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1	Om testamentes tolkning : Den yttersta viljans gränser, presumtioner och principer Lundkvist, Stefan January 2021 (has links) The interpretation of a will is indeed a delicate matter. The government committee that developed the Wills Act (SFS 1930:104) described it as an area that ”offers particular difficulties”. When there is a will to be executed, however, the difficulties must be overcome. Frequently, a great deal of time has elapsed since the will was written, which may have led to several changes in different regards. For example, the testator may no longer be in possession of the property named in the will, or changes in the circle of legatees might have occured. When a will is to be interpreted, one must identify the actual underlying intent of the provision. If that is not possible, the executor must ask what the testator’s hypothetical intent would be in the particular situation. Hence, the interpretation process is strictly subjective. If, and only if, the determination of the actual or hypothetical intent of the testator is unsuccessful can one use supplementary presumptions. The Wills Act, which was incorporated almost unmodified into the Inheritance Code (SFS 1958:637), offers a few presumption rules that ”the normal testator” is presumed to approve. This phase of the interpretation is therefore objective. The presumption rules are subsidiary to the actual or hypothetical intent of the testator and ought only be used as an exception. The Supreme Court has, in accordance with this principle of subsidiarity, seldom applied a presumption rule. The court seems to prefer an interpretation of the testator’s intent, even if the intent is rather vague. The court’s case law shows that it does not take much to rebut one of the subsidiary presumptions. Due to the continuing development of society and its constellation of families, the need for development in the law of wills is likewise perpetual. Cohabitants, for example, do not inherit one another according to Swedish law, and thus it is crucial to make a will in favour of a cohabitant to provide for their protection. This paper does not propose a right of inheritance for cohabitants, but rather a presumption rule under specific circumstances: An explicit provision for free disposal of the property left for the surviving cohabitant is presumed to contain a provision for secondary inheritance due to the 3rd chapter of the Inheritance Code. Such a presumption would harmonise with established law and hopefully prevent future interpretation disputes. testamente testamentstolkning den yttersta viljan den sista viljan testator testatrix testamentsrätt presumtionsregler Law (excluding Law and Society)
2	Artikel 2(3) van die Wet op Testamente 7 van 1953 Du Plessis, Jan Abraham. 11 1900 (has links) Text in Afrikaans, abstract in Afrikaans and English / Title page in Afrikaans and English / Die verhandeling handel oor die howe se hantering van testamentere geskrifte wat nie aan die testamentsformaliteite voldoen nie. Die posisie voor die inwerkingtreding van artikel 2(3) word eerste bespreek. Daarna bespreek ek die wysigings wat aanbeveel is deur die regskommissie. Vervolgens bespreek ek die inwerkingtreding van artikel 2(3) wat aan die howe die bevoegdheid gee om 'n testamentere geskrif wat nie aan die formaliteite voldoen nie tot geldige testament te verhef. Die spesifieke probleemareas met die interpretasie van artikel 2(3) word uitgelig en in detail bespreek. Daarna maak ek 'n aanbeveling dat 'n handtekening of merk op 'n testamentere geskrif 'n drempelvereiste moet wees alvorens 'n hof dit kan kondoneer. Ek sluit af met 'n opinie oor hoe die artikel in die toekoms geinterpreteer behoort te word. / The dissertation is about the way in which the courts handle testamentary writings which do not comply with the formalities of a will. Firstly I discuss the position before the implementation of section 2(3). Thereafter I discuss the recommendations of the law commission. Then I discuss the implementation of section 2(3) which empowers the court to legalise a document which does not comply with the formal requirements of a will. The specific problem areas with regard to the interpretation of section 2(3) are highlighted and discussed in detail. Thereafter a recommendation is made that a signature or a mark on a testamentary writing must be a prerequisite before a court can consider condoning it. I conclude my dissertation with an opinion on how this section should be interpreted in the future. / Jurisprudence / LL. M. (Legum) Will Formalities Wills Act Testator Testatrix Attestation clause Law Commission Signature Mark Drafted or Executed Administration of Estates Act 346.54068 Wills -- South Africa Probate law and practice -- South Africa
3	Artikel 2(3) van die Wet op Testamente 7 van 1953 Du Plessis, Jan Abraham. 11 1900 (has links) Text in Afrikaans, abstract in Afrikaans and English / Title page in Afrikaans and English / Die verhandeling handel oor die howe se hantering van testamentere geskrifte wat nie aan die testamentsformaliteite voldoen nie. Die posisie voor die inwerkingtreding van artikel 2(3) word eerste bespreek. Daarna bespreek ek die wysigings wat aanbeveel is deur die regskommissie. Vervolgens bespreek ek die inwerkingtreding van artikel 2(3) wat aan die howe die bevoegdheid gee om 'n testamentere geskrif wat nie aan die formaliteite voldoen nie tot geldige testament te verhef. Die spesifieke probleemareas met die interpretasie van artikel 2(3) word uitgelig en in detail bespreek. Daarna maak ek 'n aanbeveling dat 'n handtekening of merk op 'n testamentere geskrif 'n drempelvereiste moet wees alvorens 'n hof dit kan kondoneer. Ek sluit af met 'n opinie oor hoe die artikel in die toekoms geinterpreteer behoort te word. / The dissertation is about the way in which the courts handle testamentary writings which do not comply with the formalities of a will. Firstly I discuss the position before the implementation of section 2(3). Thereafter I discuss the recommendations of the law commission. Then I discuss the implementation of section 2(3) which empowers the court to legalise a document which does not comply with the formal requirements of a will. The specific problem areas with regard to the interpretation of section 2(3) are highlighted and discussed in detail. Thereafter a recommendation is made that a signature or a mark on a testamentary writing must be a prerequisite before a court can consider condoning it. I conclude my dissertation with an opinion on how this section should be interpreted in the future. / Jurisprudence / LL. M. (Legum) Will Formalities Wills Act Testator Testatrix Attestation clause Law Commission Signature Mark Drafted or Executed Administration of Estates Act 346.54068 Wills -- South Africa Probate law and practice -- South Africa
4	Återkallelse av testamente : Särskilt om bedömningen av om testator har avsett att återkalla sitt testamente / On the Revocation of Wills : Especially regarding the assessment of whether the testator has intended to revoke his will Steen, Johan January 2023 (has links) In most European legal systems, drafting a will is subject to formal requirements. In the same way, most European legal systems prescribe formal requirements for the revocation of a will. However, Swedish law is unique in this respect as it does not prescribe formal requirements for the revocation of a will. For the revocation of a will, Swedish law only requires that the testator has unequivocally announced that the disposition no longer expresses his ultimate will. This is stated in the 5th Section of the 10th Chapter of the Swedish Inheritance Code. Under Swedish law, it is therefore only a question of proof whether the testator has revoked his will. However, it may be difficult to assess whether the testator has intended to revoke his will when the testator is alleged to have revoked his will informally. Therefore, the main purpose of this thesis is to examine how the assessment of whether the testator has intended to revoke his will is carried out under current Swedish law. To achieve the purpose of this thesis, a traditional legal dogmatic method is used. This means that the material used is limited to the traditional Swedish sources of law. These are legislation, preparatory works, case law and Swedish legal doctrine. Since Swedish law does not prescribe any formal requirements for revoking a will, a will can be revoked in an unlimited number of ways. It has therefore been necessary to limit the scope of this thesis to the most common ways of revoking a will. For this reason, this thesis only covers the revocation of a will by executing a new will, by physical destruction of a will, by strikeouts and inscriptions on the will, by oral statements made by the testator and by the revocation of a previously revoked will. Consequently, other ways of revoking a will are not closer analysed. The analysis shows that no general conclusions can be drawn on how to assess whether the testator intended to revoke his will. Instead, the assessment depends on the way in which the testator is alleged to have revoked his will. However, the analysis also shows that some more specific conclusions can be drawn. It can be concluded from Swedish case-law that a high standard of proof is required for a revocation allegedly made by an informal measure. However, this does not apply if the will has been destructed. In such cases, there is instead a presumption that the will has been destructed by the testator with the purpose of revoking the will. Consequently, the burden of proof is reversed when the will has been destructed. The analysis also shows that it often can be uncertain whether the testator has intended to revoke his will by an informal measure. This is because there may be no reliable evidence of the testator’s intention in such cases. Therefore, the con-clusion is that a testator who wishes to revoke his will should do so by executing a new will which expressly states that the will is revoked. By doing so, the testator significantly reduces the risk of future disputes concerning the validity of the will. revocation revocation of wills formal requirements will testator Swedish Inheritance Code case-law återkallelse återkallelse av testamente återkallelse genom nytt testamente överstrykningar påskrifter muntliga uttalanden återkallelse av återkallelse testamentsrätt successionsrätt testationsfrihet testationsfriheten den fria återkallelserätten testator testatrix arvlåtare arvsrätt testamentstagare testamentsgivare presumtionsregel presumtion bevisbörda beviskrav ÄB 1686 års testamentsstadga 1734 års lag 1930 års testamentslag ärvdabalken 10 kap. 5 § 10 kap. 5 § ÄB 10 kap. 5 § ärvdabalken Högsta domstolen HD Lagrådet SOU 1929:22 prop. 1930:10 NJA 1930 s. 78 NJA 1944 s. 78 NJA 1948 s. 214 NJA 1948 s. 768 NJA 1952 s. 99 NJA 1959 s. 658 NJA 1960 s. 227 NJA 1963 s. 512 NJA 1966 s. 270 NJA 1974 s. 646 NJA 1977 s. 168 NJA 1977 s. 479 NJA 2017 s. 362 NJA 2022 s. 509 Law (excluding Law and Society)

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