Purpose - The authors propose that angry individuals are much more likely to consider the emotional state of their partner than are neutral individuals. They then apply a lay theory dictating that anger decreases cooperation and react accordingly by lowering their own level of cooperation. Design/methodology/approach - The authors report four experiments involving different samples, manipulations, payment schemes and interfaces. The methodological approach was to capitalize on the positives of experimental research (e.g. establishing causality) while also trying to conceptually replicate the findings in different settings. Findings - The authors found evidence for a lay theory (i.e. expectation) that anger decreases cooperation, but that actual cooperation was lowest when angry individuals were paired with other angry individuals, supporting the hypotheses. Research limitations/implications - Anger can spill over from unrelated contexts to affect cooperation, and incidental anger by itself is not enough to decrease cooperation. However, the findings are limited to anger and cannot necessarily be used to understand the effects of other emotions. Practical implications - Before entering into a context that requires cooperation, such as a negotiation, be wary of the emotional state of both yourself and of your partner. This paper suggests that only if both parties are angry, then the likelihood of cooperation is low. Originality/value - To the best of the authors' knowledge, they are the first researchers to address the question of how incidental anger affects single-round cooperation. By going back to the basics, the authors believe that the findings fill a gap in existing research and offer a building block for future research on anger and cooperation.

This thesis is a description and analysis of work that I produced during my Graduate studies at The University of New Orleans. The central theme of these work is the end of the world. Through prints, sculpture and painting I explore this idea.

Thesis advisor: James A. Russell / Theories in moral psychology propose a link between emotions and moral judgments. This dissertation presents a series of studies examining whether different discrete emotions are each linked to a different discrete moral content. Some of the studies tested a proposal called CAD: an acronym for the theory that contempt is linked to violations in the community domain (C), anger is linked to violations in the autonomy domain (A), and disgust is linked to violations in the divinity domain (D). Other studies further focused on the emotion disgust: Whether acts or issues that remind humans of their animal nature elicit disgust and whether the English concept of disgust refers to a single emotional experience pan-culturally. In most of the studies we recruited participants both from America and from India (N = 3893). The findings challenged any clean mappings between different discrete emotions and different contents of moral violations. Instead, moral violations were associated with a range of negative emotions rather than with a specific one. There was no support for the hypothesis that acts or issues that remind us of our animal nature elicit disgust, and the English concept disgust, as referring to unclean substances and moral violations, is equivalent to similar concepts in two Indian languages. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2017. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Psychology.

Thesis advisor: James F. Keenan / This dissertation addresses a specific problem, which is that the Catholic ethical tradition lacks an adequate normative approach to social anger as a potentially constructive resource in the pursuit of social justice. In response to this issue, this dissertation advances the thesis that social anger is a cognitive interruption of the ideologies and structures of oppression, which is to say, an evaluative judgment that the members of a vulnerable social group suffer systemic deprivation of one or more of the social goods constitutive of basic human flourishing. I propose that the civic virtues of justice, solidarity, and prudence may be used as a normative anthropological heuristic for determining whether agents have rightly realized their social anger in regard to particular instances of structural participation, such as political resistance and institutional reform. In order to defend this thesis, the argument first diagnoses the main causes of the problem. In attempting to address social justice concerns, Catholic ethicists have generally retrieved the Thomistic virtue ethic of temperance or moderation in anger, which was designed for damaged interpersonal relationships in a premodern context, and applied it to the contemporary context of structural injustice in sociopolitical and socioeconomic relationships. This normative ethic, however, fails to observe the qualitative difference between the moral agency of individuals in relation to one another and the agency of structural participation. Moreover, this anthropological issue is exacerbated by an uncritical characterization of anger as impulsive and non-cognitive in itself, a problem that can be traced to the lack of an adequate philosophical psychology of emotion. In light of this diagnosis, I argue that Catholic ethicists should critically engage with the cognitive theory of emotion offered by Martha Nussbaum as well as her feminist account of universal human capabilities. Once combined with the contextual anthropology of human agency in history found in modern Catholic social thought, these resources can provide the basis for an inductive natural law methodology appropriate to the task of understanding social anger in relation to the pursuit of social justice. Employing this methodology, I explicate the moral significance of social anger as cognitive interruption and offer a critically reconstructed normative ethic appropriate to the contemporary context of political resistance and institutional reform in public life. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2014. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

根據進化心理學的觀點, 特定情緒具有特定的適應功能, 能夠驅動個體以適應性的行爲反應解決進化環境中反復發生的選擇難題。厭惡情緒與疾病感染關係密切。爲了應對進化環境中反復發生的傳染病威脅, 人們進化出了行爲免疫系統, 以便在病原體進入身體之前, 就以行爲規避的方式遠離病菌。作爲行爲免疫系統的一個環節, 厭惡能夠引發個體的行爲回避傾向, 進而減少個體跟環境中病原體的接觸。跟厭惡不同, 憤怒與社會交往有關。社會交往中冒犯自我利益的做法會引發個體的憤怒, 而憤怒的進化功能在於以威懾和攻擊的方式來減少他人對自我利益的侵害。憤怒促使人們即使花費代價也要對不遵守社會交往規範的肇事者進行懲罰, 有助於個人社會名聲的建立, 既可以威懾其他具有剝削意圖的社會成員, 又能吸引到具有合作意向的社會夥伴。 / 情緒在傳統的道德心理學領域遭受普遍的忽視, 不過已有越來越多理論和實證層面的研究指出情緒在道德判斷的過程中扮演著重要角色。社會直覺主義者模型認爲道德判斷的主導因素是道德直覺, 基於情緒的直覺常常自動快速地做出道德判斷, 而推理和反思則扮演著辯護律師的角色, 主要爲直覺得出的結論尋找支持性的證據。同時, 道德領域被認爲是多元的, 存在跟社會交往、照顧他人、身心純潔、社會等級和內外群體有關的多個領域, 每個領域都有相應的道德直覺。其他研究者也強調情緒跟道德判斷之間存在密切關係。除了理論層面, 實證層面的研究表明道德判斷涉及跟情緒加工有關的諸多腦區, 情緒能夠預測人們的道德判斷, 情緒相關腦區受損者的道德判斷異于常人。不過, 特定情緒影響道德判斷的機制依然有待揭示。 / 進化心理學認爲情緒能夠驅動個體適應性的行爲選擇, 調節個體的諸多生理和心理參數, 以便有效地解決進化環境中發生的適應問題。而道德心理學研究則強調情緒在道德判斷中扮演不可或缺的積極角色。在本研究中我們試圖把兩者結合起來, 認爲特定的情緒具有特定的進化功能, 它們會驅動相關領域中適應性的行爲, 以便解決相關情境中特定的適應問題。有助於問題解決的行爲, 會受到人們的道德認可; 而阻礙問題解決的行爲, 則會受到他們的道德譴責。簡單地說, 特定情緒會影響對該情緒相關領域中的道德判斷, 但不會影響與該情緒無關領域中的道德判斷。厭惡跟病菌威脅有助, 會促使個體做出回避性的防禦行爲, 以便減少疾病感染。在衛生領域, 那些可能傳播疾病的做法會使個體處于健康受威脅的處境中, 因而人們傾向於回避這種行爲以及回避做出這種行爲的肇事者。厭惡情緒驅動的道德譴責有助於他們實現這一目的。 / 雖然有研究者認爲厭惡與衛生無關的道德判斷也有聯繫, 涉及社會交往的冒犯行爲也會引起人們的厭惡, 不過這一觀點存在很大的爭議, 而相關的研究也未能提供足夠的有說服力的證據。而我們認爲跟社會規範有關的情緒更可能是憤怒。憤怒會引發個體做出趨近性的攻擊行爲, 以便威懾他人防止自己受到傷害或不公平待遇。在社會交往領域, 違背社會規範的行爲比如傷害他人或欺騙他人會使人們利益受損, 因而他們傾向於通過攻擊威脅嚇阻這種行爲。憤怒情緒驅動的道德譴責助於實現這一目標。基於這些觀點, 本研究通過多個研究來檢驗厭惡和憤怒對特定道德判斷的不同影響。研究1通過跟中性情緒和焦慮的對比, 預期電影片段引發的厭惡影響跟衛生有關的道德判斷, 但不影響跟公平有關的道德判斷。研究2通過描寫個人經歷引發厭惡和憤怒, 預期厭惡影響跟衛生有關的道德判斷, 而憤怒則影響跟公平有關的道德判斷。研究3通過閱讀道德冒犯的方式啟動厭惡和憤怒情緒, 進一步檢驗厭惡和憤怒是否能夠特定地分別預測衛生領域和公平領域的道德判斷。同時, 研究3也試圖檢驗公平冒犯是否會引起厭惡情緒這一有爭議性的問題。 / 研究結果總體上支持了我們的假設, 即厭惡強化了人們對衛生冒犯的道德譴責, 這一情緒不影響對公平冒犯的道德判斷。同時, 我們發現憤怒跟公平領域的道德判斷同樣存在特定的對應關係, 即憤怒只影響公平領域的道德判斷, 但不影響跟社會交換無關的衛生領域的道德判斷。衛生冒犯和公平冒犯分別引發的最主要情緒是厭惡和憤怒。最後, 我們從特定情緒、情緒的進化功能以及道德判斷的角度對結果進行了討論。 / From the perspective of evolutionary psychology, emotions are adaptations to the recurring specific problems in the ancestral environment. Disgust is pertinent to cues connoting infectious diseases. Being an integral part of the behavioral immune system, the emotion of disgust is elicited by pathogen-connoting cues in the immediate environment. This emotion functions to minimize the contact with pathogens. In contrast, the origin of anger is irrelevant to diseases. The emotion of anger is relevant to deterring harm from others and minimizing exploitation in social exchange. In social interactions, people who are equipped with anger can reduce potential harm and unfairness from others than those who are not. Emotion is neglected in the traditional moral psychology, but more and more theoretical and empirical studies emphasize the important role played by emotion in morality. The social intuitionist model maintains that intuition based on emotion is the primary factor determining moral judgment, whereas reflection and reasoning act as a defending lawyer who only seeks supportive evidence for the conclusion drawn by the intuition. In addition, there are multiple moral domains rather than only one. These extended moral domains include fairness, harm, purity, authority, and loyalty. Empirical studies reveal that moral judgment involves in brain regions relevant to emotions, is predicted by emotions rather than by reasoning, and does not function well in sociopaths whose emotion-related brain regions are impaired. To conclude emotions involve in moral judgment, but the underlying mechanism is not well understood. / Evolutionary psychology proposes that emotions drive adaptive behaviors, and regulate many physiology and psychology parameters so as to resolve specific recurring problems in the ancestral environment. Moral psychology stresses the importance of emotions in moral judgment. In the present research, by combining these two approaches, I propose that specific emotions will drive adaptive behaviors in order to resolve the relevant context-specific problems. In specific moral domains, violations that may increase the risk of being harmed by specific threats, whether disease contagion or social exploitation, would be condemned more when the domain-relevant emotions are made salient. The emotion of disgust is relevant to pathogen threat, and drives withdrawal behavior to minimize contact with disease cues. Moral judgment derived from disgust should be related to hygienic violations that increase the risk of disease infection. In contrast, anger that is relevant to unfair social exchange drives aggression to deter social harm and exploitation by others. Thus, moral judgment derived from anger ould condemn and criticize social violations specifically. / Within this evolutionary framework, I conducted three studies to explore the differential effects of disgust and anger on moral judgment. Specifically, these studies explicitly addressed the hypothesis that disgust would increase moral condemnation of hygiene violations, whereas anger would increase moral criticism of fairness violations. These differential effects were predicted to emerge when violations were related to the self. In Study 1, the two emotions were elicited by watching film clips. In Study 2, they were elicited by writing personal experiences. In Study 3, disgust and anger were elicited and measured by reading relevant behavioral transgressions. Generally, the hypothesis was supported. As predicted, disgust elicited harsher moral judgment toward hygiene violations but not fairness violations. This effect emerged mainly when hygiene violations concerned the self. In contrast, anger predicted moral criticism of fairness violations. These results show that, different from some of the existing literature, disgust specifically influences moral judgment of hygiene violations but not omnibus moral violations. These findings help to clarify the existing literature some of which erroneously equates moral and physical disgust. Consistent with the function of disgust which is to avoid diseases, the emotion is only associated with hygiene-related but not other moral violations. Another important finding about disgust is that it influences hygiene violations only when the violations concern the self. The findings also show that the relationship between anger and fairness moral judgment. This and other implications are discussed in detail. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / Detailed summary in vernacular field only. / 吳宝沛. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2012. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 70-94). / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Wu Baopei. / 緒論 --- p.1 / Chapter 1 --- 情緒的進化心理學視角 --- p.3 / Chapter 1.1 --- 情緒的進化心理學界定 --- p.4 / Chapter 1.2 --- 情緒的進化心理學理論 --- p.5 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- 承諾裝置理論 --- p.7 / Chapter 1.2.2 --- 高位協調理論 --- p.11 / Chapter 1.3 --- 情緒影響道德判斷 --- p.13 / Chapter 2 --- 厭惡、病菌威脅與行爲免疫 --- p.16 / Chapter 2.1 --- 病菌威脅與行爲免疫系統 --- p.16 / Chapter 2.2 --- 作爲行爲免疫系統的社會行爲 --- p.19 / Chapter 2.3 --- 厭惡情緒與道德判斷 --- p.21 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- 厭惡是一種進化而來的抗病情緒 --- p.21 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- 厭惡影響道德判斷 --- p.22 / Chapter 3 --- 憤怒、傷害與社會交換 --- p.25 / Chapter 3.1 --- 憤怒情緒的進化功能 --- p.25 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- 憤怒的再次校正理論 --- p.25 / Chapter 3.1.2 --- 憤怒的承諾裝置理論 --- p.26 / Chapter 3.2 --- 憤怒情緒與道德判斷 --- p.29 / Chapter 4 --- 問題提出 --- p.31 / Chapter 5 --- 研究1 --- p.33 / Chapter 5.1 --- 方法 --- p.33 / Chapter 5.2 --- 結果與討論 --- p.36 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- 初步統計分析 --- p.36 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- 情緒啓動測查 --- p.36 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- 情緒影響道德判斷 --- p.37 / Chapter 5.2.4 --- 討論 --- p.39 / Chapter 6 --- 研究2 --- p.41 / Chapter 6.1 --- 方法 --- p.41 / Chapter 6.2 --- 結果 --- p.42 / Chapter 6.2.1 --- 描述性統計結果 --- p.42 / Chapter 6.2.2 --- 順序效應檢驗 --- p.43 / Chapter 6.2.3 --- 情緒啓動測查 --- p.43 / Chapter 6.2.3 --- 道德判斷的組間差異 --- p.44 / Chapter 6.2.4 --- 討論 --- p.46 / Chapter 7 --- 研究3 --- p.47 / Chapter 7.1 --- 方法 --- p.48 / Chapter 7.2 --- 結果 --- p.49 / Chapter 7.2.1 --- 描述性統計結果 --- p.49 / Chapter 7.2.2 --- 具體情緒體驗的差異 --- p.50 / Chapter 7.2.3 --- 具體情緒對道德冒犯的預測 --- p.51 / Chapter 7.2.4 --- 討論 --- p.52 / Chapter 8 --- 研究討論 --- p.52 / Chapter 8.1 --- 特定情緒和行爲決策 --- p.54 / Chapter 8.2 --- 厭惡與道德判斷之間的關係 --- p.56 / Chapter 8.3 --- 憤怒跟公平冒犯之間的關係 --- p.59 / Chapter 8.4 --- 研究局限與未來的研究展望 --- p.60 / Chapter 9 --- 研究結論 --- p.68 / 參考文獻 --- p.70 / 附錄 --- p.95

Background: Paper I [literature review] Anger is reported to be an important factor in suicidality yet there is no review in this area of research. Paper II [research study] Anger and suicidality are found in exaggerated levels in the prisoner population and their association required investigation using a novel and ecologically valid methodology. Aims: Paper I [literature review] To review studies which have investigated the relationship between anger and suicidality. Paper II [research study] To examine the relationship between anger and suicicidality in a sample of male prisoners. Paper III [critical review and appraisal] To critically review and appraise Papers I and II as well as the research processes involved. Methods: Paper I systematically reviewed 48 studies of anger and suicidality over a 20-year period. Paper II conducted an ecological momentary assessment study using multi-level modelling analysis to investigate anger and suicidality in a sample of adult male prisoners. Results: Paper I found preliminary evidence for a relationship between anger and suicidality which identified that the area required more empirically rigorous investigation, particularly using novel, ecologically valid methodology. In a sample of adult male prisoners, Paper II demonstrated that anger was temporally associated with suicidal ideation and related concepts. Anger was concurrently associated with suicidal ideation, when controlling for depression and hopelessness. Conclusions: Paper I indicated the potential relationship between anger and suicidality in clinical and non-clinical populations. Paper II revealed strong evidence of an association between concurrent anger and suicidality in adult male prisoners using ecologically valid assessment methods. Paper III examined the relevance of Papers I and II, in their independent additions to the empirical literature as to the relation between anger and suicidality.

Emotion theories from social and functionalist perspectives have greatly emphasized the importance of relationship contexts for emotions (Carolyn, 2004; Lazarus, 1991), yet relatively few empirical efforts have been spent on exploring whether and how individuals differentially deal with anger under different relationship contexts. Study 1 investigated how individuals' anger responses might vary with relationship contexts across cultural contexts. Two hundred and sixty-six participants from America, Hong Kong and Mainland China reported their responses toward anger-eliciting scenarios that were elicited by a kin, a close or a casual friend. Results indicated that, after controlling for demographic variables, personality, and relationship qualities, individuals displayed a higher level of direct and replaced aggression but a lower level of cognitive reappraisal and indirect aggression in kinship than in the two types of friendships across the three samples. While Hong Kong Chinese displayed a higher level of fractious motives in kinship than in two types of friendships, Mainland Chinese displayed a lower level of malevolent motives in kinship than in two types of friendships. / To resolve the controversy between two interpretations for the above relationship effect on anger response, we conducted an experiment to examine the roles of approach and avoidance motives in determining relationship effects on anger responses in Study 2. One hundred and fifty two Hong Kong Chinese female participants' anger responses during emotion recalling tasks were assessed in terms of subjective feeling, physiological arousal and facial expression, after approach and avoidance motives were manipulated. Results revealed that, even after controlling for relevant personality traits, demographic variables, and relationship qualities, individuals displayed a higher level of anger-related subjective feeling and facial expression in kinship than in friendship. Such relationship effects were reversed and disappeared when approach and avoidance motives. In addition, we found that approach motives reduced individuals' sympathetic activation to anger-eliciting events in kinship, and avoidance motives lowered individuals' parasympathetic activation to happy events in friendship. The above findings have great implications for anger regulation and health promotion under relationship contexts. / You, Jin. / Adviser: Helene H. L. Fung. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-01, Section: B, page: . / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 73-92). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [201-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstract also in Chinese.

This thesis examines the clash of seemingly dissonant passages in Hannah Crafts’s The Bondwoman’s Narrative to consider how the text can and should anger the reader through the juxtaposition of multiple literary genres. In particular, the placement of scenes of gothic horror alongside expressions of piety unsettles the reader, forcing them to confront a complex array of social institutions (slavery, racism, religion, and the justice system) and their own complicity in those systems. Drawing on philosophical analyses of the structure and the morality of emotion, I argue that the text is intended to elicit anger that is both moderated by reason and rooted in love. I contest the notion that anger necessarily includes a problematic desire for payback and suggest that the desire that accompanies anger is better conceptualized as a desire for recognition of an injury that may include payback but is not fixated on payback. My reading of The Bondwoman’s Narrative contests multiple claims that the moments of dissonance in the text were a result of the author’s lack of skill. Instead, I posit that these juxtapositions are intentional and seek to engage the reader in a process of ethical formation that literature is uniquely able to provide. Anger is an essential part of the formation process, pushing the reader to consider their own complicity in injustice and to work to change unjust social systems.

The purpose of this paper is to examine what role anger plays in the moral realm. To do so, I will critique Martha Nussbaum’s view that anger is normatively problematic for sustaining moral relations due to its prevalent relation to seeking payback and status. I will expand the limits Nussbaum imposes on what people can be angry at as well as what are normal responses to the emotion, to attempt to show how anger can be a vital tool in our moral lives as a tool in response to wrongdoing or injustice.

The major focus of this study was to investigate the association between adolescent attachment styles and types of parent-adolescent conflict and anger. The study used adolescent respondents (n=214, females=136, males=78), 95% of whom were aged 14 or 15. The methodology was a one-off survey design. An adapted adult attachment scale with two dimensions, anxiety and avoidance, measured attachment. This scale was used to form four adolescent attachment styles, secure, preoccupied, fearful and dismissive. Family conflict was assessed in a range of ways, including general measures of self-reported family conflict and abuse at home. Also measured were general anger-proneness and depression-proneness. As well, adolescents responded to four specific, hypothetical parent-adolescent conflict scenarios. The responses to these vignettes included their reported emotions, conflict resolution strategies, expected endings and post-conflict coping/risk behaviours. Results indicated the presence of one major healthy and functional conflict-anger pattern associated with a secure attachment style, and two major types of harmful and dysfunctional conflict-anger patterns. Healthy conflict and anger involved secure adolescents reporting they would experience negative emotions in conflict but would still expect the conflict to be resolved well for everyone. Secure adolescents were also less anger-prone and depression-prone generally than other adolescents, possibly indicating their ability to regulate their negative emotions. The first harmful conflict pattern, associated with preoccupied and fearful attachment styles, included relatively higher levels of family conflict involving poor conflict endings, and even moderate levels of violence. Preoccupied and fearful adolescents may have poor emotional regulation, as indicated by their higher levels of general anger-proneness and depression-proneness. The second harmful conflict-anger pattern was associated with a dismissive attachment style and involved conflict with emotional distance and coolness in the family, as well as lower levels of reported problem solving strategies and good conflict endings. Results are discussed in terms of adolescent attachment style profiles and the need to distinguish and assess attachment styles in families in order to devise appropriate and effective interventions. Examples of primary, secondary and tertiary preventative interventions are described to assist mildly to severely conflicted, distressed or disengaged families.