The goal of the thesis is to improve the existing Editor and Simulator applications that have been created by the autor as his Bachelor Thesis. Document speaks about the main aspects of bridge; about the auction and the bridge play. The whole document is based on the author's Bachelor Thesis which is frequently referenced in the document. Nevertheless, the document should be readable without any previous knowledge of author's former work. The author is discussing his effort to create logic expressions to describe bridge hands and truths in the bridge world. These expressions are then used to construct auction conventions and whole auction systems. The author is discussing the bridge problems and presenting the improved algorithm to solve double-dummy problems. The work also describes the software from the engineering point of view and speaks about the graphic user interface of both programmes.

There is evidence there is a global gender price gap in traditional global art auctions. Taking into account recent technological advances in the secondary art market, this study examines if there is a gender gap for the sale prices of female artists’ work in the contemporary, online art auction market. The analysis uses a unique data set of art works sold in Christie’s Online-Only Auctions for the year of 2018. We regress measures of price on gender and controls for various characteristics of the art work and artist. We find that while there is discount in prices of 17% for artwork created by female artists, further analysis indicates the difference is not necessarily the result of bidder’s biased prices, but rather rooted in the pre-sale estimates given by the auction houses.

公司管理型態的外標互助會模式，是一個複雜的競標過。但是，如果將之化簡並標準化以後，則可得出某一個競標的預期報酬函數，並以一階條件求出最佳標金策略，再佐以二階條件證明此標金策略，可使極大化預期報酬。其次，並探討在最佳標金策略之下，保證成本、利率、保留價值及不同型態的互助會會員的標金策略，得到以下五個定理： 　　定理一：提高保證成本有抑制搶標的功能。 　　定理二：利率水準越高，競標者所設定的標金越高。 　　定理三：競標者的保留價值越高，將設定越高的標金。 　　定理四：急需用錢的人與儲蓄者的標金策略是背道而馳的。 　　定理五：競標者的訊息溢價越高，將設定越低的標金策略。

<p> </p><p>Millions of dollars change hands daily through online auction markets. Online trading communities like eBay and Amazon.com are emerging as increasingly important factors of the economy. Various Reputation systems are important components in such electronic markets. Existing evidence suggests that there are a number of problems with such systems. This paper presents an empirical exploration of reputation systems. Two studies of Tradera’s discussion forums are reported. The result of the first, pilot study suggests that both sellers and buyers are worried about getting a retaliatory negative feedback if they leave a negative feedback for an unsatisfactory transaction from their trading parties. Retaliation from the non-paying bidders seems to be the most severe threat and trouble for sellers. A set of negative feedbacks were then gathered from Tradera and data were manually analyzed in order to verify the results from the preliminary study. The results from the second study confirmed the result of the pilot study. A general evaluation of Tradera’s current reputation system is made based on the results of the second study. This paper aims to make a contribution to the literature on online reputation system by developing a typology of seller complaints about Tradera buyers and providing a tentative definition of retaliatory negative feedback based on the findings of both studies. Proposed solutions to the problems of non-payment and feedback retaliation are also presented.</p><p> </p>

<p>This thesis compares the two different version of public franchise bidding for awarding 3G licenses used in Sweden and the UK, respectively a beauty contest and an auction. The fact is that the Swedish beauty contest has failed to tackle many of the problems discussed in connection with public franchise bidding in an effective way. Sweden has first of all had problems with enforcing the ambitious coverage criteria. The UK has on the other hand succeeded in tackling the problems and raised governmental revenue of £22.5bn through the auction.</p><p>The conclusion is that this thesis confirms the existing literatures’ critique of the Swedish beauty contest. However, this thesis also provides a new perspective to the existing literature. The main conclusion is that the auction has locked the prices at a high level and externalised negative price and investments effects through the international operators’ behaviour onto consumers in other countries.</p>

This thesis compares the two different version of public franchise bidding for awarding 3G licenses used in Sweden and the UK, respectively a beauty contest and an auction. The fact is that the Swedish beauty contest has failed to tackle many of the problems discussed in connection with public franchise bidding in an effective way. Sweden has first of all had problems with enforcing the ambitious coverage criteria. The UK has on the other hand succeeded in tackling the problems and raised governmental revenue of £22.5bn through the auction. The conclusion is that this thesis confirms the existing literatures’ critique of the Swedish beauty contest. However, this thesis also provides a new perspective to the existing literature. The main conclusion is that the auction has locked the prices at a high level and externalised negative price and investments effects through the international operators’ behaviour onto consumers in other countries.

In this thesis, we explore the use of double auction markets as a general approach to tackle resource allocation problems in large-scale distributed systems, which are traditionally solved using optimization techniques. Prevalently adopted in real-world markets, double auctions have the power of arbitrating mappings between participating players and trading commodities in a decentralized fashion, with every player trying to maximize her own utility selfishly. Through the design of prefetching strategies in peer-assisted video-on-demand systems, we show how the problem of minimizing server bandwidth costs by reallocating media contents can be solved by double auction markets gracefully. However, not every resource allocation problem satisfies requirements of double auctions. We illustrate the limitation of double auctions with an example of virtual machine migration in container-based datacenters, which is then modeled into a Nash bargaining game and solved by a Nash bargaining solution.

In this thesis, we explore the use of double auction markets as a general approach to tackle resource allocation problems in large-scale distributed systems, which are traditionally solved using optimization techniques. Prevalently adopted in real-world markets, double auctions have the power of arbitrating mappings between participating players and trading commodities in a decentralized fashion, with every player trying to maximize her own utility selfishly. Through the design of prefetching strategies in peer-assisted video-on-demand systems, we show how the problem of minimizing server bandwidth costs by reallocating media contents can be solved by double auction markets gracefully. However, not every resource allocation problem satisfies requirements of double auctions. We illustrate the limitation of double auctions with an example of virtual machine migration in container-based datacenters, which is then modeled into a Nash bargaining game and solved by a Nash bargaining solution.

This paper explores the determinants of the number of bidders and final price of 1900s oil paintings auctioned by resellers or dealers on eBay art auctions. We find that starting price has negative effect on bidder’s decision whether to enter the auctions or not while seller reputation variables such as seller´s feedback, being top rate seller has a positive effect. Furthermore, auction theory is introduced to study the bidder´s behavior through auction characteristics and final price. We find that, interestingly, the seller´s reputation variables have no significant effect to the final price and the number of bidders has positive effect toward final price of art work. This evidence means that art auctions on eBay has a private value auctions characteristic. However, some specific characteristics of online auctions, which are the last minute bidding and the presence of experienced bidders, significantly affect the final price. Being an experienced winner or using last minute bidding as a strategy substantially pay more than inexperienced winners or winners who do not use last minute bidding in auctioned painting. This could result from different preference of bidders toward auctioned painting or information on which each bidder is holding.

With the rapid Internet development, E-auction is also popular in recent years. In E-auction, the rating is the most effective indicator that can provide a referral for buyer and seller. In addition, buyers can use rating mechanism as feedback to respond their satisfaction after they bought goods. In the other hand, the rating of seller could reflect his transaction history before. When the positive rating is more, which means satisfied and successful transaction is more also, and represents that seller¡¦s credit accumulation. This study uses innovation diffusion model to analyze the seller¡¦s growth trend of rating, critical mass of rating by real data, classify sellers that equal to cluster analysis and discuss further. The samples are the sellers who sell t-shirt in eBay from December 1 in 2010 to January 31 in 2011. We get 8,304 sellers¡¦ data, and pick 116 of them randomly as samples, which are fit in with our research requests. This research is to answer three research questions. The first research question is to verify that growth trend of rating could fit in with diffusion of innovation, then, to analyze and discuss the growing trend and the rating accumulation. That result does verify that rating accumulation fit in with diffusion of innovation, and growing trend fit in with S-shaped curve. Furthermore, rating raise at first if it is affected by external influence, like key searching, website payment advertisement. On the contrary, the rating increases quickly for some time that the seller has good reputation if the rating is affected by internal influence, like word of mouth. The second research question is to calculate the critical mass of rating by Bass model. The result shows that the rating accelerates when it reaches critical mass between 1129 and 1402, it represents the seller accumulates considerable sale amount and customer satisfaction, and also let potential buyers more confident and promote their willingness to purchase. In addition, it can represent the sellers have enough experience and can provide the better marketing strategies when the sellers¡¦ rating reaches critical mass of rating. The third research question is to divide the sellers by cluster analysis and investigate. The result shows the diverseness between the growth trend of rating, the critical mass of rating, product price, and buyer repeated purchase. This study can provide a referral for the novice sellers, and they can develop their marketing strategy base on their characteristics of product.