This study focused on how local politicians in Kalmar perceive journalists and their intertwined relationship. We based our study on the theoretical understanding of today’s media-centric democratic society. The ‘adversary model’ offered an understanding of the intricate relations between politicians and journalists. The relationship builds on constant trade where both parties are dependent on each other. Politicians exchange information to gain attention in the media. Journalists needs politicians as important sources of information and have the power to control the exposure that politicians get in the public eye. This study was researched and conducted through qualitative interviews with local politicians. We found that experienced politicians have developed an understanding for journalistic work and that it is important to have a good relationship to reach out to their constituency. This professional relationship has to be kept at arm’s length as it otherwise risks to become too muddled. We learned that politicians are well aware of the need to adapt to media conditions – there were, however, examples of breakdowns in this precarious relationship. The politicians in our study delivered several examples of how media adaptation is managed, e g how press conferences are scheduled according to media deadlines and are held at suitable locations so that photographers can get good pictures. Trust appeared to be the crucial condition for a rewarding relationship. Every politician in our study agreed that it is all a question of trust.

<p>This study focused on how local politicians in Kalmar perceive journalists and their intertwined relationship. We based our study on the theoretical understanding of today’s media-centric democratic society. The ‘adversary model’ offered an understanding of the intricate relations between politicians and journalists. The relationship builds on constant trade where both parties are dependent on each other. Politicians exchange information to gain attention in the media. Journalists needs politicians as important sources of information and have the power to control the exposure that politicians get in the public eye. This study was researched and conducted through qualitative interviews with local politicians.</p><p>We found that experienced politicians have developed an understanding for journalistic work and that it is important to have a good relationship to reach out to their constituency. This professional relationship has to be kept at arm’s length as it otherwise risks to become too muddled. We learned that politicians are well aware of the need to adapt to media conditions – there were, however, examples of breakdowns in this precarious relationship.</p><p>The politicians in our study delivered several examples of how media adaptation is managed, e g how press conferences are scheduled according to media deadlines and are held at suitable locations so that photographers can get good pictures. Trust appeared to be the crucial condition for a rewarding relationship. Every politician in our study agreed that it is all a question of trust.</p>

Nous abordons des problèmes de sécurité dans des systèmes cyber-physiques industriels. Les attaques contre ces systèmes doivent être traitées à la fois en matière de sûreté et de sécurité. Les technologies de contrôles imposés par les normes industrielles, couvrent déjà la sûreté. Cependant, du point de vue de la sécurité, la littérature a prouvé que l’utilisation de techniques cyber pour traiter la sécurité de ces systèmes n’est pas suffisante, car les actions physiques malveillantes seront ignorées. Pour cette raison, on a besoin de mécanismes pour protéger les deux couches à la fois. Certains auteurs ont traité des attaques de rejeu et d’intégrité en utilisant une attestation physique, p. ex., le tatouage des paramètres physiques du système. Néanmoins, ces détecteurs fonctionnent correctement uniquement si les adversaires n’ont pas assez de connaissances pour tromper les deux couches. Cette thèse porte sur les limites mentionnées ci-dessus. Nous commençons en testant l’efficacité d’un détecteur qui utilise une signature stationnaire afin de détecter des actions malveillantes. Nous montrons que ce détecteur est incapable d’identifier les adversaires cyber-physiques qui tentent de connaître la dynamique du système. Nous analysons son ratio de détection sous la présence de nouveaux adversaires capables de déduire la dynamique du système. Nous revisitons le design original, en utilisant une signature non stationnaire, afin de gérer les adversaires visant à échapper à la détection. Nous proposons également une nouvelle approche qui combine des stratégies de contrôle et de communication. Toutes les solutions son validées à l’aide de simulations et maquettes d’entraînement / We address security issues in cyber-physical industrial systems. Attacks against these systems shall be handled both in terms of safety and security. Control technologies imposed by industrial standards already cover the safety dimension. From a security standpoint, the literature has shown that using only cyber information to handle the security of cyber-physical systems is not enough, since physical malicious actions are ignored. For this reason, cyber-physical systems have to be protected from threats to their cyber and physical layers. Some authors handle the attacks by using physical attestations of the underlying processes, f.i., physical watermarking to ensure the truthfulness of the process. However, these detectors work properly only if the adversaries do not have enough knowledge to mislead crosslayer data. This thesis focuses on the aforementioned limitations. It starts by testing the effectiveness of a stationary watermark-based fault detector, to detect, as well, malicious actions produced by adversaries. We show that the stationary watermark-based detector is unable to identify cyber-physical adversaries. We show that the approach only detects adversaries that do not attempt to get any knowledge about the system dynamics. We analyze the detection performance of the original design under the presence of adversaries that infer the system dynamics to evade detection. We revisit the original design, using a non-stationary watermark-based design, to handle those adversaries. We also propose a novel approach that combines control and communication strategies. We validate our solutions using numeric simulations and training cyber-physical testbeds