Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This is a theoretical study that appraises the nature and dimensions of Sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA's) political economy and the forces that underpin them, using a Coxian framework of analysis. Since 2000 the nature of SSA's political economy has been changing. Emergent trends and shifts in the region‟s political economy, including strong economic growth performances and increasing South-South cooperation, appear in contradiction to a dependent and conflict ridden depiction portrayed by most literature on SSA. From a Coxian perspective, it is contended in this study that these changes in SSA's political economy have arisen because of systemic changes occurring in the international system. At the same time, the study acknowledges that SSA's political economy is infused with dependence that can be identified through exploring the historical context of the twentieth century that shaped it. The majority of scholarly literature written on SSA has focused on humanitarian crises, poverty, war, corruption and conflict. In addition, mainstream International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE) theory largely overlook SSA. The majority of those that explore SSA's place in world politics have failed to contextualise SSA's position within the context of structural changes occurring in the international system. This has resulted in mainstream IR and IPE paradigms being inadequate to provide explanations for emergent trends in SSA's political economy. Exploration and analysis of mainstream IR and IPE theories and Africa's epistemological and ontological requirements directed the study towards selecting a narrowed Coxian Critical Theory (CCT) framework to further explore SSA's political economy. Using the CCT theoretical tools of 'historical structures' and 'hegemony' in the international system, the study explores: What have been the key trends prevalent in SSA’s political economy from 2000-2011 and how have these been shaped by structural changes in the international system? Does the nature of SSA’s political economy between 2000 and 2011 give scope for SSA’s conditions of dependence to alter? A historicised approach in line with CCT allows for exploration of SSA's conditions of dependence through identifying the key ideas, institutions and material capabilities pertinent to SSA's political economy in the twentieth century. The main trends of SSA's political economy from 2000 to 2011 include: a resilient economic and political performance in the face of the financial crisis of 2007 to 2010; increasing engagement with emerging powers resulting in being typified as the 'swing continent'; and different ideas and new approaches with regards to development thinking and the role and nature of institutions. These trends have been highly influenced by the structural change in relative material capabilities from traditional to emerging powers during this decade. The specific use of CCT as a framework has provided the means to analyse the fluid interactions between the key forces in SSA's political economy and the international system, allowing analysis of the possibility of SSA's conditions of dependency to alter. However, this is contingent on factors such as the desire of African leaders and policymakers to end the conditions of dependence. The study identifies the scope and limitations of Coxian analysis for understanding trajectories in SSA's political economy. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie is 'n teoretiese studie wat die aard en die omvang van sub-Sahara Afrika (SSA) se politieke ekonomie en die kragte wat dit beïnvloed ondersoek, deur gebruik te maak van 'n Coxiaanse (Coxian) ontledingsraamwerk. Sedert die jaar 2000 het die aard van SSA se politieke ekonomie begin verander. Verskuiwings en tendense in die streek se politieke ekonomie, insluitende sterk ekonomiese groeisyfers en 'n toename in Suid-Suid samewerking, strook nie met die beeld van 'n afhanklike en geweld geteisterde gebied wat dikwels in die literatuur oor SSA verskyn nie. Hierdie studie voer aan, vanuit 'n Coxiaanse oogpunt, dat sulke veranderinge in SSA se politieke ekonomie hul oorsprong het in sistemiese verskuiwinge in die internasionale bestel. Terselfdertyd, word dit aanvaar dat SSA se politieke ekonomie wel aspekte van afhanklikheid toon, veral wanneer die 20ste eeu in oënskou geneem word. Meeste akademiese literatuur oor SSA plaas die fokus op humanitêre krisisse, armoede, oorlog, korrupsie en konflik. Daarbenewens het hoofstroom Internationale Betrekinge (IB) en Internasionale Politieke Ekonomie (IPE) hoofsaaklik SSA oor die hoof gesien, terwyl dié wat SSA se plek in die internasionale sisteem ondersoek, dikwels daarin faal om SSA se posisie in die konteks van strukturele veranderinge in die internasionale stelsel te ontleed. Dit het IB en IPE paradigmas tot gevolg wat onvoldoende is om ontluikende tendense in SSA te verklaar. Daar is dus tekortkominge in hoofstroom IB en IPE teorieë. Terselfdertyd stel ontleding van SSA epistemologiese en ontologiese vereistes. Derhalwe gebruik hierdie studie 'n nouCoxiaanse Kritiese Teoretiese (CKT) raamwerk om SSA se politieke ekonomie dieper te ondersoek. Deur gebruik te maak van CKT se teoretiese gereedskap, historiese strukture en hegemonie in die internasionale stelsel, ondersoek die studie die volgende vraag: Wat is die belangrikste tendense wat voorkom in SSA se politieke ekonomie vanaf 2000-2011 en hoe is hierdie tendense gevorm deur die strukturele veranderinge in die internasionale stelsel? Ook, bied die aard van SSA se politieke ekonomie tussen 2000 en 2011 ruimte vir SSA se omstandighede van afhanklikheid om te verander? 'n Gehistoriseerde aanslag in lyn met CKT maak voorsiening vir die verkenning van SSA se omstandighede van afhanklikheid deur die identifisering van die belangrikste idees, instellings en materiële vermoëns wat betrekking het op SSA se politieke ekonomie in die twintigste eeu. Van die hoof tendense in SSA se politieke ekonomie tussen 2000 tot 2011 sluit in: sterk ekonomiese en politieke prestasie ten spyte van die finansiële krisis van 2007-2010; toenemende betrokkenheid deur opkomende magte wat daartoe lei tot Afrika bekend te staan as die 'swaai kontinent'; en, nuwe begrippe en idees oorontwikkeling, sowel as oor die rol en aard van instellings. Hierdie tendense is sterk beïnvloed deur strukturele veranderinge die afgelope decade in die relatiewe én materiële bevoegdhede van tradisionele en ontluikende magte. Die gebruik van CKT laat ontleding van die wisselwerking tussen sleutelmagte in SSA se politieke ekonomie toe, wat gevolglik ook analise van potensiële verandering in SSA se afhanklikheid moontlik maak. Of afhanklikheid wel beeindig sal word, hang onder meer af van die bereidheid van Afrika-leiers en beleidmakers om daad by die woord te voeg. Die studie bepaal die bydrae en beperkinge van Coxiaanse analise vir 'n begrip van die trajek wat SSA se politieke ekonomie inneem.

Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / South Africa and Malaysia share a similar history charecterised by multi-ethnicity and similar policies in redressing their economic imbalances created by past colonial experiences. In both countries, the decolonization process left economic power with minority ethnic groups, a phenomenon that led to the exclusion of the majority of people from meaningful participation in the mainstream economy. It has been argued that in such instances minority ethnic communities often experience minority domination of the economy in ethnic terms as control of economic levers of economic power. Upon independence, Malaysia and South Africa faced the challenge of redressing the socio-economic and political imbalances. In South Africa, the government led by the African National Congress (ANC) adopted the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programme to create an inclusive economy that can meet the needs of its entire citizen. Unlike Malaysia where the economic restructuring took place in a less globalised period, South Africa’s economic restructuring occurs at a time when globalisation is at an advanced stage. This has made it difficult for the South African government to match Malaysia’s successes in redressing the economic imbalances. Also, in adopting the BEE programme the ANC government has not given enough attention to education and skills development, two elements that were key to Malaysia’s own model of economic empowerment. Strategies to address poverty have so far borne little success thus further condemning the majority of Black people to impoverished conditions. The outcome of the study suggests that in order for BEE to be successful, the ANC government has to empower the majority of black people with the necessary skills that will make them active participants in the mainstream economy. Also, a broadened empowerment process should see education, skills development and poverty alleviation become aligned to the BEE programme.

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Instability in foreign political and social systems, changing power structures in international relations, and growing demands by host countries for a greater control over the operations of multinational enterprises (MNEs) have all led to the necessity of an improved way in which to determine foreign investment opportunities. Not surprisingly therefore, political risk assessment has become one of the fastest growing fields of study. Being concerned with the identification, analysis, management, and reduction of socio-political risks for foreign investors. The focus of this study is that of political risk analysis and the way in which it impacts on investor perception and consequently determines levels of foreign direct investment received by a particular country. Numerous definitions for the term "political risk" exist. Consequently, no specific definition is regarded as being completely correct since consensus still needs to be reached. One of the definitions used within this study is that political risk analysis is the analysis of the possibility that factors caused or influenced by governmental political decisions or other unforeseen events in a country will affect business climates in such a way that investors will lose money or not make as much profit as they expected when the initial decision to invest was made. These factors can be of internal (from inside the host country) or external origin, and can pose macro or micro risks. Foreign Direct Investment in brief is an investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control of a resident entity in one economy in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor. This study is a comparative between South Africa and Nigeria. South Africa and Nigeria share many similarities, they are both resource based, African countries. They are both fairly recent democracies, although some may contest the status of Nigeria as being a democracy. They are also both heterogeneous states, both consisting of various ethnic groups. Nigeria offers investors a low-cost labour pool, abundant natural resources, and a large domestic market. However, Nigeria suffers from an inadequate and poorly maintained infrastructure, confusing and inconsistent regulations, endemic corruption, and a lack of confidence in the rule of law. Despite all of this, Nigeria alone accounts for a quarter of FDI flows to Africa. In comparison, South Africa's FDI potential has not been fully exploited. This study will discuss the possible reasons why this is the case. The labour market in both countries and the challenges they face are discussed in depth within this study. Due to the fact that aside from investment, the economic growth within a country is dependent on a variety of factors, the backbone of which is the labour market. In determining levels of risk within both South Africa and Nigeria, this study made use of a political risk model. Although the intention has been to be as accurate and as thorough as possible, it should be noted that as yet, no generalised systematic method of conducting political risk assessment exists. Results, although extensively substantiated, remains the interpretation of the researcher and as such remains open to debate. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Onstabiliteit in buitelandse politieke en sosiale stelsels, veranderende mag strukture in internasionale betrekkinge, en die groeiende behoeftes van gasheer lande om meer beheer uit te oefen oor die funksioneering van buitelandse maatskappye het alles gelei na die noodsaaklikheid van 'n beter manier om buitelandse investering te bepaal. Dus is dit nie verbasend dat politieke risiko analise deesdae een van die vinnigste ontwikkelende onderwerpe is wat bestudeer word nie. Politieke risiko analise is belangrik vir die identifikasie, analise, bestuur en vermindering van sosio-politieke risiko vir buitelandse investering. Hierdie studie fokus op die impak wat politieke risiko' analise het met betrekking tot belegger waarneming en hoe dit dan ook moontlik die bedrag van buitelandse investering wat 'n land ontvang, kan bepaal. Daar is verskeie definisies wat die term "politieke risiko" beskryf en gevolglik moet konsensus nog bereik word oor 'n "korrekte" een. Een van die definisies wat in hierdie studie gebruik word is dat politieke risiko die analise is van die moontlikheid dat sekere faktore wat veroorsaak is of wat beïnvloed is deur die regering se politieke besluite, asook ander onvoorspelbare gebeurtenise in 'n land wat die investerings klimaat so kan beïnvloed dat die buitelandse beleggers moontlik geld kan verloor of miskien nie die verwagte winste behaal wat hulle aanvanklik gereken het, sou behaal nie. Hierdie faktore kan of intern (binne die gasheer land) of ekstern van aard wees en kan dus makro of mikro risiko behels. Direkte buitelandse investering in 'n land is 'n belegging wat In lang termyn verhouding insluit en dit reflekteer ook 'n blywende belangstelling en beheer van 'n buitelandse maatskappy in 'n gasheer land in. Hierdie studie is 'n vergelykende studie tussen Suid-Afrika en Nigerië. Suid-Afrika en Nigerië deel baie ooreenkomste. Beide lande is ryk aan natuurlike bronne en beide is nog "jong" demokratiese lande. Sommige mense stem nie saam dat Nigerië wel aan al die vereistes van 'n demokrasie voldoen nie. Suid-Afrika en Nigerië is ook heterogene state wat uit verskeie etniese groepe bestaan. Nigerië bied vir die buitelandse belegger billike arbeid, oorvloedige natuurlike bronne, asook In groot binnelandse mark. Ten spyte hiervan, moet dit ook in ag geneem word dat Nigerië onder onvoldoende en In swak instandhouding van infrastruktuur, wispelturige regulasies, korrupsie en ook In swak regsisteem ly. Ten spyte van al hierdie faktore, ontvang Nigerië In kwart van alle buitelandse investering in Afrika. Suid-Afrika se buitelandse investerings potensiaal in vergelyking met ander lande moet nog ontwikkel word. Hierdie studie sal die moontlike redes vir Suid Afrika se oneksploiteerbare buitelandse investerings potensiaal bespreek. Die arbeidsmark en die uitdagings wat gestel word het In groot invloed op buitelandse investering. Hierdie studie het ten doelom beide lande se arbeidsmark te bespreek en te vergelyk met betrekking tot buitelandse investering. Om die moontlike risiko in altwee lande te bepaal, maak hierdie studie gebruik van In politieke risiko analise model. Die navorser het gepoog om so deeglik en akkuraat as moontlik te wees. Dit moet ook in ag geneem word dat daar nog geen veralgemeende metode van politieke risiko analise ontwikkel is nie.

Thesis (MMil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Over the last forty years Africa has been one of the most conflict-ridden regions in the world, resulting in untold human suffering. It has been estimated that between 1955 and 1999 some nine to ten million people have died as a result of violent conflict in Africa. However, those suffering the most in these wars are not merely the defenceless victims of conflict, but also its active perpetrators. More than 120 000 children under the age of 18 years have been forced or recruited to participate in armed conflicts across Africa. Although the use of children in armed conflict is not a new phenomenon, it has never been as widespread and as brutal as during the past decade. Governmental organisations, non-governmental organisations, academic institutions, security institutes and the media have conducted extensive research on the phenomenon of child soldiers, specifically focusing on the demobilisation and reintegration of child combatants. Surprisingly, not much research has been conducted on why particular states are more prone to utilise these little soldiers than others. This thesis attempts to fill that gap by analysing the circumstances under which children are utilised as soldiers in Africa. This aim is divided into three subdivisions, namely to describe the type of states in which children are utilised as soldiers, to analyse the conflicts in which child soldiers are utilised, and to describe the socio-economic conditions that urge children to take up arms. An analysis of the child soldier-phenomenon suggests that it transpires in weak states. These states exhibit very distinct characteristics, including serious problems of legitimacy, the absence of one cohesive national identity, the presence of opposing local strongmen, high levels of institutional weakness, economic underdevelopment, and a vulnerability to external international forces. The weakness of these states is created by the fragmentation of social control amongst various social organisations, which is in turn caused by the expansion of the world economy from Europe and also by colonialism. This fragmentation poses immense challenges to state leaders and forces them to adopt very distinct political policies, which put certain limitations on the process of state-making. In response to this, leaders have adopted a number of social, political and economic strategies. These, together with the socio-economic conditions - specifically poverty - within weak states often create civil violence. These strategies include political centralisation, authoritarianism, ethnic politics, the manipulation of democratic processes and mechanisms, patronage politics and the manipulation of state economic structures and policies. However, in order to successfully execute these strategies, rulers need wealth-creating resources, which usually result in the exploitation of scarce natural resources. Warlords and local strongmen also exploit resources to purchase arms to combat both government forces and opposing strongmen. In addition, large international private companies cash in on the financial advantages accrued from conflict. This leads to the formation of entrenched war economies. In the end then, these wars becomean excuse to plunder natural resources for private enrichment. A very distinct characteristic of these conflicts is the widespread use of child soldiers. All the armed groups in Africa's wars, including government armed forces, paramilitary groups and armed opposition groups, are to a greater or lesser extent guilty of recruiting, forcefully conscripting, press-ganging and deploying child soldiers. However, states that utilise child soldiers all exhibit similar socio-economic characteristics. Poverty is endemic. Famine is widespread and magnifies the problems caused by war and poverty even further. The provision of medical and health care is insufficient because of the vast number of war wounded and the destruction of hospitals and clinics. This is also aggravated by the high numbers of HIV/AIDS sufferers. Schools are destroyed, educational systems are often poorly developed and illiteracy is widespread. In addition, due to years of war and civil unrest, millions of people are displaced and forced to become refugees. These socio-economic characteristics create the ideal breeding ground for the recruitment of child soldiers. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Oor die afgelope veertig jaar was Afrika een van die mees konflikgedrewe streke in die wêreld wat op onbeskryflike menslike lyding uitgeloop het. Dit is bereken dat tussen 1955 en 1999 ongeveer nege tot tien miljoen persone gesterf het as gevolg van die gewelddadige konflikte in Afrika. Maar diegene wat die meeste in sulke oorloë gely het, was nie maar net die weerlose slagoffers van die konflik nie, maar hulle was inderdaad ook aktiewe deelnemers daaraan. Meer as 120 000 kinders onder die ouderdom van 18 jaar is gedwing of gewerf om aan gewapende konflik regoor Afrika deel te neem. Alhoewel die deelname van kinders aan gewapende konflik nie 'n nuwe verskynsel is nie, was dit nog nooit so wydverspreid en so brutaal soos tydens die afgelope dekade nie. Regeringsorganisasies, nie-regeringsorganisasies, akademiese instellings, sekerheidsinstellings en die media het uitgebreide navorsing onderneem oor die verskynsel van kindersoldate, en spesifiek gefokus op die demobilisering en herintegrasie van kinderkrygers. Verbasend genoeg is nie veel navorsing gedoen oor waarom spesifieke state meer gereed staan om hierdie klein soldaatjies aan te wend as andere nie. Hierdie tesis poog om hierdie kennisgaping te vul deur die omstandighede waaronder kinders as soldate in Afrika aangewend word, te analiseer. Die doel hiermee word in drie onderafdelings verdeel, naamlik om die tipes state te beskryf waarin kinders as soldate aangewend word, om die konflikte te analiseer waarin kindersoldate gebruik word en ook om die sosio-ekonomiese omstandighede te beskryf wat kinders aanspoor om die wapen op te neem. 'n Analise van die kindersoldaatverskynsel dui aan dat dit in swak state voorkom. Hierdie state openbaar besonderse kenmerke, insluitende ernstige probleme rakende legitimiteit, die afwesigheid van 'n enkele samebindende nasionale identiteit, die aanwesigheid van plaaslike sterk leiers, hoë vlakke van institusionele swakhede, ekonomiese onderontwikkeling en In blootstelling aan eksterne internasionale kragte. Die swakhede van hierdie state het ontstaan deur die fragmentering van sosiale beheer onder verskeie sosiale organisasies, wat op hul beurt veroorsaak is deur die uitbreiding van die wêreldekonomie vanuit Europa en ook deur kolonialisme. Hierdie fragmentering gee aanleiding tot ontsaglike uitdagings vir staatsleiers en dwing hulle om onderskeidende politieke beleidsrigtings toe te pas wat weer sekere beperkings op die proses van staatsvorming plaas. In antwoord hierop het leiers 'n aantal sosiale, politieke en ekonomiese strategieë aanvaar. Tesame met die sosio-ekonomiese omstandighede - en spesifiek armoede - skep hierdie strategieë dikwels burgerlike geweld binne swak state. Sulke strategieë sluit in politieke sentralisasie, outoritêre oorheersing, etniese beleidsrigtings, die manipulering van demokratiese prosesse en meganismes, die politiek van beskerming en begunstiging, asook die manipulering van die staat se ekonomiese strukture en beleidsrigtings. Maar om hierdie strategieë suksesvol uit te voer, benodig die heersers welvaartskeppende hulpbronne wat gewoonlik uitloop op die uitbuiting van skaars natuurlike hulpbronne. Gewapende aanvoerders en plaaslike onderdrukkers plunder ook hulpbronne om wapens aan te skaf om sowel regeringsmagte asook opponerende onderdrukkers te beveg. Daarby trek internasionale private maatskappye ook voordeel uit die finansiële opbrengste wat uit konflik verkry word. Dit alles lei tot die totstandkoming van verskanste oorlogsekonomieë. In die finale analise word hierdie oorloë bloot 'n verskoning om natuurlike hulpbronne vir eie verryking te plunder. 'n Baie onderskeidende kenmerk van hierdie konflikte is die wydverspreide aanwending van kindersoldate. AI die gewapende groepe in Afrika se oorloë, insluitende regerings se gewapende magte, paramilitêre groepe en gewapende opposisiegroepe, is almal tot mindere of meerdere mate skuldig aan die werwing, gewelddadige rekrutering en aanwending en ook die ontplooiing van kindersoldate. State wat kindersoldate gebruik, toon almal soortgelyke sosio-ekonomiese kenmerke. Armoede is endemies. Hongersnood is wydverspreid en vererger die probleme wat deur oorloë en armoede veroorsaak is. Die voorsiening van mediese- en gesondheidsorg is onvoldoende as gevolg van die hoë aantal HIVNigslyers. Skole is vernietig, onderwysstelsels is dikwels onderontwikkeld en ongeletterdheid is wydverspreid. As gevolg van jare se oorloë en burgerlike onrus word miljoene mense verder ook uit hul huise gedryf en gedwing om vlugtelinge te word. Hierdie sosio-ekonomiese kenmerke skep die ideale teelaarde vir die werwing van kindersoldate.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / Bibliography / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis describes the development of neoliberalism within the global context and explains how this ideology influenced economic policy formulation in post-apartheid South Africa. Policies from the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) to the New Economic Growth Path (NEGP) are analysed within the timeframe from 1996 to 2011 to determine how and whether neoliberalism had an impact on policy formulation. The development of neoliberal thinking is historicised to illustrate how it became the dominant ideational framework at the world order level. This was a path dependent process which is traced at the social, institutional and ideational levels. The establishment of the Mont Pelerin Society, the development of the post-Second World War economic order and the development and implementation of the Washington Consensus are important aspects of a counter-ideational challenge to Keynesianism which took place over some 25 years. The rationale behind neoliberalism and the implementation of neoliberal policies is strongly motivated by assumptions such as private property rights, deregulation of trade, finance and production and a form of state which facilitates market dominant policies. Neoliberalism strongly came to prominence during the 1970s and 1980s. During this time increased pressure was placed on the South African apartheid government from outside and inside to implement more market-orientated or neoliberal economic policies. It became increasingly evident that South Africa’s isolation to economic globalisation was not sustainable. At the time of the unbanning of the African National Congress (ANC) and the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990, the ANC did not have a clearly formulated economic programme. Neoliberal thinking gradually gained in influence among ANC leaders and policy makers and after the party resoundingly won the 1994 elections, it seemed that neoliberal thinking became well established, albeit with some important variations and distinctive characteristics. The Growth, Employment and Redistribution programme did not fully achieve its primary goals of employment creation and redistribution, although a period of economic growth (2002-2006) did follow the first phase of its implementation. This led to a rethink and reevaluation of economic policy, particularly after the global financial crisis (2007-2009). The first “rethink” led to the adoption of the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA). This shift is regarded by some analysts as an economic transition period from GEAR to a more developmentalist and interventionist policy, but is, in fact, characterised by continuity and is in line with the World Bank’s post-Washington consensus thinking. This period is also characterised by internal tensions within the ANC and the leadership struggle between Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki (the incumbent president and architect of GEAR), Zuma’s victory was regarded as a victory for the left, but was followed by minor concessions and more continuity in policy, notwithstanding the launching of the NEGP in 2011 which spells out some goals for democratising and restructuring the economy. The study concludes that neoliberalism had a unique influence on economic policy formulation in South Africa even though it was not a pure reflection of neoliberal policies. Economic policy formulation in South Africa has undergone constant change and adaptation and reflects the shifting balance of power between the major social forces related to production and finance in the country. At the rhetorical level, policy seems to be moving in the direction of a democratic developmental state and this needs to be viewed within the context of the circumstances which led to the development of the RDP, GEAR and the NEGP. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die tesis beskryf die ontwikkeling van neoliberalisme binne die globale konteks en verduidelik hoe hierdie ideologie ekonomiese beleidformulering in Suid-Afrika beïnvloed het. Ekonomiese beleid vanaf die Herkonstruksie en Ontwikkling-program (HOP), die Groei, Indiensneming en Herverspreiding-program (GIEH) en die Nuwe Ekonomiese Groei-pad (NEGP) word geanaliseer binne die tydsbestek vanaf 1996-2011, ten einde te bepaal hoe en of neoliberalisme ’n impak op beleidsformulering in die land gehad het. Die ontwikkeling van neoliberale denke word histories beskryf ten einde te illustreer hoe dit, op die wêreld-orde vlak, die dominante ideologiese raamwerk vir ekonomiese beleid geword het. Hierdie proses was afhanklik van ’n aantal duidelik lynverwante fases wat nagespoor word op die kontinuum van sosiale, institusionele en idees dimensies. Die vorming van die Mont Pelerin Stigting, die ontwikkeling van die na-oorlogse (WWII) ekonomiese orde en die ontwikkeling en implementering van die Washington-konsensus is belangrike aspekte van die bou van ’n ideologiese alternatief vir Keynesianisme wat oor ongeveer 25 jaar plaasgevind het. Die rasionaal onderliggend aan neoliberalisme en daarmee gepaardgaande beleid word sterk gemotiveer deur die aannames van privaat eiendomsregte, deregulering van handel, finanasies en produksie en ’n staatsvorm wat mark-dominante beleid fasiliteer. Neoliberalisme het tydens die 1970s and 1980s prominent geword. Tydens hierdie periode is van buite en van binne toenemende druk op die apartheid regime geplaas om meer markgeorienteerde en neoliberale beleidsveranderinge te implementeer. Dit is veral tydens die 1980s dat dit al hoe duideliker geword het dat Suid-Afrika se isolasie in ’n ekonomies globaliserende wêreld nie meer haalbaar was nie. Ten tye van die ontbanning van die ANC en die vrylating van Nelson Mandela in 1990, het die ANC nie ’n duidelik geformuleerde ekonomiese program en beleid gehad nie. Teen 1994, het neoliberale denke geleidelik in invloed toegeneem onder ANC leiers en beleidmakers, en na die eerste demokratiese verkiesing, het dit voorgekom asof dit goed gevestig was, met nietemin belangrike plaaslike variasies en onderskeibare kenmerke. Die GIEH, wat as die amptelike vervatting van neoliberale ekonomiese beleid beskou kan word, het nie ten volle sy primêre doelwitte van werkskepping en herverspreiding bereik nie, alhoewel ’n periode van ekonomiese groei (2002-2006) wel gevolg het na die eerste fase van dié beleid se implementering. Dit het tot ’n herbeskouing en herevaluering gelei, veral na die globale finansiële krisies (2007-2009). Die eerste “herformulering” van beleid het gelei tot die aanname van die Versnelde en Gedeelde Groei-inisiatief vir Suid-Afrika (VGGISA). Hierdie ontwikkeling is deur sommige waarnemers beskou as ’n ekonomiese oorgang van GIEH na ’n meer ontwikkelingsgerigte en intervensionistiese staat, maar is, in der waarheid, gekenmerk deur kontinuïteit en was in pas met die post-Washington konsensus beleid van die Wêreld Bank. Hierdie periode is ook noemenswaardig vir interne spanninge binne die ANC en die leierskaps-stryd tussen Jacob Zuma en Thabo Mbeki (die sittende president en argitek van GIEH). Zuma se oorwinning is beskou as ’n oorwinning vir die linksgesindes in die Drieparty Alliansie (ANC, COSATU en SACP), maar is gevolg deur klein toegewings en meer kontinuïteit in ekonomiese beleid. Dit, nieteenstaande die feit dat die NEGP in 2011 lanseer is,met as onderbou die demokratisering en herstrukturering van die ekonomie. Die studie kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat neoliberalisme ’n unieke invloed op ekonomiese beleidsformulering in Suid-Afrika gehad het, selfs al was dit nie ’n suiwer weerspieëling van hierdie denkrigting nie. Ekonomiese beleidsformulering ondergaan voortdurend verandering en aanpassing en weerspieël veranderinge in magsverskuiwinge tussen die vernaamste sosiale magte verwant aan produksie en finansies in die land. Op die retoriese vlak, skyn dit asof beleid besig is om te verander in die rigting van ’n demokratiese onwikkelings-staat en dit moet gesien word binne die konteks van die omstandighede wat gelei het tot die ontwikkeling van die HOP, GIEH en NEGP.

Thesis (PhD (School of Public Management and Planning ))—University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / This study comprises a discursive analysis of the underlying assumptions, rhetorical devices and the latent agendas masked within: (i) the burgeoning international ICT, poverty and development literature; (ii) the policy agendas of the major players in international development; and (iii) the ICT, poverty and development discourse of the post-apartheid South African government. The aim of the study is to move beyond the current enthusiasm for derivative description and technological determinism, and to introduce a deeper, more balanced understanding of the relationship between ICT, poverty and development.

Thesis (DPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: South African local government literature suggests a historical problem of municipal non-consultation in services identification and provision that goes hand-in-hand with community non-participation in municipal activities, coupled by a ‘culture of non-payment’ for these services. This research, which was conducted between 2002 and 2005 in the city of Johannesburg municipality, had the central purpose of ascertaining the manner and ways in which the city of Johannesburg provides its basic services to the Soweto communities and, in turn, of understanding if communities participate in municipal activities and hold possible attitudes of non-payment for municipal services. In order to attain the research purpose, six research questions were identified through local government theories and literature and advanced. The first set of four questions was aimed at the Soweto communities: How affordable are the basic municipal services to the Soweto communities? What are community’s perceptions of the importance of the various municipal services? Are the communities participating in the services identification and provision? How satisfied are the communities with the service delivery? The second set of two questions was aimed at service providers or the municipal services managers and councillors: What methods does the municipality use in identifying and delivering service? What does the municipality perceive to be their application and enforcement of service quality management standards? The original methodological intent was to interview the Soweto communities and the city of Johannesburg municipal services managers and councillors. 200 Soweto households were indeed interviewed from the eight townships of Chiawelo, Diepkloof, Dobsonville, Dube, Jabulani, Meadowlands, Naledi and Orlando, which were randomly selected. The survey amongst the heads of these 200 households was followed by four focus group meetings at Chiawelo, Dobsonville, Dube and Meadowlands and between five and eleven households participated in the discussions in clarifying survey outcomes. It was only possible, however, to interview three service managers from the city of Johannesburg services utilities Pikitup, Johannesburg Water and the Contract Management Unit. Frustrated attempts to interview municipal councillors in the city of Johannesburg led to obtaining permission for proxy interviews from the MEC of Local Government and Traffic Safety in Mpumalanga municipalities of Govan Mbeki and Emalahleni and the inclusion of the KwaZulu-Natal municipality of Emnambithi. The usage of proxy interviews is thought to be relevant since the perceptions on service provision relate to the application and implementation of the uniform countrywide local government structures and systems. A total of 24 interviews were conducted with the Mpumalanga MEC, the city of Johannesburg service managers (3), councillors (9) and senior municipal administrators (11). In order to confirm or repudiate service provider findings from the Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal municipalities, supplementary interviews were held with persons knowledgeable about service delivery in Soweto between 2002 and 2005. A total of four additional interviews were thus conducted. In the analysis of the community survey data, townships were classified as well-off and worse-off on the basis of household incomes and thus participation in municipal activities, payment of services and other attitudes were compared between the two strata. The findings of the research reveal low levels of ability to pay for municipal services by communities in terms of household incomes. However, the household possessions of the living standard measurement (LSM) utilities indicated otherwise. The use of income as a measure of affordability to pay is suspect in methodological reliability; hence income related findings should be interpreted with caution. The worse-off townships preferred state provision of the basic municipal services. There was less inclination to participate in municipal structures such as ward committees and Integrated Development Plans (IDP) processes by the well-off townships, although they were the least satisfied with service provision and municipal performance. The city of Johannesburg municipality was found to be addressing service backlogs as a method for service identification and prioritisation. The municipality has semi-privatised basic municipal services such as water, electricity and garbage collection through section 21 companies in order to overcome service provision inefficiencies and ineffectiveness. This has devastating effects in terms of the community’s inability to pay, leading to services disconnection. Communities in general, however, believed that service provision has improved through these utilities even though the municipality has not finalised its performance management contracts with the utilities. Whereas the service provider interviews were conducted in Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal, additional telephone interviews with service provision experts for Soweto agreed that municipal challenges throughout the country are generally the same since they operate within relatively new policy frameworks. It is acknowledged, however, that metropolitan municipalities and specifically the city of Johannesburg face some unique challenges too. It is concluded that the central role of the local government as the custodian of basic municipal services cannot be disputed; however, the inefficiencies and ineffectiveness of the market forces require private-public partnerships. It can also be concluded that non-participation is an outcome of, among other things, poor participative capacity within communities, apathy, feelings of distrust of both the municipal institutions and municipal councillors and the lack of information regarding community obligations to municipal institutions. The research recommends the use of similar service utilities in both townships and former white suburban areas in order to overcome the perceptions of the municipal services level disparities that are formed on the basis of townships versus white suburban areas; an overhaul of the municipality’s billing system to overcome its debt and service charges collection problems; ward committee participation capacity improvement for both the municipal councillors and communities and the development and communication of clear guidelines on the roles of regional services management centres. Further research is recommended on, among other things, whether privatisation of municipal services results in better access by all and improves efficiency and payments, and on the functionality and effectiveness of ward committees as vehicles for community participation and in developing new and more reliable socio-economic modelling for assessing community ability to pay for government services. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Uit ’n literatuuroorsig van plaaslike regering in Suid-Afrika het dit geblyk dat daar ’n historiese probleem van nie-oorlegpleging by die identifisering en lewering van dienste deur munisipaliteite bestaan. Hierdie probleem gaan hand aan hand met niedeelname aan munisipale aktiwiteite deur gemeenskappe en ’n kultuur van “geenbetaling” vir dienste gelewer. Die hoofdoel van hierdie navorsing, wat tussen 2002 en 2005 in die stad Johannesburg gedoen is, was om vas te stel hoe die stad se munisipaliteit basiese dienste aan Soweto lewer en of daar enige gemeenskapsdeelname aan aktiwiteite is en of gemeenskappe ’n geenbetaling-houding inneem. Om die navorsingsdoel te bereik is ses vrae deur middel van literatuur en teorieë oor plaaslike regering geïdentifiseer. Die eerste vier vrae is gemik op gemeenskappe in Soweto: Hoe bekostigbaar is die basiese munisipale dienste aan die gemeenskappe in Soweto? Wat is die gemeenskap se mening oor die belangrikheid van die onderskeie munisipale dienste? Het gemeenskappe deel aan die identifisering en lewering van dienste? Hoe tevrede is die gemeenskappe met dienslewering? Die laaste twee vrae is gemik op die diensleweraars of munisipaledienstebestuurders en raadslede: Watter metodes gebruik die munisipaliteit om dienste te identifiseer en te lewer? Wat beskou die munisipaliteit as op hulle van toepassing sover dit die afdwingbaarheid van kwaliteitstandaarde in die lewering van dienste en bestuur betref? Oorspronklik was die doel om onderhoude te voer met gemeenskappe in Soweto sowel as munisipaledienste-bestuurders en raadslede van Johannesburg. Onderhoude met hoofde van 200 huishoudings in Soweto is wel gevoer. Hierdie huishoudings is ewekansig uit Chiawelo, Diepkloof, Dobsonville, Dube, Jabulani, Meadowlands, Naledi en Orlando gekies. Die onderhoude is gevolg deur vier fokusgroepvergaderings te Chiawelo, Dobsonville, Dube en Meadowlands, en tussen vyf en elf huishoudings het aan besprekings deelgeneem ten einde duidelikheid te verkry oor bevindinge van die ondersoek. Dit was egter net moontlik om onderhoude met drie dienstebestuurders van die stad Johannesburg te voer, naamlik Pikitup, Johannesburg Water en die Kontrak Bestuursgroep. Verskeie vrugtelose pogings om onderhoude met raadslede te bekom het uiteindelik gelei tot die verkryging van toestemming vir plaasvervangende onderhoude met die LUR vir die Plaaslike Regering sowel as Verkeersveiligheid in die volgende munisipaliteite: Govan Mbeki en Emalahleni in Mpumalanga en Emnambithi in KwaZulu-Natal. Hierdie plaasvervangende onderhoude is as toepaslik beskou, aangesien die menings oor dienslewering te doen het met die toepassing en implementering van die uniforme landswye plaaslikeregering-strukture en -stelsels wat dus op Soweto ook van toepassing is. ’n Totaal van 24 onderhoude is gevoer met die Mpumalanga-LUR (1), die dienstebestuurders van die stad Johannesburg (3), raadslede (9) en senior munisipale administrateurs (11). Om die bevindinge van die Mpumulanga- en KwaZulu-Natal-munisipaliteite te bevestig of te weerlê, is aanvullende onderhoude met persone wat kennis van dienslewering in Soweto het tussen 2002 en 2005 gevoer. Altesaam vier addisionele onderhoude is dus gevoer. Tydens die ontleding van die gemeenskapsdata is gemeenskappe as gegoed of minder gegoed geklassifiseer op grond van huishoudelike inkomste en dus is deelname aan munisipale aktiwiteite, betaling vir dienste en ander gesindhede tussen die twee strata vergelyk. Daar is bevind dat min mense munisipale dienste kan bekostig in terme van huishoudelike inkomste, maar dat huishoudelike besittings wat lewenstandaard bepaal op die teenoorgestelde dui. Die gebruik van huishoudelike inkomste as ’n maatstaf van die vermoë om te betaal is ’n aanvaarbare metode, maar moet tog met omsigtigheid benader word. Die gemeenskap wat die slegste daaraan toe was, verkies dat die staat basiese munisipale dienste voorsien. ’n Laer geneigdheid tot deelname aan munisipale strukture soos wykskomitees en geïntegreerde ontwikkelingsplanne is by die meer gegoede gemeenskappe aangetref, hoewel hulle die grootste ontevredenheid toon met dienslewering en munisipale werkverrigting. Daar is gevind dat die munisipaliteit van die stad Johannesburg die agterstand in dienste aangespreek het as metode om dienste te identifiseer en te prioritiseer. Om die probleem van oneffektiewe en ondoeltreffende dienste te oorkom, maak die munisipaliteit gebruik van artikel 21- maatskappye vir dienste soos water, elektrisiteit en vullisverwydering. Dit lei tot die beëindiging van die dienste van gemeenskappe wat nie kan betaal nie. Oor die algemeen is inwoners egter van mening dat dienste deur hierdie maatskappye verbeter is, hoewel die munisipaliteit nog nie sy prestasiebestuurkontrakte met hierdie maatskappye gefinaliseer het nie. Terwyl die onderhoude met diensverskaffers in Mpumalanga en KwaZulu- Natal gevoer is, is verdere telefoniese onderhoude met kundiges op die gebied van dienslewering in Soweto gevoer. Laasgenoemde het saamgestem dat munisipaliteite regoor die land oor die algemeen voor dieselfde uitdagings te staan kom, omdat hulle binne relatief nuwe beleidsraamwerke funksioneer. Daar word egter toegegee dat stedelike (metropolitaanse) munisipaliteite, en spesifiek die stad Johannesburg, ook met sekere unieke uitdagings te kampe het. Die gevolgtrekking waartoe gekom is, is dat die rol van plaaslike regering as die toesighouer oor basiese munisipale dienste nie betwis kan word nie, hoewel oneffektiwiteit en ondoeltreffendheid privaat vennootskappe vereis. ’n Verdere gevolgtrekking is dat niedeelname onder andere ’n gevolg is van ’n gebrek aan deelnemende kapasiteit binne gemeenskappe, apatie, wantroue in munisipale instellings en raadslede, en ’n gebrek aan inligting rakende gemeenskappe se verpligtinge jeens munisipale instellings. Die navorsing beveel aan dat gelyke dienste gelewer word in swart gemeenskappe en in tradisioneel wit gemeenskappe ten einde die siening dat daar onderskeid getref word, te verander. Daar behoort ook ’n hersiening van die munisipaliteit se rekeningestelsel te wees ten einde die skuldinvorderingsprobleme uit die weg te ruim. Deelnemende kapasiteit vir raadslede en gemeenskappe binne wyke moet verbeter word. Duidelike riglyne oor die rol van streeksdienstebestuursentrums moet ontwikkel en aan gemeenskappe oorgedra word. Verdere navorsing word aanbeveel om te bepaal of die privatisering van dienste tot beter toegang vir almal sal lei en of dit doeltreffendheid en betaling sal verbeter. Die funksionaliteit en effektiwiteit van wykskomitees as meganisme vir gemeenskapsbetrokkenheid sowel as die ontwikkeling van nuwe en meer betroubare sosio-ekonomiese modelle vir die bepaling van gemeenskapsvermoë om vir dienste te betaal, behoort ook ondersoek te word.

Thesis (MA (Public and Development Management))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / Great pressure is placed on national government to initiate a way of achieving greater economic growth as well as alleviating poverty. A mandate has therefore been given to local government to play a fundamental role in achieving this. Local Economic Development (LED), a relatively new approach to development, is currently seen as a prominent strategy to tackle the problem of unemployment and poverty in South Africa and provide a bottom-up approach to economic development. It forms part of the economic and social development mandate given by national government to local authorities. However, although policies are in place, LED strategies have produced very few success stories for various reasons, such as the lack of capacity within municipalities as well as resource constraints. It is also alleged that LED is incorrectly interpreted and therefore also incorrectly implemented. Because of the presumed effects of LED in terms of economic growth and social upliftment, pressure is placed on municipalities to get appropriate strategies into place as soon as possible. A literature review is presented which covers the theory of LED by looking at the global perspectives of the concept and nature of LED, the history and concept of LED, the different LED approaches and strategies, and key actors within LED. LED is then evaluated within the context of development in order to establish a link between LED and poverty alleviation. LED is also evaluated within the South African context, specifically with regards to the policy context, the historical approach and the challenges to LED implementation in South Africa. An investigation into the background of the City of Cape Town served as the point of departure to evaluate LED implementation. The issue of regional planning for LED integration between urban and rural areas is also discussed. The challenges to economic and social improvement in the City of Cape Town are also highlighted and the current draft Strategy for Economic and Human Development in the City of Cape Town was evaluated. This was done to investigate the LED approach and specific interventions of the City of Cape Town Municipality in terms of the Comprehensive Approach Model, a model formulated in the thesis. This was done to establish whether it is likely to succeed or not, and therefore the thesis specifically explored the priorities and the fundamentals outlined by the Strategy. Thereafter its possible implementation was assessed according to the organisational structure and how it affects the operationalisation of the Strategy in terms of planning, the process itself, and the monitoring and evaluation of the process. Finally, the challenges to the Strategy were discussed and recommendations were made. From the literature review it is clear that LED should lead to much more than merely economic improvement; this insight reinforces the socio-economic role of LED development intervention strategies. What is also evident in terms of LED in developing countries is that the approach has to establish a strategy which deliberately focuses on pro-poor LED implementation. It is often the way that the process is executed that brings the social focus of LED into perspective.

Thesis (MPhil (Sustainable Development Planning and Management))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / The study evaluated co-operative governance in integrated development planning (IDP), with a focus on local economic development (LED). Literature review, survey questionnaires and semi-structured interviews were data gathering instruments. Co-operative governance entailed mutual understanding with inclusive decision-making between government spheres and government, business and communities. This was unsuccessful in IDP because of national government dominance, complex tools for co-operation, expert-controlled co-operative governance, finance-dominated planning, a lack of proactive municipal planning and dominance by empowered role-players. Four LED models, namely, a Western, Latin American, African and South African emerged. South Africa’s model is multi-sectoral with land management policy, investor promotion, institutional development, financial and social investment strategies and sufficient policy and legislation. However, co-operative governance in IDP (LED) is dis-functional because of assumed equality of stakeholders. The study recommends a ‘Quilted Co-operative Development Planning Model’, which has a streamlined policy framework, efficient and effective management tools and organisation that promote bottom-up planning.

Thesis (MPA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Apart from meeting basic customer needs, small and medium enterprises in the townships are a source of employment and livelihood for many. Businesses in the townships of the Strand have mushroomed from a formerly neglected area, like others in various townships throughout South Africa. Yet very little is known about them and their owners. What are their characteristics? What traits distinguish those that make higher revenues from the rest? Many of these small businesses have emerged without government assistance, even though such support is often seen as a non-factor in determining the rate of an enterprise’s growth. Entrepreneurship, as literature often explains, is a dynamic endeavour which requires a business founder to display both determination and skill. Yet very few businesses normally survive the early stages. Many aspects of entrepreneurship need to be practically learned to enable the business to overcome many prevalent obstacles, and thus enable the enterprise to grow and contribute to job-creation. Not all entrepreneurs are alike in their capability to spot an opportunity. Also, entrepreneurs differ in their ability to either steer or set up systems to take an enterprise through its various transitions. Yet still, the financial strategic decisions made at inception stage often influence the rate at which businesses will generate revenues later in existence. Government, both local and national, has a responsibility to provide an enabling environment for businesses to thrive. Using a study of spaza and informal trade done in the past by Unisa and by Bojanala Platinum District Municipality as a baseline, this study surveyed 60.6 percent of businesses in the Strand townships that were identified through the database of both Khanyolwethu School and Sinobulumko Business Association. The main areas of focus were – the socio-economic and demographic profile, the physical characteristics, financing, relationship with suppliers, transport, income/turnover and traits that distinguish higher-revenue businesses from others. Analyses through the Mann-Whitney U, the Spearman's rank correlation coefficient, the chi-square and the Kruskal-Wallis test then showed that the businesses that tend to make larger monthly revenues are those that are owned by males, using cheque accounts for the business, and those whose main suppliers deliver merchandise to their premises. The businesses that make larger daily revenues were shown to be those that are owned by males, registered with CIPRO, using cheque accounts for the business and those whose owners have Grade 7 to 9 qualifications and above. For government, the results of this study call for a further refining of the criteria used for loaning to businesses in townships, as well as to make the public more aware of the assistance provided by government’s business support agencies. For banks, the study calls for the designing of a ‘Spaza Account’, tailored to the needs and skills level of businesses owners in the townships. Socially, the study calls for the tearing down of all the walls that make it difficult for open trade to take place / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Klein besighede in informele nedersettings spreek die behoefte aan van kliënte en genereer ‘n tipe inkomste, maar daar is min kennis oor eienaars se belange. Besighede in die Strand se informele nedersettings was gestig in minderbevooregte gebiede, soos baie ander regdeur Suid Afrika. Watter karaktereienskappe beskik hierdie eienaars om ‘n beter inkomste te genereer as die res van die inwoners? Baie van hierdie besighede het ontstaan sonder enige hulp van regering instansies ten spyte van ondersteuningsdienste wat aan hulle beskikbaar was. Afhangende van die groei van die besigheidseienaar word dit in elk geval nie in ag geneem nie. Entrepreneurskap verduidelik letterlik dat die besigheids eienaar uithouvermoe en vaardighede kan uitbeeld. Baie min van hierdie besighede oorleef hulle eerste fase vanuit die staanspoor. Baie aspekte van die besigheid moet prakties aangeleer word om daaglikse uitdagings te oorkom. Op hierdie wyse groei die mark en sodoende word werksgeleenthede geskep. Nie alle besighede is sodanig op hoogte van sake om geleenthede raak te sien nie. Dikwels verskil bestuurstyle van besighede om sisteme in plek te stel wat verandering kan meebring. Finansiële besluite wat geneem is aan die begin stadium het ‘n impak op inkomste wat op ‘n later stadium in die besigheid gegenereer word. Beide die nasionale en plaaslike regering het die verantwoordelikheid om ‘n goedgegewe besigheids omgewing te skep vir besigheidsgroei. ‘n Vorige studie van ‘n spaza en oor informele handel deur Unisa en Bojanala Platinum Distriksmunisipaliteit was as basis gebruik. Die studie het bewys dat 60.6 persent van besighede in informele nedersettings in die Strand geidentifiseer is deur gebruik te maak van die databasisse van beide plaaslike skole en besigheidsvereningings. Die hoof fokus areas was die sosio-ekonomiese en demografiese profiele, die fisiese karaktereienskappe, finansiering, verhoudinge met verskaffers, vervoer, inkomste en kenmerke wat die hoër – inkomste genererende besigheide van die ander skei. Analises deur die Mann-Whitney, die Spearman rank korrelasie, die Chi-square en die Kruskal-Wallis toetse bewys dat besighede met ‘n hoër maandelikse inkomste deur mans besit word wat hulle besigheide vanaf hulle eiendomme bestuur en gebruik maak van tjekrekeninge. Die besighede wat ‘n daaglikse hoër inkomste genereer is ook daardie wat deur mans besit word, geregistreer is by CIPRO, gebruik maak van tjek rekeninge vir die besigheid en daardie van wie se eienaars kwalifikasies van graad 7 tot 9 en hoër het. Asgevolg van die uitkoms van hierdie studie, soos van toepassing op die regering, moet vereistes vir lenings aan besighede in informele nedersettings hersien word. Die publiek moet ook meer bewus gemaak word oor die ondersteuning wat deur die regering beskikbaar gestel word. Ten opsigte van banke het die studie uitgelig dat daar ‘n spesiale ‘Spaza rekening’ geskep moet word wat voldoen aan die behoeftes en vaardighede van besigheidseienaars in die informele nedersettings. Op ‘n sosiale vlak vra die studie aan dat die ‘mure’ wat dit moeilik en onmoontlik maak vir ope mark besigheids geleenthede om plaas te vind, afgebreek moet word.