvingar ett ytterligare laglottsskydd. Rättsregeln aktualiseras när en arvlåtare har bortgivit egendom under sådana omständigheter eller på sådana villkor att gåvan är att likställa med testamente och särskilda skäl ej föreligger. Om gåvan inskränker en bröstarvinges laglott ska gåvan återbäras till dödsboet. Kan gåvan inte återbäras ska ersättning motsvarande gåvans värde utgå. I rättsregelns ordalydelse återfinns tre stycken vaga rekvisit, vars innebörd har utkristalliserats i rättspraxis. Domstolen har därav tolkat vad som innefattas i begreppet gåva, vad som ska likställas med testamente samt när särskilda skäl ska anses föreligga. Vid en tillämpning av rättsregeln måste domstolen således beakta dessa vaga rekvisit, som till sist utmynnar i en subjektiv bedömning. Med det i beaktande och i samband med att vissa situationer faller utanför rättsregelns tillämpningsområde, vore det önskvärt med en reform avseende det förstärkta laglottsskyddet. / The thesis discuss the reinforced statutory share of inheritance in the 7th chapter 4 § ÄB, which is an important part of the Swedish inheritance law but likewise difficult to implement practically. It is therefore important to clarify this complex branch of law. The purpose of the thesis is to examine applicable law concerning the legal rule and to detect and analyze the practical implementation difficulties that occur for the court in order to examine if the legal rule is in need of a reformation. To achieve this purpose, a legal dogmatic method is utilized; where case-law have a prominent part of the thesis. When someone passes away, his estate shall be allocated through the legal rule of inheritance if a will has not been created. A devisor freely can bequeath one half of the share of inheritance, while the other half constitutes the direct heirs statutory share of inheritance. A direct heir is always entitled to obtain his statutory share of inheritance, which means that a direct heir can claim a will that circumscribes his statutory share of inheritance. The reinforced statutory share of inheritance gives additional protection of the statutory share of inheritance for direct heirs. The legal rule is actualized if a devisor gives property away during circumstances or upon such terms that the bequest is equivalent with a will and special reasons does not apply. If the bequest circumscribes a direct heirs’ statutory share of inheritance, the bequest shall be refunded to the estate. If the bequest cannot be refunded, remuneration corresponding to the bequest shall be reimbursed. The legal rules’ wording consists of three vague necessary conditions, whose meaning has been crystalized by case-law. The court has therefore interpreted what the term bequest is contained of, what is equivalent with a will and when special reasons shall apply. The court must therefore pay attention to these vague necessary conditions when the legal rule is applied practically, which finally results in a subjective judging. With that in mind and that some situations is not regulated within the legal rule, it would be desirable with a reformation regarding the reinforced statutory share of inheritance.

With regards to Swedish succession rights, and the distribution of the inheritance as such, there is an underlying conflict of a fundamental nature betweenthe deceased´s former interest in how the estate should be distributed on theone hand, and the interest of the primary heirs in the preservation of theinheritance on the other. The deceased´s interest can be derived from the rightto private ownership, while the interest of the primary heirs rests upon thestatutory minimum portion of the inheritance (laglott) which they are entitled to by law. The statutory minimum portion of the inheritance is half of the sharethat is due by law (arvslott) to the primary heirs if there is no will, i.e. if theintestate succession (legala arvsordningen) is followed. Furthermore, this conflictof interest can provoke an individual to plan their estate with the intention ofminimizing the inheritance of one or more of their primary heirs. This pertainsespecially to children who are not the offspring of the surviving spouse,considering that they are entitled to receive their statutory minimum portion ofthe inheritance immediately upon the deceased’s – their parent's – death. Thedispositions at hand for someone who wants to plan their estate (dödsrättshandlingar) according to Swedish law are of two particular types. Wills (testamenten)and beneficiary designations (förmånstagarförordnanden). Gifts made in contemplation of the donor’s impending death (gåvor för dödsfalls skull), ties into thiscategory as well. Namely, gifts of this nature are in this respect equated to wills.Another rationale for sorting these three different dispositions together can befound in their common purpose, i.e. to benefit someone else with all or someof the estate. In the most abstract terms, these three categories could be called,gratuitous legal dispositions made ad mortis causa, (benefika dispositioner fördödsfalls skull). In light of this the thesis explores and examines whether a primaryheir´s legal protection – especially if the statutory minimum portion of theinheritance – has an equal efficiency in relation to this broad category –constituted of the three aforementioned subsets – accessible to someone whowants to plan their estate. The result of the thesis is primarily that such adifference in fact does exist and secondarily that this inconsistency to some extent is unjustifiable considering (1) the similar nature and purpose of these dispositions, and (2) the presence and function of the legal institute of forcedheirship in Swedish law.