Thesis (doctoral)--Technische Universität, Darmstadt, 2003.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 2008. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 361-380). Also available on the Internet.

This study analyzes the rule of the law of treaties permitting the provisional application of treaties or parts thereof, which usually occurs between signature and ratification (article 25 of the 1969 Vienna Convention). Chapter 1 reviews the negotiating record of article 25. Chapter 2 examines the reasons for provisional application, which include the urgency of the treaty and preparation for a new international organization. Chapter 3 considers article 25 in detail, while chapter 4 explores provisional application under customary international law, including the origins of the custom. The constitutionality of provisional application and the municipal effect of provisionally applied treaties are examined in chapter 5, along with provisional application in South African law and treaty practice. Chapter 6 considers the special role of provisional application in the field of arms control instruments. The main conclusion reached is that the principle of pacta sunt servanda applies during the provisional period. / Jurisprudence / LL.M

Nuclear deterrence is born from the two superpowers’ relations during the Cold War as they were the first countries to get nuclear weapons and they were the main and most powerful rivals in the world. Then new actors joined the game by testing their own nuclear bombs: the UK in 1952, followed by France in 1960, China in 1964, India in 1974, and Pakistan in 1998. Israel pretends it does not have any nuclear weapons but it is an open secret that they do 1. France helped Israel to get its weapons and the nuclear explosion in 1979 off the southern coast of Africa probably involved Israel and South Africa (sourced by the Federation of American Scientists, the Wisconsin Project on Arms Control, the Center for Defense Information, etc.). This was confirmed by Mordechai Vanunu, former Israeli scientist who worked on developing the bomb. The intrusion of new nuclear countries frightened the United States and the USSR because the balance was already fragile and newcomers could break it. Would the game remain "safe" with more players? Therefore in 1968 both countries drafted a treaty to prevent nuclear proliferation. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970, at a time when five countries had successfully achieved a nuclear explosion. The NPT officially recognises only these five countries as nuclear-weapons states. They happen to be also the five permanent member states of the UN Security Council. India and Pakistan carried out a nuclear test after 1968 and are therefore referred to as non-official nuclearweapons states. The new nuclear states adopted and adapted the nuclear doctrine to their needs, their geopolitical interests and their place in international relations.

The timeframe of 1978-1984, a period of critical importance in the development of the nuclear world, sets the boundaries for this analysis of Canadian nuclear arms control policy. The situation brought about by increasing hostility between the superpowers, and changes in doctrine and advances in technology that facilitated nuclear war-fighting scenarios, was extremely grave. Therefore it would seem appropriate for Canada, in its traditional role as mediator and middlepower devoted to easing the danger of world conflagration, to have taken an active stand in its nuclear arms control diplomacy. Such was not the case, as bureaucratic politics, cybernetic decision-making, and cognitive dissonance made adherence to the status quo, or minimal rhetorical changes, the order of the day. While that changed towards the end of the period under examination, there remained little substantive modification of policy, despite the growing threat of nuclear disaster. Four examples of Canadian nuclear arms control policy are examined with the aid of official government documents and appropriate commentary from a variety of analysts. Canadian arms control policy at the two United Nations Special Sessions on Disarmament, the controversy over the question of testing the American Air-Launched Cruise Missile in Canada, and Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau's personal peace initiative provide a wealth of information that is used to illustrate the struggle of bureaucratic politics versus rational decision-making. Some of the more influential theoretical and structural difficulties within the foreign policy-making process in Canada that posed real impediments to comprehensive analytical decision-making are presented. These problems are outlined in order to provide a framework for the analysis of the four policy situations. In the first three cases, the decision-making indicates the predominance of the bureaucracy's cybernetic conduct. In the last instance, the attempts of the Prime Minister to impose rational/analytical decision-making on the policy process caused him to actively circumvent the bureaucracy within Canada, but he was bested by external forces. The thesis of this monograph is that Canadian nuclear arms control policy for much of this period was reactive, limited to well-crafted rhetoric, and oblivious to the changing nature of the strategic environment. The reasons for this policy behavior may be traced to external constraints imposed by the dynamics of the international system, the nonrationality of the nuclear world, and the weakness of Canada's influence vis-a-vis the superpowers. As well, the importance of not alienating the United States by too forceful a criticism was an essential consideration in the policy process due to the many issues of contention that already existed between Canada and the United States, and the vulnerability of Canada in economic terms to the negative reactions of its North American neighbour. When the Prime Minister did try to set policy and actively change the nuclear world via his personal peace initiative, the same factors and forces proved to be his undoing. In addition, the reactions on the international scene by some of the more powerful Western players indicate that Canada did not have the credibility to attempt such an influential role in the nuclear world. This response may have been prompted by Canada's minimal defence spending in recent years, or it may well have been the fate of a middlepower trying to exert influence in areas where the other nations were loathe to accept it. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

The primary goal of this thesis is to analyze and compare the impact of political and technological influences on the breakdown of disarmament efforts between the two world wars. This issue is approached by analyzing the string of disarmament conferences that took place in the interwar period and restrictions placed on the German military imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. The theory that serves both as inspiration and a tool to examine the subject is the Actor-network theory originating from École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris. This theory is used to view the subject in a new light. The author places military technology, the political movement of disarmament, and especially restrictions of Germany on par with states and international organizations. While the political turmoil and causes and effects are well researched and documented, the technological aspects of the issue less so. The author asks if the disarmament efforts were realistic in their scope. Whether a state abiding by the new rules could even mount a feasible defence in a case of attack and retain offensive capabilities. Whether the technology itself allowed the existence of alternative weapon systems not breaking these rules. And in the case of Germany, whether these restrictions were effectively limiting German potential...

No description available.

A holistic arms control (HAC) analytical framework was employed to explore the full range of mechanisms that could potentially be utilised to effectively regulate the development, stockpiling, transfer or use of riot control agents (RCAs), incapacitants and related means of delivery. From this analysis it is clear that the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and its attendant regime are the most appropriate and probably the most receptive mechanisms, at least in the short term, for the discussion of these concerns and the development of appropriate policy responses. However, the response of CWC States Parties to these issues is by no means certain and parallel processes should be established to explore alternative regulatory mechanisms with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, UN drugs conventions, international and regional human rights instruments, international humanitarian law, and transfer controls potentially yielding positive results in the next five to ten year period. Other regimes that may well prove important in the longer term include: the international criminal court and other international criminal law entities; the UN Secretary General¿s investigation mechanism and other ad hoc UN investigatory mechanisms. A comprehensive HAC strategy for the regulation of RCAs, incapacitants and related means of delivery will also require active involvement of informed and activist civil society in societal verification; development and promotion of norms prohibiting the involvement of scientific and medical communities in weaponisation programmes intended for malign application; and far greater active engagement of such expert communities in relevant State and international policy development processes.

This thesis examines the evolution of international humanitarian concern culminating in adoption of a Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) banning these weapons in May 2008. It is based on systematic analysis of official documents, extensive interviews, participant-observation, and several bodies of international relations (IR) theory. Part I explains the research methodology and discusses the theoretical context for the thesis. It is argued that several core assumptions of rationalist-materialist approaches to IR theory impede understanding of the CCM¿s emergence, and thus the thesis adopts an interpretivist framework. The four chapters of Part II analyse international efforts on cluster munitions including prior, failed attempts to restrict cluster munitions, the emergence of an international campaign from 2003, ensuing activity involving states, international organisations and civil society, and the CCM¿s eventual negotiation involving more than 100 states. Part III marries this empirical account to theoretical analysis of four thesis propositions. It is concluded that non-state actor-engendered processes of evidence collection and analysis, learning and frame alignment were central to the Oslo process¿s emergence. The Oslo Declaration¿s particular humanitarian framing (to ban cluster munitions causing unacceptable harm to civilians) and the structure of the subsequent ¿define-and-ban¿ discourse permitted convergence between states over prohibiting these weapons. Nevertheless, they contain implications for other international efforts aimed at controlling means of armed violence.

Current revolutions in biotechnology and neuroscience are changing military technologies, necessitating dramatic re-evaluations in arms regulatory regimes. This study assesses how these new technologies can be used in weapons systems - by governments and terrorists alike - and whether this frightening development can be brought under effective international control. Malcolm Dando begins by surveying the existing (and arguably inadequate) control mechanisms for chemical and biological weapons. He then discusses how earlier generations of toxin and bioregulatory weapons have been used by such states as Iraq, the Soviet Union and the USA, and explains, in non-technical terms, the implications for new weapons technology. Considering how international law might be applied to constrain undesirable military developments without restricting technological developments for peaceful purposes, Dando concludes with a proposal for an integrated control regime that would link international agreements, national legislation, and trade regulations.