Zugl.: Aachen, Techn. Hochsch., Diss., 2009

Thesis--Catholic University of America. / Bibliography: p. 203-209.

Universiẗat, Diss., 2002--Stuttgart.

No description available.

Mémoire numérisé par la Direction des bibliothèques de l'Université de Montréal.

This paper evaluates the United States' decision not to come to Austria's aid prior to and during the Anschluss of 12 March 1938. The uniqueness of this work is the two-front evaluation of both the internal/domestic affairs of the United States and the foreign policy of the US Government vis-à-vis Hitler's aggressive foreign policy. As this paper will show, Anschluss might have been prevented, but at a cost neither the United States nor European powers were willing to pay. The domestic situation in the United States was too fragile, as was the lack of public support for war for FDR to have any leeway in militarily aiding Austria. American, and to some degree European, opinion held that the Austrian question was a European matter, and to that end American domestic policy dominated foreign policy in hopes of reestablishing the United States economy prior to attempting to aid anyone else.

Zugl.: Dresden, Techn. University, Diss., 2005.

No description available.

A la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale, la France contribue largement à transformer l’ancienne Autriche-Hongrie, et doit assumer une responsabilité quant à la survie et au devenir de la nouvelle Autriche, à travers différents engagements internationaux, même si aucun traité ne lie formellement les deux Etats. On définit généralement la position française vis-à-vis de l'Autriche par cette alternative : ni Habsbourg, ni Anschluss. A partir de 1930, l'héritier du trône, Otto de Habsbourg, accède à la majorité : se pose alors concrètement la question d'une éventuelle restauration. Les années 1930 voient par ailleurs le développement d'une multitude de projets de réorganisation de l'Europe centrale, alternative à ce retour des Habsbourg. L'arrivée d'Hitler au pouvoir en Allemagne doit pousser la France à des prises de position claires : son dessein est la réunion de l'Autriche au Reich, et le gouvernement français doit déterminer quelle attitude adopter envers le gouvernement autrichien qui choisit la voie de l'autoritarisme contre la poussée nazie. Si une part de l'opinion française a des sympathies pour la cause de l'indépendance autrichienne, le gouvernement n'impose jamais de choix clairs en ce sens, en raison notamment de facteurs idéologiques. Il est aussi prisonnier d'une conception trop économique de l'organisation de l'Europe centrale, qui lui fait sous-estimer les problèmes identitaires existant entre l'Autriche et l'Allemagne. L'absence d'une réflexion sur les spécificités de la nation autrichienne en construction conduit à faire le jeu de l'Allemagne, à travers l'idée d'un « germanisme » commun aux deux Etats. L'Anschluss, sans réaction française, vient couronner plus d'une décennie de contradictions et prépare la défaite symbolique de Munich. / At the end of World War I, France is a major actor of the transformation of old Austria-Hungary and becomes one of the main protectors of Austria through several international commitments; yet no treaty ever connects the two countries. The French policy on Austria is generally admitted to be : neither Habsburg, nor Anschluss. In 1930 Otto von Habsburg, the son of the last emperor, attains the age of majority ; so the issue of restauration appears again to be a major problem in Europe. At the same time, many plans and projects are discussed to reorganize Central Europe, as a possible alternative to the come back of the Habsburg family. With Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in Germany in 1933, France has to make up clear decisions, since Hitler's goal is to achieve the unification of Austria with Germany. The French government has to decide whether to support or not the Austrian government, getting authoritative in order to fight against nazi propaganda and terrorism. Many people in France are quite in favour of the cause of the independence of Austria. Yet the French government doesn't make any decisive choices to defend it, in particular because of ideological reasons. The French policy is also confined to an all-economic conception of international relations in Central Europe, and under-estimates the problems of national identity existing between Austria and Germany. The lack of a reflection on the specificities of an Austrian nation to be built tends to be of a great advantage for Germany, which praises for the idea of a common « germanism » for both countries. The Anschluss is made without any real French reaction, as a consequence of more than ten years of political contradictions ; thus it prepares the symbolical defeat of Munich.

The right of national independence, which came to be called the principle of self-determination, is, in general terms, the belief that each nation has a right to constitute an independent state and determine its own government. It will be the thesis of this paper to show that the Nazi regime under the rule of Adolph Hitler took this principle as its own insofar as its relations with other nations were concerned, but while they paid lip service to the principle, it was in fact being prostituted to the fullest degree in the case of Austria and the Anschluss of 1938.