<p>When a person of the older generation in a family owned company wish to transfer his ownership to a person in the younger generation this can be done through a succession of generation. Different methods can be used to proceed with such a matter, selling the company shares for a price below the market value is one example of this.</p><p>When the owner transfers shares to a person in the younger generation, either as a gift or by selling them to a price below the market value, the provision in the 7th chapter 4 § ÄB can be applicable. This provision establish that; when a gift that has been given during the grantors lifetime and when the purpose of this gift is to be equivalent to a testament, the gift shall be returned to the receiver if this action confines with the direct heirs statutory portion.</p><p>A gift is to be equivalent to a testament when the giver had the intention to arrange the succession when the gift was given away, and when this gift did not amount to any economical sacrifice for the giver. There are two situations which causes a gift to be equivalent to a testament. The first situation arises when the gift is given by the giver right before his death, on his deathbed so to speak. The other situation arises when the giver keeps his right of using the gift or when he claims the right to the return, such as dividends etc, of the given property.</p><p>Based upon the conditions that are to be fulfilled for a direct heir to make use of the regulation to claim his statutory portion, some situations can be constructed where the provision in the 7th chapter 4 § ÄB should be both applicable and inapplicable, depending on the nature of the situation. However, there are situations in which it is doubtful whether a gift in a succession of generation is to be equivalent to a testament and whether there exists certain circumstances that will make the provision inapplicable. Even though it is possible to construct situations where the provision is both applicable and inapplicable, one cannot be certain about the outcome in any particular case since there might be circumstances that differs from one situation to another and which will determine whether the provision is applicable.</p><p>In situations where the provision is applicable, the receiver of the gift has an obligation to return the gift or secondary to pay compensation if this is not possible. According to the wording in the provision, the receiver should not be able to determine whether to return the property or whether to pay compensation himself, this is since it is stated in the provision that the property is to be returned and payment is only to be made when this is not possible. In situation where the gift can be returned the receiver shall therefore do this regardless of his opinion of the matter.</p>

When a person of the older generation in a family owned company wish to transfer his ownership to a person in the younger generation this can be done through a succession of generation. Different methods can be used to proceed with such a matter, selling the company shares for a price below the market value is one example of this. When the owner transfers shares to a person in the younger generation, either as a gift or by selling them to a price below the market value, the provision in the 7th chapter 4 § ÄB can be applicable. This provision establish that; when a gift that has been given during the grantors lifetime and when the purpose of this gift is to be equivalent to a testament, the gift shall be returned to the receiver if this action confines with the direct heirs statutory portion. A gift is to be equivalent to a testament when the giver had the intention to arrange the succession when the gift was given away, and when this gift did not amount to any economical sacrifice for the giver. There are two situations which causes a gift to be equivalent to a testament. The first situation arises when the gift is given by the giver right before his death, on his deathbed so to speak. The other situation arises when the giver keeps his right of using the gift or when he claims the right to the return, such as dividends etc, of the given property. Based upon the conditions that are to be fulfilled for a direct heir to make use of the regulation to claim his statutory portion, some situations can be constructed where the provision in the 7th chapter 4 § ÄB should be both applicable and inapplicable, depending on the nature of the situation. However, there are situations in which it is doubtful whether a gift in a succession of generation is to be equivalent to a testament and whether there exists certain circumstances that will make the provision inapplicable. Even though it is possible to construct situations where the provision is both applicable and inapplicable, one cannot be certain about the outcome in any particular case since there might be circumstances that differs from one situation to another and which will determine whether the provision is applicable. In situations where the provision is applicable, the receiver of the gift has an obligation to return the gift or secondary to pay compensation if this is not possible. According to the wording in the provision, the receiver should not be able to determine whether to return the property or whether to pay compensation himself, this is since it is stated in the provision that the property is to be returned and payment is only to be made when this is not possible. In situation where the gift can be returned the receiver shall therefore do this regardless of his opinion of the matter.

Lagstiftningen kring laglotten är cirka 150 år gammal och har sedan införandet varit i det närmaste oförändrad, där vissa regler och principer som idag styr hur arv fördelas förekom redan under medeltiden. Kritik har framförts om att laglotten är föråldrad och byggd på gamla traditioner samt värderingar där rätten till arv grundade sig i blodsband och släktskap. Eftersom de sociala förhållandena och familjekonstellationerna ser annorlunda ut idag påverkas samhörigheten som utgjorde motivet bakom införandet av laglotten. Proportionaliteten bakom den inskränkning laglotten utgör i arvlåtares fria vilja av förvaltandet av sin egendom kan därmed sättas i förhållande till skyddet som laglotten innebär för arvingar. Vidare uppstår avvägningar mellan efterlevande makes skydd i förhållande till att särkullbarns rätt till arv bevaras. Laglotten ger därmed upphov till två motstridiga intressen där bröstarvingars rätt till arv ska skyddas samtidigt som arvlåtares fria vilja och integritet bör värnas. Det torde således föreligga ett intresse kring laglottens utformning samt tillämpning i dagens samhälle. I uppsatsen tolkas och analyseras därmed de argument som framförts gällande laglottens fortsatta kvarlevnad respektive avskaffande eller förändring. Gällande rätt kommer att fastställas i syfte att ge en ökad förståelse för lagstiftningen och den kritik som senare framställs. Analysen av argumenten och de bakomliggande motiven till laglottens införande resulterar i en slutsats och förslag på eventuella ändringar av laglotten. Det framkommer att de rättsliga motiven bakom laglottens införande fortfarande anses väga tyngre än nyttan med ett eventuellt avskaffande av laglotten. Den ekonomiska trygghet som kvarlåtenskapen tidigare medförde anses inte avgörande idag, utan vikten av den sociala samhörigheten och rättvisa som laglotten medför belyses. Laglotten medför att bröstarvingar likställs och erhåller lika stor del av arvet samt förhindrar missgynnande eller utpressning från arvlåtares sida. Laglotten anses även avgörande för att skydda särkullbarns rätt till arv. Det förekommer dock utrymme att ändra lagstiftningen så särkullbarns rätt till laglott inträder först vid efterlevande makes bortgång. Vidare är det möjligt att ändra rekvisiten för vad som utgör förverkande av arv vid brott mot arvlåtare.

With regards to Swedish succession rights, and the distribution of the inheritance as such, there is an underlying conflict of a fundamental nature betweenthe deceased´s former interest in how the estate should be distributed on theone hand, and the interest of the primary heirs in the preservation of theinheritance on the other. The deceased´s interest can be derived from the rightto private ownership, while the interest of the primary heirs rests upon thestatutory minimum portion of the inheritance (laglott) which they are entitled to by law. The statutory minimum portion of the inheritance is half of the sharethat is due by law (arvslott) to the primary heirs if there is no will, i.e. if theintestate succession (legala arvsordningen) is followed. Furthermore, this conflictof interest can provoke an individual to plan their estate with the intention ofminimizing the inheritance of one or more of their primary heirs. This pertainsespecially to children who are not the offspring of the surviving spouse,considering that they are entitled to receive their statutory minimum portion ofthe inheritance immediately upon the deceased’s – their parent's – death. Thedispositions at hand for someone who wants to plan their estate (dödsrättshandlingar) according to Swedish law are of two particular types. Wills (testamenten)and beneficiary designations (förmånstagarförordnanden). Gifts made in contemplation of the donor’s impending death (gåvor för dödsfalls skull), ties into thiscategory as well. Namely, gifts of this nature are in this respect equated to wills.Another rationale for sorting these three different dispositions together can befound in their common purpose, i.e. to benefit someone else with all or someof the estate. In the most abstract terms, these three categories could be called,gratuitous legal dispositions made ad mortis causa, (benefika dispositioner fördödsfalls skull). In light of this the thesis explores and examines whether a primaryheir´s legal protection – especially if the statutory minimum portion of theinheritance – has an equal efficiency in relation to this broad category –constituted of the three aforementioned subsets – accessible to someone whowants to plan their estate. The result of the thesis is primarily that such adifference in fact does exist and secondarily that this inconsistency to some extent is unjustifiable considering (1) the similar nature and purpose of these dispositions, and (2) the presence and function of the legal institute of forcedheirship in Swedish law.