MA thesis project Klára Schneiderová PREDICATE ANALYSIS AND ANALYSIS OF METAPHORS USED IN MESSAGES ATTRIBUTED TO OSAMA BIN LADEN REGARDING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICAAND THEIR EUROPEAN ALLIES FOLLOWING THE 2003 INVASION OF IRAQ INTRODUCTION - War on terror = war on Islam? (analysis of fundamentalist logic and stream of thought) For this Master thesis project, I chose to analyze the terrorist discourse of Osama bin Laden, the leader of the global Jihadist network, al-Qaeda, particularly his messages regarding the United States of America and its European allies following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, as they were gathered in various relevant sources of record up to the near present.1 I chose this topic due to my long-term interest in the Middle East, particularly the relationship and links between religious ideology and politics in the region. The methodology chosen for this work is closely related to media image analysis which I became familiar with during my previous studies and which I applied in my Bachelor's thesis. In the world today, I believe it has become increasingly important to reflect, observe and closely examine the roots and foundations of fundamentalist argumentation and logic, which in this case serve as the key motors of the global Jihadist movement. Following the 9-11-01 terrorist attacks...

The phenomenon of strategic culture and its influence on the state behaviour has penetrated the theories of international relations only recently. The same stands for unmanned aerial vehicles. The aim of this thesis is to examine how does the United States deploy their UAVs to fight Al-Qaeda in its save heavens located in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. To be specific my intention is to determine what does in this sense the behavior of Obama's administration mean in the context of the U.S. strategic culture. The main research tools utilized in this thesis are discourse analysis and Colin Gray's model of strategic culture. In the public discourse consisting of speeches and comments made by political and military representatives I have identified all the four strategic culture variables set out in the theoretical part of the work. Moreover, the public discourse around drone deployment contains several intriguing metaphors and symbols. Furthermore, the contribution of this work is that it deals with the issue of UAV deployment within the scope of strategic culture. Keywords UAV; drones; strategic culture; Colin Gray; Alastair Johnston; Barack Obama; Al- Qaeda

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Bibliography / Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This research paper offers an analysis of new terrorism as a concept for analysis in Political Risk. In order to assess the novelty and value of new terrorism it is juxtaposed with old terrorism. This analysis uses a historical comparative method in which three terrorist groups, within two distinct historical periods, are discussed and compared. The first historical period is 1945-2000 and assesses old terrorism through a descriptive assessment of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hezbollah. The second historical period, 2001-2009, provides a descriptive assessment of al-Qaeda. The primary variables for analysis with regards to the terrorist groups selected herein are goals, targets and tactics. Also discussed is the secondary variable structure. A number of key findings indicate that there are more similarities than there are differences between old and new terrorism. The novelty and value of new terrorism is thus limited as a concept for analysis within Political Risk Analysis. The conclusion of this research paper establishes that for a normative conceptualisation of terrorism to exist, and have value, it must consider both old and new terrorism. This normative understanding of terrorism better serves the purpose of mitigation within the sphere of Political Risk Analysis. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie bied .n ontleding van nuwe terrorisme as .n begrip vir ontleding in Politieke Risiko. Ten einde die nuutheid en waarde van nuwe terrorisme te evalueer, word dit naas ou terrorisme gestel. Hierdie ontleding gebruik .n histories-vergelykende metode waarin drie terroristegroepe, in twee afsonderlike historiese tydperke, bespreek en vergelyk word. Die eerste historiese tydperk strek van 1945.2000 en evalueer ou terrorisme met behulp van .n beskrywende evaluering van die Moslem Broederskap en Hezbollah. Die tweede historiese tydperk, 2001.2009, bied .n beskrywende evaluering van al-Qaeda. Die primere veranderlikes vir ontleding met betrekking tot die terroristegroepe wat hierin aangewys is, is doelstellings, teikens en taktiek. Verder word die sekondere veranderlike struktuur bespreek. .n Aantal belangrike bevindinge dui daarop dat daar meer ooreenkomste as verskille tussen ou en nuwe terrorisme bestaan. Die nuutheid en waarde van nuwe terrorisme het dus beperkinge vir ontleding as .n begrip in Politieke Risiko-ontleding. Die gevolgtrekking van hierdie studie dui dus daarop dat, vir .n normatiewe konseptualisering van terrorisme om te bestaan, en ook waarde te he, dit beide ou en nuwe terrorisme in berekening moet bring. Hierdie normatiewe begrip van terrorisme dien die doel van tempering binne die sfeer van Politieke Risiko-ontleding beter.

In early 2001, as I began exploring the role of religion in conflict, I came across a declaration by a then little-known leader, Osama bin Laden, and his fellows. That declaration was of the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders. Many analysts now see it as one of the founding documents of al Qaeda, the amorphous terrorist umbrella group. The purpose of the declaration was to issue a fatwa that, because United States troops were stationed in the holy Arabian peninsula and threatened Muslims, particularly in Iraq, it was every Muslim's duty 'to kill the Americans and their allies - civilians and military - ... in any country in which it is possible to do it'. Of course, the first thing that struck me, as an American, was that here was a group that wished to kill me solely because of my birthplace. They did not seem to care that I might not support specific actions of my government, even if I supported that government generally. Nor was there any discussion of whether methods other than violence might be more useful in persuading my fellow citizens as to the justice of their cause. I wondered, as a student of peace studies, what I could do in the face of such seemingly implacable hatred. The second thing that struck me about the declaration was its language. I noticed, in particular, a certain flourish that one does not often find in political analysis. The image that 'nations are attacking Muslims like people fighting over a plate of food' has always stayed in my mind because the simple image has such rhetorical power. I also noticed, in accordance with my research interests, the use of religious teachings as a justification for violence. Yet poetic rhetoric and religious dogma were not the only contents of that declaration. Bin Laden and his fellows made coherent political points. They cited as examples of the harm caused by the United States: the post-Gulf War presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia, 'dictating to its rulers [and] humiliating its people;' the continued bombing of Iraq 'even though all [Saudi] rulers are against their territories being used to that end;' and, finally, the way that these actions contributed to the security of Israel by weakening Arab nations. Thus, beneath its religious expression the declaration contained political points with which I could engage. Now, as I categorically oppose the use of violence, I unreservedly reject the conclusion of the fatwa. Moreover, I do not assume that a single statement is evidence of this group's true intent. It may very well be the case, as analysts more versed in their politics than I have argued, that al Qaeda's real goal is the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. Its affiliation with Afghanistan's Taliban certainly supports this argument. In spite of these things, though, their use of political arguments meant they were trying to reach an audience that cared about such things. I could address that audience as well, and try to propose different courses of action that would address the same concerns. Thus, I could step outside of my original framework, in which I envisioned implacable hatred, and argue for nonviolent ways of addressing the issues. Yet the religious idiom of the declaration was also an important factor. Given that the declaration addressed Muslims as Muslims, by only trying to argue political points with them I might alienate people for whom the religious language meant a great deal. Already in my research I had come to the conclusion, drawing on R. Scott Appleby's The Ambivalence of the Sacred, that the people best placed to show the peaceful potential of a religion are believers in that religion. I am not, however, religious. Thus, this conclusion left me with no recourse in the face of the religious aspects of conflict. I began to wonder what role a nonreligious - or, as I came to think of myself, a secular - person could play in peacemaking when religion is an element of a conflict. Moreover, I saw that different seculars would have different reactions to bin Laden's arguments. Some would reject the message because of the religious medium. Some, like I first did, would perceive the sociopolitical elements but continue to ignore the religious language. Others, as I also briefly did, might consider the religious element but leave out the issue of their own secular nature. Yet no perspective provided a good model for what I, as a secular, might do. Thus, the goal of my thesis became to analyze the various models of secularity, find the most beneficial principles, and construct from these a model for secular best practice. That Osama bin Laden's words should catalyze this thesis brings me to two important points. First, this is not a thesis about Islam. If a disproportionate number of the examples that I use throughout the thesis focus on Islam, this should not indicate that Islam deserves special attention concerning conflict and violence. Rather, the focus here is always on secularity and secular responses to religion in situations of conflict. However, particularly after September 11th, the largely secular policy and scholarly establishments of Europe and North America have produced a great deal of material concerning Islam. Thus, while I sought out more diverse sources dealing with secularity, I often used the religion most commented on by secular sources as an exemplar. That leads to the second point, which is that this is not a thesis about terrorism. Given its scope and the place of religion in it, most obvious case study to use in this thesis is the 'war on terror' - which I call such for ease of use, as that is what the Western media generally call it, not because I think it is an adequate designation. I will cover this topic in the final chapter, but because the thesis is about peace and violence in conflict, and not about specific forms of violence, it will not figure elsewhere. Because this thesis is concerned with violence and, specifically, with the promotion of peace, it has an overt prescriptive element. This stems in large part from my Peace Studies background. Peace Studies entails a normative commitment to pursue peaceful situations through nonviolent means. Thus, at several points I actively enjoin readers to take or not take certain types of action because, by my analysis, that is the best way to promote peaceful relationships. More generally, by the title of this thesis, I ask readers to 'rethink secular and sacred' - both what these terms mean, and more importantly how they relate to one another. In particular, this goal leads me to avoid discussing the concept of tolerance. Tolerance is often held to be a virtue by those who seek to promote nonconfrontational religious interaction. However, as many other writers have pointed out, the word 'tolerance' itself stems from physiological and biological studies, where it means the ability to withstand negative factors, such as poisons or drugs. Thus I find that its social meaning is essentially negative, denoting forbearance of what one finds repugnant. While in a very limited sense I feel that tolerance is necessary, it is only as a first step to actively engaging with what one might at first find off-putting.

A suicide attack is an extreme modus operandi of terrorism. This research examines the application of two similar sociological theories to terrorism and specifically, to suicide terrorism. Three models are built to test if Merton‘s strain theory can explain the propensities of provinces to produce terrorists and suicide bombers in the first phase. Next, in Phase 2 one model is built on a combination of altruistic and fatalistic type variables to test if Durkheim‘s anomie theory can explain the probability of a terrorist to become suicide bomber or not. The analyses of models 1, 2, and 3 are performed in Phase 1 using aggregate secondary data and the analysis of model 4 is performed in Phase 2 using individual level secondary data. While models 1 and 2 are employing multiple regression, models 3 and 4 use logistic regression analyses. Model 1 tests the propensity of a province to produce terrorists relative to six strain variables, while model 2 develops an optimum model, testing the same associations by using only three significant independent variables. Model 3 tests the probability of a province to produce a suicide bomber(s) using the same six indicators. Model 4 tests the probability of a terrorist to become a suicide bomber relative to anomie theory driven by seven indicators. The results reflect support for the overall model 1, while only the indicators of unemployment rate and political representation in the legislative assembly significantly contribute in explaining the propensity score of a province to produce a terrorist. However, the optimum model (2) includes three statistically significant indicators of unemployment rate, political representation in the legislative assembly, and quality of life. Although model 3 also emerged significant in its overall effect, only educational opportunity significantly contributes to explaining the probability of a province to produce a suicide bomber. Model 4 is also supported. The individual effects reveal that the indicators of age group, income level, and hierarchical position in the organization statistically contribute to explaining the probability of a terrorist to become a suicide bomber. In general, the research provides partial support for the application of strain and anomie theories to terrorism and suicide attacks.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / The emergence of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the early 1990s represented the radicalization of the Filipino Muslim separatist movement. Despite the initial success of the joint Philippine and U.S. Balikatan exercise against the Abu Sayyaf on 2002, the ASG has continued to carry out attacks on lightly guarded or "soft" targets, the same way international terrorist groups have been known to do. The anarchic region of Central Mindanao has become a training base for the Southeast Asian terror organizations and a refuge for Abu Sayyaf. The war on terrorism has changed the lives of the Filipinos and strained the capacities of the government. Over the years, the Philippines has fought terrorism in many ways. It has retaliated militarily, prosecuted terrorists, preempted terrorist attacks, implemented defensive measures, and addressed some of the causes of terrorism. To some degree, all suffer from limited effectiveness and applicability. This thesis analyzes the Philippine response to terrorism and determines how it should develop an effective strategy to counter terrorism. This study also discusses the government organizational structure and the problems faced by the Philippine government agencies in addressing the terrorism specifically posed by the Abu Sayyaf. In addition, this thesis presents a case study of Abu Sayyaf by analyzing its organizational and operational tools in the maintenance of its terrorist capability. Finally, this thesis examines the government bureaucracy and its capability to respond to the threats posed by terrorism. / Colonel, Philippine Air Force

With the rise of global transnational terrorist networks (GTTNs), there has been an increase in scholarly output on the subject. While many scholars have focused on the ways in which these networks enable terrorist organizations to achieve their goals, few have studied the transformative impact that GTTNs have on group cohesion. In order to fill this gap, I seek to answer the question how, if at all, GTTNs affect the likelihood of armed groups experiencing fragmentation. In doing so, I propose three ways in which GTTNs can influence cohesion among their members and explore these in the cases of al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, while using the Taliban as a counterfactual. Although I find that both GTTN members and non-members experience fragmentation, the ways in which fragmentation manifests itself differs. Whereas the Taliban experienced fragmentation following key events, al-Shabaab and Boko Haram experienced splits as a result of long-term processes. Thus, GTTN membership ostensibly reinforces internal processes that may cause factions to split from the organization, thereby increasing the risk of fragmentation. However, more research is required on the different ways through which GTTNs exert influence over their members and the effect this has on the risk of fragmentation.

Depuis 2012, le Mali est confronté à une rébellion des minorités touarègues menée par les insurgés du MNLA (mouvement national pour la libération de l’Azawad) et leurs alliées du MAA (Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad) et du HCUA (Haut conseil pour l’unicité de l’Azawad) ; tous, regoupés au sein de la CMA (Coordination des mouvements de l’Azawad). Ainsi, les parties nord du pays (Azawad : objet de revendication pour une autonomie ou pour une indépendance) ont servi de lieux d’affrontements les plus meurtriers entre l’armée malienne et les insurgés. Grâce à une coalition MNLA-AQMI (Al Qaïda au Maghreb islamique) et alliés (narcotrafiquants, An Sar Dine, etc.), ils ont défait l’armée malienne et occupé les territoires revendiqués avant d’être chassé à leur tour les terroristes. Cependant, si, les interventions française (de l’Opération Serval) et africaine depuis janvier 2012 ont mis un frein à l’offensive des terroristes et libérer les grandes villes du Nord, elles n’ont pas mis fin à la guerre qui oppose rebelles et soldats maliens qui continuent jusqu’au mois de mai 2015. Malgré les pourparlers d’Alger (entamés depuis début 2015), les insurgés qui occupent toujours la ville de Kidal, poursuivent leur revendication d’un statut juridique et politique pour l’Azawad. De manière générale, la présente rébellion est une suite logique des précédentes (des années 60, 90 et 2000). Elles émanent d’un malaise de certaines communautés arabo-touarègues manifesté par la mauvaise gouvernance et la marginalisation dont celles-ci pensent avoir subi. Ce mal être des insurgés résulte aussi de la part de l’héritage des rapports difficiles et conflictuels entre nomades et sédentaires, entre « noirs » et « blancs », entre maîtres et esclaves, entre assujettis et « seigneurs ». Aussi, la crise du Sahel a aggravé l’enclavement et l’isolement du Mali-Nord, notamment de l’Azawad, et accentué le sentiment d’être oublié. Elle a desserré et distendu les liens d’avec le reste du Mali « utile ». Toutefois, le soulèvement de 2012 n’a pas entraîné toutes les communautés de l’Azawad dont les rebelles supposent défendre ou parler en leur nom. Il intervient également dans un contexte de soulèvements populaires dans certains Etats arabo-berbères (« printemps arabe » pour les médias), notamment en Libye (guerre civile, puis, la chute de Kadafi). De nombreux combattants touaregs de l’armée libyenne ont ainsi rejoint (avec armes) les rangs du MNLA. / Since 2012, Mali ha been facing a rebellion of the Tuareg minority-led insurgents MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) and allied MAA (Arab Movement of Azawad) and HCUA (High Council for the Uniqueness of Azawad); all together within the CMA (Coordination of movements of Azawad). Thus, the northern parts of the country (Azawad claim object for autonomy or independence) have served as scene of the deadliest clashes between the Malian army and the insurgents. Through MNLA-AQIM coalition (Al Qaeda in Islamic Magrheb) and allies (drug traffickers, An Sar Dine, etc.), they defeated the Malian army and have occupied territories claimed before have being chased in turn terrorists. However, if the French and African’s intervention (Operation Serval) since January 2012 have curbed the terrorist offensive and freed the major cities of the North but, they have not ended the war between rebels and Malian soldiers continue until May 2015. Despite the Algiers talks (started since early 2015), the insurgents who still occupy the city of Kidal, continue to claim a legal and political status for Azawad. In general, this rebellion is a logical continuation of insurrections (1960, 1990 and 2000). These rebellions erupted because certain Arab and Tuareg communities feel discontented and they have suffered from poor governance and marginalization. The insurgent unrest also results from the legacy of difficult and conflicting relations between nomads and settled, between "black" and "white", between masters and slaves, and between subjects and "lords". Also, the Sahel crisis have aggravated the isolation of North Mali (particularly Azawad) and accentuated the feeling of being forgotten. It has stretched and distended the bonds of the rest of "useful" Mali. However, all the communities’ Azawad didn’t participate in the 2012 uprising therefore rebels cannot defend or speak for them. It also comes amid popular uprisings in some Arab-Berber States ("Arab Spring" for the media), especially in Libya (civil war, then the fall of Kadafi). Many Tuareg fighters of the Libyan army joined (with then weapons) the ranks of the MNLA.

The al-Qaeda Organization (AQO) and the Islamic State Organization (ISO) are transnational adversaries that conduct terrorism in the name of Sunni Islam. It is declared U.S. Government (USG) policy to degrade, defeat, and destroy them. The present book has been written to assist policymakers, military planners, strategists, and professional military educators whose mission demands a deep understanding of strategically-relevant differences between these two transnational terrorist entities. In it, one shall find a careful comparative analysis across three key strategically relevant dimensions: essential doctrine, beliefs, and worldview; strategic concept, including terrorist modus operandi; and specific implications and recommendations for current USG policy and strategy. Key questions that are addressed include: How is each terrorist entity related historically and doctrinally to the broader phenomenon of transnational Sunni “jihadism”? What is the exact nature of the ISO? How, if at all, does ISO differ in strategically relevant ways from AQO? What doctrinal differences essentially define these entities? How does each understand and operationalize strategy? What critical requirements and vulnerabilities characterize each entity? Finally, what implications, recommendations, and proposals are advanced that are of particular interest to USG strategists and professional military educators? / https://dc.etsu.edu/etsu_books/1127/thumbnail.jpg