The purpose of this study is to sample a number of disparate texts from the early Islamic cultural field to explore the shared grounds or themes that bind them together. The focus of the sampled texts and their analysis is the different relations between God and the real things of this world. The method that is applied in the selection of the texts of this research relies on Pierre Bourdieu’s approach to the study of cultural production. It assumes a relational and dynamic intellectual field which creates interlinked differences and similarities. This is the reason for sampling texts which are assumed to be reasonably marginal to the main cultural establishment. The kalām of the early stage, exemplified by the texts of the Zaydī al-Qāsim al-Rassī and the eastern Ibādīs, is found to emphasise the radical separation between the creator and the created. The development of this relation, which is explored through an intertextual reading of Qurʾānic exegesis, bridges the fissure, between creator and created, through the process of re-interpreting the terms of creation. The act of creation itself becomes an act of transformation, and the objects of creation become eternal ‘non-existent things’ that acquire the quality of existence. In the philosophical works of Jābir Ibn Ḥayyān, the things of this world are also reduced to transformations within the one substance that encompasses the intelligible and the material world. The results of this research show that there is a great degree of diffusion of ideas in this early stage of Islamic culture, from an assumed centre to the margins, and vice versa. The general tendencies in the texts considered reflect, on the one hand, a critique of multiplicity of principles, particularly dualism, and an emphasis on God’s unity, through different interpretations of tawḥīd. On the other hand, the sought unity itself established God’s radical transcendence from the real world, thus leading to another form of dualism dividing the world and the absolute other. The process of opposition to dualism seems to have eventually produced two forms of affirming and defining unity. Both forms define the existent things in terms of substance (jawhar), however, the kalām model expresses it in atomistic terms whilst the alchemical model of Jābir expresses it in terms of a hylomorphic model. One of these redefines the meanings of the existent and the non-existent things in term of subsistence, and the other, develops the idea of a single substance with different gradation in being.

O presente trabalho pretende discutir o papel da noção de modelo dentro da Bildtheorie, ou concepção-Bild, de Boltzmann por meio de uma reconstrução parcial das visões sobre a Natureza e sobre a Ciência deste cientista-filósofo austríaco, em termos de imagem científica de natureza e imagem filosófica de ciência. Queremos destacar as contribuições epistemológicas de Boltzmann para a Física e para a Filosofia da Ciência a partir de sua concepção de mundo (Weltanschauung), baseadas em uma visão mecânico-estatística de natureza e em suas posturas filosóficas pautadas pelo pluralismo, pelo representacionalismo e pelo naturalismo (bem como sua defesa ao atomismo, ao método hipotético-dedutivo, a bem da criatividade científica). Consideramos estes os elementos fundamentais para a compreensão do papel da noção de modelo dentro da ecologia cognitiva global boltzmanniana, papel que se nos parece fundamental para a manutenção da coerência desta estrutura global. / The present work intends to discuss the role of the notion of the model within Boltzmann\'s Bildtheorie, or conception-Bild, by means of a partial reconstruction of the visions on the Nature and on the Science of this Austrian scientist-philosopher, in terms of scientific image of nature and philosophical image of science. We want to emphasize Boltzmann\'s epistemological contributions to Physics and to the Philosophy of Science from his world\'s conception (Weltanschauung), based on a mechanical-statistical view of nature and its philosophical positions guided by pluralism, representationalism and naturalism (as well as his defense of atomism, the hypothetical-deductive method, for the sake of scientific creativity). We consider these the fundamental elements for the understanding the role of the notion of the model within Boltzmann\'s global cognitive ecology, role that seems fundamental to the maintenance of the coherence of his global structure.

I here defend logical atomism. This defense rests on reinterpreting logical atomism as a search for logical forms. This reinterpretation has two parts comprising six chapters. In the first part, I do some historically-driven recovery. In the introduction, I review the literature on Russell's logical atomism. In Chapter 1, I argue that the dominant interpretation of logical atomism is wrong on historical grounds: it accounts for neither the history of logical atomism nor for crucial elements of the logical atomist texts. In Chapter 2, I then use Russell's writings to recover what I argue is the core of logical atomism. I explicate the critical notions and essential ingredients of logical atomism using "Principia Mathematica" as the archetype of logical atomism. I argue that logical atomsts are term busters. The essential ingredient of a logical atomist's term busting practice is a higher-order logic with the power of impredicative comprehension. In Chapter 3, I discuss the widespread view that Wittgenstein held a version of logical atomism. Focusing on his pre-"Tractatus" writings and changes in his earlier views, I argue that Wittgenstein embraced a philosophy of logic incompatible with emulating impredicative comprehension in April 1914. As such, Wittgenstein was a logical atomist, if ever, in October 1913, possibly through April 1914. In the second part, having clarified what logical atomism is, I present a modern logical atomism. In Chapter 4, I develop a philosophy of logic for logical atomism based on the notion of a pure logic. I critically discuss normativity in logic, the epistemology of pure logic, and logical pluralism. In Chapter 5, I propose a formal logic for logical atomism. I argue for the logic of logical atomism being an infinitely-descending and infinitely-ascending simple type theory with impredicative comprehension compatible with a domain empty of particulars. In Chapter 6, I critically discuss what the ontology of logical atomism should be, that is, what the ontology of the logical atomist's logic must be. This includes an ontology of logical concepts and of logical forms as completely-general, necessarily-existing logical facts with no constituents. I conclude by indicating avenues for new work on logical atomism.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1997. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 391-403). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1997. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 391-403). Also available on the Internet.

132f. / Submitted by Suelen Reis (suziy.ellen@gmail.com) on 2013-04-16T19:29:19Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Tatiana Rovarisseg.pdf: 1481018 bytes, checksum: 1f2f50b309b2257dabc4f62595cea8bf (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rodrigo Meirelles(rodrigomei@ufba.br) on 2013-05-23T18:56:30Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Tatiana Rovarisseg.pdf: 1481018 bytes, checksum: 1f2f50b309b2257dabc4f62595cea8bf (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-05-23T18:56:30Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Tatiana Rovarisseg.pdf: 1481018 bytes, checksum: 1f2f50b309b2257dabc4f62595cea8bf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 / Este trabalho pretende expor o antiaristotelismo e o projeto epicurista de Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655) presente em dois livros,; o Exercícios contra os aristotélicos, de 1624, e o Syntagma philosophicum, de 1658. Neles, Gassendi compreende um projeto que visa à completa destituição e substituição da filosofia de Aristóteles pelo epicurismo. Uma das principais críticas do filósofo ao aristotelismo é a dificuldade em lidar com questões que dizem respeito à investigação da natureza, já que suas afirmações e sua dialética apresentam, segundo ele, conceitos obscuros e inúteis como a substância, a forma e as categorias. Com base nessa crítica, Gassendi apresenta a filosofia de Epicuro como adequada para auxiliar a nova ciência do século XVII. O epicurismo, como o aristotelismo, também é uma filosofia antiga e poderia ser alterado para adequar-se ao cristianismo. Como a filosofia de Gassendi se pauta pela crítica ao aristotelismo, é esse que guia Gassendi na elaboração dos conceitos de espaço e tempo, por exemplo. O atomismo epicurista, que afirma que tudo que existe é composto de átomos, i.e., partícula material indivisível, e vazio, permite, segundo Gassendi, que se façam observações empíricas para entender o mecanismo da natureza e conduzido pela canônica, que é um conjunto de regras que guiam o pensamento e a observação empírica, juntamente com algumas correções, como o estabelecimento de sua criação por Deus no início do mundo, fazem com que, para Gassendi, o atomismo seja o substituto apropriado para o aristotelismo. / Salvador

I aim to offer an innovative interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy, first by examining how the various views that make up his ontology of individual substance involve a persistent rejection of atomism in natural philosophy and secondly, by exploring the significance of this rejection in the larger context of Seventeenth-century physics. My thesis is structured as a developmental story, each chapter analyzing the discontinuities or changes Leibniz makes to his views on individuation and atomism from his early to late years. The goal is to illuminate underrepresented views on individuals and atoms throughout Leibniz’s works and thus bring a clearer understanding of his philosophy. I, therefore, argue that the New System of Nature, published towards the end of Leibniz’s middle period (1695), marks an important landmark in his philosophical evolution, a radical terminological and ontological shift in his metaphysics of substance. Once Leibniz elaborates the concept of “simple substance,” the future synonym of “monad,” the problem of individuation of his early and middle years (1663-1686) becomes secondary. The focus changes from what makes substances “individual” to what makes them “simple” and truly “one,” i.e., “metaphysical” atoms. I prove that this shift was marked by a two-tiered critical confrontation: a first, direct confrontation, 1) with Descartes’ physics, through the critique of the notion of extended matter and of Descartes’ principle of individuation through shared motion and, a second confrontation, 2) with different strands of Seventeenth-century atomism, including Cartesian Gérauld de Cordemoy’s quasi-“metaphysical” atomism and its attempt at improving Descartes’ individuating principle. I claim that this double confrontation ultimately led Leibniz to formulate a more fundamental ontology, in terms of the “metaphysical atomism” of his Monadology (1714). My analysis complicates a persistent scholarly assumption in recent Leibniz studies, claiming that, throughout his entire career, Leibniz continued to hold the same fundamental positions on substance, individuation and, implicitly, atoms. Against this type of general continuity thesis, I show that: 1) far from being a constant concern, Leibniz’s interest in what makes substances individual fades towards the end of his life (New Essays 1703, correspondence with Samuel Clarke, 1714); 2) I trace the changing fate of some of Leibniz’s early and middle period views on substance and the individual (the principle of the identity of indiscernibles, space-time as individuating properties) in his late works; and 3) I prove the claim that Leibniz really embraced atomism, either for a short time or all throughout his philosophy is problematic. While he does refer to some sort of atoms during his Paris period (1672-1676), this is insufficient proof of a commitment to atomism. Instead, the episode has to be understood in the broader framework of a bundle of interrelated issues, such as the problem of the cohesion of bodies and the problem of minds or mind-like principles individuating those bodies. Thus, as I show through an analysis of Leibniz’s arguments against atomism in the correspondences with his scientific contemporaries (Christiaan Huyghens 1692-1695, Nicholas Hartsoeker 1706-1714), rejecting physical atomism remains a fundamental and surprisingly constant point of his philosophy.

Fakhr al-Din al-Razi is a significant philosopher who is famous for his critics on Avicenna. He also made effective dialogues between two rival doctrines (namely Kalam and Peripateticism) in the Islamic world in Middle Ages. He defended Kalam Atomism in last decades of his life. This thesis is working on his two treatises as manuscripts and translating it into English. One of the treatises is about proving atom and another one is rejecting Hylomorphism. These two treatises are attached together as a manuscript book titled as Proving Atomism. / Au Moyen Âge, dans le monde islamique, il y avait deux groupes d'érudits qui avaient deux indications différentes sur l'existence. Le premier groupe était des philosophes, ḥukamā, qui ont approuvé falsafah ou ḥikmah. Cette doctrine avait des bases aristotéliciennes. Un autre groupe était des théologiens, mutikalimūn qui était pour la plupart atomistes. Les théologiens constituaient le kalām qui se traduisait parfois par théologie islamique.Fakhr-e-Razi ou Fakhr al-Din al-Razi était un philosophe et théologien important au 12ème siècle qui a fait des dialogues et des débats entre ces deux doctrines. Il a écrit des critiques sur les livres d'Avicenne et a défendu la doctrine de l'atomisme de Kalam. Bien qu'il ait défendu l'atomisme de Kalam dans beaucoup de livres, il a écrit un traité indépendant sur ce sujet. Cette thèse est l'édition et la traduction d'un livre manuscrit qui comprend deux traités indépendants, dont l'un, prouve atomisme et un autre réfute Hylémorphisme.Cette thèse inclut des commentaires sur l'atomisme et l'hylémorphisme (l'introduction du livre). L'atomisme comme vue générale et l'atomisme de Kalam en particulier sont étudiés. L'histoire de l'atomisme est brièvement passée en revue en tant que racines de l'atomisme de Kalam. Puis la vue de Razi sur l'atomisme est étudiée selon ce livre présent et ses autres livres. Le contraste entre la vision de Razi et la doctrine d'Avicenne comme son rival sont également analysés.

O epicurismo apresentou teorias sobre a física que constituíam, em boa parte, uma continuidade do pensamento materialista antigo, ainda assim, há certamente muitos elementos originais em seu pensamento para destacá-lo e torná-lo em um sistema reconhecido por sua própria importância. Como se desenvolveu em uma filosofia de amplo alcance, e por isso mesmo muito visada por adversários, além dos conteúdos de sua física, ética e canônica, disciplinas principais de seu pensamento, Epicuro e os membros de sua escola viam-se compelidos a opinar em assuntos que transcendiam esse grupo de investigações. É notório o conjunto de opiniões que a escola teria apresentado sobre o lavor poético e a veiculação de mitos; testemunhos de Plutarco, Sexto Empírico, Cícero e outros marcam essa postura como de oposição a essas expressões, oposição essa que certamente encontra respaldo na orientação pela busca pela felicidade por meio da remoção do indivíduo das fontes de perturbação com as quais normalmente essas formas de expressão se associam. Ainda assim, a obra mais apreciada dessa mesma escola, o poema De rerum natura do romano Tito Lucrécio Caro, escrito no século I a.C. é notória por transigir com relação a essas modalidades de expressão \"rechaçadas\" por sua escola. Além dessa aparente transgressão, um outro elemento digno de nota nesse poema é a recusa em se usar um termo apenas para referenciar os átomos, definitivamente singularizado por Epicuro por meio do termo ἄτομος e ocasionalmente retomado também por meio termo σομα pelo autor grego. As opções de cunho estético (uso da forma poética e de elementos míticos) revelam a adesão a um programa didático estabelecido e nos convidam a relativizar a postura epicurista e a buscar elementos mais sólidos que corroborem uma visão não tão sectária como a veiculada pelos críticos da doutrina. De outra parte, a variação vocabular reflete o desenvolvimento do programa didático encampado, no qual se faz uso de posições de outros pensadores (pré-socráticos) a respeito dos componentes essenciais da matéria, posições essas que são convenientemente deturpadas como forma de desqualificar escolas de pensamento ativas e influentes na época de Lucrécio (estoicismo e a academia). Outra função que esse expediente cumpre é a de adiantar ao leitor a explicação de conceitos complexos sobre o atomismo, a partir dos quais a exposição das teses epicuristas possa se dar de uma forma mais rápida e completa. / Epicureanism presented theories on physics that can be seen to continue, for the most part, the ancient materialistic thought of the pre-socratics. Even so, it has certainly many original ele-ments on itself so it may be considered to have its own relevance and importance. As it became a well known philosophy in its time, and therefore a constant target for its adversaries, it needed to approach other subjects beyond the contents of its intended fields: physics, canonics and ethics. For this reason, Epicuro and the members of its school were compelled to provide posi-tions on aesthetic matters, even though this was not a primordial object of inquiry. The set of opinions that the school may have presented on subjects such as poetic creation and the propa-gation of myths is well known; testimonies of Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Cicero and others mark epicureanism stance as of oppositon to these forms of expressions. This alledged hostility certainly finds endorsement on the guidance for the pursuit of happiness by means of the re-moval of sources of disturbance normally associated with those means of expression. Still the most appreciated work of the epicurean school, the poem De rerum natura by the Roman author Titus Lucretius Carus, writen in the 1st century BC, is notorious for its compromise with regard to those modes of expression \"repeled\" by epicureans. Beyond this apparent violation, another noteworthy element in this poem is the refusal of a single term to mean \'atom\', which was definitively singularized by Epicuro by means of the term ἄτομος and, occasionally referred also by the term σομα. The options of aesthetic matrix (use of the poetical form and mythical elements) disclose Lucretius\' adherence to an established didactic program and invite us to rel-ativize the epicurean position and to search for more solid elements that support a view on aesthetic and mythic matters less sectarian than the one propagated by the critics of the doctrine. On the other hand, the vocabulary variation reflects the development of the didactic program, in that sense Lucretius makes use of positions of other thinkers (pre-socratic thinkers) regarding the essential components of matter. Those positions are conveniently misrepresented so to dis-qualify active and influential schools of thought at the time of Lucretius (stoicism and the Acad-emy). These misrepresentations help Lucretius to guide the reader throught complicated con-cepts and by this mean the exposure of the Epicurean thesis can be performed in a faster and more complete way.

This investigation constitutes an attempt towards(1) understanding issues and problems relating to the notions of one, many, part and whole in Parmenides and Plato; (2) extracting conditions for a successful account of multiplicity and parthood;(3) surveying Deleuzian conceptions and uses of these notions; (4) appraising the extent to which Deleuze’s metaphysics can answer some of these ancient problems concerning the status of multiplicity and the nature of mereological composition, that is, of the relations that pertain between parts and the wholes that they compose.