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1	Nullitet, ogiltighet, overksamhet : hinder mot verkställande av testamente Beijar Johansson, Niklas January 2015 (has links) No description available. Successionsrätt
2	Förhållandet mellan förskott på arv och laglott : en belysning av rättsläget och dess tillämpningsproblem Ahlvik Doverhem, Rebecka January 2016 (has links) No description available. Familjerätt successionsrätt
3	Förmögenhetsrättsliga avtals ställning inom successionsrätten vid tillämpningen av 17 kap 3 § ärvdabalken : är lagstiftningen i takt med tiden? Schüldt, Gustaf January 2018 (has links) No description available. Successionsrätt familjerätt Law Juridik
4	Laglotten : Ett nödvändigt skydd eller oproportionerligt tvång? / The reserved share : A necessary protection or a disproportionately restriction? Pelli, Kristofer, Strömberg, Rebecca January 2017 (has links) Lagstiftningen kring laglotten är cirka 150 år gammal och har sedan införandet varit i det närmaste oförändrad, där vissa regler och principer som idag styr hur arv fördelas förekom redan under medeltiden. Kritik har framförts om att laglotten är föråldrad och byggd på gamla traditioner samt värderingar där rätten till arv grundade sig i blodsband och släktskap. Eftersom de sociala förhållandena och familjekonstellationerna ser annorlunda ut idag påverkas samhörigheten som utgjorde motivet bakom införandet av laglotten. Proportionaliteten bakom den inskränkning laglotten utgör i arvlåtares fria vilja av förvaltandet av sin egendom kan därmed sättas i förhållande till skyddet som laglotten innebär för arvingar. Vidare uppstår avvägningar mellan efterlevande makes skydd i förhållande till att särkullbarns rätt till arv bevaras. Laglotten ger därmed upphov till två motstridiga intressen där bröstarvingars rätt till arv ska skyddas samtidigt som arvlåtares fria vilja och integritet bör värnas. Det torde således föreligga ett intresse kring laglottens utformning samt tillämpning i dagens samhälle. I uppsatsen tolkas och analyseras därmed de argument som framförts gällande laglottens fortsatta kvarlevnad respektive avskaffande eller förändring. Gällande rätt kommer att fastställas i syfte att ge en ökad förståelse för lagstiftningen och den kritik som senare framställs. Analysen av argumenten och de bakomliggande motiven till laglottens införande resulterar i en slutsats och förslag på eventuella ändringar av laglotten. Det framkommer att de rättsliga motiven bakom laglottens införande fortfarande anses väga tyngre än nyttan med ett eventuellt avskaffande av laglotten. Den ekonomiska trygghet som kvarlåtenskapen tidigare medförde anses inte avgörande idag, utan vikten av den sociala samhörigheten och rättvisa som laglotten medför belyses. Laglotten medför att bröstarvingar likställs och erhåller lika stor del av arvet samt förhindrar missgynnande eller utpressning från arvlåtares sida. Laglotten anses även avgörande för att skydda särkullbarns rätt till arv. Det förekommer dock utrymme att ändra lagstiftningen så särkullbarns rätt till laglott inträder först vid efterlevande makes bortgång. Vidare är det möjligt att ändra rekvisiten för vad som utgör förverkande av arv vid brott mot arvlåtare. laglott arvslott arvsrätt successionsrätt familjerätt arvsordning arvsklasser bröstarvinge särkullbarn testamente Law and Society Juridik och samhälle
5	Arv och testamente. : Om avsaknad av en adekvat fördelningsform och en successionsrätt i förändring. Glad, Johan January 2011 (has links) No description available. Civilrätt familjerätt successionsrätt arv testamente prop. 1986/87:1 fördelningsform förändring LAW/JURISPRUDENCE RÄTTSVETENSKAP/JURIDIK Private law Civilrätt
6	Arvsrätt efter den efterlevande maken utan egna arvingar : En analys av konsekvenserna av HD:s tolkning av 3 kap. 8 § ÄB Larsson, Ebba January 2023 (has links) There are many practical implications connected to the distribution of the inheritance of a deceased married person, the rules on inheritance distribution are regulated in the Swedish Inheritance Code. The Inheritance Code was reformed in 1987 with the aim of strengthening the spouses’ inheritance status. Among other amendments, a new law was introduced in chapter 3 paragraph 8 of the Inheritance Code. Pursuant to the new law, in situations where heirs are left only after one of the spouses, they shall inherit everything upon the death of the surviving spouse. The purpose of the legislation was to restrict the Swedish General Inheritance Fund’s right to inherit. The interpretation of the paragraph has raised extensive discussions in the legal doctrine, mainly relating to the following three aspects: firstly, whether the paragraph requires a concrete right to secondary inheritance, secondly, which rel- atives have the right to inherit, and lastly, the legal nature of the paragraph. The meaning of the paragraph has been clarified in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Sweden to eliminate any uncertainties. This thesis aims to examine how chapter 3 paragraph 8 of the Inheritance Code shall be, de lege lata, and ought to be, de lege ferenda, interpreted. In conclusion, pursuant to the case law of the Supreme Court of Sweden, the paragraph only grants the first and second order of heirs the right to inherit. With regard to the legal nature of the paragraph, the court has stated that the paragraph merely determines allocation of inheritance shares. Furthermore, the court held that the paragraph requires a concrete right to secondary inheritance, albeit heavily criticized. Through the analysis of the Swedish Supreme Court ruling conducted herein, it can be concluded that the requirement puts children of the de- ceased person in a previous marriage in a disadvantaged position, whereby they are treated differently from other heirs. Additionally, it contradicts basic Swedish principles of law, such as “parantelprincipen”. Although the supreme court’s practice provides guidance on how the paragraph should be interpreted, the case law concerning chapter 3 paragraph 8 of the Inheritance Code has regardless resulted in several consequences that affect fundamental principles of the Swedish inheritance law. I argue, de lege ferenda, that the requirement of concrete right to secondary inheritance ought to be removed completely as it may put children of the deceased person in a previous marriage in a disadvantage. Upon removing the requirement, the negative consequences would be eliminated. Therefore, this thesis 3 seeks to urge the legislature to review the paragraph to ascertain whether this requirement is necessary. 3:8 ÄB successionsrätt arvsrätt NJA 1993 s. 145 NJA 2005 s. 400 NJA 2016 s. 442 Law Juridik
7	I dödsrättshandlingarnas landskap : Om konflikten mellan arvlåtare och bröstarvinge beträffande arvets fördelning / I dödsrättshandlingarnas landskap : Om konflikten mellan arvlåtare och bröstarvinge beträffande arvets fördelning Fjellström, Ludvig January 2023 (has links) With regards to Swedish succession rights, and the distribution of the inheritance as such, there is an underlying conflict of a fundamental nature betweenthe deceased´s former interest in how the estate should be distributed on theone hand, and the interest of the primary heirs in the preservation of theinheritance on the other. The deceased´s interest can be derived from the rightto private ownership, while the interest of the primary heirs rests upon thestatutory minimum portion of the inheritance (laglott) which they are entitled to by law. The statutory minimum portion of the inheritance is half of the sharethat is due by law (arvslott) to the primary heirs if there is no will, i.e. if theintestate succession (legala arvsordningen) is followed. Furthermore, this conflictof interest can provoke an individual to plan their estate with the intention ofminimizing the inheritance of one or more of their primary heirs. This pertainsespecially to children who are not the offspring of the surviving spouse,considering that they are entitled to receive their statutory minimum portion ofthe inheritance immediately upon the deceased’s – their parent's – death. Thedispositions at hand for someone who wants to plan their estate (dödsrättshandlingar) according to Swedish law are of two particular types. Wills (testamenten)and beneficiary designations (förmånstagarförordnanden). Gifts made in contemplation of the donor’s impending death (gåvor för dödsfalls skull), ties into thiscategory as well. Namely, gifts of this nature are in this respect equated to wills.Another rationale for sorting these three different dispositions together can befound in their common purpose, i.e. to benefit someone else with all or someof the estate. In the most abstract terms, these three categories could be called,gratuitous legal dispositions made ad mortis causa, (benefika dispositioner fördödsfalls skull). In light of this the thesis explores and examines whether a primaryheir´s legal protection – especially if the statutory minimum portion of theinheritance – has an equal efficiency in relation to this broad category –constituted of the three aforementioned subsets – accessible to someone whowants to plan their estate. The result of the thesis is primarily that such adifference in fact does exist and secondarily that this inconsistency to some extent is unjustifiable considering (1) the similar nature and purpose of these dispositions, and (2) the presence and function of the legal institute of forcedheirship in Swedish law. Arv arvsfördelning arvsplanering laglott det förstärkta laglottsskyddet 7:4 ÄB bröstarvinge arvlåtare förmånstagarförordnande förmånstagare gåva för dödsfalls skull försäkring successionsrätt CC Law Juridik
8	Återkallelse av testamente : Särskilt om bedömningen av om testator har avsett att återkalla sitt testamente / On the Revocation of Wills : Especially regarding the assessment of whether the testator has intended to revoke his will Steen, Johan January 2023 (has links) In most European legal systems, drafting a will is subject to formal requirements. In the same way, most European legal systems prescribe formal requirements for the revocation of a will. However, Swedish law is unique in this respect as it does not prescribe formal requirements for the revocation of a will. For the revocation of a will, Swedish law only requires that the testator has unequivocally announced that the disposition no longer expresses his ultimate will. This is stated in the 5th Section of the 10th Chapter of the Swedish Inheritance Code. Under Swedish law, it is therefore only a question of proof whether the testator has revoked his will. However, it may be difficult to assess whether the testator has intended to revoke his will when the testator is alleged to have revoked his will informally. Therefore, the main purpose of this thesis is to examine how the assessment of whether the testator has intended to revoke his will is carried out under current Swedish law. To achieve the purpose of this thesis, a traditional legal dogmatic method is used. This means that the material used is limited to the traditional Swedish sources of law. These are legislation, preparatory works, case law and Swedish legal doctrine. Since Swedish law does not prescribe any formal requirements for revoking a will, a will can be revoked in an unlimited number of ways. It has therefore been necessary to limit the scope of this thesis to the most common ways of revoking a will. For this reason, this thesis only covers the revocation of a will by executing a new will, by physical destruction of a will, by strikeouts and inscriptions on the will, by oral statements made by the testator and by the revocation of a previously revoked will. Consequently, other ways of revoking a will are not closer analysed. The analysis shows that no general conclusions can be drawn on how to assess whether the testator intended to revoke his will. Instead, the assessment depends on the way in which the testator is alleged to have revoked his will. However, the analysis also shows that some more specific conclusions can be drawn. It can be concluded from Swedish case-law that a high standard of proof is required for a revocation allegedly made by an informal measure. However, this does not apply if the will has been destructed. In such cases, there is instead a presumption that the will has been destructed by the testator with the purpose of revoking the will. Consequently, the burden of proof is reversed when the will has been destructed. The analysis also shows that it often can be uncertain whether the testator has intended to revoke his will by an informal measure. This is because there may be no reliable evidence of the testator’s intention in such cases. Therefore, the con-clusion is that a testator who wishes to revoke his will should do so by executing a new will which expressly states that the will is revoked. By doing so, the testator significantly reduces the risk of future disputes concerning the validity of the will. revocation revocation of wills formal requirements will testator Swedish Inheritance Code case-law återkallelse återkallelse av testamente återkallelse genom nytt testamente överstrykningar påskrifter muntliga uttalanden återkallelse av återkallelse testamentsrätt successionsrätt testationsfrihet testationsfriheten den fria återkallelserätten testator testatrix arvlåtare arvsrätt testamentstagare testamentsgivare presumtionsregel presumtion bevisbörda beviskrav ÄB 1686 års testamentsstadga 1734 års lag 1930 års testamentslag ärvdabalken 10 kap. 5 § 10 kap. 5 § ÄB 10 kap. 5 § ärvdabalken Högsta domstolen HD Lagrådet SOU 1929:22 prop. 1930:10 NJA 1930 s. 78 NJA 1944 s. 78 NJA 1948 s. 214 NJA 1948 s. 768 NJA 1952 s. 99 NJA 1959 s. 658 NJA 1960 s. 227 NJA 1963 s. 512 NJA 1966 s. 270 NJA 1974 s. 646 NJA 1977 s. 168 NJA 1977 s. 479 NJA 2017 s. 362 NJA 2022 s. 509 Law (excluding Law and Society)

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