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The R&D alliance becomes a popular way to develop products by cooperating with external organizations in the face of severe global competition. The enterprises can improve core competence and reduce environmental uncertainty through R&D alliances. However, the success rate of alliance is not high. Consequently, how to organize and operate R&D alliances effectively and successfully is the key competence of enterprise to win in the future. In order to increase the success rate of R&D alliance, the purpose of this study is to create a conceptual and integrated model for developing the successful mechanisms of formation and operation on R&D alliances. VPDCA (Vision-Plan-Do-Check-Action) cycle was developed as a conceptual framework through literature survey and case study for investigating the successful mechanisms of formation and operation on R&D alliances, which is to be regarded as a ¡¥learning by doing¡¦ process. First of all, vision leading is the first step to assure alliance to be succeeded. SSO (Search-Select-Organize) was developed as a successful process model for organizing R&D alliances. R&D alliance operation was regarded as a teamwork operation in this study. Only has the good effective team operation, can achieve expected vision. LICTEL (Leadership-Integration-Communication-Trust-Execution-Learning) was considered as the key aspects to run alliances successfully. The key success factors of each aspect are as follows: Leadership: vision, inspiration vitality, integrity and delegation Integration: open, linkage, collaboration, leverage outside resources, synergy Communication: dialogue, open mind, passion, patience and positive thinking Trust: co-value, cooperation, communication, consensus and commitment Execution: discipline, push and pull Learning: connect, interaction and share The achievements of operation and management on R&D alliance should be evaluated finally. 3P (Pleasure-Performance-Profit) was considered as key measures to evaluate the outcomes of R&D alliance implementation. Furthermore, effectiveness, efficiency and competence build-up are regarded as key measures to evaluate implementation performance of R&D alliance.

Esta tese teve por objeto analisar a viabilidade de implementação de, no âmbito do sistema de solução de controvérsias (SSC) da OMC, um mecanismo de contramedidas (retaliação) coletiva, à luz da teoria de formação de alianças, tal qual desenvolvida na teoria de relações internacionais. O objetivo foi perquirir se e em que condições poderão se formar coalizões visando à aplicação de retaliação coletiva, caso tal mecanismo seja incorporado ao SSC/OMC. A tese se baseou na premissa de que o enforcement do SSC/OMC ainda se funda em soluções de self-help, ou seja, dependente da força, do poder, do Membro demandante de induzir o Membro demandado a cumprir as recomendações do Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (OSC), mediante a aplicação de retaliação bilateral, centrada na reciprocidade. Observa-se todavia uma insuficiência e/ou ineficácia de tais contramedidas bilaterais para induzir o Membro demandado a cumprir com as recomendações do OSC em situações envolvendo desequilíbrio de poder (entre Membro demandante e Membro demandado). A teoria de formação de alianças se mostrou adequada para a análise pretendida, primeiramente porque o desequilíbrio de poder é objeto de estudo de tal teoria. Em segundo lugar, com ênfase na sistematização apresentada por Glenn N. Snyder, tal teoria se mostrou apropriada para a questão em vista da configuração do sistema de comércio internacional como uma anarquia, dentro de uma estrutura de multipolaridade, em que não é possível perceber ex ante os possíveis alinhamentos, diante de uma determinada configuração, justificando o emprego de tal teoria. A tese então confirmou a necessidade de adoção de um mecanismo de retaliação coletiva no SSC/OMC, tendo indicado quando a retaliação coletiva deverá ser desnecessária, facultativa ou obrigatória. Para tanto, a tese desenvolveu conceitos como capacidade relativa, menor coalizão vencedora, aliança-dependência, além de perquirir sobre a situação pré-aliança dos interesses das unidades envolvidas, como propulsionadora ou limitadora da formação de alianças. Tais conceitos foram aplicados sobre as situações fáticas das onze arbitragens do Artigo 22.6 do Entendimento sobre Solução de Controvérsias (ESC). Por meio da aplicação da Teoria da Paisagem de Agregação, a tese confirmou a necessidade de implementação, em determinadas circunstâncias, de um mecanismo obrigatório de retaliação coletiva. Assim, propôs a tese que um mecanismo de retaliação coletiva poderá ter caráter meramente facultativo quando, em uma situação de desequilíbrio de poder: (i) houver outros Membros com interesses comuns, intensos e específicos a propulsionar a formação de uma aliança; e (ii) tais Membros reunirem capacidade relativa suficiente para formar uma menor coalizão vencedora, juntamente com o Membro demandante. De outra parte, o mecanismo de retaliação coletiva deverá ter caráter obrigatório quando, diante de uma situação de desequilíbrio de poder: (i) seja patente a baixa capacidade relativa do Membro demandante; (ii) não haja Membros com interesses comuns, intensos e específicos a propulsionar a formação de uma aliança com o Membro demandante; e (iii) seja improvável a formação de uma menor coalizão vencedora. Por fim, a tese apresentou uma proposta de emenda aos Artigos 22.3 e 22.6 do ESC, para incorporação de um mecanismo de retaliação coletiva no SSC/OMC, explicitando os requisitos legais para tanto. / The objective of the thesis was to examine the viability of implementing a mechanism of collective countermeasures (retaliation) within the dispute settlement system (DS) of the WTO, as from the perspective of the alliance formation theory, as developed under international relations. The aim was to verify whether and under which conditions coalitions seeking at imposing collective retaliation will form, in case such mechanism is implemented in the DS/WTO. The thesis developed under the premise that enforcement under the DS/WTO is still founded on self-help, i.e., dependent on the force, the power, of the demanding Members to induce the demanded Member to adopt the Dispute Settlement Bodys (DSB) recommendations, by means of bilateral retaliation, based on reciprocity. However, one can note that the insufficiency and/or ineffectiveness of such bilateral countermeasures to induce the demanded Member to comply with the DSBs recommendations are generally associated with imbalance of power situations. The alliance formation theory proved to be appropriate for undertaking the envisaged analysis. Firstly, the analysis of imbalance of power situations is under the purview of the alliance formation theory. Secondly, with emphasis on the work developed by Glenn N. Snyder, the theory showed to be appropriate for the matter at hand, because the international trade system is structured under anarchy, in a multipolar structure, where it is not possible to predict ex ante the possible alignments in a given configuration, justifying the usage of the theory. The thesis thus confirmed the need to adopt a mechanism of collective retaliation at the DS/WTO, having indicated that collective retaliation can be unnecessary; allowed or mandatory. For that, the theory developed the concepts of relative capacity, minimal winning coalition, alliancedependence, besides the examination of the pre-alliance situation of the interests of the units involved, to verify whether there are fostering or preventing factors to the alliance formation. Such concepts were applied to the factual settings of the eleven arbitrations of Article 22.6 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). By means of the application of the Landscape Theory of Aggregation, the thesis confirmed the need to implement, under certain circumstances, a mandatory mechanism of collective retaliation. Thus, the thesis submitted that the collective retaliation mechanism will be allowed, when, under an imbalance of power situation: (i) there are other Members with common, intense and specific interests fostering the alliance formation; and (ii) such Members bring about enough relative capacity to form a minimal winning coalition with the demanding Member. On the other hand, the collective retaliation mechanism will be mandatory, in an imbalance of power situation, when: (i) it is evident that the demanding Member has low relative capacity; (ii) there are no Members with common, intense and specific interests to foster the formation of an alliance with the demanding Member; and (iii) it is improbable that a minimal winning coalition will be formed. Finally, the thesis proposed an amendment to the text of Articles 22.3 and 22.6 of the DSU, to incorporate the collective relation mechanism in the DS/WTO, indicating the legal requisites thereof.

In maritime transportation, liner shipping accounts for over 60\% of the value of goods shipped. However, very limited literature is available on the study of various problems in liner shipping. In this thesis we focus on problems related to this industry. Given a set of cargo to be transported, a set of ports and a set of ships, a common problem faced by carriers in liner shipping is the design of their service network. We develop an integrated model to design service network for the ships and to route the available cargo, simultaneously. The proposed model incorporates many relevant constraints, such as the weekly frequency constraint on the operated routes, and emerging trends, such as obtaining benefits from transshipping cargo on two or more service routes, that appear in practice but have not been considered previously in literature. Also, we design exact and heuristic algorithms to solve the integer program efficiently. The proposed algorithms integrate the ship scheduling problem, a tactical planning level decision, and the cargo routing problem, an operational planning level decision, and provide good overall solution strategy. Computational experiments indicate that larger problem instances, as compared to the literature, can be solved using these algorithms in acceptable computational time. Alliance formation is very common among global liner carriers however a quantitative study of liner alliances is missing from literature. We provide a mathematical framework for the quantitative study of these alliances. For the formation of a sustainable alliance, carriers need to agree on an overall service network and resolve issues concerning distribution of benefits and costs among the members of the alliance. We develop mechanisms to design a collaborative service network and to manage the interaction among the carriers through the allocation of profits in a fair way. The mechanism utilizes inverse optimization techniques to obtain resource exchange costs in the network. These costs provide side payments to the members, on top of the revenue generated by them in the collaborative solution, to motivate them to act in the best interest of the alliance while satisfying their own self interests.

Esta tese teve por objeto analisar a viabilidade de implementação de, no âmbito do sistema de solução de controvérsias (SSC) da OMC, um mecanismo de contramedidas (retaliação) coletiva, à luz da teoria de formação de alianças, tal qual desenvolvida na teoria de relações internacionais. O objetivo foi perquirir se e em que condições poderão se formar coalizões visando à aplicação de retaliação coletiva, caso tal mecanismo seja incorporado ao SSC/OMC. A tese se baseou na premissa de que o enforcement do SSC/OMC ainda se funda em soluções de self-help, ou seja, dependente da força, do poder, do Membro demandante de induzir o Membro demandado a cumprir as recomendações do Órgão de Solução de Controvérsias (OSC), mediante a aplicação de retaliação bilateral, centrada na reciprocidade. Observa-se todavia uma insuficiência e/ou ineficácia de tais contramedidas bilaterais para induzir o Membro demandado a cumprir com as recomendações do OSC em situações envolvendo desequilíbrio de poder (entre Membro demandante e Membro demandado). A teoria de formação de alianças se mostrou adequada para a análise pretendida, primeiramente porque o desequilíbrio de poder é objeto de estudo de tal teoria. Em segundo lugar, com ênfase na sistematização apresentada por Glenn N. Snyder, tal teoria se mostrou apropriada para a questão em vista da configuração do sistema de comércio internacional como uma anarquia, dentro de uma estrutura de multipolaridade, em que não é possível perceber ex ante os possíveis alinhamentos, diante de uma determinada configuração, justificando o emprego de tal teoria. A tese então confirmou a necessidade de adoção de um mecanismo de retaliação coletiva no SSC/OMC, tendo indicado quando a retaliação coletiva deverá ser desnecessária, facultativa ou obrigatória. Para tanto, a tese desenvolveu conceitos como capacidade relativa, menor coalizão vencedora, aliança-dependência, além de perquirir sobre a situação pré-aliança dos interesses das unidades envolvidas, como propulsionadora ou limitadora da formação de alianças. Tais conceitos foram aplicados sobre as situações fáticas das onze arbitragens do Artigo 22.6 do Entendimento sobre Solução de Controvérsias (ESC). Por meio da aplicação da Teoria da Paisagem de Agregação, a tese confirmou a necessidade de implementação, em determinadas circunstâncias, de um mecanismo obrigatório de retaliação coletiva. Assim, propôs a tese que um mecanismo de retaliação coletiva poderá ter caráter meramente facultativo quando, em uma situação de desequilíbrio de poder: (i) houver outros Membros com interesses comuns, intensos e específicos a propulsionar a formação de uma aliança; e (ii) tais Membros reunirem capacidade relativa suficiente para formar uma menor coalizão vencedora, juntamente com o Membro demandante. De outra parte, o mecanismo de retaliação coletiva deverá ter caráter obrigatório quando, diante de uma situação de desequilíbrio de poder: (i) seja patente a baixa capacidade relativa do Membro demandante; (ii) não haja Membros com interesses comuns, intensos e específicos a propulsionar a formação de uma aliança com o Membro demandante; e (iii) seja improvável a formação de uma menor coalizão vencedora. Por fim, a tese apresentou uma proposta de emenda aos Artigos 22.3 e 22.6 do ESC, para incorporação de um mecanismo de retaliação coletiva no SSC/OMC, explicitando os requisitos legais para tanto. / The objective of the thesis was to examine the viability of implementing a mechanism of collective countermeasures (retaliation) within the dispute settlement system (DS) of the WTO, as from the perspective of the alliance formation theory, as developed under international relations. The aim was to verify whether and under which conditions coalitions seeking at imposing collective retaliation will form, in case such mechanism is implemented in the DS/WTO. The thesis developed under the premise that enforcement under the DS/WTO is still founded on self-help, i.e., dependent on the force, the power, of the demanding Members to induce the demanded Member to adopt the Dispute Settlement Bodys (DSB) recommendations, by means of bilateral retaliation, based on reciprocity. However, one can note that the insufficiency and/or ineffectiveness of such bilateral countermeasures to induce the demanded Member to comply with the DSBs recommendations are generally associated with imbalance of power situations. The alliance formation theory proved to be appropriate for undertaking the envisaged analysis. Firstly, the analysis of imbalance of power situations is under the purview of the alliance formation theory. Secondly, with emphasis on the work developed by Glenn N. Snyder, the theory showed to be appropriate for the matter at hand, because the international trade system is structured under anarchy, in a multipolar structure, where it is not possible to predict ex ante the possible alignments in a given configuration, justifying the usage of the theory. The thesis thus confirmed the need to adopt a mechanism of collective retaliation at the DS/WTO, having indicated that collective retaliation can be unnecessary; allowed or mandatory. For that, the theory developed the concepts of relative capacity, minimal winning coalition, alliancedependence, besides the examination of the pre-alliance situation of the interests of the units involved, to verify whether there are fostering or preventing factors to the alliance formation. Such concepts were applied to the factual settings of the eleven arbitrations of Article 22.6 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). By means of the application of the Landscape Theory of Aggregation, the thesis confirmed the need to implement, under certain circumstances, a mandatory mechanism of collective retaliation. Thus, the thesis submitted that the collective retaliation mechanism will be allowed, when, under an imbalance of power situation: (i) there are other Members with common, intense and specific interests fostering the alliance formation; and (ii) such Members bring about enough relative capacity to form a minimal winning coalition with the demanding Member. On the other hand, the collective retaliation mechanism will be mandatory, in an imbalance of power situation, when: (i) it is evident that the demanding Member has low relative capacity; (ii) there are no Members with common, intense and specific interests to foster the formation of an alliance with the demanding Member; and (iii) it is improbable that a minimal winning coalition will be formed. Finally, the thesis proposed an amendment to the text of Articles 22.3 and 22.6 of the DSU, to incorporate the collective relation mechanism in the DS/WTO, indicating the legal requisites thereof.

Despite that alliance formation commonly happen when states share mutual interests and like-mindedness, it is possible to find alliances, where the states promote radically different political, normative, and cultural characteristics. Such an alliance is observed in the case of Saudi Arabia and the United States, which subsequently have endured. The following research will thus elaborate on how the Saudi-American alliance have endured throughout, despite their radical differences. To examine the endurance of the Saudi-American alliance, this research has conducted a case study and used Walter Carlsnaes Foreign Policy model. The research has concludingly found that the alliance has endured due to a variety of factors such as economic trade, regional instability, and security, that consistently has persisted throughout. Despite the American role as a hegemon and the changing administrations throughout the endurance, it has been argued that the longevity of the relation has contributed to the consistency of the factors mentioned above. This is evident in the unpredictability in terms of the region, instability, and insecurity that opposes threats to the U.S., and economic trade relations which have discouraged the U.S. from leaving the alliance.

No description available.

No description available.

Les alliances stratégiques sont devenues autant une nécessité qu'un choix pour les entreprises afin d'être compétitif sur les marchés d'aujourd'hui. Toutefois, faire fonctionner les alliances stratégiques n'est pas une évidence. Des taux de défaillance entre 30% et jusqu'à 70% ont été régulièrement signalés. Un nombre important de recherches a examiné comment ces chiffres pouvaient être améliorés. La sélection de partenaires a été identifiée comme l'un des facteurs clés de la réussite. En fait, les attributs spécifiques de chaque partenaire, influant même sur la sélection de ces mêmes partenaires, ont tendance à avoir des effets boule de neige au-delà de la phase de formation, jusqu'aux phases de conception et de post-formation. S'appuyant sur des recherches antérieures étudiant l'attribut « réputation », cette thèse vient combler une lacune en explorant le rôle que peut jouer la réputation pour la performance environnementale dans la détermination des avantages individuels et communs dans les différentes phases des alliances stratégiques. Dans quatre essais indépendants mais interconnectés, des questions de recherche spécifiques sont théoriquement examinées sous la « Natural-Resource-Based View (NRBV) » et la « Strategic Cognition Perspective ». Les hypothèses de l'étude sont testées empiriquement à partir des données recueillies auprès des PDG et des cadres supérieurs dans 176 entreprises manufacturières norvégiennes. / Strategic alliances have become as much a necessity as a choice for companies to be competitive in today's markets. However, making strategic alliances work is not evident. Failure rates between 30% and as high as 70% have been regularly reported. A substantial stream of research has examined how these numbers can be improved. Partner selection has been identified as a key success factor. In fact, partner-specific attributes, affecting which partners are selected, tend to have snowball effects beyond the formation phase to the design and postformation phases. Building on previous studies investigating the attribute of reputation, this thesis fills a gap by exploring the role reputation for environmental performance can play in determining firm-specific and joint competitive advantages in the different phases of strategic alliances. In four individual but connected Essays, specific research questions are theoretically examined under the Natural-Resource-Based View (NRBV) and Strategic Cognition Perspective. The study's hypotheses are empirically tested using data collected from CEOs and top managers in 176 Norwegian manufacturing firms.