Esta dissertação consiste em uma investigação cujo objetivo é examir o tema da participação política dos metecos atenienses, através da análise dos discursos forenses de Lísias e da crítica da historiografia. Alguns conceitos são discutidos, como identidade, espaço, memória, Estado, vida cotidiana, reprodução social, poder, liberdade etc, como um meio de se acessar a complexidade da sociedade ateniense. / This dissertation consists in a investigation which aims to examine the issue of the political participation of Athenian metic in Classical Athens, through the analysis of the Lysias forensic speeches and the critique of the historiography. Some concepts are discussed, like identity, space, memory, State, everyday life, social reproduction, power, freedom etc, as a way to have access to the complexity of Athenian society.

Esta dissertação consiste em uma investigação cujo objetivo é examir o tema da participação política dos metecos atenienses, através da análise dos discursos forenses de Lísias e da crítica da historiografia. Alguns conceitos são discutidos, como identidade, espaço, memória, Estado, vida cotidiana, reprodução social, poder, liberdade etc, como um meio de se acessar a complexidade da sociedade ateniense. / This dissertation consists in a investigation which aims to examine the issue of the political participation of Athenian metic in Classical Athens, through the analysis of the Lysias forensic speeches and the critique of the historiography. Some concepts are discussed, like identity, space, memory, State, everyday life, social reproduction, power, freedom etc, as a way to have access to the complexity of Athenian society.

The main aim of this work is to compare the First (478/7 - 404 B. C.) and the Second (378/7 - 338 B. C.) Athenian Maritime League, which were often put together without paying attention to both literary and epigraphical sources. The First League transformed into the Athenian Empire which exploited its own allies and often set about the violence. The Second League is frequently told to had grown into the "second empire". This work compares the evidence about the organisation, the administrative machinery and the relations within leagues to pinpoint common features and to distinguish the differences. The main focus of this work is financial system of both alliances since it was one of the main reasons for allies to defect.

This thesis argues that ‘democracy’ can better be understood in terms of a conceptual diarchy of ‘isonomia’ (equal political rights) and ‘isegoria’ (equal speech rights), rather than the conventional diarchy of ‘will’ and ‘opinion’ that originated in the era of absolute monarchy. As the proposed diarchy has its origin in classical Greece, the thesis starts with a brief overview of the institutional changes in sixth-, fifth- and fourth-century Athenian democracy that implemented the distinction in different ways, and examines some of its dysfunctions. The particular aspect of Athenian democracy under focus is sortition – the random selection of citizens for public office – viewed in antiquity as democratic, whereas election was viewed as an aristocratic or oligarchic selection mechanism. The thesis takes issue with Bernard Manin’s claim that the ‘triumph of election’ was on account of the natural right theory of consent, arguing that sortition-based proxy representation is a better way of indicating (hypothetical) consent than preference election. The thesis then seeks to clarify the concept(s) of representation – essential to the implementation of the democratic diarchy in modern large-scale societies – and to study how the diarchy has been reincarnated in modern representative democracies, along with an examination of the pathologies thereof. Consideration is given as to what the deliberative style of assemblies selected by lot should be, alongside evaluation of the epistemic potential of cognitive diversity and the ‘wisdom of crowds’. Given the need for both isonomia and isegoria to assume a representative form in large modern states, Michael Saward’s Representative Claim is adopted as a theoretical model to extend the reach of political representation beyond elections. The thesis concludes with tentative proposals as to how the fourth-century reforms (delegation of the final lawmaking decision to randomly-selected nomothetic courts) might be used as a template for modern institutions to resolve some of the problems of mass democracy.

This dissertation offers a new reading of Athenian democracy, focusing on the connection between the politics of accountability and the dynamics of political advice. I analyze Athenian institutions, norms, and practices comparatively, alongside their autocratic counterparts. I show how Greek thinkers relied on a common conceptual apparatus to understand, defend, and criticize patterns of accountability and unaccountability across regimes. I explore how powerful, unaccountable political actors – whether autocratic rulers or democratic assemblies – could solicit and secure good advice, and how accountable advisers could advise them effectively and safely. In stressing similarities between counsel across regime types, I challenge the characterization of Athens as a deliberative democracy. The sumboulos (adviser) was an important figure in Greek conceptions of both democratic and autocratic politics. Athenian orators are best understood – and understood themselves – as the accountable sumbouloi of the Athenian demos. This identification casts them not as co-deliberators with their fellow citizens but rather as participants in a common Greek tradition of advising powerful figures, a tradition that found expression across political contexts. The important role of sumbouloi in both democracies and autocracies follows from the structural similarity between the two regime types. The Athenian demos, gathered together in the Assembly and in the Popular Courts, was understood to have competencies and powers akin to those of an autocratic ruler. In particular, both the demos and the autocrat were recognized as unaccountable rulers able to hold others – including their advisers – to account. Given the power imbalances structuring relationships between sumbouloi and decision makers in both democracies and autocracies, both practicing orators and theoretically inclined observers came to see that the problems and opportunities associated with having (or choosing) to speak to the powerful were comparable across regimes. The issues at stake in the demos-adviser relationship could fruitfully be compared to those at stake in the autocrat-adviser relationship. Questions such as how the powerful could recognize good advice and good advisers and what the possibilities and limitations of frank advice were under conditions of risk were not regime-specific. Insofar as ancient Greeks had a theory of political counsel, it was a strikingly portable one. / Government

Flavius Philostratus was a Greek author working in the early third century CE, attached to a circle of philosophers and thinkers under the patronage of the Roman Empress Julia Domna. It is he who coined the term that we today use to describe this period in literary history-the Second Sophistic. While it was a time of startling literary productivity, it was also a time of increasing moral decline and confusion for the inhabitants of the Roman Empire. The old beliefs and morality of Graeco-Roman polytheism was fast becoming outmoded in the light of new developments coming out of the East and places like Palaestine in particular. Faiths like Christianity that placed the individual believer and his or her desire for salvation at the heart of the system were challenging the older Olympian style of religion, wherein the polis or city-state was all important. Add to this the growing influence of the cult worship of the Roman emperor and upheaval was the only foreseeable outcome, with not even the mas maiorum remaining intact as a moral compass for the average citizen. Flavius Philostratus struck out against this growing tide of moral and religious uncertainty by proposing a solution founded in religious fundamentalist tendencies. He could not do this in an obvious fashion, for fear not only of losing his imperial patroness, but pOSSibly also his life as well for speaking ill of emperor and empire. Instead, Philostratus pretends to submission, while at the very same time suggesting a return to the old ways of Graeco-Roman paganism when the needs of the many outweighed individual desires. He also suggests a way of counteracting the popularity of foreign individualized cults by regenerating the almost forgotten cult of the ancestors, with the hero-cult a particular focus. Indeed, Philostratus' approach addresses every possible concern that may have arisen in his imperial milieu, ranging from philosophy to politics to the rejection of the cult of the emperor. I have posited a theory of ancient religious fundamentalism as gleaned from the writings of Philostratus by envisioning a modified formulation of the twentieth century notion of religious fundamentalism itself. This new form removes fundamentalist dogma from its apparent reliance on a monotheistic faith and reconfigures it into a 'polyvalent' fundamentalism, wherein it is conceivable for an inhabitant of the Graeco-Roman world like Philostratus to have championed a variegated polytheistic belief system in the face of advancing Eastern influences and emperor worship, choosing to see Graeco-.Roman belief as a singular entity under threat. In an effort to conceal his beliefs from those who 111 might take offence at them, Philostratus makes use of a simulacrum for his ideals. This is the first century sage known as A pollonius of Tyana. My own approach to this idea has been twofold, with the first half being devoted to analysing the time and place in which Philostratus was working. I assess the literary tensions of the Second Sophistic itself and investigate how this may have impacted upon Philostratus' presentation of his argument I also look to the figure of Apollonius of Tyana, essential to the whole of the Philostratean fundamentalist 'project', and examine what changes Philostratus may have effected to the existing canon on Apollonius in order to make him useful to his fundamentalist perspective. The second half of my thesis involves the specific analysis of four of the works of Philostratus- the Vita Apollonii, Vitae Sophistarum, Heroikos, and Nero. Each is assessed in detail with respect to its representation of a specific aspect of Philostratus' beliefs. The Vita Apollonii presents Apollonius of Tyana as the paragon and champion of Philostratus' new belief system, teaching a Pythagorean way of life and personally reSisting Roman emperors like Domitian. The Vitae Sophistarum provides a catalogue of past sophists and offers up their behaviour as a guide for all good and wise men to follow, while the Nero presents Musonius Rufus as the archetypal philosopher battling imperial tyranny. Finally the Heroiiws is suggested as Philostratus' attempt at reinvigorating the cult of the ancestors as a means of providing an alternative individualized religious b•adition to ward off the encroaching Eastern mysteries. In all it is my contention that Flavius Philostratus deploys his sophistic talents in a manner reflective of his time, as a means of remedying Of, at the very least, positing a remedy, for the decline of belief and morality in the Roman Empire. He does this through four great literary works and chiefly through the figure of Apollonius of Tyana, his paragon and simulacrum. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2011.

The principal sanctuaries of Attica outside the asty were situated in strategically important positions at the territorial limits of Athens. It will be argued that the sanctuaries placed on the frontiers of Attica were important nodes in the social construction, expression and implementation of Athenian territoriality. Sanctuaries which accommodated polis-level cults outside the urban centre provided the Athenians with a highly visible means of demarcating and communicating the extent of their territorial sovereignty. These religious sites developed in a visually conspicuous manner at a time when the territorial and social boundaries between the Athenians and neighbouring communities were crystallising. From an early stage in the development of the sanctuary sites of Attica, they played an instrumental role in defining the extent of Athenian territory, a space imbued with meaning in terms of claims of sovereignty and membership within the Athenian community. During the Archaic period, the border sanctuaries of Attica and the cults which they accommodated were elaborated, augmenting Athenian claims to contested borderlands and enhancing the prestige of the polis. The relative ranking and status of Athens in her interpolis relations was thereby enhanced, allowing the Athenians to reduce the threat of invasion of the chora. Following the Persian Wars, the sanctuaries continued to disseminate messages of the power and status of Athens, now hegemon of the Delian League. The structures and rites of the border sanctuaries reified the hegemonic power of Athens. When, during the long and bitter conflict of the Peloponnesian War, it became necessary to control the points of access into Athenian territory along the coastline, Rhamnous and Sounion were fortified. In the Late Classical period, the military role of a number of these sanctuaries was institutionalised. Fortification walls were augmented and refurbished and ephebic involvement in rites and festivals attested the close connection between religious and military activity.

The principal sanctuaries of Attica outside the asty were situated in strategically important positions at the territorial limits of Athens. It will be argued that the sanctuaries placed on the frontiers of Attica were important nodes in the social construction, expression and implementation of Athenian territoriality. Sanctuaries which accommodated polis-level cults outside the urban centre provided the Athenians with a highly visible means of demarcating and communicating the extent of their territorial sovereignty. These religious sites developed in a visually conspicuous manner at a time when the territorial and social boundaries between the Athenians and neighbouring communities were crystallising. From an early stage in the development of the sanctuary sites of Attica, they played an instrumental role in defining the extent of Athenian territory, a space imbued with meaning in terms of claims of sovereignty and membership within the Athenian community. During the Archaic period, the border sanctuaries of Attica and the cults which they accommodated were elaborated, augmenting Athenian claims to contested borderlands and enhancing the prestige of the polis. The relative ranking and status of Athens in her interpolis relations was thereby enhanced, allowing the Athenians to reduce the threat of invasion of the chora. Following the Persian Wars, the sanctuaries continued to disseminate messages of the power and status of Athens, now hegemon of the Delian League. The structures and rites of the border sanctuaries reified the hegemonic power of Athens. When, during the long and bitter conflict of the Peloponnesian War, it became necessary to control the points of access into Athenian territory along the coastline, Rhamnous and Sounion were fortified. In the Late Classical period, the military role of a number of these sanctuaries was institutionalised. Fortification walls were augmented and refurbished and ephebic involvement in rites and festivals attested the close connection between religious and military activity.

The ancient Greek terms parrhesia and isegoria are both frequently translated as "free speech" or "freedom of speech". Translating these terms in a straightforward fashion as "free speech" obscures a number of significant differences among what are in truth three very distinct concepts. These dis-analogies may appear unimportant at first glance, but when we understand the central role these concepts play in their respective cultures – more specifically, in their political and legal systems – it becomes clear that small differences in meaning can make a big difference in our ability to grasp the nature of Athenian civic culture. I will outline the most salient of these dis-analogies, and the mistaken conceptions of Athenian political culture that can, and do, result from them. In particular, though the idea of freedom features prominently in parrhesia and isegoria, what freedom amounts to in Athens is sometimes nearly antithetical to what it amounts to in modern liberal republics. Ancient Athenian freedom was the freedom of opportunity. In the case of parrhesia, it was a custom or value which was not a feature of government or law, but part of the Athenian character. The fact that Athenians valued free speaking was formalised in political practice under the democracy through the equal opportunity to address the political assemblies known as isegoria. There was in Athens no explicit or implied protection against the negative consequences of what one said. In contrast, "freedom of speech" means that the individual is protected against the negative consequences of speaking, in particular protected against action by the government to suppress speech and to punish speech after the fact. This difference in what having "freedom" with respect to speech amounts to, makes the translation of isegoria as "freedom of speech" nearly always systematically misleading, and so we should refrain from doing so in any context in which such confusion might be generated. This misunderstanding is compounded by the frequent translation of parrhesia as "freedom of speech" or "free speech". Parrhesia is the name for a certain mode of speech, namely speech which is direct and truthful, and risks negative consequences. As such, it has both positive and negative connotations, and correspondingly was only valued in contexts in which direct truthful speech would be preferable to other modes of speech. Parrhesia was never formalised as isegoria was, since isegoria was a political privilege while parrhesia was merely a mode of expression. In contrast, free speech is legally protected. Speech which is not believed to be valuable is protected, in order to ensure that valuable speech is not suppressed by the powerful through the instruments of government.

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