Electrical energy generation and distribution systems are good examples of complex systems. They include continuous, discrete, and social dynamics. They are operated by millions of human and non-human (or electro-mechanical) agents, and they show statistical properties found in other complex systems, such as power-law distributions in failure sizes. A number of recent large blackouts in Europe and North America have emphasized the societal importance of understanding these dynamics. Classical electromagnetic analysis alone frequently does not provide the insight required to characterize and mitigate risks in the electricity infrastructure. The objective of this thesis is to obtain insights into the dynamics of power grids using tools from the science of complex systems. In particular, this thesis will compare the topology, electrical structure, and attack/failure tolerance of power grids with those of theoretical graph structures such as regular, random, small-world, and scale-free networks. Simulation results in this thesis will describe the cost of the disturbances as a function of failure or attack sizes. The cost associated with network perturbations is often measured by changes on the diameter or average path length, whereas in the electricity industry, the loss of power demand (or blackout size) is the best indicator of the cost or impact of disturbances to electricity infrastructure.

La seguridad nacional y económica de los países depende del funcionamiento confiable de su infraestructura crítica. Las amenazas de ciberseguridad explotan la creciente complejidad de dichos sistemas, colocando la economía, la seguridad pública y la salud en riesgo. Al igual que el riesgo financiero y de reputación, el riesgo de ciberseguridad afecta a los objetivos estratégicos de una empresa. Puede aumentar los costos y afectar los ingresos. Puede dañar la capacidad de una organización para Innovar, brindar servicios, ganar y mantener a los clientes. Así mimo, la información se ha convertido en uno de los activos más importantes para cualquier organización, y el aseguramiento de la misma como un punto primordial para lograr ventajas competitivas y generación del valor, basando en el adecuado resguardo de la Confidencialidad, Disponibilidad e Integridad de la Información. El propósito del presente trabajo es desarrollar y proponer un método que permita gestionar la ciberseguridad en empresas del sector telecomunicaciones sobre la base de una adecuada gestión del riesgo y la medición de controles según un nivel de madurez. Este método propuesto se encuentra basado en el Cyber Security Framework (CSF) del National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promulgada por el Presidente Obama mediante la Orden Ejecutiva (EO) 13636. / The national and economic security of the countries depends on the reliable operation of their critical infrastructure. Cybersecurity threats exploit the increasing complexity of these systems, putting the economy, public safety and health at risk. Like financial and reputation risk, cybersecurity risk affects the strategic objectives of a company. It can increase costs and affect income. It can damage the ability of an organization to innovate, provide services, earn and maintain customers. Likewise, information has become one of the most important assets for any organization, and the assurance of it as a fundamental point to achieve competitive advantages and generation of value, based on the appropriate protection of Confidentiality, Availability and Integrity of the information. The purpose of this paper is to develop and propose a method for managing cybersecurity in companies in the telecommunications sector on the basis of an adequate risk management and the measurement of controls according to a level of maturity. This proposed method is based on the Cyber Security Framework (CSF) of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) promulgated by President Obama through Executive Order (EO) 13636. / Trabajo de investigación

Critical infrastructure is a term to define the network of crucial assets for the functioning of a society and modern economies. The complexity of critical infrastructures and the ability to connect smart devices to these networks make them more vulnerable to cyberattacks. One of the cutting events pointing out gaps and importance of the cyber resilience in the nation's infrastructure systems, including Industrial Control Systems (ICS), was the discovery of Stuxnet in 2010, a malicious computer worm attacking Iranian nuclear facilities. The vulnerability of cyber systems was further revealed by a cyberattack on the SCADA system in Ukraine in 2015. This paper uses both a systematic literature strategy base on the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) statement and co-occurrence analysis by VOSviewer, a tool for visualization of similarities, to explore the specific research domains of cyber resilience for critical infrastructures and to understand the current trend of development and future research orientation. Despite the literature's emphasis on essential industries, the results show that, of all exposure parameters, the organization's sector is most consistently connected with the emergence of cyber resilience traits. The sector is also important in terms of the kind of attack and its effect on data. The attacked entities in the sample have a low level of cyber resilience, as evidenced by the surprisingly low intensity of devoted Cyber Security (CS) operational setting, use of CS structures, the resilience of Prevention, Detection, and Recovery controls (PDR), and organizations' reactions to their stakeholders following cyber attacks. The studied countries do not consistently adopt cyber resilience features. The prevalence of resilience traits, on the other hand, seems to have a beneficial influence on the frequency of litigation and sanctions. Furthermore, improved protection, detection, and recovery measures increase the frequency of responsibilities and expectations to stakeholders following cyber assaults.

Our society is heavily dependent on commodities, as water and electricity, supplied to final users by engineered systems, which are known as critical infrastructures. In such context, the understanding of how such systems handle damaging events is an important aspect and is a current concern of researchers, public agents, and society. How much of performance a system loses due to damages is related to its vulnerability, and the ability to absorb and recover successfully from damages is its resilience. In this study, approaches to assess the vulnerability and resilience of power distribution systems by evaluating dynamic features, as the processes of failure and repair, and system reconfiguration for vulnerability, and the effects of extreme weather scenarios for resilience together with the processes of failure of repair are presented. Such approaches were applied on systems previously presented in the literature, and also on a Brazilian power distribution system. A Monte Carlo simulation was applied to evaluate this systems, models for time-to-failure and time-to-repair under different circumstances were obtained from historical data, and a method to use the models of time-to-failure during the vulnerability analysis was introduced. In addition, an assessment of the impact of reconfiguration capability on vulnerability is also carried out, and a resilience assessment under different climate scenarios has been developed. The time-to-failure and repair models highlighted how external factors modifies the Brazilian system failure and repair dynamics, the use of time-to-failure models during vulnerability analysis showed that the consideration of the failure dynamic of the types of elements give different results, and the time domain allows new analysis\' perspectives. The investigation indicated that the vulnerability reduction due to reconfiguration is affected by the number of switches and also the maximum load capacity of the distribution system feeders. The resilience assessment showed that for structural connectivity, larger distribution networks are less resilient, while for electricity delivery, a set of features, related with the topological and electrical organization of such networks, seems to be associated with the network service resilience, such information is useful for system planning and management. The dynamics evaluated in this study are relevant to vulnerability and resilience of such systems, and also to other critical infrastructures. Moreover, the developed approaches can be applied to other systems, as transportation and water distribution. In future studies, other power distribution systems features, as distributed generation and energy storage, will be considered in both, vulnerability and resilience analysis. / Nossa sociedade é altamente dependente de commodities, como água e eletricidade, fornecidas para os usuários por sistemas de engenharia, conhecidos como infraestruturas críticas. A compreensão de como tais sistemas lidam com eventos prejudiciais é uma preocupação atual de pesquisadores, agentes públicos e sociedade. A perda de desempenho de um sistema devido a danos é relacionada à sua vulnerabilidade, e a capacidade de absorver e se recuperar dos danos é a resiliência. Neste estudo, são apresentadas abordagens para avaliar a vulnerabilidade e resiliência de sistemas de distribuição de energia considerando características dinâmicas, como os processos de falha e reconfiguração do sistema, para a vulnerabilidade, e os efeitos de climas extremos na resiliência com os processos de falha e reparo. Tais abordagens foram aplicadas em sistemas previamente apresentados na literatura, e também em um sistema brasileiro. Simulação de Monte Carlo foi utilizada para avaliar as dinâmicas de falha e reparo do sistema utilizando de modelos obtidos a partir de dados históricos, e um método para usar os modelos de tempo-até-falha durante a análise de vulnerabilidade também foi apresentado. Além disso, uma avaliação do impacto da dinâmica de reconfiguração na vulnerabilidade foi realizada e uma avaliação de resiliência sob diferentes cenários climáticos foi desenvolvida. Os modelos tempo-para-falha e reparo destacaram como fatores externos modificam as dinâmicas de falha e reparo do sistema brasileiro, o uso de modelos de confiabilidade na análise de vulnerabilidades mostrou que a consideração dos diferentes tipos de elementos geram resultados diferentes e o domínio de tempo permite novas perspectivas de análise. A investigação da reconfiguração indicou que a redução da vulnerabilidade devido à reconfiguração é afetada pelo número de chaves e também pela máxima capacidade de carga dos alimentadores do sistema de distribuição. A avaliação de resiliência mostrou que, para conectividade estrutural, redes de distribuição maiores são menos resilientes, enquanto que para fornecimento de energia, um conjunto de características, relacionados com a organização topológica e elétrica dessas redes parece ser associado à resiliência do serviço, informação útil para o planejamento. As dinâmicas avaliadas neste estudo são relevantes para a vulnerabilidade e resiliência de tais sistemas, e também para outras infraestruturas críticas. Além disso, essas abordagens podem ser aplicadas a outros sistemas, como transporte e distribuição de água. Em estudos futuros, outras características de sistemas de distribuição de energia, como geração distribuída e armazenamento de energia, serão consideradas nas análises de vulnerabilidade e resiliência.

Our society is heavily dependent on commodities, as water and electricity, supplied to final users by engineered systems, which are known as critical infrastructures. In such context, the understanding of how such systems handle damaging events is an important aspect and is a current concern of researchers, public agents, and society. How much of performance a system loses due to damages is related to its vulnerability, and the ability to absorb and recover successfully from damages is its resilience. In this study, approaches to assess the vulnerability and resilience of power distribution systems by evaluating dynamic features, as the processes of failure and repair, and system reconfiguration for vulnerability, and the effects of extreme weather scenarios for resilience together with the processes of failure of repair are presented. Such approaches were applied on systems previously presented in the literature, and also on a Brazilian power distribution system. A Monte Carlo simulation was applied to evaluate this systems, models for time-to-failure and time-to-repair under different circumstances were obtained from historical data, and a method to use the models of time-to-failure during the vulnerability analysis was introduced. In addition, an assessment of the impact of reconfiguration capability on vulnerability is also carried out, and a resilience assessment under different climate scenarios has been developed. The time-to-failure and repair models highlighted how external factors modifies the Brazilian system failure and repair dynamics, the use of time-to-failure models during vulnerability analysis showed that the consideration of the failure dynamic of the types of elements give different results, and the time domain allows new analysis\' perspectives. The investigation indicated that the vulnerability reduction due to reconfiguration is affected by the number of switches and also the maximum load capacity of the distribution system feeders. The resilience assessment showed that for structural connectivity, larger distribution networks are less resilient, while for electricity delivery, a set of features, related with the topological and electrical organization of such networks, seems to be associated with the network service resilience, such information is useful for system planning and management. The dynamics evaluated in this study are relevant to vulnerability and resilience of such systems, and also to other critical infrastructures. Moreover, the developed approaches can be applied to other systems, as transportation and water distribution. In future studies, other power distribution systems features, as distributed generation and energy storage, will be considered in both, vulnerability and resilience analysis. / Nossa sociedade é altamente dependente de commodities, como água e eletricidade, fornecidas para os usuários por sistemas de engenharia, conhecidos como infraestruturas críticas. A compreensão de como tais sistemas lidam com eventos prejudiciais é uma preocupação atual de pesquisadores, agentes públicos e sociedade. A perda de desempenho de um sistema devido a danos é relacionada à sua vulnerabilidade, e a capacidade de absorver e se recuperar dos danos é a resiliência. Neste estudo, são apresentadas abordagens para avaliar a vulnerabilidade e resiliência de sistemas de distribuição de energia considerando características dinâmicas, como os processos de falha e reconfiguração do sistema, para a vulnerabilidade, e os efeitos de climas extremos na resiliência com os processos de falha e reparo. Tais abordagens foram aplicadas em sistemas previamente apresentados na literatura, e também em um sistema brasileiro. Simulação de Monte Carlo foi utilizada para avaliar as dinâmicas de falha e reparo do sistema utilizando de modelos obtidos a partir de dados históricos, e um método para usar os modelos de tempo-até-falha durante a análise de vulnerabilidade também foi apresentado. Além disso, uma avaliação do impacto da dinâmica de reconfiguração na vulnerabilidade foi realizada e uma avaliação de resiliência sob diferentes cenários climáticos foi desenvolvida. Os modelos tempo-para-falha e reparo destacaram como fatores externos modificam as dinâmicas de falha e reparo do sistema brasileiro, o uso de modelos de confiabilidade na análise de vulnerabilidades mostrou que a consideração dos diferentes tipos de elementos geram resultados diferentes e o domínio de tempo permite novas perspectivas de análise. A investigação da reconfiguração indicou que a redução da vulnerabilidade devido à reconfiguração é afetada pelo número de chaves e também pela máxima capacidade de carga dos alimentadores do sistema de distribuição. A avaliação de resiliência mostrou que, para conectividade estrutural, redes de distribuição maiores são menos resilientes, enquanto que para fornecimento de energia, um conjunto de características, relacionados com a organização topológica e elétrica dessas redes parece ser associado à resiliência do serviço, informação útil para o planejamento. As dinâmicas avaliadas neste estudo são relevantes para a vulnerabilidade e resiliência de tais sistemas, e também para outras infraestruturas críticas. Além disso, essas abordagens podem ser aplicadas a outros sistemas, como transporte e distribuição de água. Em estudos futuros, outras características de sistemas de distribuição de energia, como geração distribuída e armazenamento de energia, serão consideradas nas análises de vulnerabilidade e resiliência.

De trop nombreux évènements survenus la décennie passée illustrent la gravité et l’étendue des impacts auxquels les territoires peuvent être confrontés. L'atteinte aux infrastructures critiques peut induire de très nombreux dysfonctionnements en cascade pouvant plonger ce territoire et sa société dans une crise de grande ampleur. Les interdépendances entre ces activités essentielles et celles avec la population accentuent leur fragilité. Afin d'évaluer les impacts directs et indirects d'une perturbation majeure, la méthodologie développée étudie la problématique sous un angle multisectoriel répondant ainsi à une prise en compte de la complexité des territoires. Dans un premier temps, le territoire via ses activités essentielles et sa population est modélisé en s'appuyant sur les liens d'interdépendance existants. Sur la base d'un évènement initial donné, la méthode identifie les scénarios de propagation possibles et leurs conséquences sur les "usagers" concernés par la délivrance des services touchés. Cette simulation permet ainsi d'apprécier la résilience systémique des enjeux du territoire. Basé sur une approche systémique et spatiale, ce travail a pour objectif de fournir une aide à la décision à la planification des mesures de continuité et de rétablissement d'activité ou à la mise en place de mesures de traitement des risques. / Too many dramatic events occurred over the last ten years have demonstrated the severity and extent of impacts that territories may be confronted with. Damages to critical infrastructures may have a variety of downfall disturbing effects, which can lead territories and society into a huge crisis. Interdependency between these essential activities on the one hand, and between these activities and the population on the other hand, increases their vulnerability. This thesis presents a methodology to better assess direct and indirect impacts of a major disturbance. The issue is addressed from a multi-activity perspective, to take into account territories complexity.In the first stage, a territory is modeled using existing interdependency links between essential activities and the population. The methodology then identifies, based on a defined initial event, possible propagation scenarios and their consequences on services “users”. Finally, this simulation gives an assessment of the territory stakes resilience. This works provides a decision-making tool for the development of activity continuity plans, or risk assessment and mitigation policies.

Due to the considerable advantages of cloud computing, such as cost efficiency, flexibility, and scalability, the technology has transformed the means of IT service provisioning. To realize the proclaimed benefits, critical infrastructure providers, as the backbone of societal life, increasingly deploy their IT services, processes, and functions in cloud environments. However, as the control over the underlying cloud infrastructure and the corresponding security measures is delegated to the cloud provider, the outsourcing to cloud environments exposes critical infrastructures to security risks. This is especially crucial since critical infrastructures highly rely on IT systems for dependable service provisioning. In addition, each cloud deployment is afflicted with individual risks depending on the selected cloud service and deployment model. Due to the strict requirements and regulations regarding the IT security of their landscapes, the management of IT security risks related to the adoption of cloud services is of significant importance for critical infrastructures. Thus, the objective of this thesis is to examine the IT security risk management of cloud services in critical infrastructures. For this purpose, frameworks, conceptual models, prototypical tools, action recommendations, and implications are developed. Besides the investigation of the status quo of cloud computing service adoption in German critical infrastructures, implications and methods for an adequate management of IT security and the corresponding risks resulting from the adoption of cloud computing services are derived. Further, in the context of the interaction between critical infrastructure and cloud computing service providers, the role of trust is examined. In addition, frameworks and prototypes for a tool support for the IT security risk management of cloud services in critical infrastructures are developed. As an underlying analytical framework, a multi-method approach is chosen to examine the field from a behavioral- as well as a design-oriented perspective by applying various qualitative and quantitative research methods. The results of this dissertation can support decision makers and researchers in the field of the IT security risk management of cloud computing services in critical infrastructures.

Les méthodes actuelles utilisées pour l'identification des infrastructures critiques, souvent envisagées dans leurs seules dimensions techniques, montrent certaines limites. Notre thèse postule qu'il est nécessaire de tenir compte du contexte territorial dans lequel ces infrastructures s'inscrivent, dans la mesure où les caractéristiques d'un territoire contribuent à leur criticité. En retour, les infrastructures critiques sont susceptibles d'aggraver la vulnérabilité de ces territoires. Nous développons deux hypothèses de recherche: 1. La "criticité territoriale" exprime le fait que les infrastructures critiques ne sont pas critiques en elles-mêmes, mais par rapport à un contexte socio-économique, politique et géographique. Nous proposons ainsi un ensemble de critères, associés à une approche multiscalaire des systèmes d'infrastructures, permettant l'identification des infrastructures critiques. Une étude de cas portant sur les infrastructures critiques d'énergie de l'Union Européenne valide cette approche. 2. La "criticité politique" souligne la dimension géopolitique des infrastructures critiques : celles-ci reflètent les seuils d'acceptabilité des autorités territoriales, au regard des conséquences potentielles de l'interruption de services essentiels. Cette hypothèse est développée et testée dans le cadre de notre participation au processus de concertation entre l'Union Européenne et ses pays membres pour la mise en place de la Directive 2008/114/EC sur l'identification et la protection des infrastructures critiques européennes. Les conclusions soulignent la pertinence d'une approche géographique et territoriale pour l'identification des infrastructures critiques. / The existing methods for identifying critical infrastructures, mainly based on risk analysis, were found to be insufficient. Our PhD states that the existing territorial vulnerability factors contribute to the criticality of the infrastructures; in return, critical infrastructures enhance this vulnerability. As a consequence, the identification process should be based, not only on technical aspects, but also on a geographical approach. Two main research hypothesis are developed: 1. The "territorial criticality" expresses the fact that an infrastructure is not critical in itself, but its criticality is related to the socio-economic, political and geographical context. We propose a set of criteria and related indicators associated to a multilevel model. A case study shows how these criteria can be applied in the case of the European energy critical infrastructures. 2. The "political criticality" means that the designation of an infrastructure as critical reflects the level of consequences decision-makers are ready to accept. These acceptability thresholds are related to the potential consequences the disruption of such infrastructure could trigger. If the potential consequences go beyond a given threshold, then the infrastructure is considered as critical. We developed and tested this hypothesis in the context of our participation to the preparatory work carried out by the European Commission Joint Research Center to support the European Commission and its member states on the definition of criteria for identifying European Critical Infrastructures (ECI). Conclusions highlight the benefits of a geographical approach to identify critical infrastructures.

Au vu de l’utilisation croissante des technologies de l’information et de la communication dans les réseaux électriques, il est indispensable d’étudier l’étroite liaison entre ces infrastructures et d’avoir une vision intégrée du système couplé. Cette thèse porte ainsi sur la modélisation des systèmes multi-infrastructures. Cela inclut les interdépendances et les trajectoires de défaillances de type modes communs, aggravations et cascades. Il est en effet nécessaire d’identifier les points de faiblesse qui peuvent déclencher une ou de multiples défaillance(s), se succéder en cascade au travers de ces infrastructures liées et ainsi entrainer des défaillances inattendues et de plus en plus graves dans des autres infrastructures. Dans cette optique, différents modèles basés sur la théorie des Réseaux Complexes sont développés afin d’identifier les composants les plus importantes, et pourtant critiques, dans le système interconnecté. Un des principaux verrous scientifiques levé dans cette thèse est relatif au développement d'un modèle mathématique « unifié » afin de représenter les comportements des multiples infrastructures non-homogènes qui ont des interdépendances asymétriques. / In view of the increasing use of Information and Communication Technol-ogies in power systems, it is essential to study the interdependencies between these coupled heterogeneous systems. This thesis focuses on the modeling of multi- infrastructure systems. This includes interdependencies and the three major failures families: common mode, escalat-ing and cascading. It is indeed necessary to identify the weaknesses that can trigger one or multiple failure(s) and cascade through these interdependent infrastructures, causing unex-pected and increasingly more serious failures to other infrastructures. In this context, different approaches, based on the theory of Complex Networks, are developed to identify the most critical components in the coupled heterogeneous system. One of the major scientific barriers addressed in this thesis is the development of a unified mathematical model to represent the behavior.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T14:56:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DanielECRM_DISSERT.pdf: 8738315 bytes, checksum: d256cff68e3707ec5352efefd60cc545 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-07-04 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Cient?fico e Tecnol?gico / There is a growing need to develop new tools to help end users in tasks related to the design, monitoring, maintenance and commissioning of critical infrastructures. The complexity of the industrial environment, for example, requires that these tools have flexible features in order to provide valuable data for the designers at the design phases. Furthermore, it is known that industrial processes have stringent requirements for dependability, since failures can cause economic losses, environmental damages and danger to people. The lack of tools that enable the evaluation of faults in critical infrastructures could mitigate these problems. Accordingly, the said work presents developing a framework for analyzing of dependability for critical infrastructures. The proposal allows the modeling of critical infrastructure, mapping its components to a Fault Tree. Then the mathematical model generated is used for dependability analysis of infrastructure, relying on the equipment and its interconnections failures. Finally, typical scenarios of industrial environments are used to validate the proposal / A demanda para o desenvolvimento de novas ferramentas que facilitem o projeto, monitoramento, manuten??o e comissionamento de infraestruturas cr?ticas ? permanente. A complexidade do ambiente industrial, por exemplo, exige que estas ferramentas apresentem funcionalidades bastante flex?veis, informando dados valiosos para os projetistas ainda na fase de pr?-projeto. Adicionado a estes fatores, sabe-se que os processos industriais apresentam requisitos de dependabilidade r?gidos, uma vez que falhas podem provocar perdas econ?micas, danos ambientais e riscos de vida aos oper?rios. A utiliza??o de uma ferramenta que habilite a avalia??o de falhas nas infraestruturas cr?ticas poderia mitigar esses problemas. Nesse sentido, o referido trabalho apresenta o desenvolvimento de uma framework para an?lise da dependabilidade de infraestruturas cr?ticas. A proposta permite a modelagem das infraestruturas cr?ticas, mapeando seus componentes em uma ?rvore de Falha. Em seguida, o modelo matem?tico gerado ? utilizado para an?lise da dependabilidade da infraestrutura, baseando-se nas falhas de equipamentos e suas interliga??es. Finalmente, cen?rios t?picos de ambientes industriais s?o utilizados para a valida??o da proposta