Em um mercado de capitais perfeito, a administração dos riscos não acrescenta nenhum valor à empresa. No entanto, vários indicadores, mostram aumento nessa atividade, entre eles a ampliação das transações com contratos de derivativos, e do número de cargos de gestores de riscos. Duas grandes linhas teóricas têm se desenvolvido para explicar o gerenciamento de riscos: a teoria de que essa atividade adiciona riqueza ao acionista, Hipótese da Maximização da Riqueza do Acionista, elenca várias vantagens nessa atividade. De outro lado, decorrente da Teoria da Agência, a Hipótese da Maximização da Utilidade Gerencial afirma que essa atividade decorre da aversão ao risco dos gestores e dos seus interesses, muitas vezes divergentes daqueles dos acionistas. Este estudo verifica, empiricamente, por meio de um levantamento, se as políticas de administração de riscos são reveladoras de conflitos de agência. Para a sua realização, foram identificados os benefícios da gestão de riscos que constam na literatura. Com base em estudo exploratório foi desenvolvido um questionário, que, após sua validação, foi usado para entrevistar conselheiros administrativos, conselheiros fiscais e executivos das empresas de capital aberto, inscritas na Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM). A coleta de dados resultou em 315 entrevistados pertencentes a 229 empresas. Os números apontam aspectos específicos que revelam divergências de opinião, e que podem resultar em conflitos de agência. Os dados analisados confirmaram, parcialmente duas das sete hipóteses formuladas. / In perfect stock market, the administration of the risks does not add any value to the company. However, several pointers show an increase in this activity, among them, the enlargement of the trasactions with derivative contracts and the number of risk manager positions. Two great theoretical lines hold themselves developed to explain the risks management: the theory from this activity adds wealth for the shareholder, it includes several advantages. The other theory, from the managerial usefulness maximization, due the to the agency's theory, it affirms that this activity elapses from aversion to the manager's risk and theirs interests, many times diverging from those of the shareholders. This study verifies empirically, by means of the interviewee's opinion, if the politics of the risks administration are generators of agency conflicts. For its accomplishment, the benefits of the risks management were identified and they consist of the literature. A questionnaire was developed on the basis in exploratory study that, after its validation was used to interview administrative counselors, controler counselors and stock companie's executives enrolled in the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários - CVM- (Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil). The data collect resulted in 315 interviewees relating to 229 companies. The numbers show specific aspects that result into a disagreement which they can become agency conflicts. The analyzed data partially confirmed two of the seven formulated hypothesis.

Em um mercado de capitais perfeito, a administração dos riscos não acrescenta nenhum valor à empresa. No entanto, vários indicadores, mostram aumento nessa atividade, entre eles a ampliação das transações com contratos de derivativos, e do número de cargos de gestores de riscos. Duas grandes linhas teóricas têm se desenvolvido para explicar o gerenciamento de riscos: a teoria de que essa atividade adiciona riqueza ao acionista, Hipótese da Maximização da Riqueza do Acionista, elenca várias vantagens nessa atividade. De outro lado, decorrente da Teoria da Agência, a Hipótese da Maximização da Utilidade Gerencial afirma que essa atividade decorre da aversão ao risco dos gestores e dos seus interesses, muitas vezes divergentes daqueles dos acionistas. Este estudo verifica, empiricamente, por meio de um levantamento, se as políticas de administração de riscos são reveladoras de conflitos de agência. Para a sua realização, foram identificados os benefícios da gestão de riscos que constam na literatura. Com base em estudo exploratório foi desenvolvido um questionário, que, após sua validação, foi usado para entrevistar conselheiros administrativos, conselheiros fiscais e executivos das empresas de capital aberto, inscritas na Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM). A coleta de dados resultou em 315 entrevistados pertencentes a 229 empresas. Os números apontam aspectos específicos que revelam divergências de opinião, e que podem resultar em conflitos de agência. Os dados analisados confirmaram, parcialmente duas das sete hipóteses formuladas. / In perfect stock market, the administration of the risks does not add any value to the company. However, several pointers show an increase in this activity, among them, the enlargement of the trasactions with derivative contracts and the number of risk manager positions. Two great theoretical lines hold themselves developed to explain the risks management: the theory from this activity adds wealth for the shareholder, it includes several advantages. The other theory, from the managerial usefulness maximization, due the to the agency's theory, it affirms that this activity elapses from aversion to the manager's risk and theirs interests, many times diverging from those of the shareholders. This study verifies empirically, by means of the interviewee's opinion, if the politics of the risks administration are generators of agency conflicts. For its accomplishment, the benefits of the risks management were identified and they consist of the literature. A questionnaire was developed on the basis in exploratory study that, after its validation was used to interview administrative counselors, controler counselors and stock companie's executives enrolled in the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários - CVM- (Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil). The data collect resulted in 315 interviewees relating to 229 companies. The numbers show specific aspects that result into a disagreement which they can become agency conflicts. The analyzed data partially confirmed two of the seven formulated hypothesis.

Em um mercado de capitais perfeito, a administração dos riscos não acrescenta nenhum valor à empresa. No entanto, vários indicadores, mostram aumento nessa atividade, entre eles a ampliação das transações com contratos de derivativos, e do número de cargos de gestores de riscos. Duas grandes linhas teóricas têm se desenvolvido para explicar o gerenciamento de riscos: a teoria de que essa atividade adiciona riqueza ao acionista, Hipótese da Maximização da Riqueza do Acionista, elenca várias vantagens nessa atividade. De outro lado, decorrente da Teoria da Agência, a Hipótese da Maximização da Utilidade Gerencial afirma que essa atividade decorre da aversão ao risco dos gestores e dos seus interesses, muitas vezes divergentes daqueles dos acionistas. Este estudo verifica, empiricamente, por meio de um levantamento, se as políticas de administração de riscos são reveladoras de conflitos de agência. Para a sua realização, foram identificados os benefícios da gestão de riscos que constam na literatura. Com base em estudo exploratório foi desenvolvido um questionário, que, após sua validação, foi usado para entrevistar conselheiros administrativos, conselheiros fiscais e executivos das empresas de capital aberto, inscritas na Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM). A coleta de dados resultou em 315 entrevistados pertencentes a 229 empresas. Os números apontam aspectos específicos que revelam divergências de opinião, e que podem resultar em conflitos de agência. Os dados analisados confirmaram, parcialmente duas das sete hipóteses formuladas. / In perfect stock market, the administration of the risks does not add any value to the company. However, several pointers show an increase in this activity, among them, the enlargement of the trasactions with derivative contracts and the number of risk manager positions. Two great theoretical lines hold themselves developed to explain the risks management: the theory from this activity adds wealth for the shareholder, it includes several advantages. The other theory, from the managerial usefulness maximization, due the to the agency's theory, it affirms that this activity elapses from aversion to the manager's risk and theirs interests, many times diverging from those of the shareholders. This study verifies empirically, by means of the interviewee's opinion, if the politics of the risks administration are generators of agency conflicts. For its accomplishment, the benefits of the risks management were identified and they consist of the literature. A questionnaire was developed on the basis in exploratory study that, after its validation was used to interview administrative counselors, controler counselors and stock companie's executives enrolled in the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários - CVM- (Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil). The data collect resulted in 315 interviewees relating to 229 companies. The numbers show specific aspects that result into a disagreement which they can become agency conflicts. The analyzed data partially confirmed two of the seven formulated hypothesis.

In this paper, we explore drivers and mitigators of agency conflicts inherent in the fund manager-fund investor relationship through the lens of the principal-agent model. By engaging in abductive qualitative research, we apply both deductive and inductive inquiry to complement and extend previous literature with insights from parties directly involved in the Swedish mutual fund market. Hence, data is collected from eight semi-structured interviews with four senior fund managers, three institutional investors and one fund investment association, all operating in Sweden. The results of the study show that agency conflicts and mitigators found in previous studied principal-agent settings are also in large part found in the fund manager-fund investor setting in Sweden. However, this study has extended previous research by generating knowledge about drivers and mitigators of agency conflict found in the real world, which have been left unexplored in previous studies.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-25T18:40:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Andrea Marissol dos Santos Vieira.pdf: 593637 bytes, checksum: 667b110630468e762d424754a5e4a2d1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-05-30 / The need to keep up the fast evolution in the developmental process make that being proposed several mechanisms that help to the achievement of such needs. Among these mechanisms we highlight the Corporate Governance, a concept that preaches the practice of equity, ethic, transparency and responsability in the conduct of the management in organizations, in order to provide sustainability and longevity to them. When referring to the adoption of practices that preach these concepts, we understand that these recommendations derive from conflicts that occur within organizations, arising from imperfectly symmetrical interests between managers and owners of capital, these conflicts are called Agency Conflicts; And in this context, the using of practices of corporate governance is presented as a way to make pleasant such conflicts Mapping a parallel between private administration and public administration also see the existence of conflicts of similar interests, but in this case, between public managers and citizens and by analogy we can conclude that the use of the mentioned corporate governance practices in public administration, also help to make pleasant such conflicts. Starting this assumption associated with growing concern expressed in several parts of the world to encourage the adoption of corporate governance practices in public management, we build on for the present work, a study published by the Public Sector Committee in together with the International Federation of Accountants (PSC IFAC) called Study 13 in which there is a discussion on the topic Corporate Governance and Public Management. To prepare this, we conducted a case study based on the city of São Caetano do Sul, for present the peculiar characteristics to a Brazilian city and set out to examine the management of the current administration (2008/2009) with the objective of confront the management practices adopted by management publishes sulsancaetanense with the recommendations of corporate governance practices in public administration developed in the study 13 of PSC / IFAC. The results achieved through the present, indicate that public management has been progressively adopting the corporate governance practices recommended in the study 13, but needs to improve the way given to practices of ACCOUNTABILITY AND DISCLOSURE that testify that need to be better enforced, so we conclude the present with recommendations that may contribute to enhance such practices, aiming so, awake the interest of the other researchers for issues related to the theme of our research / A necessidade de acompanhar a rápida evolução no processo desenvolvimentista faz com que sejam propostos vários mecanismos que auxiliem o alcance de tais necessidades. Dentre estes mecanismos destacamos a Governança Corporativa, conceito que prega a prática da equidade, ética, transparência e responsabilidade na condução da gestão nas organizações, visando prover sustentabilidade e longevidade às mesmas. Quando nos referimos à adoção de práticas que pregam estes conceitos, entendemos que tais recomendações derivam de conflitos que ocorrem no interior das organizações, advindos de interesses imperfeitamente simétricos entre gestores e donos do capital, esses conflitos são chamados Conflitos de Agência; E neste contexto, o emprego de práticas de Governança Corporativa apresenta-se como forma de buscar amenizar tais conflitos. Traçando um paralelo entre administração privada e administração pública percebe-se também a existência de conflitos de interesses similares, más neste caso, entre gestores públicos e cidadãos e por analogia pode-se concluir que o emprego das mencionadas práticas de Governança Corporativa na administração pública, contribuiria também para amenizar tais conflitos. Partindo deste pressuposto aliado a preocupação crescente manifestada em diversas partes do mundo de incentivos à adoção de práticas de governança corporativa na gestão pública, tomamos por base para a realização do presente trabalho, um estudo publicado pelo Public Sector Committee em conjunto com a International Federation of Accountants (PSC/IFAC) denominado Estudo 13 no qual encontramos a discussão acerca do tema Governança Corporativa e Gestão Pública. Para a elaboração deste, realizamos um estudo de caso tendo como base o município de São Caetano do Sul, por apresentar características peculiares a um Município Brasileiro e nos propusemos a analisar a gestão da atual administração (2008/2009) com o objetivo de confrontar as práticas de gestão adotadas pela gestão publica sulsancaetanense com as recomendações de práticas de governança corporativa na gestão pública elaboradas no Estudo 13 do PSC/IFAC. Os resultados auferidos com o presente indicam que a gestão pública vem adotando de maneira progressiva as práticas de governança corporativa recomendadas no estudo 13, más que necessita aprimorar a maneira dispensada às práticas de ACCOUNTABILITY E DISCLOSURE que atestamos necessitam ser melhores aplicadas, portanto concluímos o presente com recomendações que possam contribuir para otimizar tais práticas, objetivando assim, despertar o interesse dos demais pesquisadores para assuntos correlatos ao tema de nossa pesquisa

The classical corporation, as described by Berle and Means (1932), was characterized by ownership that is dispersed between many small shareholders, yet control was concentrated in the hands of managers. This ownership structure created the conflict of interest between managers and dispersed shareholders. More recent empirical work (see, e.g., La Porta et al. (1999) and Barca and Becht (2001)) has shown that ownership in many countries around the world is typically concentrated in the hands of a small number of large shareholders. As a result, an equally important agency conflict arises between large controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. On the one hand, large shareholders can benefit minority shareholders by monitoring managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986, 1997). On the other hand, large shareholders can be harmful if they pursue private goals that differ from profit maximization or if they reduce valuable managerial incentives (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; and Burkart et al., 1997). In the presence of several large shareholders, a conflict of interest may arise between these controlling shareholders (see, e.g., Zwiebel (1995), Pagano and Röell (1998), and Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000)). They can compete for control, monitor each other, or form controlling coalitions to share private benefits. The question arises as to what determines the role of controlling shareholders in various firm policies and performance. Previous literature has noted that the incentives to expropriate minority shareholders are often exacerbated by the fact that the capital invested by the controlling shareholders is relatively lower than the voting control they achieve through the use of dual class shares (i.e., shares with differential voting rights) or stock pyramids (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002). Moreover, the identity of the shareholder (e.g., family vs. financial institution) is important for understanding the role of controlling shareholders (see, e.g., Holderness and Sheehan (1988), Volpin (2002), Claessens et al. (2002), and Burkart et al. (2003)). Using Swedish data, Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) show that the agency costs of family owners are larger than the agency costs of other controlling owners. The role of controlling shareholders in transition countries is exacerbated by the fact that the legal and general institutional environment remains underdeveloped. In such an environment, strong owners may be the second best option to weak legal protection of investors (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). The transition countries of central and eastern Europe are experiencing increasingly concentrated control structures, typically with the controlling owner actively involved in the management of the firm (Berglöf and Pajuste, 2003). Moreover, experience from transition countries suggests that foreign direct investment, where investors take controlling positions, have been critical to the successful restructuring of privatized firms. This thesis consists of four self-contained chapters that empirically examine various corporate governance issues. The common theme throughout the thesis is the focus on large shareholders, their identity, as well as to whether they deviate from the principle of one share-one vote. In particular, I examine the effect of large shareholders on firm value (in the first and third chapters), dividend policies (in the second chapter), and stock returns (in the final chapter). The first two chapters employ the data from Finland, the third looks at companies in seven European countries where deviations from one share-one vote are common, and the final one explores the evidence from transition countries. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2004

L’objectif de cette thèse est d’analyser l’existence de spécificités dans l’utilisation par les banques de la politique de dividende comme moyen de résolution des conflits d’intérêts. Il s’agit également de s’interroger sur l’opportunité d’une réglementation visant à imposer aux firmes le versement de dividendes, dans une perspective d’amélioration de la qualité de la gouvernance. Le premier chapitre analyse l’influence de deux conflits majeurs, dirigeants vs actionnaires et actionnaires vs créanciers. Il montre que les banques prennent en compte les deux types de conflits, la résolution des conflits entre actionnaires et dirigeants revêtant toutefois une importance prédominante. Les banques utilisent les dividendes comme un substitut à de faibles degrés de protection des droits des actionnaires et des créanciers. Le second chapitre explore ces conflits d’intérêt plus avant en analysant l’impact de la concentration de l’actionnariat et du degré d’opacité des banques. Que l’actionnariat soit dispersé ou concentré, un plus fort degré d’opacité favorise les comportements d’expropriation par les insiders (dirigeants ou actionnaires majoritaire) et conduit à des dividendes plus faibles. Un environnement institutionnel plus protecteur des droits des actionnaires ou un régime de supervision strict permettent de limiter l’expropriation. Une réglementation limitant le versement de dividendes, telle que définit dans Bâle III, pourraient renforcer de tels phénomènes. Le dernier chapitre s’interroge sur l’opportunité d’une réglementation de la politique des dividendes et s’intéresse au cas de l’Indonésie caractérisée un faible taux de versement et un faible degré de protection des actionnaires. En cohérence avec la théorie du cycle de vie, une telle réglementation devrait tenir compte du stade de développement de la firme et contraindre uniquement les firmes ayant atteint un stade de maturité, une réglementation uniforme de la politique de dividende n’étant donc pas souhaitable. / This dissertation aims first to investigate whether banks, which have unique characteristics, use dividends to reduce the agency conflicts between their different stakeholders. Another objective is to investigate if the implementation of a regulation of dividend policy is necessary to oblige firms to pay dividends for good governance purposes. In Chapter 1, we examine if bank managers use dividends to reduce agency cost of equity (managers vs. shareholders) and agency cost of debt (shareholders vs. creditors). We show that bank managers use dividends as substitute to weak legal protection and strike a balance in their dividend policy with however a more decisive role played by the agency cost of equity than the one of debt. Chapter 2 further explores if the degree of ownership concentration and the level of asymmetric information (opacity) faced by outsiders influence banks’ dividend payouts. In either concentrated or dispersed ownership structure insiders (managers or majority shareholders) pay lower dividends when the degree of opacity is high. In line with the entrenchment behavior for banks, insiders extract higher levels of private benefits when it might be more difficult to detect such opportunistic behavior. Higher level of shareholder protection and stronger supervisory regimes help to constrain such behavior. These findings have critical policy implications for the implementation of Basel 3 with restrictions on dividend payouts that might reinforce this entrenchment behavior. In the Chapter 3, we investigate if the implementation of a regulation to oblige firms to pay dividends for better governance is desirable. We consider the case of Indonesia, where the regulator plans to implement a mandatory regulation on dividends in a context of declining dividend payments and weak shareholder rights. The findings recommend that firms should only be required to pay dividends when they reach a certain development stage, and action should only be taken against those firms which do not pay dividends, although they should be able to. Overall, dividend policies should not be regulated by one-policy-for-all regulation.

Notre thèse s'intéresse aux conflits d'agence entre les actionnaires de contrôle et les actionnaires minoritaires pouvant surgir suite à une décision de fusion ou d'acquisition. Plus précisément, nous tentons, à travers trois essais, d'identifier les cas où, les actionnaires de contrôle utilisent des opérations de fusions-acquisitions comme un outil de transfert de richesses des actionnaires minoritaires vers leurs propres comptes. Dans le premier essai, nous présentons une analyse théorique de ce comportement opportuniste avec deux cas portant sur des faits réels. En utilisant la méthodologie des études d'événement, nous montrons dans le deuxième essai que ce comportement peut se révéler important dans des cas spécifiques liés au degré de l'enracinement de l'actionnaire de contrôle. Dans le troisième essai, nous montrons que la prime d'acquisition peut refléter ce comportement dans les cas de fusions-acquisitions à caractère public / Our dissertation focuses on agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders that may arise following a merger-acquisition decision. Through three essays, we aim to identify cases in which the controlling shareholders use mergers and acquisitions as a tool to transfer wealth from minority shareholders to their own accounts. The first essay provides a theoretical analysis of this opportunistic behavior and examines two real cases. Using event study methodology, the second essay shows that the opportunistic behavior may be important in specific cases linked to the level of shareholder's entrenchment. Finally, the third essay shows that the acquisition premium may reflect this behavior even in cases of public transactions

Le rachat d'actions est devenu au fil des années une opération financière répondue au même titre que la distribution de dividende. Toutefois, le rachat reste une opération complexe dont la recherche peine à apprécier les motivations et les conséquences. En effet, la décision de rachat est à la fois une décision d'investissement, de distribution, de structure de capital et un moyen de modifier la structure de l'actionnariat. Cette recherche se penche sur les motivations des opérations de rachat d'actions annoncées sur le marché français et analyses leurs conséquences et impacts sur le cours de l'action, les conflits d'agence et la structure de l'actionnariat. / The share repurchase has become in recent years an increasingly important instrument for distributing cash to shareholders. However, the repurchase is a complex operation whose research has difficulties to appreciate its motivations and consequences. Indeed, the decision to repurchase is an investment, payout, and capital structure decision and also the way to change the ownership structure. This research examines the motivations of buyback program of French market and analyzes their implications and impacts in stock price, agency conflicts and ownership structure.

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