O direito antitruste, atualmente ditado pela Lei 12.529 de 30 de novembro de 2011, e o direito da propriedade intelectual permeiam o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro buscando regrar condutas e procedimentos com vistas a tutelar, de um lado, a livre concorrência e, de outro, estimular a inovação e o desenvolvimento tecnológico do país. No exercício de ambos os direitos, muitas vezes observam-se conflitos, que aparentemente revelam uma contradição: a concessão de exclusividade de exploração de bens intangíveis, tais como patentes e desenhos industriais, conflita com a livre concorrência, sendo uma excludente da outra. Entretanto, essa contradição, como se verá, encontra-se superada. Em nosso sistema jurídico não há direitos absolutos que possam justificar a dominância pura e simples de um sobre o outro sem medir as consequências. O equilíbrio é buscado através da vedação legal aos abusos de direito, especialmente abusos de direito de propriedade intelectual e o exercício abusivo de poder econômico. Adicionalmente, a Constituição Federal subordina o uso da propriedade à sua função social. O presente estudo analisa as questões que envolvem esse aparente conflito e os abusos decorrentes do exercício desses direitos. O tema é introduzido com a análise da interface entre o direito da propriedade intelectual e o antitruste e as questões de direito dela decorrentes. A seguir, são analisados o abuso de direito, o abuso de poder econômico e o abuso de posição dominante, com destaque para o entendimento da existência de venda casada mesmo que o vínculo ocorra com diferimento no tempo. O estudo prossegue discorrendo sobre a livre iniciativa e a livre concorrência, bem como o instituto do desenho industrial e seu eventual uso abusivo. Também são analisados o mercado de reposição de peças e partes de produtos complexos e sua repercussão no Brasil e no exterior, e a posição do CADE sobre eventuais condutas anticompetitivas. A jurisprudência comentada ilustra as diversas posições doutrinárias acerca da matéria. O monopólio decorrente de direito de propriedade intelectual seria benéfico para a eficiência e regulação dos mercados, apesar de seus eventuais efeitos contra os interesses do consumidor? Este ensaio procura responder essa indagação, aprofundando o debate sobre o conflito entre o monopólio concedido por desenho industrial às peças de reposição de objetos complexos e a liberdade de escolha do consumidor. Oferece ainda uma proposta legislativa que visa assegurar o equilíbrio entre os direitos dos envolvidos. / The antitrust law, currently under Law 12,529, of November 30, 2011, and the intellectual property law is within the Brazilian juridical ordination, seeking to rule conducts and procedures intended to protect the free competition, on one hand, and to stimulate the innovation and technological development of the country, on the other hand. In the performance of both rights, conflicts are many times observed, which apparently reveal a contradiction: the granting of exclusivity for the exploitation of intangible goods, such as patents and industrial designs, conflicts with the free competition, excluding one another. Said contradiction, however, has been overcome, as it will be noticed. Our juridical system encompasses no absolute rights liable to justify the pure and simple dominance of one on the other, without assessing the consequences. The balance is searched by means of the legal prevention of the abuses of right, especially the abuses of the intellectual property law and the abusive exercise of the economic power. In addition, the Federal Constitution subordinates the use of property to its social function. This study analyzes the issues involving this apparent conflict and the abuses resulting from the enforcement of said rights. The theme is introduced with the analysis of the interface between the intellectual property right and the antitrust one and the resulting legal issues. Then, the abuse of right, the abuse of economic power and the abuse of the dominant position are analysed, pointing out the understanding of the existence of a tying arrangement, even though the binding occurs with deferral in time. The study proceeds by analyzing the free initiative and the free competition, as well as the industrial design institute and its eventual abusive use. The parts reposition and parts of complex products and their repercussion in Brazil and overseas, the CADE´s position as to eventual anticompetitive conducts are also analyzed. The commented jurisprudence illustrates the several opinion of jurists on this matter. Would the monopoly resulting from the intellectual property right benefit the market efficiency and regulation, despite the eventual effects against the consumer interests ? This paper seeks to reply such a question, by deepening the debate on the conflicts between the monopoly granted by industrial design to spare parts of complex objects and the consumer´s free choice. It also offers a legislative proposal intended to ensure the balance between the involved parties´ rights.

O direito antitruste, atualmente ditado pela Lei 12.529 de 30 de novembro de 2011, e o direito da propriedade intelectual permeiam o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro buscando regrar condutas e procedimentos com vistas a tutelar, de um lado, a livre concorrência e, de outro, estimular a inovação e o desenvolvimento tecnológico do país. No exercício de ambos os direitos, muitas vezes observam-se conflitos, que aparentemente revelam uma contradição: a concessão de exclusividade de exploração de bens intangíveis, tais como patentes e desenhos industriais, conflita com a livre concorrência, sendo uma excludente da outra. Entretanto, essa contradição, como se verá, encontra-se superada. Em nosso sistema jurídico não há direitos absolutos que possam justificar a dominância pura e simples de um sobre o outro sem medir as consequências. O equilíbrio é buscado através da vedação legal aos abusos de direito, especialmente abusos de direito de propriedade intelectual e o exercício abusivo de poder econômico. Adicionalmente, a Constituição Federal subordina o uso da propriedade à sua função social. O presente estudo analisa as questões que envolvem esse aparente conflito e os abusos decorrentes do exercício desses direitos. O tema é introduzido com a análise da interface entre o direito da propriedade intelectual e o antitruste e as questões de direito dela decorrentes. A seguir, são analisados o abuso de direito, o abuso de poder econômico e o abuso de posição dominante, com destaque para o entendimento da existência de venda casada mesmo que o vínculo ocorra com diferimento no tempo. O estudo prossegue discorrendo sobre a livre iniciativa e a livre concorrência, bem como o instituto do desenho industrial e seu eventual uso abusivo. Também são analisados o mercado de reposição de peças e partes de produtos complexos e sua repercussão no Brasil e no exterior, e a posição do CADE sobre eventuais condutas anticompetitivas. A jurisprudência comentada ilustra as diversas posições doutrinárias acerca da matéria. O monopólio decorrente de direito de propriedade intelectual seria benéfico para a eficiência e regulação dos mercados, apesar de seus eventuais efeitos contra os interesses do consumidor? Este ensaio procura responder essa indagação, aprofundando o debate sobre o conflito entre o monopólio concedido por desenho industrial às peças de reposição de objetos complexos e a liberdade de escolha do consumidor. Oferece ainda uma proposta legislativa que visa assegurar o equilíbrio entre os direitos dos envolvidos. / The antitrust law, currently under Law 12,529, of November 30, 2011, and the intellectual property law is within the Brazilian juridical ordination, seeking to rule conducts and procedures intended to protect the free competition, on one hand, and to stimulate the innovation and technological development of the country, on the other hand. In the performance of both rights, conflicts are many times observed, which apparently reveal a contradiction: the granting of exclusivity for the exploitation of intangible goods, such as patents and industrial designs, conflicts with the free competition, excluding one another. Said contradiction, however, has been overcome, as it will be noticed. Our juridical system encompasses no absolute rights liable to justify the pure and simple dominance of one on the other, without assessing the consequences. The balance is searched by means of the legal prevention of the abuses of right, especially the abuses of the intellectual property law and the abusive exercise of the economic power. In addition, the Federal Constitution subordinates the use of property to its social function. This study analyzes the issues involving this apparent conflict and the abuses resulting from the enforcement of said rights. The theme is introduced with the analysis of the interface between the intellectual property right and the antitrust one and the resulting legal issues. Then, the abuse of right, the abuse of economic power and the abuse of the dominant position are analysed, pointing out the understanding of the existence of a tying arrangement, even though the binding occurs with deferral in time. The study proceeds by analyzing the free initiative and the free competition, as well as the industrial design institute and its eventual abusive use. The parts reposition and parts of complex products and their repercussion in Brazil and overseas, the CADE´s position as to eventual anticompetitive conducts are also analyzed. The commented jurisprudence illustrates the several opinion of jurists on this matter. Would the monopoly resulting from the intellectual property right benefit the market efficiency and regulation, despite the eventual effects against the consumer interests ? This paper seeks to reply such a question, by deepening the debate on the conflicts between the monopoly granted by industrial design to spare parts of complex objects and the consumer´s free choice. It also offers a legislative proposal intended to ensure the balance between the involved parties´ rights.

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The study shows that multi-sided markets pose difficulties when the relevant product market is to be defined. These difficulties pertain to two questions. The first question is whether one or several markets should be defined. In this regard, it is not easy to extract a coherent method from the cases examined. Instead, the methods applied give the impression of ad hoc-solutions, where similar circumstances result in dissimilar outcomes. Indeed, it is hard to reconcile the different market definitions in Visa International MIF and MasterCard MIF. The uncertainties are not limited to these two cases, as the methods applied in Google Shopping too give rise to ambiguities. Why was the market for general search engine platforms separated into two distinct product markets, but the market for comparison shopping services encompassed both sides? Unfortunately, this discussion was not present in the decision. This only serves to reinforce the impression that these questions are solved on an ad hoc-basis. A clear method of approaching multi-sided markets is desirable, not least because the enforcement of competition rules must be characterized by consistency and foreseeability. Hopefully, the judgement in Google Shopping will bring further clarity to this. Nonetheless, the conclusion is that one market should be defined when differences between competitive constraints on the two sides are absent. E contrario, this means that two markets should be defined when such differences are present. This is true regardless of the market in question being a transaction or a non-transaction market. This method seems preferable to strictly adhering to the division of multi-sided markets into transaction or non-transaction markets. If the Commission’s analysis is correct in that there are no differences in competitive constraints on the two sides of comparison shopping services, in combination with crossing network effects, the platform’s multi-sidedness is a necessary trait for both sides. This means that a substitute has to be multi-sided in order for it to be included on the relevant product market, which minimizes the risk for false negatives. Vice versa, the definition of two markets allows for one-sided products to be included on the relevant product market, which minimizes the risk for false positives. This is important not only for the binary finding of dominance or non-dominance, but also the degree of dominance. As concluded above, incorrectly defining one market may artificially inflate the degree of dominance into false super-dominance, and incorrectly defining several markets may artificially dilute the degree of dominance. The second question is how substitutability should be measured. It is obvious from the cases examined that qualitative measures are used and not quantitative measures. The products’ characteristics, intended use, purpose, functionalities, users’ perceptions of the product, etc. were given much attention. The SSNIP test was not applied in any of the cases. The first conclusion to be drawn from the examination above is therefore that the difficulties regarding measuring substitutability on multi-sided markets mainly concern quantitative measures. The arguments against applying a SSNIP test related to the cellophane fallacy (in two different forms, one of which was deceivingly similar to the reverse cellophane fallacy) and differences in price sensitivities between the two sides. Network effects present an additional difficulty, which may lead to exaggerated results when measuring substitutability. The second conclusion to be drawn is that there exists a reluctance to apply a SSNIP test in a way that is tailored for multi-sided markets. One method that has been proposed is to apply the test on the total sum paid by both sides, while allowing the intermediary to adjust the increase in price in accordance with its price structure. The categorical dismissal of applying the test in this way suggests that adapted versions have some time to wait before being introduced into case law and decisional practice. If they, as their proponents argue, are a robust way of broadening the evidence of possible substitutability, this is unfortunate. The risk of defining the market overly narrow or overly broad is of course present in this regard as well. A broader spectrum of evidence therefore minimizes the risk of incorrectly finding both dominance and non-dominance.

Europe is facing a climate and environmental crisis. To respond to this, the European Commission has launched several programmes, which aim to increase sustainability and environmental protection. This aim has been condensed into the policy document that is the European Green Deal. The European Green Deal sets out the aim of making the Union’s economy climate neutral, while improving environmental protection and protecting biodiversity. To this end, several different sectors of the economy need to be overhauled.  In EU Law, a key policy area is to protect free competition. Article 101 TFEU sets out that agreements between undertakings which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition are prohibited. Similarly, Article 102 TFEU prohibits abuse by an undertaking of a dominant position.  This thesis explores what happens when competition law thus intersects with the environmental policy of the Union. The thesis identifies two main situations  of interaction. Undertakings can invoke environmental protection to justify a restriction of competition. The Union may also rely on its antitrust provisions to enforce sustainability by holding unsustainable practices as restrictive agreements or abuses of dominant behaviour, respectively, and thus prohibited by the antitrust provisions.  Generally, the thesis concludes that there is not enough information on how the Commission and the CJEU will approach arguments relating to sustainability in its antitrust assessment. The Commission’s consumer welfare standard appears to limit environmental integration to points where a certain factor results affects the environment or sustainability on the one hand, and consumer welfare on the other. The lack of information, moreover, is in itself an issue as undertakings may abstain from environmental action if they believe they will come under scrutiny due to violations of the antitrust provisions. Therefore, a key conclusion in the thesis is that the Commission and the CJEU should set out clear guidelines for environmental action by undertakings, in relation to the antitrust provisions. Similarly, the Commission appears to be cautious to use antitrust as a tool against unsustainable practices. The Commission has, however, recently decided to open an investigation into agreements which limit sustainability, which shows that the picture may be changing.

Competition and data protection law are two powerful regimes simultaneously shaping the use of digital information, which has given rise to new interactions between these areas of law. While most views on this intersection emphasize that competition and data protection law must work together, nascent developments indicate that these legal regimes may sometimes conflict.  In the first place, firms faced with antitrust allegations are to an increasing extent invoking the need to protect the privacy of their users to justify their impugned conduct. Here, the conduct could either be prohibited by competition law despite of data protection or justified under competition law because of data protection. In the EU, no such justification attempt has reached court-stage, and it remains unclear how an enforcer ought to deal with such a claim. In the second place, competition law can mandate a firm to provide access to commercially valuable personal data to its rivals under a competition law remedy. Where that is the case, the question arising in this connection is whether an enforcer can and should design the remedy in a way that aligns with data protection law. If so, the issue remains of how that ought to be done. The task of the thesis has been to explore these issues, legally, economically, and coherently.  The thesis has rendered four main conclusions. First, data protection has a justified role in EU competition law in two ways. On the one hand, enhanced data protection can increase the quality of a service and may thus be factored in the competitive analysis as a dimension of quality. On the other, data protection as a human right must be guaranteed in the application of competition law. Second, these perspectives can be squared with the criteria for justifying competition breaches, in that data protection can be invoked to exculpate a firm from antitrust allegations. Third, in that context, the human rights dimension of data protection may entail that the enforcer must consider data protection even if it is not invoked. However, allowing data protection interests to override competition law in this manner is relatively inefficient as it may lead to less innovation, higher costs, and lower revenues. Fourth, the profound importance of data protection in the EU necessarily means that enforcers should accommodate data protection interests in designing competition law remedies which mandate access to personal data. This may be done in several ways, including requirements to anonymize data before providing access, or to oblige the firm to be compliant with data protection law in the process of providing access. The analysis largely confirms that anonymization is the preferable option.