Information transparency enhances corporate governance. In an attempt to reduce the information asymmetry between business insiders and outsiders and to allow outsiders to have more information for decision making by disclosing more corporate information voluntarily, the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation (TSEC) and Over-The-Counter Securities Exchange (OTCE) requested the Securities & Futures Institute (SFI) to implement an information disclosure and evaluation system for all publicly traded and OTC companies listed in TSEC. This study investigates the effects of the system on decision behavior of the investors, analysts, and auditors. Empirical results indicate that investors¡¦ ability of future earnings evaluation increases, analysts¡¦ earnings forecasts are more accurate, and the earnings forecasts dispersion among the analysts decreases after the system has been implemented. However, the implementation of the system has no effects on the types of audit opinion issued by auditors. Besides, the analysts¡¦ earnings forecasts are more accurate for the ¡§more transparent¡¨ companies. However, the differences of future earnings evaluation, earnings forecasts dispersion among the analysts and types of audit opinion between ¡§more transparent¡¨ and ¡§less transparent¡¨ companies are not significant. These results may provide implication to authorities for making related policies.

歷經國內外多起知名企業的財務弊案後，各國政府及投資人開始關注公司的資訊透明度，企業也意識到資訊透明度對於企業永續經營的重要性，因此，本研究主要探討資訊透明度對於企業價值之影響。研究貢獻在於以具有專業和分析能力之分析師預測行為作為判斷企業資訊透明度之依據，進而探究其與企業價值之關聯性。本研究以2008年到2013年台灣上市(櫃)公司為樣本，以企業價值(Tobin’s Q)為應變數，資訊透明度相關之變數(分析師追蹤意願、分析師盈餘預測偏誤與分析師盈餘預測離散性)為主要解釋變數，在控制公司成長面、獲利面、風險面與公司規模因素，並固定產業和年份，利用追蹤資料迴歸模型(panel regression)來進行分析。 實證結果分為兩部分，（1）代表資訊透明度之變數－分析師預測意願、分析師預測精準度及分析師預測離散性與企業價值具有顯著正向關係。另利用前述之結果，本研究自行建立一個衡量企業透明度的模型，以整合性資訊探討資訊透明度對於企業價值的影響，實證結果顯示（2）資訊透明度與企業價值間確實具有顯著正向關係，結果支持良好的資訊透明度，有助於公司治理，長期間更能夠提升企業價值與永續經營。此外，本研究以整合資訊衡量企業資訊透明度，相較於單一資訊更為完善，也提供企業利害關係人及一般大眾不同面相去了解企業的資訊透明度，進而保護其權益。 / Since the occurrences of financial scandal, issues surrounding corporate governance and information disclosure have been widely discussed in these few years. Not only have government and investors started paying more attention on information transparency, but more and more firms have noticed that well corporate governance could help its sustainable development. The main purpose of this study is to examine the influences of information transparency on corporate value. Based on the samples of Taiwan listed firms for the period from 2009 to 2013, this study employs panel regression model with Corporate value (Tobin’s Q) as the dependent variable against various combinations of explanatory variables (analysts following, analysts’ earnings forecast bias and analysts’ earnings forecast derivation). The results of this research reveal that (1) the firms with high corporate value significantly have more analysts following, less analyst's earning forecast error and the greater forecast derivation. And by using an integrated model to do further analysis, the evidence shows that (2) higher information transparency could improve the corporate governance, gain more corporate value and benefit sustainable development in the long term. What’s more, instead of unitary source, this research measures corporate information transparency via integrated sources to ensure credibility, and provides various angles for corporate stakeholders and the general public to learn further more about corporate information transparency and be able to protect their rights.

本論文分為兩部分，第一部份是探討全球航空產業的油料避險會不會對公司價值有所影響，以及油料避險的誘因。第二部份則是檢視全球航空公司的風險曝露會不會影響分析師的預測誤差，尤其是燃油價格變動的風險曝露。 / In the first essay, we examine whether jet fuel hedging increases the market value of airline companies around the world. Using a sample of 70 airline companies from 32 countries over the period 1995 to 2005, we find that jet fuel hedging is not significantly positively related to their firm value in the global airlines, but this positive relationship holds in the various sub-samples and is significant for US and non-alliance firms. Moreover, our results show that the risk-taking behavior of executives and the tendency to avoid financial distress are important determinants for the jet fuel hedging activities of non-US airline companies. Alleviating the problem of underinvestment is also an important factor to explain the jet fuel hedging activities of US and non-alliance firms. Our results add support to the growing body of literature which finds that hedging increases firm value for global airline companies. In the second essay, we examine the extent analysts revise their earnings forecasts in response to oil price, interest rate and foreign exchange rate shocks they have observed during the year, and whether these revisions contain additional information about how current and past price shocks affect reported earnings, using the sample of the global airline industry. Empirical results indicate that jet fuel hedging can increase analysts’ forecast revisions in the total sample, and in the sub-sample of the volatile fuel price period. These results can also be seen in US and non-US airlines, and airlines with both strong and weak governance. Overall, our results show that oil price shocks play an important role in investor and analyst information uncertainty with regard to the global airline industry. Consequently, corporate risk disclosures only provide limited information about firms’ financial risk exposures. Two essays are comprised in this dussertation to examine whether jet fuel hedging has effects on firm value and analysts’ forecast accuracy in the global airline industry. Using global data allows us to cmpare the differences of jet fuel hedging behavior and incentives for hedging across different sub-samples. Furthermore, we also examine how jet fuel hedging affects analysts’ forecast erros across different sub-samples and its implications for firm disclosures about their risk exposures in the financial reports. In the first essay, we examine whether jet fuel hedging increases the market value of airline companies around the world. Using a sample of 70 airline companies from 32 countries over the period 1995 to 2005, we find that jet fuel hedging is not significantly positively related to their firm value in the global airlines, but this positive relationship holds in the various sub-samples and is significant for US and non-alliance firms. Moreover, our results show that the risk-taking behavior of executives and the tendency to avoid financial distress are important determinants for the jet fuel hedging activities of non-US airline companies. Alleviating the problem of underinvestment is also an important factor to explain the jet fuel hedging activities of US and non-alliance firms. Our results add support to the growing body of literature which finds that hedging increases firm value for global airline companies. In the second essay, we examine the extent analysts revise their earnings forecasts in response to oil price, interest rate and foreign exchange rate shocks they have observed during the year, and whether these revisions contain additional information about how current and past price shocks affect reported earnings, using the sample of the global airline industry. Empirical results indicate that jet fuel hedging can increase analysts’ forecast revisions in the total sample, and in the sub-sample of the volatile fuel price period. These results can also be seen in US and non-US airlines, and airlines with both strong and weak governance. Overall, our results show that oil price shocks play an important role in investor and analyst information uncertainty with regard to the global airline industry. Consequently, corporate risk disclosures only provide limited information about firms’ financial risk exposures.

會計盈餘是企業向投資人傳達營運績效的指標，又投資人視公司達成分析師預測門檻與否為企業前景的重要訊號。當公司宣告策略聯盟決策時，資本市場給予正面評價，不過策略聯盟協議可能使管理當局存在機會主義與盈餘管理活動，過去文獻發現，有策略聯盟的公司，其盈餘品質較低。本文探究企業執行策略聯盟對於跨越盈餘門檻的關聯性，觀察策略聯盟事件是否為管理當局進行盈餘管理或是預期管理的工具，以迎合或擊敗分析師之盈餘預測門檻。本文實證發現策略聯盟與否及策略聯盟多寡與分析師預測門檻具有顯著正相關，而執行策略聯盟之公司從事向下引導分析師預測的機率較低，此外，實證結果亦發現，策略聯盟會降低公司管理當局採取向上調整裁決性應計數的可能性。綜上研究顯示，有策略聯盟之企業達成分析師預測門檻的機會較高，然而，其管理當局較不會選擇應計項目盈餘管理或預期管理方式來迎合或擊敗分析師之盈餘預測門檻。