In this essential guide to the past, present and future of bio-warfare, international security expert Malcolm Dando draws a wealth of ecperience and research to uncover the truth about the alarming failure of international community to place effective curbs on the use of this deadly weapon.

This study is designed to assess the effectiveness of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime and analyze theories for effectively analyzing countries that are a risk for proliferating nuclear armaments. The initial phase of my research is designed to assess the existing literature and primary theoretical approaches for analyzing nuclear non-proliferation initiatives and potential nuclear proliferators. My main means of analysis will be to examine the national and international actors involved in each case. With this method, I plan to analyze a government at the level of each of its ruling institutions. Each of these institutions will be analyzed in the context of Joseph Cirincione's five drivers and barriers: security, prestige, domestic politics, technology, and economics. This study will then review multiple historical cases of countries and treaties related to the nuclear non-proliferation issue in the context of my method of analysis. In particular, each historical study will discuss major actors and institutions with respect to the five major proliferation concepts, as a means of demonstrating the validity of my method. The primary section of my thesis will be the application of my method to one of the preeminent nuclear proliferation threats today: Iran. After a discussion of the physical status of Iran's nuclear program, I will begin my analysis in terms of my concepts, and will examine the principal actors involved in the Iranian nuclear dispute. These will be the Iran's moderate and conservative factions, as well as the U.S., Israel, the EU-3, and IAEA, and they will be examined in the context of the five drivers and barriers. The final section will be my overall risk analysis for Iran. My preliminary analysis is that regime survival is the most critical issue when it comes to the principal motivations of a state to develop nuclear arms. If this is correct, policy options designed to take advantage of the actors' positions in Iran can be formulated based on the specific conditions that prevail in Iran.

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Clear changes occurred in the field of conventional arms control in the last two decades. States adopted a multitude of norms on especially small arms control in various multilateral control instruments. In addition, non-governmental advocacy actors often established themselves as active participants in control debates with governments. The changes are surprising because they took place in the security sphere and therewith in an area traditionally understood to be the exclusive domain of governments. This research project investigates the significance of the changes for the traditional understanding of security governance. Specifically, it investigates the emergence of control norms and the role and policy impact of non-governmental actors in the promotion of the norms. It asks whether the normative changes and significance of nongovernmental actors therein challenge the understanding of security governance that underpins many established approaches to international relations theory.

Analyses of US/Soviet arms control have usually focused on domestic variables to explain US/Soviet arms control behavior. Partly because the number of negotiating parties is only two, there is a propensity to focus on the bilateral relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union and their respective domestic political situations. Only superficial attention has usually been given to international systems variables that may well influence the domestic political situation and arms control policy. This thesis broadens the explanatory scope of US/Soviet arms control by showing how the political environment of a trilateral relationship (a subsystem that includes the West European members of NATO as a single actor as well as the United States and the Soviet Union) is a primary motivator of US/Soviet arms control behavior.

Clear changes occurred in the field of conventional arms control in the last two decades. States adopted a multitude of norms on especially small arms control in various multilateral control instruments. In addition, non-governmental advocacy actors often established themselves as active participants in control debates with governments. The changes are surprising because they took place in the security sphere and therewith in an area traditionally understood to be the exclusive domain of governments. This research project investigates the significance of the changes for the traditional understanding of security governance. Specifically, it investigates the emergence of control norms and the role and policy impact of non-governmental actors in the promotion of the norms. It asks whether the normative changes and significance of nongovernmental actors therein challenge the understanding of security governance that underpins many established approaches to international relations theory.

This thesis examines the regulation of naval competition between the major naval powers, and especially between Britain and the United States, under the regime of the Washington and London naval treaties, and the attempts to extend and maintain naval limitation in the period 1927 to 1936 in the face of Anglo-American rivalry and, later, the threats from Japan and Germany. Based upon British and American public and private sources, it traces the interaction of the two nations, and their relationships with other naval powers, from 1927 - when Anglo-American relations reached a nadir after the failed 'Coolidge Conference' in Geneva and the subsequen abortive 'Anglo-French Compromise' - to 1936, when naval limitation ende but by which time Anglo-American antipathy was fading in the face of mut external threats. The naval conferences of Geneva (1927) and London (19 and 1935-36), and the parallel naval side of the long-running Disarmamen Conference and its Preparatory Commission are reviewed with their attend preparations in London and Washington, and the influence of domestic factors - public opinion, financial stringency, and personal and politic prejudice - are examined. The central role of the naval balance in the relationship between the interward Great Powers is stressed, and the importance of the naval negotiations to both governments and public opinion echoes our contemporary concern for the preservation and management of the strategic balance. While the Washington-London naval system failed to halt naval rival it achieved the unforeseen consequences of permitting Britain to gracefu cede naval supremacy to the United States, under the guise of conceding 'parity', with a minimum of friction or indeed recognition of the fact. Additionally, it demonstrated by its breakdown the vulnerability of an arms limitation system that was neither geographically nor technically comprehensive.

This study analyzes the rule of the law of treaties permitting the provisional application of treaties or parts thereof, which usually occurs between signature and ratification (article 25 of the 1969 Vienna Convention). Chapter 1 reviews the negotiating record of article 25. Chapter 2 examines the reasons for provisional application, which include the urgency of the treaty and preparation for a new international organization. Chapter 3 considers article 25 in detail, while chapter 4 explores provisional application under customary international law, including the origins of the custom. The constitutionality of provisional application and the municipal effect of provisionally applied treaties are examined in chapter 5, along with provisional application in South African law and treaty practice. Chapter 6 considers the special role of provisional application in the field of arms control instruments. The main conclusion reached is that the principle of pacta sunt servanda applies during the provisional period. / Jurisprudence / LL.M

International Telemetering Conference Proceedings / October 25-28, 1993 / Riviera Hotel and Convention Center, Las Vegas, Nevada / This paper provides a brief history of the role strategic ballistic missile telemetry has played in U.S.-Soviet and Russian arms control relations from the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) through the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II).

This research was conducted to determine the effectiveness of using commercial satellite data to detect covert nuclear weapons programs. Seven-band Landsat Thematic Mapper data covering the Pahute Mesa (an area within the United States Nevada Nuclear Testing Site), acquired on October 16, 1985, were analyzed to determine if underground nuclear test sites were spectrally distinguishable from the surrounding area. The analysis consisted of four steps: (1) analyzing the raw data, (2) manipulating the raw data through contrast stretching, filter application, matrix algebra, and principal components analyses, (3) identifying parameters that affect classification of underground nuclear tests and (4) selectively limiting parameters. The results of limiting parameters showed that a supervised classification of a signature created with a five-original-pixel seed of one representative, known test site provided an accurate classification of most known test sites. To further eliminate erroneous classification of roads and other areas of similar reflectance, these areas were seeded to create a second signature. This signature, whose spectral responses were different, was then used in a simultaneous classification. This classification further eliminated erroneous classification of non-test site areas, demonstrating that commercial satellite digital data can aid in the detection of covert nuclear weapons programs, in this case, underground nuclear testing. An application of the classification scheme used is proposed to confront a scenario in which a country seeks additional verification of another party's proposed violation of test ban treaties. / Department of Physics and Astronomy