Os caleidociclos têm sido utilizados como forma artística de apresentação de imagens, pinturas ou como parte de trabalhos artísticos, principalmente de imagens com simetrias; talvez os mais conhecidos sejam os trabalhos de M. C. Escher. As poucas publicações encontradas da teoria matemática envolvida nos caleidociclos dão base para imaginar e criar aplicações no desenvolvimento de habilidades e competências trabalhadas na escola. Para aumentar as possibilidades de aplicações de conceitos, teoremas e relações matemáticas estudadas no ensino básico, o presente trabalho apresenta algumas propostas de atividades utilizando os caleidociclos. As propostas foram elaboradas de acordo com o nível de ensino, ou seja, simetrias para o 7o ano, teorema de Pitágoras para os 8o e 9o anos do Ensino Fundamental, lei dos cossenos e relação fundamental da trigonometria para a 1a série e volume e área de superfície de sólidos geométricos para 2a série do Ensino Médio; algumas das propostas apresentam variações para se adequar ao nível de desenvolvimento em que a turma se encontra. Todos os moldes utilizados e outras possibilidades de caleidociclos, incluindo sólidos encaixantes aos caleidociclos, foram organizados ao final deste trabalho em um dos apêndices. Há também um apêndice com outros tipos de sólidos geométricos com movimentos, que podem ser usados no mesmo intuito de aplicação diferenciada da geometria espacial. / Kaleidocycles have been used asan artistic formof presentation of pictures, paintings or a part of artworks, especially images with symmetries; perhaps the best known works are M. C. Eschers. The few finded publications of the mathematical theory related to these three-dimensional rings give rise to imagine and create applications for developing skills to be worked in classroom. In order to increase the possibility of applications of concepts, theorems and mathematical relations, the present work proposes some activities dealing with kaleidocycles. The proposals were prepared in accordance with the students level of education, i.e., symmetries for the7th grade, the Pythagorean theorem for the 8th and 9th grades, law of cosines and the fundamental relation of trigonometry, volume and surface area of geometric solids for high school students; some of the proposals have variations to suit the level of development in which the class is at. All the molds used and other possibilities of kaleidocycles, including solids which fit into kaleidocycles, were organized at the end of this dissertation in one of the appendices. There is also an appendix with other types of mobile geometric solids that can be used in the same purpose in different applications of spatial geometry.

The aim of this study was to investigate how conceptions of gender are expressed in the construction of women and men in judgments on the Care of Substance Abusers (Special Provisions) Act (LVM). According to Swedish law everyone must be treated equally, regardless of gender. In addition, the social services have an important responsibility to promote gender equality. At the same time there are conceptions of gender in our society that have been shown to influence the treatment of women and men. It is therefore important to examine, from a gender perspective, whether and how conceptions of gender are expressed in judgments. The empirical material consisted of 30 court cases, whereof 14 cases concerned women and 16 cases concerned men. The data has been analysed through the method “critical discourse analysis”, which focuses on the implicit rather than the explicit. The method allowed us to examine the language in judgments. The main results showed that, despite of a neutral law, women and men were described different. Through the descriptions, four discourses were found. Two on each gender, which acted as opposites. Women as passive victims versus men as active agents. Women as deviant versus men as the norm. The gender discourses showed conceptions of gender that expressed a separation and a hierarchy between women and men.

Établissant une relation entre un État ou l’une de ses émanations, d’une part, et un investisseur d’autre part, le droit des investissements étrangers se meut au-delà de la distinction droit public/droit privé. Compte tenu du fait qu’il se situe à un point de jonction entre le droit international et le droit interne, le droit des investissements pose d’importantes questions relatives à la loi applicable, ainsi qu’aux juridictions compétentes. Conçu comme un ordre juridique spécifique provenant de l’interaction entre les ordres juridiques international et interne, le droit des investissements engendre de multiples répercussions quant à son interférence avec l’ordre juridique interne. Cette interférence, n’étant soumise à aucune hiérarchie de compétence législative ou juridictionnelle, soulève de sérieuses interrogations : quel serait le droit applicable lorsque les droits interne et international ont vocation à s’appliquer dans un même litige ? Dans le même ordre d’idées, quelle serait la juridiction compétente si les institutions juridictionnelles internationales et internes sont toutes les deux compétentes selon leurs propres règles de rattachement pour trancher le litige ? Les réponses à ces interrogations ne sont pas évidentes et continuent de donner lieu à de vifs débats. La question n’ayant pas été tranchée de façon ferme et définitive, la présente étude proposera d’y apporter des éléments de réponse en démontrant la manifeste prééminence du droit international de fond et de l’arbitrage transnational de nature à permettre d’écarter l’application de la loi locale et d’exclure la compétence des juges internes. Cette prééminence fera enfin l’objet d’un examen approprié. / Establishing a relationship between a State or one of its emanations, on the one hand, and an investor, on the other, international investment law moves beyond the distinction between public law and private law. Given the fact that it resides in-between international law and domestic law, international investment law raises important questions about the governing law and jurisdiction. Conceived as a specific legal order arising from the interaction between the international and the national legal orders, international investment law begets controversy with respect to its interference with the national legal order. This interference, which is not submitted to any hierarchy on the legislative or jurisdictional level, raises serious questions: what would be the applicable law when domestic law and international law are both involved in the same dispute? In a similar manner, what would be the competent court if the international and domestic jurisdictional institutions are both competent according to the rules of their own legal order? The answers to these questions are not obvious and continue to give rise to heated debates. As the issue has not been firmly and definitively resolved, the present study aims to provide an answer by demonstrating the pre-eminence of substantive international law and transnational arbitration to the point of clearly excluding the application of the local law and the competence of domestic judges. This pre-eminence will finally be subject to an in-depth examination.

Les règles de conflit de lois n’ont pas toutes la même autorité. Les parties, et même le juge, peuvent être autorisés à passer outre à la désignation opérée par la règle de conflit. Les parties sont parfois libres d’écarter par convention la loi objectivement désignée (règles de conflit supplétives), parfois tenues par la désignation opérée, qui s’impose à elles (règles de conflit impératives). Le juge est tantôt tenu, tantôt libre de relever d’office l’internationalité du litige, et d’en déduire l’application de la règle de conflit. Le choix d’envisager ensemble des questions aussi variées peut étonner, mais c’est celui de la jurisprudence. L’autorité des règles de conflit y est définie de manière conjointe, à l’égard des parties comme du juge, à l’aune de considérations substantielles. Ainsi, parce qu’une demande en recherche de paternité relève, en droit substantiel, d’une matière d’ordre public, et qu’elle intéresse l’état des personnes, réputé indisponible, la règle de conflit qui lui est applicable sera impérative et mise en œuvre, au besoin d’office, par le juge. Inversement, si la prétention relève d’une matière largement supplétive ou vise des droits disponibles, la règle de conflit applicable sera supplétive, et le juge ne sera pas tenu de la relever d’office. Ce sont donc des considérations substantielles qui définissent, en jurisprudence, l’autorité des règles de conflit à l’égard des parties comme du juge.Cependant, ce régime n’est plus celui du droit international privé européen. D’abord, les règlements européens n’ont défini l’autorité des règles de conflit qu’à l’égard des parties, laissant à chaque Etat membre le soin de déterminer leur autorité à l’égard du juge. Ensuite, la définition européenne de l’impérativité des règles de conflit fait abstraction de toute considération substantielle, en retenant une supplétivité de principe pour l’ensemble des règles de conflit unifiées à l’échelle européenne. La jurisprudence a-t-elle raison de définir l’autorité des règles de conflits exclusivement à l’aune de considérations substantielles ? Non, car cela revient à nier que l’effet juridique des règles de conflit est imputé selon des considérations propres à la justice conflictuelle. Pour autant, on ne saurait, à l’instar du législateur européen, exclure toute considération substantielle. Le présupposé des règles de conflit vise des questions de droit substantiel. Les règles de conflit sont donc construites en contemplation de considérations substantielles. Dès lors, si ces dernières ne sauraient dicter à elles seules l’autorité des règles de conflit, on ne saurait, non plus, en faire totalement abstraction. / Choice-of-law rules do not all have the same authority. The parties, and even the judge, may be allowed to override the designation made by the conflict rule. The parties are sometimes free to depart, by convention, from the designated law (suppletory choice-of-law rules), sometimes bound by the designation made (imperative choice-of-law rules). The judge is sometimes obliged, sometimes free to raise ex officio the internationality of the dispute, and to deduce from it the application of the choice-of-law rule. Considering together such varied questions may be surprising, but it is the approach adopted by French case law. The authority of choice-of-law rules is defined jointly, according to substantive considerations. As a matter of example, an affiliation proceeding is, in French substantive law, a matter of public policy regarding someone’s family status, and deemed to concern an unwaivable right. Therefore, the applicable choice-of-law rule will be imperative and applied ex officio by the judge. Conversely, if the claim falls within a largely suppletory subject matter or relates to waivable rights, the applicable choice-of-law rule will be suppletory, and the judge will not be required to apply it ex officio. Therefore, the authority of choice-of-law rules is defined, with respect to both the parties and the judge, according to substantive considerations.However, this regime is no longer that of European private international law. Firstly, the European regulations have only defined the authority of their choice-of-law rules with respect to the parties, leaving it up to each Member State to determine their authority over the judge. Secondly, the European definition of their authority over the parties disregards any substantive consideration, and retains a whole set of suppletory choice-of-law rules, regardless of the subject-matter. Is case law justified in defining the authority of choice-of-law rules solely on the basis of substantive considerations ? No, because choice-of-law rules designate the applicable law according to choice-of-law considerations. However, one cannot, like the European legislator, exclude any substantive consideration. The supposition of choice-of-law rules concerns substantive law issues. Choice-of-law rules are, thus, devised according to substantive considerations. Therefore, if these alone cannot define the authority of choice-of-law rules, they cannot be totally ignored either.

Based on society's established norms, girls and boys are expected to behave differently. Certain behaviours are also differently accepted due to gender. This makes it possible to question if the principle of the best interests of the child in cases regarding The Compulsory Care of Young Persons Act (1990:52) (LVU), applies in the gender-neutral way that it's intended to do. To answer this, we have collected data through “collection of materials''. More specifically, we have used cases from a sample of administrative courts and courts of appeals which all deal with 3§ LVU. The data has been analysed through the method “qualitative content analysis” in which different patterns could be read out. The main conclusion of our study is that girls tend to be judged more harshly than boys. The courts assessments in girl cases/judgments includes factors that in boys cases/judgments goes unnoticed, like factors related to mental illness and self-harm. Another conclusion is that the principle creates space for many different interpretations which includes gender norms upon application of the 3§ LVU. When the principle is gender neutral, like it's intended to do, a discrimination because of sex can be hidden.