How might new technical verification capabilities enhance the prospects of success in future nuclear arms control negotiations? Both theory and evidence suggest that verification technologies can influence the dynamics of arms control negotiations by shaping and constraining the arguments and strategies that are available to the involved stakeholders. In the future, new technologies may help transcend the specific verification challenge of high-security warhead authentication, which is a verification capability needed in future disarmament scenarios that address fewer warheads, limit new categories of warheads, and involve nuclear weapons states other than the United States and Russia. Under these circumstances, the core challenge is maintaining the confidentiality of the classified information related to the warheads under inspection, while providing transparency in the verification process. This analysis focuses on a set of emerging warhead authentication approaches that rely on the cryptographic concept of zero-knowledge proofs and intend to solve the paradox between secrecy and transparency, making deeper reductions in warhead arsenals possible and thus facilitating future nuclear arms control negotiations.

Mathematical methods have been developed to perform arms-control-treaty verification tasks for enhanced information security. The purpose of these methods is to verify and classify inspected items while shielding the monitoring party from confidential aspects of the objects that the host country does not wish to reveal. Advanced medical-imaging methods used for detection and classification tasks have been adapted for list-mode processing, useful for discriminating projection data without aggregating sensitive information. These models make decisions off of varying amounts of stored information, and their task performance scales with that information. Development has focused on the Bayesian ideal observer, which assumes com- plete probabilistic knowledge of the detector data, and Hotelling observer, which assumes a multivariate Gaussian distribution on the detector data. The models can effectively discriminate sources in the presence of nuisance parameters. The chan- nelized Hotelling observer has proven particularly useful in that quality performance can be achieved while reducing the size of the projection data set. The inclusion of additional penalty terms into the channelizing-matrix optimization offers a great benefit for treaty-verification tasks. Penalty terms can be used to generate non- sensitive channels or to penalize the model's ability to discriminate objects based on confidential information. The end result is a mathematical model that could be shared openly with the monitor. Similarly, observers based on the likelihood probabilities have been developed to perform null-hypothesis tasks. To test these models, neutron and gamma-ray data was simulated with the GEANT4 toolkit. Tasks were performed on various uranium and plutonium in- spection objects. A fast-neutron coded-aperture detector was simulated to image the particles.

A holistic arms control (HAC) analytical framework was employed to explore the full range of mechanisms that could potentially be utilised to effectively regulate the development, stockpiling, transfer or use of riot control agents (RCAs), incapacitants and related means of delivery. From this analysis it is clear that the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and its attendant regime are the most appropriate and probably the most receptive mechanisms, at least in the short term, for the discussion of these concerns and the development of appropriate policy responses. However, the response of CWC States Parties to these issues is by no means certain and parallel processes should be established to explore alternative regulatory mechanisms with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, UN drugs conventions, international and regional human rights instruments, international humanitarian law, and transfer controls potentially yielding positive results in the next five to ten year period. Other regimes that may well prove important in the longer term include: the international criminal court and other international criminal law entities; the UN Secretary General's investigation mechanism and other ad hoc UN investigatory mechanisms. A comprehensive HAC strategy for the regulation of RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery will also require active involvement of informed and activist civil society in societal verification; development and promotion of norms prohibiting the involvement of scientific and medical communities in weaponisation programmes intended for malign application; and far greater active engagement of such expert communities in relevant State and international policy development processes.

Typescript (photocopy). / Digitized by Kansas Correctional Industries

[pt] O trabalho proposto visa interpretar, por meio de uma abordagem sociológica, o processo pelo qual os movimentos sociais envolveram-se nas políticas internacionais de controle de armamentos e foram capazes de construir uma nova interpretação das minas terrestres. Percebe-se que a participação desses novos atores em temas da política internacional que tradicionalmente são vistos como exclusivos ao debate estatal tem se intensificado desde a década de 1990. A fim de acompanhar essa mudança e discutir a contribuição que a variedade de atores traz à política internacional, este trabalho recupera autores das ciências sociais para explicar as relações internacionais como relações sociais. Assim, a partir do trabalho de Anthony Giddens, Erving Goffman, David Snow e Robert Benford pressupõem-se a existência de atores que agem reflexivamente a partir do Esquema de Interpretação da realidade (frame), como os movimentos sociais, os quais são capazes de gerar Esquemas de Interpretação coletivos. Ao produzirem e trocarem informações distintas através de redes transnacionais, esses movimentos se mostram capazes de criar novos recortes e novas percepções da realidade a partir da consideração de seus objetivos. No que tange à proibição das minas terrestres, percebe-se que esse novo recorte priorizou aspectos humanitários desse armamento, vinculando ao longo do processo uma conotação de injustiça ao uso e posteriormente à existência das minas terrestres. Ademais, fica clara a relevância que a busca por apoio às campanhas pelo banimento das minas terrestres teve na construção desse novo Esquema de Interpretação, constrangendo de várias formas a formulação da nova interpretação das minas. / [en] This paper intent through a sociological approach to interpret the evolvement process of social movements in the international arms control politics, and the construction of a landmine new interpretation. These new international actors action has grown since the 1990’s in areas of international politics that traditionally are viewed as exclusive to interstate debate. So, in reason to deal with this change and discuss the contribution that a diversity of actors can bring to international politics, this paper rescue social science authors to explain international relations as social relations. Thus, based on Anthony Giddens’, Erving Goffman’s, David Snow’s and Robert Benford’s work it presupposes actors able to reflect about reality through the creation of frames. The same is with social movements, which reflect reality based on collective frames created by them. By the collection of distinct information through transnational nets, social movements form new clippings and new perceptions of reality according to its objectives. Relating to landmines prohibition, this perception prioritized humanitarian aspects of this weapon, which resulted in an injustice connotation of the use of landmines and then of the landmines itself. In addition, it is interesting to note the relevance that participants and support to landmines campaigns had in this new frame construction, since it constrains in many ways the formulation of a new interpretation.

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, November, 2009. / Title from PDF t.p. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, September 2003. / Title from title screen (viewed Jan. 22, 2004). Includes bibliographical references. Also issued in paper format.

This thesis examines the evolution of international humanitarian concern culminating in adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) banning these weapons in May 2008. It is based on systematic analysis of official documents, extensive interviews, participant-observation, and several bodies of international relations (IR) theory. Part I explains the research methodology and discusses the theoretical context for the thesis. It is argued that several core assumptions of rationalist-materialist approaches to IR theory impede understanding of the CCM's emergence, and thus the thesis adopts an interpretivist framework. The four chapters of Part II analyse international efforts on cluster munitions including prior, failed attempts to restrict cluster munitions, the emergence of an international campaign from 2003, ensuing activity involving states, international organisations and civil society, and the CCM's eventual negotiation involving more than 100 states. Part III marries this empirical account to theoretical analysis of four thesis propositions. It is concluded that non-state actor-engendered processes of evidence collection and analysis, learning and frame alignment were central to the Oslo process's emergence. The Oslo Declaration's particular humanitarian framing (to ban cluster munitions causing unacceptable harm to civilians) and the structure of the subsequent 'define-and-ban' discourse permitted convergence between states over prohibiting these weapons. Nevertheless, they contain implications for other international efforts aimed at controlling means of armed violence.

This work considers the strategic value of the 1935 London Naval Conference to the United States Navy and the American Government. It addresses longstanding historiographical debates on interwar American foreign policy, including the nature of isolationism under the Roosevelt Administration, the degree of Anglo-American cooperation in the 1930s, and the strategic vision of the United States Navy in the Pacific in the interwar period. Taking into account in equal degrees the perspectives of the uniformed naval officers and the civilian diplomats in the State Department, this thesis will argue that American participation in the 1935 London Naval Conference shows a degree of international participation and a commitment to the international order that is often overlooked by historians in this field.

The objective of this thesis is to determine why Canada, a state that pioneered nuclear technology, and that faced, throughout the Cold War, the Soviet threat to its national security, consistently rejected any opportunity to convert its latent nuclear capability into an indigenous nuclear weapons program. The answer to this research question must address a number of explicit contradictions in Canadian foreign policy. While Canada has, on the one hand, rejected the bomb, it has, on the other hand, pursued defence and industrial policies based upon intimate involvement with nuclear weapons. Moreover, Canada espouses, on the one hand, a clearly realpolitik view of international relations, while, on the other hand, committing to forging for itself a role as an international peace broker. It becomes, therefore, unclear which theory of international relations could adequately explain this dualism in Canadian policy formulation. This thesis argues that power and self-interest are not separable from Canada's decision to reject the bomb, and that by modifying certain precepts of realist theory, we may substantiate the hypotheses that two disincentives to proliferation are at the root of Canada's policies: first, Canada's political and geographical proximity to the United States and thus a credible U.S. nuclear umbrella; and second, prestige, where Canada interpreted both the rejection of its nuclear option and its internationalist policies as a sign of independence vis-a-vis the United States.