La procédure suivie devant le juge administratif est traversée par une double évolution qui justifie qu’une étude soit consacrée à l’office des parties. A mesure que le droit du contentieux administratif se transforme en un droit du procès administratif, on observe que ce procès n’est plus pensé comme un procès fait à un acte, mais comme un procès entre parties. Le renversement des perspectives auquel invite le point de vue des parties est possible grâce à un instrument d’analyse finaliste du droit : l’office. Ce concept permet de s’interroger sur l’adéquation entre les facultés dont disposent et les charges que supportent les parties – i.e. l’office stricto sensu – et les finalités que l’ordre juridique leur assigne – i.e. l’office lato sensu. Comprises comme les personnes physiques ou morales qui participent au lien juridique d’instance en raison d’un litige né de prétentions propres et contraires sur un droit, les parties au procès poursuivent deux finalités complémentaires : la détermination intéressée de la matière litigieuse et la participation loyale à l’instance. Dès lors, le point de vue des parties permet de mettre en lumière non seulement les facultés et les charges que la doctrine néglige lorsqu’elle envisage le procès administratif sous l’angle exclusif du juge, mais aussi que leur office stricto sensu peut être perfectionné en vue de mieux répondre aux finalités de leur office lato sensu. En permettant de renoncer à une opposition dogmatique entre les procès civil et administratif, l’étude de l’office des parties encourage à inscrire la recherche et l’enseignement du droit du procès administratif dans une perspective résolument processualiste. / The procedure before administrative courts is characterised by a double evolution, which justifies a study to be devoted to the office of the parties in an administrative hearing. As the law of administrative litigation increasingly transforms itself into the law of administrative hearings, one can observe that this process is no longer considered as a trial made to an act, but as a trial between parties. The perspective switch, to which the point of view of the parties to the trial invites, is made possible thanks to an instrument of finalist analysis of the law : the office. This concept makes it possible to question the adequacy between the powers and the charges of the parties - that is, the office stricto sensu - with the goals assigned to them by the legal order - namely, the office lato sensu. Understood as the physical or legal persons who participate in the legal relationship because of a dispute arising from own and contrary claims to a right, the parties to the lawsuit pursue two complementary goals : the interested determination of the dispute and the fair participation in the instance. This study allows to draw two conclusions. On the one hand, the office stricto sensu can be improved in order to better converge toward the office lato sensu. On the other hand, it shows that an opposition between the civil lawsuit and the administrative lawsuit is no longer possible. This study about the parties office in administrative lawsuit reveals the importance of research and teaching in procedural law.

A tese objetiva estruturar os pressupostos constitucionais impostos pelo conteúdo atual e humanizado do contraditório participativo às técnicas de sumarização da cognição. A primeira parte do estudo volta-se ao descortínio do papel do contraditório no sistema processual civil, do seu conteúdo mínimo atual, a partir da experiência internacional, em especial das Cortes de proteção dos direitos humanos, em confronto com o estágio evolutivo da jurisprudência brasileira. A segunda parte estuda as pressões exercidas pela celeridade sobre as fronteiras do contraditório, passando pelo exame dos dados disponibilizados pelo Conselho Nacional de Justiça e por outros institutos, pelo conteúdo do direito à razoável duração dos processos, também com amparo na experiência das Cortes internacionais de proteção dos direitos humanos, com o exame detido das condenações impostas ao Brasil pela Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos e da urisprudência interna sobre o tema, que nega aos prejudicados o direito à reparação dos danos sofridos pelos retardos injustificados. Definidas as bases, segue-se a análise das técnicas de sumarização da cognição, seus fundamentos, objetivos e espécies. A cognição sumária é definida em contraposição à cognição plena, segundo a qual as partes podem exercer, plenamente, em Juízo, os direitos inerentes ao contraditório participativo. O último quadrante se volta à estruturação dos pressupostos constitucionais legitimadores do emprego das técnicas de sumarização da cognição, impostos pelo contraditório como freio às pressões constantes da celeridade. O emprego legítimo das técnicas de tutela diferenciadas que se valem da cognição sumária para acelerar os resultados pressupõe, no quadro constitucional atual, (i) a observância do núcleo essencial do contraditório, identificado na audiência bilateral, em todo o iter da relação processual, (ii) a predeterminação legislativa, para que os cortes cognitivos não venham a ser casuisticamente realizados, (iii) a oportunidade, assegurada às partes, para integrar o contraditório em outra fase ou processo, em cognição plena, bem como (iv) a manutenção do equilíbrio na estabilização dos resultados, não podendo a cognição sumária, porque marcada pela incompletude, ser exaustiva em si. Ao final, depois do exame do caráter renunciável das garantias, é realizada a análise de alguns institutos processuais vigentes, nos quais é possível verificar o traço da sumarização da cognição, seguida da indicação das correções legislativas necessárias à conformação dos modelos aos padrões legitimadores propostos, reequilibrando as bases do sistema processual civil. / The thesis aims to structure the constitutional assumptions imposed by the current and humanized content of the adversarial principle to the cognition summarization techniques. The first part of the study is turned to envisaging the role of the adversarial principle in the civil procedure system, of its minimum current content, as from the international experience, especially of the Courts for protecting human rights, in opposition to the evolutive stage of Brazilian case law. The second part studies the pressures exerted by expeditiousness on the borderlines of the adversarial principle, by way of the review of the data made available by the National Justice Council and by other institutes, by content of the law to the reasonable duration of the procedures, also with support in the experience of the international Courts for protection of human rights, with accurate review of the condemnations imposed upon Brazil by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and of internal case law on the theme, which denies those injured the right of reparation of damage suffered by unjustified delays. The bases being defined, there follows the analysis of techniques for summarizing cognition, its grounds, objectives and species. Summary cognition is defined in counterpart to full cognition, according to which the parties may exercise, fully, in Court, the rights inherent to adversarial principle. The last quadrant is turned to the structuring of the constitutional assumptions legitimating the use of the techniques of cognition summarization, imposed by the adversarial principle as a brake to the constant pressures of expeditiousness. The legitimate use of the differentiated relief techniques employing summary cognition to expedite results assumes, in the current constitutional outlook, (i) compliance with the essential core of the adversarial principle, identified in the bilateral hearing, throughout the entire procedure, (ii) the legislative predetermination, so that the cognitive cuts may not be casuistically performed, (iii) the opportunity, assured to the parties, to integrate the current content of the adversarial principle in another phase or process, in full cognition, as well as (iv) the upkeep of the balance in the stabilization of the results, summary cognition not being, because it is highlighted by incompletion, exhaustive in itself. Finally, following review of the renounceable character of the guarantees, the analysis of a number of some standing procedural institutes, in which it is possible to ascertain traces of cognition summarizat ion, followed by the indication of the legislative corrections needed to the forming of models to the legitimating standards, rebalancing the bases of the civil procedure system.

A tese objetiva estruturar os pressupostos constitucionais impostos pelo conteúdo atual e humanizado do contraditório participativo às técnicas de sumarização da cognição. A primeira parte do estudo volta-se ao descortínio do papel do contraditório no sistema processual civil, do seu conteúdo mínimo atual, a partir da experiência internacional, em especial das Cortes de proteção dos direitos humanos, em confronto com o estágio evolutivo da jurisprudência brasileira. A segunda parte estuda as pressões exercidas pela celeridade sobre as fronteiras do contraditório, passando pelo exame dos dados disponibilizados pelo Conselho Nacional de Justiça e por outros institutos, pelo conteúdo do direito à razoável duração dos processos, também com amparo na experiência das Cortes internacionais de proteção dos direitos humanos, com o exame detido das condenações impostas ao Brasil pela Corte Interamericana de Direitos Humanos e da urisprudência interna sobre o tema, que nega aos prejudicados o direito à reparação dos danos sofridos pelos retardos injustificados. Definidas as bases, segue-se a análise das técnicas de sumarização da cognição, seus fundamentos, objetivos e espécies. A cognição sumária é definida em contraposição à cognição plena, segundo a qual as partes podem exercer, plenamente, em Juízo, os direitos inerentes ao contraditório participativo. O último quadrante se volta à estruturação dos pressupostos constitucionais legitimadores do emprego das técnicas de sumarização da cognição, impostos pelo contraditório como freio às pressões constantes da celeridade. O emprego legítimo das técnicas de tutela diferenciadas que se valem da cognição sumária para acelerar os resultados pressupõe, no quadro constitucional atual, (i) a observância do núcleo essencial do contraditório, identificado na audiência bilateral, em todo o iter da relação processual, (ii) a predeterminação legislativa, para que os cortes cognitivos não venham a ser casuisticamente realizados, (iii) a oportunidade, assegurada às partes, para integrar o contraditório em outra fase ou processo, em cognição plena, bem como (iv) a manutenção do equilíbrio na estabilização dos resultados, não podendo a cognição sumária, porque marcada pela incompletude, ser exaustiva em si. Ao final, depois do exame do caráter renunciável das garantias, é realizada a análise de alguns institutos processuais vigentes, nos quais é possível verificar o traço da sumarização da cognição, seguida da indicação das correções legislativas necessárias à conformação dos modelos aos padrões legitimadores propostos, reequilibrando as bases do sistema processual civil. / The thesis aims to structure the constitutional assumptions imposed by the current and humanized content of the adversarial principle to the cognition summarization techniques. The first part of the study is turned to envisaging the role of the adversarial principle in the civil procedure system, of its minimum current content, as from the international experience, especially of the Courts for protecting human rights, in opposition to the evolutive stage of Brazilian case law. The second part studies the pressures exerted by expeditiousness on the borderlines of the adversarial principle, by way of the review of the data made available by the National Justice Council and by other institutes, by content of the law to the reasonable duration of the procedures, also with support in the experience of the international Courts for protection of human rights, with accurate review of the condemnations imposed upon Brazil by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and of internal case law on the theme, which denies those injured the right of reparation of damage suffered by unjustified delays. The bases being defined, there follows the analysis of techniques for summarizing cognition, its grounds, objectives and species. Summary cognition is defined in counterpart to full cognition, according to which the parties may exercise, fully, in Court, the rights inherent to adversarial principle. The last quadrant is turned to the structuring of the constitutional assumptions legitimating the use of the techniques of cognition summarization, imposed by the adversarial principle as a brake to the constant pressures of expeditiousness. The legitimate use of the differentiated relief techniques employing summary cognition to expedite results assumes, in the current constitutional outlook, (i) compliance with the essential core of the adversarial principle, identified in the bilateral hearing, throughout the entire procedure, (ii) the legislative predetermination, so that the cognitive cuts may not be casuistically performed, (iii) the opportunity, assured to the parties, to integrate the current content of the adversarial principle in another phase or process, in full cognition, as well as (iv) the upkeep of the balance in the stabilization of the results, summary cognition not being, because it is highlighted by incompletion, exhaustive in itself. Finally, following review of the renounceable character of the guarantees, the analysis of a number of some standing procedural institutes, in which it is possible to ascertain traces of cognition summarizat ion, followed by the indication of the legislative corrections needed to the forming of models to the legitimating standards, rebalancing the bases of the civil procedure system.

En procédure civile, la connaissance des actes du procès par les parties est essentielle ; des garanties importantes y sont attachées, à commencer par le respect du principe du contradictoire. Une difficulté se pose, toutefois : il est malaisé de déterminer si une partie a eu connaissance de l’acte qui lui a été communiqué. Toute la question est alors de savoir comment le droit s’accommode de cette difficulté. À cette fin, deux modèles contraires peuvent être dégagés. Dans le premier, formaliste, il est fait le choix de favoriser la connaissance des actes du procès par les parties en amont, pour pouvoir se désintéresser de leur connaissance effective en aval, tous les moyens ayant été mis en oeuvre pour y parvenir. Dans le second, réaliste, on se désintéresse de la façon dont les actes du procès sont portés à la connaissance des parties, mais, par la suite, on prête beaucoup d’intérêt à la connaissance que les parties en ont réellement eue. L’étude révèle que le droit du procès civil reposait initialement sur un modèle à dominante formaliste, mais que ce modèle a évolué, particulièrement au cours des dix dernières années. Sous l’influence des soucis contemporains de rationalisation des coûts de la justice et de protection accrue des droits fondamentaux des parties, le formalisme du droit du procès civil s’est tempéré. Faudrait-il qu’il le soit davantage ? Ce travail ne plaide ni pour la subversion du modèle classique, ni pour son rétablissement. Plutôt, c’est une évolution nuancée du droit qui est suggérée, proposant d’exalter le formalisme lorsque la sécurité juridique l’exige, sans renoncer à tirer profit de règles l’atténuant quand cela s’impose. / In civil law procedures, the parties’ knowledge of the acts of the trial is essential; it guarantees that certain principles, such as the adversarial principle, will be respected. However, a difficulty arises: it is hard to determine whether a party has in fact become aware of the act which was communicated to him. The question is to determine whether the law can accept such a difficulty. To this end, two divergent models can be provided. In the formalistic one, the choice is made to favor the knowledge of the acts of the trial beforehand, in order to be able to become disinterested in their actual knowledge afterwards, all the means having been implemented to carry this out. In the realistic one, the way in which the acts of the trial are brought to the parties' attention is neglected, but thereafter, there is a resurgent focus on the knowledge the parties have genuinely had. The study reveals that the law of civil trial was initially based on a predominantly formalistic model, but this model has evolved, especially during the last decade. Under the influence of contemporary concerns in order to rationalize justice costs and increase the protection of the parties' fundamental rights, the formalism of civil lawsuit has been tempered. Should it be even more moderate? This work neither pleads for the subversion of the classical model nor for its reinstatement. Instead, it is a nuanced evolution of the law which is suggested. It suggests to promote formalism when legal certainty requires it, without sacrificing the benefit of lightening the rules when it is necessary.

Le principe du contradictoire post-arbitral en matière d’arbitrage international est établi dans la majorité des systèmes juridiques. Toutefois, les décisions des juges étatiques montrent que l’adhésion générale à ce concept masque d’importantes différences concernant sa portée et son application. Cette thèse ne vise point à établir une description théorique du contenu du principe, elle propose une analyse qualitative, dont l’objectif essentiel est la vérification de son individualité, et non le fait qu’il est une simple application du principe civiliste classique. Loin de constater l’adoption définitive d’un concept arbitral autonome, la solution retenue démontre l’opportunité et, donc, le besoin de sa légitimation, ayant un impact direct sur la circulation des sentences arbitrales internationales. En fin de compte, hors de tout encadrement statique, il y a lieu de détecter, à travers la progression de l’étude, une évolution logique et une activité d’apurement au niveau du droit comparé. Cette évolution, d’un principe classique vers un concept arbitral international, à lecture contractuelle et non-statutaire, contenant une règle d’égalité, puis vers un outil technique en état de disparition, ne peut que dévoiler la période d’agonie dans laquelle se place le concept en cause. Cet aboutissement ne contribue pas seulement à souligner les errements conceptuels préjudiciables en jurisprudence comparée, il concourt également à marquer l’un des traits les plus émancipatoires du processus arbitral international. Dans cette optique, une telle conjoncture participerait à l’accélération de la privatisation de la justice arbitrale internationale. / The post-arbitral adversarial principle in international arbitration is established in most legal systems. However, decisions of state judges show that general support for this concept masks significant differences in terms of its scope and application. This thesis does not aim to outline a theoretical description of the principle’s content ; it provides a qualitative analysis, the main objective of which is to ascertain its individuality, and not the fact that it is a mere application of the classic civil principle. Far from establishing the definitive adoption of an autonomous arbitral concept, the solution demonstrates the appropriateness and, therefore, the need for its legitimation, and has a direct impact on the movement of international arbitral awards. Ultimately, beyond any static framework, through the progress of the study, a logical development and regularisation activity with respect to comparative law should be detected. This development, from a classical principle to an international arbitration concept, to a contractual and non-statutory reading, containing a rule of equality, and thereafter to a technical tool which is disappearing, can only reveal the death throes in which the concept in question finds itself in. This outcome not only serves to highlight the detrimental conceptual errors in comparative case law, it also helps to mark one of the most emancipatory features of the international arbitration process. In this respect, such a situation would contribute to the accelerated privatisation of international arbitration proceedings.