There have been significant advances in the information systems (IS) literature about the business value that can be realized through information technology (IT) investments and the mechanisms through which IT creates different facets of business value. We identify three important gaps in understanding the literature on IT business value. First, it is unclear how risk arising from deficiencies in a firm’s information environment, along with internal and external contextual factors, affects a firm’s IT implementation choices. Second, it is unclear how IT resources in a focal domain need to be combined with knowledge resources in the same domain and IT resources in other domains to develop process capabilities and create process-level benefits. Third, it is unclear what risks IT-enabled process innovations create for different process stakeholders and what controls can be applied to mitigate these risks. My dissertation addresses the above three gaps in three essays. The first essay examines the influence of a firm’s information risk on its prioritization of accounting enterprise systems (AES) relative to complementary enterprise systems and the moderation of this relationship by the weaknesses of internal controls and environmental uncertainty characteristics. The second essay focuses on the impact of AES implementation on a firm’s internal controls process, and the complementary roles of managerial competence and enterprise systems implemented in other domains related to the internal controls process of the firm. The final essay explores the risk factors that can arise for buyers and suppliers due to the use of reverse auctions, and the controls that can be applied to mitigate the key risk factors. In terms of research methods, the first two essays apply econometric analysis to panel datasets constructed from multiple sources and the third essay uses a combination of Delphi studies and semi-structured interviews. Collectively, the essays advance our understanding of (1) the factors underlying a firm’s prioritization of IT investment choices; (2) the mechanisms through which IT resources, in combination with human expertise, create business value; and (3) the risks introduced for different stakeholders by the adoption of IT-enabled process innovations and the controls that can be used to effectively mitigate them.

"Dissertation, Humboldt-Universitäte zu Berlin, 2008"--T.p. verso. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 209-212) and index.

Univ., Diss.--Kiel, 2003. / Literaturverz. S. [145] - 149.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2005. / Thesis directed by Philip E. Mirowski for the Department of Economics. "December 2005." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 152-165).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

abstract: Ranking is of definitive importance to both usability and profitability of web information systems. While ranking of results is crucial for the accessibility of information to the user, the ranking of online ads increases the profitability of the search provider. The scope of my thesis includes both search and ad ranking. I consider the emerging problem of ranking the deep web data considering trustworthiness and relevance. I address the end-to-end deep web ranking by focusing on: (i) ranking and selection of the deep web databases (ii) topic sensitive ranking of the sources (iii) ranking the result tuples from the selected databases. Especially, assessing the trustworthiness and relevances of results for ranking is hard since the currently used link analysis is inapplicable (since deep web records do not have links). I formulated a method---namely SourceRank---to assess the trustworthiness and relevance of the sources based on the inter-source agreement. Secondly, I extend the SourceRank to consider the topic of the agreeing sources in multi-topic environments. Further, I formulate a ranking sensitive to trustworthiness and relevance for the individual results returned by the selected sources. For ad ranking, I formulate a generalized ranking function---namely Click Efficiency (CE)---based on a realistic user click model of ads and documents. The CE ranking considers hitherto ignored parameters of perceived relevance and user dissatisfaction. CE ranking guaranteeing optimal utilities for the click model. Interestingly, I show that the existing ad and document ranking functions are reduced forms of the CE ranking under restrictive assumptions. Subsequently, I extend the CE ranking to include a pricing mechanism, designing a complete auction mechanism. My analysis proves several desirable properties including revenue dominance over popular Vickery-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auctions for the same bid vector and existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. The equilibrium is socially optimal, and revenue equivalent to the truthful VCG equilibrium. Further, I relax the independence assumption in CE ranking and analyze the diversity ranking problem. I show that optimal diversity ranking is NP-Hard in general, and that a constant time approximation algorithm is not likely. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Computer Science 2012

Firstly, this thesis contains an overview of basic concepts that we can meet on the real estate market. In the theoretical part of the thesis, the issues of auctions and their requirements are dealt with. Secondly, the practical part describes the specific real estate auction made in the area of Liberec Heights-Stary Harcov and there is further prepared by statistics dealing with the difference of the estimated price of the apartments, which were sold at auction, with prices of involuntary, which these flats were actually auctioned for. The work also includes its own estimate of one of these flats with an explanation of why the assessed prices differ from the prices at which the apartments are auctioned

Submitted by Bruno Francisco (brmatt@gmail.com) on 2015-07-09T21:10:12Z No. of bitstreams: 1 20140627_Dissertacao vf4 rev2 imp.pdf: 1323767 bytes, checksum: b0f103e4c50e3d2754d2882b5015e8c5 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by GILSON ROCHA MIRANDA (gilson.miranda@fgv.br) on 2015-09-09T13:11:25Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 20140627_Dissertacao vf4 rev2 imp.pdf: 1323767 bytes, checksum: b0f103e4c50e3d2754d2882b5015e8c5 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2015-09-11T12:07:17Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 20140627_Dissertacao vf4 rev2 imp.pdf: 1323767 bytes, checksum: b0f103e4c50e3d2754d2882b5015e8c5 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-11T12:07:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 20140627_Dissertacao vf4 rev2 imp.pdf: 1323767 bytes, checksum: b0f103e4c50e3d2754d2882b5015e8c5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-05-29 / Brazil’s oil auctions use an equation to form a score that defines the winner. Each company or consortium interested in the oil block must bid in three attributes: Signature Bonus (BA), Minimum Exploration Program (PEM) and Local Content (CL). Each of these attributes receives a weight in the equation and bidder’s final score also depends on the others companies bid. Although oil auctions have being widely studied in the economy the multi-attribute score auction is still poorly analyzed specially as a mechanism of mining rights allocation. The present work highlights the insertion of the local content as an attribute which transforms the auction structure from what could be a first price auction to a multi-attribute score auction. Through the project’s costs curve is demonstrated how the local content is related to another important score attribute that is the signature bonus. To better understand the insertion of the local content attribute we have created three cases of hypothetical auctions. We also have fixed the minimum exploration program and made some simplifications in order to build those cases. In the first scenario (Sem CL), the structure comes down to a first-price auction, where only the BA attribute defines the auction winner. In the second scenario (CLO=CLR), where the local content does impact the final score, the bidder is obligated to realize the local content as was bid. The last scenario is the complete case (Com Multa) which allows the bidder to failure the local content bid when paying the penalty represents an economic gain to the company. Taking those cases into consideration we have verified that, although the company’s revenue and the allocation efficiency don’t vary, the government revenue drops significantly when the local content is introduced as an attribute of score auctions. / Os leilões para concessão de blocos de petróleo no Brasil utilizam uma equação para formar a pontuação que define o vencedor. Cada participante deve submeter ao leiloeiro um lance composto por três atributos: Bônus de Assinatura (BA), Programa Exploratório Mínimo (PEM) e Conteúdo Local (CL). Cada atributo possui um peso na equação e a nota final de cada participante também depende dos lances ofertados pelos outros participantes. Apesar de leilões de petróleo serem muito estudados na economia, o leilão multi-atributos, do tipo máxima pontuação, ainda é pouco analisado, principalmente como mecanismo de alocação de direitos minerários. Este trabalho destaca a inserção do CL como atributo que transforma a estrutura, do que poderia ser um leilão simples de primeiro preço, em um leilão multi-atributos de máxima pontuação. Demonstra-se como o CL, através da curva de custos do projeto, está relacionado também ao Bônus de Assinatura, outro importante atributo da equação. Para compreender o impacto do fenômeno da inserção do CL, foram criados três casos de leilões hipotéticos, onde, dentre outras simplificações, o programa exploratório mínimo foi fixado para todas as empresas envolvidas. No caso base (Sem CL), simula-se a estrutura de um leilão de primeiro preço, onde apenas o BA define o vencedor do leilão. Já no caso forçado (CLO=CLR), há inserção do atributo CL, sendo o participante obrigado a cumprir o CL ofertado. Por fim, o caso completo (Com Multa) permite que o participante preveja a aplicação de multa por descumprimento do CL ofertado e, caso haja benefício econômico, descumpra efetivamente o CL ofertado. Considerando estes casos, argumenta-se que, apesar do o lucro das empresas e a eficiência do leilão não serem alterados, a inclusão do conteúdo local na estrutura do leilão pode ter reflexos consideráveis na receita do governo.

Submitted by Luis Eduardo Craizer (lecraizer@gmail.com) on 2016-09-26T19:40:04Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Versão Final.pdf: 1700556 bytes, checksum: 6dce561cf40774feced5f3a980199830 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Janete de Oliveira Feitosa (janete.feitosa@fgv.br) on 2016-09-27T13:30:15Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Versão Final.pdf: 1700556 bytes, checksum: 6dce561cf40774feced5f3a980199830 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Maria Almeida (maria.socorro@fgv.br) on 2016-10-18T11:49:02Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Versão Final.pdf: 1700556 bytes, checksum: 6dce561cf40774feced5f3a980199830 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-10-18T11:49:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação - Versão Final.pdf: 1700556 bytes, checksum: 6dce561cf40774feced5f3a980199830 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-11 / In an auction, both the good’s seller and the potential buyer desire to maximize their profit. The seller aims to obtain the highest possible value for the good, whereas the buyers want to win the auction paying the less they can for the object. In this scenario, this study suggests an algorithm based on the Fictitious Play, which seeks to simulate the agents’ behavior for the different kinds of auctions. In this simulation, we are also going to embed the risk aversion and try to forecast rational behavior of the agents. The main goal of the work is to make a parallel between the strategy functions, which maximize the agents’ utilities cataloged on books and texts, and the optimal strategies, which are obtained in the simulation through the usage of the proposed algorithm. / Em um leilão, tanto o vendedor quanto os potenciais compradores desejam maximizar suas receitas: no caso do leiloeiro, ele quer obter o maior valor possível pela venda de seu bem; no caso dos agentes participantes, eles desejam pagar o menor valor possível pelo objeto e, ainda assim, vencer o leilão. Tendo como base de estudo o cenário descrito, este trabalho sugere um algoritmo baseado no Fictitious Play que visa simular o comportamento dos agentes perante um certo tipo de leilão específico. Esta simulação pretende também incorporar a aversão ao risco e pretende-se prever o comportamento racional dos agentes participantes perante este cenário. O objetivo principal desta dissertação é realizar uma comparação entre as funções que descrevem as estratégias que maximizam as utilidades dos participantes já catalogadas na literatura e as estratégias ótimas que são obtidas na simulação através do algoritmo proposto.

abstract: I study the design of two different institutions to evaluate the welfare implications of counterfactual policies. In particular, I analyze (i) the problem of assigning students to colleges (majors) in a centralized admission system; and (ii) an auction where the seller can use securities to determine winner’s payment, and bidders suffer negative externalities. In the former, I provide a novel methodology to evaluate counterfactual policies when the admission mechanism is manipulable. In the latter, I determine which instrument yields the highest expected revenue from the class of instruments that combines cash and equity payments. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Economics 2017