Global ETD Search

21	探討半參數隨機邊界模型的技術與配置效率之一致性估計方法 / Consistent estimation of technical and allocative efficiencies for a semiparametric Stochastic Cost Frontier with Shadow Input Prices 陳冠臻, Chen, Kuan Chen Unknown Date (has links) 傳統參數隨機成本邊界模型需事先假設其函數型態，但真正的函數型態未知，若是假設錯誤的函數型態可能存在模型設定誤差，另外過去估計成本函數時，大多著重於技術效率的衡量，而忽略配置效率，如此一來，將導致模型參數估計產生偏誤，影響後來效率的計算。基於上述的問題，本研究將應用半參數隨機成本邊界模型且同時考量技術效率與配置效率，不但函數設定具有彈性且能正確的衡量效率值，然而在考量配置效率的衡量後，增加模型估計的困難度，使得估計收斂不易，因此本研究提出一個五階段的估計步驟，應用蒙地卡羅模擬進行分析，該估計步驟不但能簡化估計且能得到技術與配置效率的一致性估計。最後則將本研究提出的估計方法應用在實證研究上，探討14個東歐國家在轉型期間其技術與配置效率的衡量，使用不平衡縱橫資料，共340家商業銀行進行實證分析。 / Conventional parametric stochastic cost frontier models are likely to suffer from biased inferences due to misspecification and the ignorance of allocative efficiency (AE). To fill up the gap in the literature, this article proposes a semiparametric stochastic cost frontier with shadow input prices that combines a parametric portion with a nonparametric portion and that allows for the presence of both technical efficiency (TE) and AE. The introduction of AE and the nonparametric function into the cost function complicates substantially the estimation procedure. We develop a new estimation procedure that leads to consistent estimators and valid TE and AE measures, which are proved by conducting Monte Carlo simulations. An empirical study using unbalanced panel data on 340 commercial banks from 14 East European countries over the period 1993-2004 is performed to help shed some light on the usefulness of our procedure. 半參數成本邊界核估計式影子價格技術效率配置效率 semiparametric cost frontier kernel estimation shadow prices technical efficiency allocative efficiency
22	Design Of Truthful Allocation Mechanisms For Carbon Footprint Reduction Udaya Lakshmi, L 03 1900 (has links) (PDF) Global warming is currently a major challenge faced by the world. Reduction of carbon emissions is of paramount importance in the context of global warming. There are widespread ongoing efforts to find satisfactory ways of surmounting this challenge. The basic objective of all such efforts can be summarized as conception and formation of protocols to reduce the pace of global carbon levels. Countries and global companies are now engaged in understanding systematic ways of achieving well defined emission targets. In this dissertation, we explore the specific problem faced by a global industry or global company in allocating carbon emission reduction units to its different divisions and supply chain partners in achieving a required target of reductions in its carbon reduction program. The problem becomes a challenging one since the divisions and supply chain partners are often autonomous and could exhibit strategic behavior. Game theory and mechanism design provide a natural modeling tool for capturing the strategic dynamics involved in this problem. DSIC (Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility), AE (Allocative Efficiency), and SBB (Strict Budget Balance) are the key desirable properties for carbon reduction allocation mechanisms. But due to an impossibility result in mechanism design, DSIC, AE, and SBB can never be simultaneously achieved. Hence in this dissertation, we offer as contributions, two elegant solutions to this carbon emission reduction allocation problem. The first contribution is a mechanism which is DSIC and AE. We first propose a straightforward Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism based solution to the problem, leading to a DSIC and AE reverse auction protocol for allocating carbon reductions among the divisions. This solution, however, leads to a high level of budget imbalance. To reduce budget imbalance, we use redistribution mechanisms, without affecting the key properties of DSIC and AE. The Cavallo-Bailey redistribution mechanism, when applied to the above reverse auction protocol leads to reduced budget imbalance. To reduce the imbalance further, we propose an innovative forward auction protocol which achieves less imbalance when combined with the Cavallo-Bailey redistribution mechanism. The forward auction protocol also has the appealing feature of handsomely rewarding divisions that reduce emissions and levying appropriate penalties on divisions that do not participate in emission reductions. The second contribution is a DSIC and SBB mechanism. Even though the first mechanism tries to reduce the budget imbalance, there is always a surplus which cannot be distributed among divisions and is wasted. So, in this part, by slightly compromising on efficiency, we propose a mechanism which is DSIC and SBB. The SBB property guarantees that there is no need for any monetary support from an external agency for implementing the mechanism and there is no leakage of revenue. Game Theory Allocations Air Pollution Carbon Emission Carbon Footprint Carbon Emission Reduction Allocation Mechanism Design Allocative Efficiency (AE) Strict Budget Balance (SBB) Environmental Engineering
23	Der Einfluß der internationalen Besteuerung auf die Erzielung grenzüberschreitender Einkünfte: ein Reformvorschlag Baumann, Elke 25 May 2001 (has links) Die große Bedeutung grenzüberschreitender Kapitalbewegungen und die zunehmende Mobilität des Faktors Arbeit verstärken immer mehr die Relevanz der steuerlichen Behandlung grenzüberschreitend erzielter Einkünfte. Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit den Auswirkungen des derzeitigen Systems der internationalen Besteuerung auf grenzüberschreitende Faktorallokationen. Im Idealfall sollte die Freizügigkeit der Faktorströme zu effizienten Produktionsstrukturen führen, indem Unternehmen, Kapitalanleger und Arbeiter ihren Investitions-, Kapitalanlage- bzw. Arbeitsort dort wählen, wo ihre Produktivität am höchsten ist; die Besteuerung sollte dabei ohne Einfluß sein. Zur Untersuchung, ob dieser Idealfall auch in der Praxis gegeben ist, werden zunächst die internationalen Besteuerungsprinzipien vorgestellt. Die darauffolgenden Kapitel befassen sich sodann mit den Auswirkungen der internationalen Besteuerung auf die räumliche Allokation der Faktoren Kapital und Arbeit im Rahmen einer theoretischen Analyse und der Frage, welchen Anforderungen ein internationales Steuersystem genügen muß, um eine global optimale Allokation zu gewährleisten. Vor dem Hintergrund eines solchen idealtypischen internationalen Steuersystems erfolgt eine Analyse der bestehenden Besteuerungsvorschriften für grenzüberschreitend erzielte Einkünfte zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich bzw. Deutschland und den USA verbunden mit einer Einführung in das nationale und internationale Steuerrecht der betrachteten Länder. Aufbauend auf diesen Erkenntnissen wird schließlich ein Reformsteuersystem mit Beispielen für die jeweiligen Länder und Einkunftsarten erarbeitet, das eine allokationsneutrale internationale Einkommenserzielung gestattet. Dieser Reformvorschlag zeichnet sich durch seine pragmatische Ausgestaltung aus, die zur Sicherung einer Realisierungschance so wenig wie möglich in die Besteuerungsautonomien der einzelnen Länder eingreift und administrativ relativ einfach umzusetzen ist. / The importance of international capital flows and the increasing mobility of human capital give more and more weight to the question of taxation of the revenues thereof. This study analyses the effects of the actual system of international taxation in this context. Ideally, free factor flows should lead to efficient production structures with companies, capital owners and workers choosing their location of input where the productivity is highest; taxation should have no influence on this process. The analysis starts with a description of the existing international taxation principles. It then continues with the effects of the international taxation on the geographical allocation of the production factors capital and work and the conditions a system of international taxation has to fulfil for optimal global allocation. The existing international tax law for cross border revenues between Germany and France, and Germany and the United States, respectively, is compared with such an ideal system joined with an introduction to the national and international tax law of the countries considered. Given this information, a reform proposal for international taxation guaranteeing efficient factor allocations is presented with examples for the three countries and the different revenues. This reform proposal is characterised by its pragmatic concept: It disturbs the tax autonomies of the countries the least it has to and it is relatively easy to introduce. info:eu-repo/classification/ddc/17 ddc:17
24	人工雙方喊價市場之競價行為與市場績效的研究－遺傳規劃的應用池秉聰 Unknown Date (has links) 近年來，網際網路(Internet)快速發展，已成為一個無疆無界無時差的市場，如何不被這股潮流所淘汰，我們所提出的解決方案—軟體代理人(software agent)，一位具有人工智慧(artificial intelligence)演化調適(adaptive)能力的代理人，現在已經有許多企業與資訊、管理、電腦科學等各方面專家結合，開始使用軟體代理人來代勞，試想一位永不停止、具有創新、學習適應的員工，企業家可以隨意複製或刪除，隨時配合市場規模，不必擔心任何裁員的負擔，這樣的代理人的問世，勢必對我們的經濟環境帶來莫大的衝擊。電子商務(electronic commerce)已經行之有年，人類的消費型態似乎不易於因這個轉變而有所改變，消費者如果沒有經過視覺、觸覺、嗅覺等感官的刺激，很難有購買的動機，再加上授信制度的不健全使得電子商務的施行充滿了風險。雖然有這麼多問題，我們仍無法阻擋這股趨勢，在電子科技的進步，3D數位影像、各種感官刺激的傳送、或如同期貨市場上明確公認的規格、法律的修訂、完善的認證制度，接下來我們就是要看軟體代理人的表現。我們將軟體代理人運用在人工雙方喊價(artificial double auction)的市場，就像真實市場已經有人開始使用自動下單或自動議價代理人的機制一樣。然而市場上是否有必然不敗的策略呢？本文就是要解開這個答案。再進一步來看，待真實市場每個成員受不了生存競爭的壓力，也採取使用代理人的演化性策略，屆時我們的人工市場就是真實市場的縮影，我們在本文也會針對這樣一個具有未來前瞻性市場的表現如何？透過經濟學的角度來揭露市場的本質是否仍然維持？在本文軟體代理人即為議價代理人(bargaining agent)，她可以在穩定的(stable)市場環境(其他參與者使用固定策略)中辨別出一些有利的市場特徵，藉由這些特徵發展出有利的策略，而其結果甚至不是很容易想到的策略；接著若每個人都使用議價代理人在市場上交易，這裡我們使用一種納許式過程(Nash-like process)來詮釋，之後再分別依市場的分配效率、價格效率、及所得分配來討論市場績效。軟體代理人人工智慧電子商務人工雙方喊價市場議價代理人納許式過程分配效率價格效率 Software Agent Artificial Intelligence Electronic Commerce Artificial Double Auction Market Bargaining Agent Nash-Like Process Allocative Efficiency Price Efficiency
25	La disparition de la rencontre de marché dans la tradition économique française : de Boisguilbert à Walras / The disappearance of the encounter of market in the French economic tradition : from Boisguilbert to Walras Bruneau, Laurent 16 December 2010 (has links) La thèse se propose de réexaminer le concept de concurrence dans une sélection de textes classiques de la tradition économique française du 18ème siècle et du 19ème siècle.L’examen des textes fondateurs de Boisguilbert et de Cantillon, montre que le concept de concurrence recouvre deux contenus différents.- D’une part, la concurrence qui s’exerce sur un site de marché, du côté long du marché, et qui prend la forme d’un comportement conflictuel de rabais ou d’enchères monétaires.- D’autre part, la concurrence qui s’exerce ensuite à partir des signaux prix constitués sur le site de marché, et qui prend la forme de décisions quantitatives, de réallocations des marchandises, des capitaux et des hommes. Cette deuxième signification va peu à peu supplanter la première jusqu’à faire disparaître le concept même de rencontre de marché, notamment dans l’œuvre de Turgot (avec le marché général). Cette même tendance apparaît dans l’analyse mathématique d’Isnard, alors même que Canard propose une approche mathématique de la rencontre conflictuelle de marché.Au début du 19ème siècle, influencé par Smith modifiant la définition de la demande, Say confirme la disparition, tandis que Sismondi ne parvient pas à dissocier les processus concurrentiels.Par la suite, les auteurs de l’école française, au premier rang desquels Garnier et Molinari vont alors parachever le processus d’occultation des processus concurrentiels du premier type, malgré la tentative iconoclaste de Walras qui tente, sans succès selon nous, d’en rendre compte avec le tâtonnement. Au final, la recherche montre que l’absence de prise de conscience de la dualité du concept de concurrence, a rendu invisible le changement de direction de l’analyse de la rencontre de marché, vers 1760. Une reconnaissance de cette dualité pourrait donc réorienter efficacement les recherches contemporaines. / The thesis offers to re-examine the concept of competition in a selection of traditional texts of the French economic tradition of the 18th and 19th century.The examination of the founding texts of Boisguilbert and Cantillon, shows that the concept of competition covers two different contents.- On the one hand, the competition which is exerted on the site of a marketplace, on the long side of the marketplace, and which takes the form of conflictual behavior of outbidding or underbidding price.- On the other hand, the competition which is exerted from indications of price signal on the site of marketplace, and which takes the form of quantitative decisions, of réallocations of the goods, capital and men. This second significance gradually will supplant the first, until it made disappear the concept itself of encounter of market, in particular in the work of Turgot (with the general market). This same tendency appears in the mathematical analysis of Isnard, while at the same time Canard introduces a mathematical approach of the conflictual encounter of market.At the beginning of the 19th century, influenced by Smith amending the definition of the demand, Say confirms this disappearance, while Sismondi does not manage to dissociate the competitive processes. Thereafter, the authors of the French school, first and foremost Garnier and Molinari are then going to complete the blanking process of the competitive behaviour of the first type, in spite of the iconoclastic attempt of Walras which tries, unsuccessfully according to us, to give an account of it, with the concept of tâtonnement (groping).Finally, research shows that the absence of awareness of the duality of the concept of competition, made invisible the change of direction in the analysis of the encounter of market, in about 1760. A recognition of this duality could thus successfully reorientate contemporary research. Marché Rencontre de marché Rabais Enchères Efficience allocative Tâtonnement Formation des prix Processus concurrentiels Main invisible Allocation Prix Loi de l’offre et de la demande Vendeur Acheteur Valeur Travail Production Échange Équilibre Circulation Sciences économiques Boisguilbert Cantillon Turgot Isnard Canard Say Sismondi Smith Garnier Molinari Walras Cournot Market Encounter of market Competition Underbidding Outbidding Allocative efficiency Groping Price formation Competitive processes Invisible hand Price Law of the supply and of the demand Supply Demand Salesman Purchaser Value Work Production Exchange Balance Circulation Economy Economics

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