Biochemists often adopt what may be called the “Strategy of Decomposition” for the causal discovery of biochemical pathway dynamic behaviours. This involves decomposing a pathway into a set of isolated parts, which are then analysed separately. It is assumed that knowledge gained of the isolated parts can then be used to explain the dynamic behaviours of the whole pathway. My thesis addresses the extent to which use of the Strategy of Decomposition is warranted. I evaluate two challenges contained in Bechtel and Richardson’s Discovering Complexity. The first challenge is that pathways lack the ‘modular’ structure assumed in the Strategy of Decomposition. Bechtel and Richardson take biochemists to use a concept of modularity called ‘near decomposability’. The second challenge is that pathways have ‘Pathway Emergent’ behaviours. I reject both challenges. I show that near decomposability is the wrong type of modularity to apply to pathways, and that the occurrence of Pathway Emergence has not been established. I argue that an underlying problem with Bechtel and Richardson’s analyses is that they overstate the consequences of feedback and nonlinearity for the Strategy of Decomposition. Instead, the analysis of pathway modularity and emergence needs to be centered on the context-sensitivity of pathways’ ‘local causal laws’. I identify that the type of modularity assumed in the Strategy of Decomposition is ‘causal law modularity’, which requires the invariance of local causal laws. I also identify a necessary condition for Pathway Emergence: a pathway must manifest at least one local causal law that is not manifested by its isolated parts. I argue that the use of the Strategy of Decomposition may often be unwarranted. This is because the local causal laws of pathways are highly context-sensitive, and pathways might often not be causal law modular. This context-sensitivity also leaves open the possibility of Pathway Emergence.

Scientific models are important, if not the sole, units of science. This thesis addresses the following question: in virtue of what do scientific models represent their target systems? In Part i I motivate the question, and lay out some important desiderata that any successful answer must meet. This provides a novel conceptual framework in which to think about the question (or questions) of scientific representation. I then argue against Callender and Cohen’s (2006) attempt to diffuse the question. In Part ii I investigate the ideas that scientific models are ‘similar’, or structurally (iso)morphic, to their target systems. I argue that these approaches are misguided, and that at best these relationships concern the accuracy of a pre-existing representational relationship. I also pay particular attention to the sense in which target systems can be appropriately taken to exhibit a ‘structure’, and van Fraassen’s (2008) recent argument concerning the pragmatic equivalence between representing phenomena and data. My next target is the idea that models should not be seen as objects in their own right, but rather what look like descriptions of them are actually direct descriptions of target systems, albeit not ones that should be understood literally. I argue that these approaches fail to do justice to the practice of scientific modelling. Finally I turn to the idea that how models represent is grounded, in some sense, in their inferential capacity. I compare this approach to anti-representationalism in the philosophy of language and argue that analogous issues arise in the context of scientific representation. Part iii contains my positive proposal. I provide an account of scientific representation based on Goodman and Elgin’s notion of representation-as. The result is a highly conventional account which is the appropriate level of generality to capture all of its instances, whilst remaining informative about the notion. I illustrate it with reference to the Phillips-Newlyn machine, models of proteins, and the Lotka-Volterra model of predator-prey systems. These examples demonstrate how the account must be understood, and how it sheds light on our understanding of how models are used. I finally demonstrate how the account meets the desiderata laid out at the beginning of the thesis, and outline its implications for further questions from the philosophy of science; not limited to issues surrounding the applicability of mathematics, idealisation, and what it takes for a model to be ‘true’.

Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Centro de Ciências da Saúde. Programa de Pós-graduação em Farmácia / Made available in DSpace on 2013-07-15T22:51:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 / A freqüência de infecções fúngicas tem crescido nos últimos anos, sendo que as infecções por leveduras do gênero Candida e os fungos filamentosos do gênero Aspergillus são as mais freqüentes. O antifúngico padrão de largo espectro, anfotericina B (AB) em desoxicolato de sódio (AB-DOC), é considerado fármaco de primeira escolha no tratamento dessa enfermidade. Porém, a sua administração em pacientes gravemente debilitados é seguida geralmente de várias reações adversas. De todas, a nefrotoxicidade é a mais grave, uma vez que a deterioração da função renal limita freqüentemente a dose ou o tratamento, reduzindo a probabilidade de um resultado clínico satisfatório. A necessidade de minimizar os efeitos tóxicos da AB veio estimular uma grande variedade de abordagens experimentais, dentre as quais o desenvolvimento de uma microemulsão lipídica rica em triacilgliceróis, preocupando-se com a manutenção da eficiência terapêutica e estabilidade da formulação. Diante disso, o objetivo do trabalho foi desenvolver uma microemulsão por meio de técnica de ultraemulsificação, estéril e apirogênica, com o intuito de administrá-la endovenosamente. Utilizou-se, portanto, componentes compatíveis com a administração endovenosa, mais especificamente, lipídios, de forma a mimetizar quilomícrons da linfa. O intuito foi de associar a AB a essa partícula de modo a torná-la menos propensa a agregação AB-AB. A caracterização e os estudos de estabilidade foram contemplados de forma a abranger as propriedades físico-químicas da partícula como diâmetro, potencial zeta, grau de agregação avaliado por espectros de absorção na região UV-Visível, taxa de incorporação e estabilidade da associação AB:lipídeo e finalmente a atividade antifúngica do fármaco vetorizado a microemulsão. O desenvolvimento das microemulsões lipídicas contendo AB mostrou-se viável, compatível com administração endovenosa no que contempla valores de pH e diâmetro da partícula, bem como da estabilidade e apirogenicidade. A associação entre AB e os componentes lipídicos mostrou-se estável, mesmo em condições drásticas de armazenamento (25 °C). A atividade antifúngica foi mantida ao longo de 4 meses, bem como o conteúdo de AB às partículas. Desta maneira, a microemulsão lipídica mostrou-se viável e promissora como veículo alternativo de AB, principalmente pela estabilidade e manutenção da atividade antifúngica.

The primary aim of this thesis is to analyse the tension between Humean epistemology and Humean ethics. The tension is identified as being due to the strict Humean empiricist epistemology, which severely limits the scope of ethical investigation. A key point of contrast, between Hume’s bundle theory of the self and his commitment to long-term durable character traits, is analysed, to exemplify the difficulties. Humean empiricism leads directly to a bundle conception of the self, one that is comprised entirely of observable impressions and ideas, yet it is unclear how this conception is related to durable character traits, which are an integral part of Humean ethics. The solution offered is that, to be understood coherently, Humean metaphysics should incorporate aspects of powers-based ontologies to replace summative models. Specifically, character traits such as virtues and vices should be understood as tending towards an outcome, rather than adhering to a standard stimulus-response dispositional model. It is argued that this reconceptualization can be achieved without contravening Humean epistemology in any significant way, and that it can be done while maintaining the basic Humean principle that all ideas must precede from a corresponding impression. This thesis will conclude that adopting the metaphysics of powers in a limited sphere of investigation can lead to a stronger Humean metaphysics of character and eliminate contradictions from Humean philosophy as a whole.

This dissertation discusses whether Giacomo Leopardi (1798-1837) can be considered a philosophical heir of Giambattista Vico (1668-1744), as some scholars retain, despite the fact that there is no evidence that Leopardi read Vico’s New Science or other works until late (1828); too late to demonstrate a direct influence of the philosopher’s thought on the deepest nexuses of Leopardi’s reflection. This dissertation clarifies how Leopardi responded to Vico-related questions characterizing the culture of his time through an innovative methodology that looks at the diffraction of Vico’s ideas in Bourbon Restoration Italian culture. This work aims to paint a dynamic picture of Italian nineteenth-century polycentric culture through a geographical organization of the material; it in fact tackles the diffusion of Vico’s works and ideas from Naples to Venice (Chapter 1), to Milan (Chapter 2), to Leopardi’s hometown Recanati (Chapter 3), to Florence (Chapter 4), and again to Naples (Chapter 5). Not only does this work shed new light on the existence of a Vico-Leopardi philosophical lineage, but it also present an original study of perceptions of time and history and of the dichotomy ancient/modern in Post-Napoleonic Italian culture.

This thesis evaluates and compares two versions of neutral monism, one developed by William James and the other by Bertrand Russell. Both argued against Cartesianism in favour of a "subjectless given" as the basic stuff which constitutes both mind and matter. My evaluation will demonstrate that James’s and Russell's supposedly neutral entities are not neutral as their exponents claim because they fail to satisfy important criteria set for a theory to be genuinely neutral. There are two fundamental elements within my discussion of the neutral entities. Firstly, I shall demonstrate that although James's initial repudiation of dualistic epistemology of subject and object, knower and known, led him to avoid metaphysical dualism of mental and physical, in Cartesian sense, by committing him to the view that there is one kind of entity called "experience", his final analysis admitted an internal distinction within the supposedly simple neutral entities. I shall call this covert dualism. Accepting James’s radical empiricism as an archetype, Russell’s early commitment to neutral monism led him to assert three distinctive kinds of entities, sensation (neutral), image (subjective) and unperceived (objective), and was therefore not complete as that of James. In order to bring his theory in line with James, Russell, in his mature version, entirely repudiated the dualistic view of perception which, following Moore, he accepted, to reject idealism. Russell declared percept as the neutral entity, which is both mental and material at once. But by re-introducing epistemological dualism, as James did, Russell admitted that a percept is not simple but complete bundle of compresent qualities and relations. 1 shall argue that like James’ his theory also collapses into covert dualism. Secondly, I shall argue that to produce a genuinely explanatory theory of neutral entities James and Russell exploited science to justify their theories. In course of their analysis they produced various arguments which has been considered as circular. An attempt will be made to show that the apparent circularity of their analysis is really part of a sophisticated programme, now known as bootstrapping. The notion of a bootstrap strategy has recently been developed in philosophy of science, and suggests a way in which the same evidence can be used to generate both a general and specific hypothesis. The thesis is divided into eight chapters. Chapters one, two and four are largely exegetical and chronological, and discuss the development of neutral monism especially in James and Russell’s philosophy together with the general characteristics of the theory as distinguished from other theories explaining mind and matter. Chapters three, five and six critically analyse James’s and Russell’s versions respectively to show their theories collapse into covert dualism. In chapter seven we argue that the alleged circularities in their theory are non- viscious and their employment of a bootstrap strategy introduced a profound innovation in epistemology.

Gilbert Ryle claimed that intelligent actions and activities are not merely the external signs of inner mental workings but rather that such actions and activities are the workings of the mind itself. In this thesis I propose an interpretation and defence of sich claim, against a common an, in my view, mistaken way of understanding Ryle's position. In chapter [1]. I introduce the argumentative thread of this thesis and a more detailed overview of the chapters. In chapter [2], I criticise Stanley and Williamson's understanding of Ryle's argument and position. In chapters [3]-[5] I examine Ryle's position and provide a way of understanding his view against what I take his main opponent, INTELLECTUALISM, to be. Chapter [6] offers an argument against INTELLECTUALISM as a way of motivating a Rylean account intelligent actions and activities. I conclude in chapter [7] with a response to purported counter-examples to the view I propose.

The distinction between the mind and body, their relatedness and respective properties is perhaps the single most persistent problem that faces philosophical contemplation. Various models have been proposed in order to overcome this gaping duality: idealism, occasionalism, epiphenomenalism, behaviourism, etc. The model proposed within this thesis corresponds to psychophysical parallelism - a parallelism judged purely phenomenological - wherein mind and body are conceived in terms of two aspects of an unconscious transcendental reality. Historically, philosophy has tended to prioritise one of the aspects over the other: Hegel and Marx serve to illustrate this point. As I will argue throughout this thesis, this transcendental reality - within which we will situate spontaneous creativity - is essentially double and subsists between the two extremes. The consequence of this duplicity is to negate the possibility of any reconciliation into an originary Being, but through which the extremes communicate and pass information. Furthermore, since reality is essentially double, we will be at pains to describe it from two perspectives: from the point of view of language and biology, and thereby avoid the tendency to prioritise. The ontological, therefore, will be described in terms of a virtual or potential being situated in neither the heights nor the depths, but staged upon a surface that slips in between the two extremes. This has the added consequence of grounding ethics in sensibility. However, this is not a reductionist programme, but a theory of the whole which functions in the manner of a cybernetic entity constituted upon fractal sedimentations.

The notion that we are essentially conscious beings has a good deal of intuitive appeal, but also gives rise to a number of philosophical problems. As a result of its appeal, and in conjunction with a growing dissatisfaction with reductive accounts of consciousness, a number of experiential accounts of personal identity have been introduced into the relatively recent literature. These accounts offer various analyses of the relationship between consciousness and selfhood in an attempt to overcome the problems faced by adopting such a position. I argue that a correct appreciation of the nature of inner awareness, and experience more generally, entails that the experiential approach is indeed justifiable. Specifically, I argue that the relationship between an experience and its subject necessitates the view that selves are constituted by episodes of consciousness. I then evaluate a number of theories of temporal consciousness and argue that the most promising kind of account has implications concerning our persistence conditions. Subsequently, I argue for a radical account of our nature by defending the resulting ontological claim: selves are streams of consciousness.

One of the conceptual limitations of the orthodox game theory is its inability to offer definitive theoretical predictions concerning the outcomes of noncooperative games with multiple rationalizable outcomes. This prompted the emergence of goal-directed theories of reasoning – the team reasoning theory and the theory of hypothetical bargaining. Both theories suggest that people resolve non-cooperative games by using a reasoning algorithm which allows them to identify mutually advantageous solutions of non-cooperative games. The primary aim of this thesis is to enrich the current debate on goaldirected reasoning theories by studying the extent to which the principles of the bargaining theory can be used to formally characterize the concept of mutual advantage in a way which is compatible with some of the conceptually compelling principles of orthodox game theory, such as individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and non-comparability of decision-makers’ personal payoffs. I discuss two formal characterizations of the concept of mutual advantage derived from the aforementioned goal-directed reasoning theories: A measure of mutual advantage developed in collaboration with Jurgis Karpus, which is broadly in line with the notion of mutual advantage suggested by Sugden (2011, 2015), and the benefit-equilibrating bargaining solution function, which is broadly in line with the principles underlying Conley and Wilkie’s (2012) solution for Pareto optimal point selection problems with finite choice sets. I discuss the formal properties of each solution, as well as its theoretical predictions in a number of games. I also explore each solution concept’s compatibility with orthodox game theory. I also discuss the limitations of the aforementioned goal-directed reasoning theories. I argue that each theory offers a compelling explanation of how a certain type of decision-maker identifies the mutually advantageous solutions of non-cooperative games, but neither of them offers a definitive answer to the question of how people coordinate their actions in non-cooperative social interactions.