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Affective polarization is a relatively new concept that refers to feelings of sympathy towards partisans of a person's own political party preference and antipathy towards those who vote for and identify with opposing parties. This thesis aims to answer the questions if those who know more about politics also are more affectively polarized, and whether there is a difference between knowing about different types of political facts, and the predicted level of affective polarization. Using panel data from 35 different countries from Module 4 of the Comparative Study of Election Systems, I measure the affective polarization on an individual level, and whether answering correctly to different types of knowledge questions predict the respondents to be more or less affectively polarized. The results show that political knowledge significantly predicts higher levels of affective polarization, but that there is a difference between different types of political knowledge. Political knowledge typically learned from the media has a stronger factor in predicting affective polarization.

During his 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump distinguished himself from other candidates via his hardline stances on issues of immigration. Using data from national surveys conducted between 2014 and 2019, we identify three key findings about views of immigrants among the American public during the Trump era. First, xenophobia was the strongest predictor of Americans’ feelings—anger, fear, pride, and hope—about Donald Trump during his time in office, and the second strongest predictor of feelings about the Republican party (after partisan identification). Second, the influence of Americans’ levels of xenophobia on their feelings about the Republican Party were significantly mediated by their feelings about Trump, especially for negative affect (anger and fear). Third, there has been a backlash against xenophobia, such that political independents and Democrats became significantly more favorable toward immigrants after 2016. As a result, views of immigrants have become more favorable overall, but also more politically polarized. These findings support and extend immigration backlash theory, contribute to research on affective polarization, and document consequential trends in contemporary American politics.

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According to social identity theory people categorize themselves and others into groups based on political affiliation. The political group identity makes them favor policies and people associated with the political ingroup and disapprove of policies and people associated with the political outgroup. The purpose of this study was to investigate if this effect could extend to attitudes on non-political clothes associated with politicians. 638 Swedish adults partook in an online experimental survey. Participants evaluated pictures of clothes worn by famous Swedish politicians and non-political persons on two occasions. On the first occasion, identity was unknown, and on the second occasion, identity was revealed. When revealing identity, participants rated clothes worn by outgroup politicians less beautiful and clothes worn by ingroup politicians more beautiful. They were also willing to pay more for clothes that they learned were worn by ingroup politicians. Participants were also analyzed by their political left or right placement. Both leftist and rightist participants rated clothes worn by opposite political groups less beautiful. This tendency was stronger for rightists. Additionally, rightists rated clothes worn by rightist politicians more beautiful and were willing to pay more for them when learning about their political affiliation. In conclusion, by associating non-political items with politicians our attitudes towards those items can change, thus political association can affect our attitudes outside of the political realm.

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The political polarization is considered to have increased in recent decades, which is considered a threat to democracy. Polarization is the process by which the normal diversity of differences in a society conforms more closely to a single dimension, where people perceive and describe politics and society in terms of "us" and "them". There are two distinct forms of political polarization, which are affective and ideological polarization. Ideological polarization is the difference between political beliefs, attitudes and positions of political opponents and affective polarization asses the extent to which people like their political allies and dislike their political opponents. A higher level of polarization can be beneficial to society, as it can contribute to higher levels of political participation and a perception that there are choices. However, this process can also entail disadvantages for democracy, by increasing the centralization of power and making citizens more dissatisfied. In addition, there are also described interpersonal implications of polarization, which include a reluctance to interact with and dehumanization of poltical opponents. Previous research that investigated the political polarization on social media has mainly focused on Twitter and Facebook, thus it was considered relevant to what the polarization looks like on Reddit instead. This platform has a different structure and also describes itself as being at the forefront of the internet. It was focused on two communities, where on community was skeptic and the other convinced of the climate issue. It could be seen here that there were primarly traces of affective polarization, as there was a certain reluctance to interact with one's political opponents. The mechanism of polarization that could mainly be deciphered was confirmation bias, as a preference for interaction with those with like-minded views could be made clear. Traces of echo chambers and filter bubbles could also be discerned, which are alos mechanisms that can also lead to further polarization.

Les médias sociaux augmentent-ils les niveaux de polarisation affective en renforçant l'animosité envers les partisans opposés ? Les recherches montrent que la polarisation affective est influencée par les niveaux croissants de polarisation idéologique des élites, mais également par l'évolution des systèmes médiatiques. Les plateformes de réseaux sociaux, où les utilisateurs sont plus enclins à être exposés à des informations conformes à leur prédisposition, pourraient agir différemment en fonction des caractéristiques architecturales telles que les algorithmes, les sections de commentaires et la présentation. Je présente une étude expérimentale dans laquelle environ 425 répondants du Québec ont été invités à suivre des comptes politiques préidentifiés en accord avec leur idéologie déclarée entre deux plateformes médiatiques – Facebook et Instagram. Les résultats révèlent que les traitements ont influencé la polarisation affective, mais que leurs effets sont modestes. Alors que les répondants assignés au traitement Facebook sont devenus légèrement plus polarisés affectivement, j'ai observé l'effet inverse pour ceux assignés au traitement Instagram. Ces résultats indiquent donc un modèle intéressant selon lequel différentes plateformes de médias sociaux pourraient avoir des effets distincts. Cette étude d'un mois, au cours de laquelle j'ai recréé des chambres d'écho administrées dans un environnement naturel, permet d’approfondir le fonctionnement des différentes plateformes médiatiques et la manière dont l'obtention d’information politique sur les réseaux sociaux pourrait affecter les sentiments des gens à l'égard de partisans opposés, mais également ceux qu’ils considèrent de leur in-group. / Do social media raise levels of affective polarization by increasing animosity towards opposing partisans? Research shows that affective polarization is influenced by the growing levels of elite ideological polarization and most importantly, the changing media systems Social media platforms, where users are more inclined to be exposed with information consistent with their predisposition, such as what they believe in regard of their likes, comments and follows, might act differently based on configuration characteristics like algorithms, comments sections and presentation. I present a two-wave experimental study where around 425 respondents from Québec were asked to follow pre-identified political accounts in line with their self-reported ideology between two social-media platforms – Facebook and Instagram. Results reveal that social media conditions influenced affective polarization, but their effect was modest. While respondents assigned to the Facebook treatment became slightly more affectively polarized, I observed the opposite effect for the ones assigned to the Instagram treatment. These results thus point to an interesting pattern whereby different social media platforms might have different media effect. This month-long study where I recreated echo chambers administered in a natural environment, allowed me to shed light on how different social media platforms operate and how the habit of getting political information on social media could alter people’s feelings towards opposing partisans.

Il y a une préoccupation croissante parmi les experts en ce qui a trait à la polarisation idéologique des élites politiques en raison de son potentiel à pousser les masses vers les extrêmes et à exacerber la polarisation affective. Ces préoccupations sont-elles justifiées? Cette thèse comprend trois articles distincts mais liés, chacun contribuant à apporter une réponse à cette question. Le premier chapitre empirique (chapitre 2) examine si la polarisation idéologique des élites a augmenté au fil du temps en Europe de l’Ouest. Pour ce faire, ce chapitre se concentre sur la polarisation des partis politiques (c’est-à-dire la polarisation idéologique des élites) sur trois dimensions (économique, sociale et sur la question de l’intégration européenne) simultanément, car la transformation post-industrielle de l’espace politique européen a entraîné une politique multidimensionnelle qui n’est pas toujours alignée avec l’une et l’autre. De plus, le chapitre 2 compare ces tendances à celles fondées sur la dimension traditionnelle gauche-droite. En utilisant les jugements d’experts du Chapel Hill Expert Survey comme indicateur des positions des partis, la polarisation des parties est mesurée en fonction de leur dispersion moyenne des partis par rapport au centre relatif du système politique. Ce chapitre montre une tendance vers une plus grande polarisation des partis sur la dimension gauche-droite ainsi que sur les dimensions économique et sociale, mais pas sur la dimension d’integration européenne. Les partis prennent de plus en plus de positions distinctes sur les questions économique et sociales, et le "menu" idéologique servi aux citoyens est devenu plus diversifié u fil du temps. De plus, il montre que la polarisation des partis sur les dimensions économique, sociales et d’intégration européenne est modérément corrélée à celle de la dimension gauche-droite traditionnelle, tandis que les corrélations de la polarisation des partis sur ces dimensions entre elles sont plutôt faibles. Bien que la dimension gauche-droite agisse comme une position super-thématique qui absorbe les positions des partis sur d’autres dimensions, elles ne sont pas nécessairement alignées les unes sur les autres. Ayant établi que la polarisation idéologique des élites est en hausse en Europe de l’Ouest, le deuxième chapitre empirique (chapitre 3) examine comment les masses réagissent à l’augmentation de la polarisation idéologiques des élites. Plus précisément, la question est de savoir si la polarisation idéologique des élites conduit à une polarisation idéologique des masses. En d'autres termes, lorsque des propositions de politique plus extrêmes sont disponibles pour les citoyens, adoptent-ils également des préférences de politique plus extrêmes? Ce chapitre avance que les masses se polarisent suivant deux mécanismes. En vertu de la théorie de l’identité sociale, les partisans devraient suivre leur parti et adopter une position idéologique plus extrême, tandis que les non-partisans devraient réagir à l'opposé. De plus, ce chapitre soutient que si les partisans se polarisent en fonction des changements qui surviennent à l'interieur de leur parti dépend de leur position spatiale par rapport à ce même parti sur l’échelle idéologique. Par exemple, seuls ceux qui sont parfaitement alignée avec leur parti ou plus à droite que leur parti devraient se conformer aux mouvements des élites. Ce chapitre teste ces attentes dans un cadre réel en s’appuyant sur un design quasi-expérimentale. Le chapitre exploite une augmentation subite de la polarisation idéologique de l’élite qui s’est produite lorsque le Parti travailliste au Royaume-Uni a subi une changement de position soudain avec l’élection de Jeremy Corbyn à titre de nouveau chef. À l’aide des données du British Election Study Internet Panel, ce chapitre ne trouve que des éléments de preuves limitées supportant l'hypothèse que la polarisation de l’élite entraîne une polarisation idéologique de masse : ni les partisans du Parti travailliste ni les autres partisans ne sont devenus plus polarisés à la suite du changement de position du Parti travailliste. Seule une petite minorité de partisans travaillistes situés à droite du parti ont suivi le parti en adoptant une position plus à gauche sur le plan idéologique. De plus, contrairement aux attentes, la plupart des partisans et des non-partisans ont modéré leurs positions. Ce chapitre examine les raisons potentielles de cet effet inattendu. Dans l’ensemble, ces résultats améliorent nos connaissances sur la manière dont les masses réagissent à la polarisation de l’élite et contribuent à dissiper les préoccupations des experts selon lesquelles les masses deviendraient elles-mêmes idéologiquement polarisées lorsque les partis politiques se polarisent. Le troisième chapitre empirique (chapitre 4) étend l’étude aux réactions affectives des citoyens. Les masses deviennent-elles affectivement plus polarisées lorsque la polarisation idéologique de l’élite augmente ? En se basant sur le contexte britannique, qui a connu une montée de la polarisation idéologique de l’élite en raison du virage à gauche du Parti travailliste et du conflit du Brexit en cours, ce chapitre constate qu’une augmentation de la polarisation idéologique de l’élite conduit à une polarisation affective plus élevée des masses, même parmi les partisans de l’opposition et ceux qui ne sont pas attachés à un parti (c’est-à-dire les indépendants). Les résultats montrent que l’effet de la polarisation de l’élite sur la polarisation affective des masses est davantage influencé par les sentiments envers le parti avec lequels identifient les individus que par les sentiments que ceux-ci entretiennent envers le parti opposé. Ces résultats suggèrent que la polarisation affective ne reflète pas nécessairement de l’animosité envers le parti opposé, mais peut fluctuer en raison des changements dans le niveau d’enthousiasme à l'égard de son propre parti. Ce chapitre constate également une relation causale bidirectionnelle entre la perception par des citoyens de la polarisation idéologique de l’élite et leur polarisation affective. Cela signifie que la polarisation affective est enracinée à la fois dans l’identité et l’idéologie. Les résultats suggèrent que la polarisation affective peut être tempérée dans une certaine mesure par une position modérée des partis, mais que certains niveaux de polarisation affective sont inhérents aux systems démocratiques. Les analyses présentées dans cette thèse permettent d'apporter une réponse claire mais nuancée concernant les préoccupations des experts concernant sur l’augmentation de la polarisation idéologique et ses effets potentiellement néfastes. La polarisation idéologique des élites a augmenté en Europe de l’Ouest. Cependant, l’augmentation de la polarisation idéologique des élites ne conduit pas nécessairement à une polarisation idéologique accrue des masses, bien qu’elle conduise à une polarisation affective accrue parmi les citoyens. Dans la mesure où des niveaux excessifs de polarisation affective peuvent compromettre les démocraties représentatives, il peut être raisonnable pour les experts de s’inquiéter de l’augmentation des niveaux de polarisation idéologique des élites. Cependant, si la polarisation affective ne représente pas une menace pour les démocraties représentatives et ne conduit pas au délitement du tissu social, il peut ne pas être nécessaire de s’inquiéter immédiatement de l’impact de la polarisation idéologique des élites sur ce phénomène. / There is a growing concern among experts and policymakers about the increasing elite ideological polarization due to its potential to push the masses to the extremes and exacerbate affective polarization. Are these concerns warranted? This dissertation has 3 standalone articles, each of which contributes to providing an answer to this overarching question. The first empirical chapter (Chapter 2) examines whether elite ideological polarization has increased over time in Western Europe. To do so, it focuses on party polarization (i.e., elite ideological polarization) on three dimensions (the economic, social, and European integration dimensions) simultaneously, as the post-industrialization transformation of the European political space has resulted in multi-dimensional politics that are not always aligned with each other. Additionally, it compares these trends to those based on the traditional left-right dimension. Using mean expert judgments from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey as an indicator of party positions, party polarization is measured based on the average dispersion of parties from the relative center of the political system. This chapter finds a trend towards more party polarization on the left-right, economic, and social dimensions, but not on the European integration dimension. Parties increasingly take more distinct positions from each other on economic and social issues, and the available ideological menu available to citizens has become more diverse over time. Moreover, it shows that party polarization on economic, social, and European integration dimensions moderately correlates with that on traditional left-right dimension while the correlations of party polarization on these dimensions are relatively weak. While left-right acts like a super-issue position that absorbs party positions on other dimensions, they are not necessarily aligned with each other. Having established that elite ideological polarization is on the rise in Western Europe, second empirical chapter (Chapter 3) turns to how the masses react to the increasing elite ideological polarization. Specifically, the question is whether elite ideological polarization leads to mass ideological polarization. When more extreme policy proposals are available to citizens, do they also adopt more extreme policy preferences? This chapter argues that masses become polarized through two mechanisms. Based on social identity theory, in-partisans should follow their party and adopt a more extreme ideological stance, while out-partisans should backlash and move in the opposite direction. Additionally, this chapter argues that whether in-partisans become polarized when their party does so depends on their spatial location relative to the party on the ideological scale. For example, only those who are perfectly aligned with the party or more right-wing than the party should follow the party to the left when it moves in that direction. This chapter tests these expectations in a real-world setting by relying on a quasi-experimental design. It leverages a sudden increase in elite ideological polarization that occurred when the Labour Party in the United Kingdom underwent a sudden position change when Jeremy Corbyn was elected as its new leader. Using British Election Study Internet Panel data, this chapter finds limited evidence that elite polarization leads to mass ideological polarization: Neither in-partisans nor out-partisans became more polarized following the change in the Labour Party’s position. Only a small minority of Labour partisans that were located to the right of the Labour Party followed the party by adopting a more left-wing ideological stance. Moreover, contrary to the expectations, I find that most in- and out-partisans moderated their positions. This chapter discusses the potential reasons for this unexpected effect. The third empirical chapter (Chapter 4) extends the investigation to citizens’ affective reactions. Do the masses become affectively more polarized when elite ideological polarization increases? Relying on the British context, which experienced a surge in elite ideological polarization as a result of both the leftward pivot of the Labour Party and the ongoing Brexit conflict, this chapter finds that an increase in elite ideological polarization leads to higher mass affective polarization, even among out-partisans (i.e., those who identify with the out-party) and those who lack partisan attachment (i.e., independents). The results show that the effect of elite polarization on affective mass polarization is driven more by in-party feelings than out-party feelings. These results suggest that affective polarization is not necessarily a reflection of out-party animosity, but can fluctuate due to changes in in-party enthusiasm. This chapter also finds a bidirectional causal relationship between how citizens perceive elite ideological polarization and how affectively polarized they are. This means that affective polarization is rooted both in identity and ideology. The findings suggest that affective polarization can be tamed to some extent by moderate position-taking by parties, but some levels of affective polarization are inherent in democratic systems. Coming back to whether pundits' concerns about growing ideological polarization is warranted, this dissertation provides a clear but a nuanced answer. Elite ideological polarization has increased in Western Europe. However, increasing elite ideological polarization does not necessarily lead to more ideologically polarized masses although it leads to more affectively polarized masses. To the extent that excessive levels of affective polarization can undermine representative democracies, it may be reasonable for pundits to express concern about rising levels of elite ideological polarization. However, if affective polarization does not pose a threat to representative democracies and does not hinder societal coexistence, then there may not be a need for immediate concern regarding the impact of elite ideological polarization on this phenomenon.

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