Two experimental procedures are employed to value both health and environmental benefits from reducing pesticides in Uganda. The first experiment, an incentive compatible auction involves subjects with incomplete information placing bids to avoid consuming potentially contaminated groundnuts/water in a framed field experimental procedure. Three experimental treatments (information, proxy good, and group treatments) are used. Subjects are endowed with a monetary amount (starting capital) equivalent to half the country's per capita daily income (in small denominations). Two hundred and fifty seven respondents were involved in a total of 35 experimental sessions in Kampala and Iganga districts. Tobit model results indicate that subjects place significant positive values to avoid ill health outcomes, although these values vary by region, by treatment and by socio-economic characteristics. Gender differences were important in explaining bidding behavior, with male respondents in both study areas bidding higher to avoid ill health outcomes than females. Consistent with a priori expectation, rural population's average willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid ill health outcomes was lower (by 11.4 percent) than the urban population's WTP possibly reflecting the poverty level in the rural areas and how it translates into reduced regard for health and environmental improvements. Tests of hypotheses suggest (i) providing brief information to subjects just prior to the valuation exercise does not influence bid behavior, (ii) subjects are indifferent to the source of contamination: WTP to avoid health outcomes from potentially contaminated water and groundnuts are not significantly different, and (iii) the classical tendency to free-ride in public goods provision was observed, and this phenomenon was more pronounced in the urban than the rural area. The second experimental procedure involved 132 urban respondents making repeated choices from a set of scenarios described by attributes of water quality, an environmental good. Water quality is represented by profiles of water safety levels at varying costs. Analysis using the conditional (fixed effects) logit showed that urban subjects highly discount unsafe drinking water, and were willing to pay less for safe agricultural water, a result not unexpected considering that the urban population is not directly involved in agricultural activities and thus does not value agricultural water quality as much as drinking water quality. Results also showed that subjects' utility increased with the cost of a water sample (inconsistent with a downward sloping demand curve), suggesting perhaps that they perceived higher costs to be associated with higher water quality. Some theoretically inconsistent results were obtained with choice experiments. / Ph. D.

Orientador: Paulo de Barros Correia / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Faculdade de Engenharia Mecânica / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-27T01:59:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silva_ElisaBastos_D.pdf: 2776184 bytes, checksum: 20b2252b72c7204d062893f8dcb3d304 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015 / Resumo: Leilões de novos empreendimentos de energia envolvem o compromisso de construí-los e o direito de explorá-los por meio de contratos de outorga. O leiloeiro, cujo objetivo é minimizar o pagamento pela energia contratada, buscando a redução de seu preço para os consumidores finais, fornece o direito de outorga da usina para o vencedor. O licitante é um investidor, e.g., uma empresa de geração que procura maximizar seu benefício com a venda de energia proveniente do empreendimento. Quando a natureza desses empreendimentos é complementar, torna-se possível proporcionar maiores benefícios aos licitantes, e maior eficiência ao leilão, caso sejam negociados em conjunto. Atualmente, o projeto de leilão instituído é composto por uma abordagem híbrida, sequencial e simultânea, que não permite a extração das sinergias entre empreendimentos. Esta tese examina duas metodologias híbridas de leilões reversos, considerando-se o ponto de vista do leiloeiro. O primeiro modelo, centralizado, é composto por duas fases: uma simultânea de lance aberto e outra combinatória de lance fechado. A fase simultânea incentiva a revelação do preço da energia, enquanto a fase combinatória oferece oportunidade aos licitantes de submeterem ofertas mais agressivas através de pacotes de empreendimentos complementares. O modelo centralizado é formulado como um problema de otimização inteiro e combinatório. A função-objetivo consiste em minimizar o pagamento, isso é, energia multiplicada pelo preço (lance) para todas as usinas. A estratégia de solução identifica os vencedores, resolvendo um problema de set-packing restrito. A segunda metodologia utiliza uma abordagem, também, em duas fases. A primeira é um projeto simultâneo de lance aberto, e a segunda fase um projeto combinatório descentralizado. Nesse modelo, a dificuldade do problema aumenta progressivamente à medida que os pacotes são ofertados. A dificuldade da alocação é distribuída entre os licitantes e, por isso, o leiloeiro não necessita resolver um problema de otimização. As metodologias propostas são aplicadas aos leilões de energia nova para o setor elétrico brasileiro. Os resultados mostram que a utilização de ambas as metodologias resolvem o problema de alocação com um tempo computacional aceitável / Abstract: Auctions for new power plants involve a commitment of constructing and the right of exploring them through power sales contracts. The auctioneer -- whose objective is to minimize the payment for the contracted energy, seeking to reduce prices for consumers -- provides the power plant's right for the winner. The bidder is an investor, for example, a generation company, which aims to maximize benefits of energy sales. When the power plant's nature is complementary, it is possible to provide more benefits to bidders and greater efficiency to the auction if these plants were traded together. Currently, the instituted auction design consists of a hybrid approach -- sequential and simultaneous -- which does not allow the extraction of synergies among plants. This thesis examines two hybrid methods of reverse auctions from the auctioneer's view point. The first model, centralized, consists of two phases: a simultaneous open bid and a combinatorial sealed bid. The simultaneous phase encourages the energy prices revelation. The combinatorial phase allows aggressive bidders to acquire bundles of complementary plants. The centralized model is formulated as an integer and combinatorial optimization problem. The objective function consists of minimizing the payment, that is, energy multiplied by the price (bid) for all plants. The solution strategy identifies the winners solving a restricted set-packing problem. The second method also uses a two phase approach. The first phase is a simultaneous open bid design and the second phase is a decentralized combinatorial design. In this model, the problem difficulty increases gradually. The allocation difficulty is distributed among the bidders; therefore, the auctioneer does not need to solve an optimization problem. The proposed methodologies are applied to new energy auctions on Brazilian electrical energy sector. The results show the use of both methods solving the problem of allocation with an acceptable computational time / Doutorado / Planejamento de Sistemas Energeticos / Doutora em Planejamento de Sistemas Energéticos

This thesis is an explanation of Real Estate Auctions in the Czech republic. It is a document, to be used by the Auctioneer and also by the organization of the Auction for issued expenses. This thesis describes how the price of property can be created. It also explains methods to detect the usual Auction price of the property, in the experts opinion, and it provides specific case estimates of the prices of auctioned property. Further this thesis analyzes the growth of Auctions in the Czech republic in time and cost savings against the usual price of property, which can be reached by the bidder in a public Auction.

No / With the advent and maturity of the internet, reverse electronic auctions (e-auctions) are now an important mechanism for public and private sector organisations, in the procurement of goods and services. Here, a novel link is made between reverse electronic auctions (e-auctions) and its potential impact on organisational agility, a link not previously developed in the literature. In this paper, we justify this relationship from a theoretical perspective. We investigate how information and internet technology impacts procurement, by an analysis and evaluation of the literature. E-auctions are reviewed and organisational agility defined; the advantages of agile management are also identified and the role that e-auctions can play in achieving this, discussed. Strategies for re-aligning reverse e-auctions in support of organisational agility are proposed and the advantages of this process discussed. Recommendations for future practice that will maximise the chances of realising agile systems management are also presented. Finally, areas for further research are identified.

I have developed a multiagent system platform that provides a valuable complement to the alternative research methods. The platform facilitates the development of heterogeneous agents in complex environments. The first application of the multiagent system is to the study of sealed-bid auctions with two-dimensional value signals from pure private to pure common value. I find that several auction outcomes are significantly nonlinear across the two-dimensional value signals. As the common value percent increases, profit, revenue, and efficiency all decrease monotonically, but they decrease in different ways. Finally, I find that forcing revelation by the auction winner of the true common value may have beneficial revenue effects when the common-value percent is high and there is a high degree of uncertainty about the common value. The second application of the multiagent system is to the study of English auctions with two-dimensional value signals using agents that learn a signal-averaging factor. I find that signal averaging increases nonlinearly as the common value percent increases, decreases with the number of bidders, and decreases at high common value percents when the common value signal is more uncertain. Using signal averaging, agents increase their profit when the value is more uncertain. The most obvious effect of signal averaging is on reducing the percentage of auctions won by bidders with the highest common value signal. The third application of the multiagent system is to the study of the optimal payment rule in Treasury auctions using Canadian rules. The model encompasses the when-issued, auction, and secondary markets, as well as constraints for primary dealers. I find that the Spanish payment rule is revenue inferior to the Discriminatory payment rule across all market price spreads, but the Average rule is revenue superior. For most market-price spreads, Uniform payment results in less revenue than Discriminatory, but there are many cases in which Vickrey payment produces more revenue.

I have developed a multiagent system platform that provides a valuable complement to the alternative research methods. The platform facilitates the development of heterogeneous agents in complex environments. The first application of the multiagent system is to the study of sealed-bid auctions with two-dimensional value signals from pure private to pure common value. I find that several auction outcomes are significantly nonlinear across the two-dimensional value signals. As the common value percent increases, profit, revenue, and efficiency all decrease monotonically, but they decrease in different ways. Finally, I find that forcing revelation by the auction winner of the true common value may have beneficial revenue effects when the common-value percent is high and there is a high degree of uncertainty about the common value. The second application of the multiagent system is to the study of English auctions with two-dimensional value signals using agents that learn a signal-averaging factor. I find that signal averaging increases nonlinearly as the common value percent increases, decreases with the number of bidders, and decreases at high common value percents when the common value signal is more uncertain. Using signal averaging, agents increase their profit when the value is more uncertain. The most obvious effect of signal averaging is on reducing the percentage of auctions won by bidders with the highest common value signal. The third application of the multiagent system is to the study of the optimal payment rule in Treasury auctions using Canadian rules. The model encompasses the when-issued, auction, and secondary markets, as well as constraints for primary dealers. I find that the Spanish payment rule is revenue inferior to the Discriminatory payment rule across all market price spreads, but the Average rule is revenue superior. For most market-price spreads, Uniform payment results in less revenue than Discriminatory, but there are many cases in which Vickrey payment produces more revenue.

I have developed a multiagent system platform that provides a valuable complement to the alternative research methods. The platform facilitates the development of heterogeneous agents in complex environments. The first application of the multiagent system is to the study of sealed-bid auctions with two-dimensional value signals from pure private to pure common value. I find that several auction outcomes are significantly nonlinear across the two-dimensional value signals. As the common value percent increases, profit, revenue, and efficiency all decrease monotonically, but they decrease in different ways. Finally, I find that forcing revelation by the auction winner of the true common value may have beneficial revenue effects when the common-value percent is high and there is a high degree of uncertainty about the common value. The second application of the multiagent system is to the study of English auctions with two-dimensional value signals using agents that learn a signal-averaging factor. I find that signal averaging increases nonlinearly as the common value percent increases, decreases with the number of bidders, and decreases at high common value percents when the common value signal is more uncertain. Using signal averaging, agents increase their profit when the value is more uncertain. The most obvious effect of signal averaging is on reducing the percentage of auctions won by bidders with the highest common value signal. The third application of the multiagent system is to the study of the optimal payment rule in Treasury auctions using Canadian rules. The model encompasses the when-issued, auction, and secondary markets, as well as constraints for primary dealers. I find that the Spanish payment rule is revenue inferior to the Discriminatory payment rule across all market price spreads, but the Average rule is revenue superior. For most market-price spreads, Uniform payment results in less revenue than Discriminatory, but there are many cases in which Vickrey payment produces more revenue.

Charles University in Prague Faculty of Social Sciences Institute of Economic Studies MASTER THESIS An Experimental Test of Design Alternatives for Spectrum Auctions with Communication Channels Author: Bc. Jindřich Matoušek Supervisor: PhDr. Lubomír Cingl Academic Year: 2013/2014 Abstract The multi-unit auction mechanisms are one of the most important instruments used for the allocation of spectrum licenses, airport time slots, delivery routes, networking or furniture allocation. This thesis experimentally examines the attributes of complex multi-unit auction mechanisms (Simultaneous Multi-Round Auction and its combinatorial extension Simultaneous Multi-Round Package Bidding) in the presence of an opportunity to collude among the bidding participants due to a provision of a simple communication channel - a chat window. The results suggest that in our parameter setting, the combinatorial bidding format does not bring higher efficiency. Interestingly, allowing for communication increases efficiency in both examined auction formats. Bidders are able to split the auctioned goods in a collusive agreement, which results in a better allocation compared to the auction formats without the communication channel. Combinatorial bidding on packages probably makes the decision-making problem of bidders hard to process...

Zahlungen für Ökosystemdienstleistungen (Payments for Ecosystem Services – PES) und auktionsbasierte Vergabeverfahren sind ein wichtiges und innovatives Instrument im Kampf gegen den fortwährenden Verlust von biologischer Vielfalt. Basierend auf einem Vertrag zwischen einem Leistungserbringer und einem öffentlichen oder privaten Leistungsempfänger, der die Naturschutzleistung entlohnt, können bestimmte Vorgaben der Landschaftspflege oder der agrarwirtschaftlichen Bearbeitung verbindlich festgelegt werden. Die Vorteile von PES liegen in dem direkten monetären Anreiz zur Bereitstellung von Naturschutzleistungen und zudem in der Möglichkeit, ein Niveau an Umweltschutz und –qualität jenseits des von der Umweltgesetzgebung sichergestellten Mindestniveaus zu implementieren. Der Nachteil liegt in der hohen Informationsasymmetrie in der Vertragsbeziehung, welche einerseits dem Umweltgut als Vertragsgegenstand und andererseits der Natur ökonomischen Handelns geschuldet ist. Thema dieser Dissertation ist die Analyse der interdependenten Beziehung von Kompetitivität und Vertragserfüllung und das Aufzeigen der Relevanz von Vertrauen und Reziprozität in Verträgen über Umweltgüter. Auf diese Weise leistet sie einen Beitrag zu der umfangreichen und multidisziplinären Literatur über Zahlungen für Ökosystemdienstleistungen und Naturschutzauktionen. Während der vergangenen 25 Jahre habe Praktiker und Wissenschaftler unser Verständnis der Funktionsweise von Ausschreibungen zur Allokation von Zahlungen für Ökosystemdienstleistungen konstant verbessert und erweitert. Ein Großteil der Forschungsaktivität war jedoch auf die Auktionsmetrik und das Bieterverhalten gerichtet, wohingegen die resultierende Vertragsbeziehung zwischen Programmverwaltern (den Käufern) und Landbesitzern (den Ausführenden) weitgehend unbeachtet blieb. Wie in dieser Dissertation bewiesen wird, ist jedoch genau diese Beziehung der Schlüssel für ein erfolgreiches marktbasiertes Naturschutzprogramm. In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird in drei Artikeln argumentiert, dass Vertrauen und Reziprozität für die Überwindung von asymmetrischer Information in kompetitiv alloziierten PES-Verträgen von herausragender Bedeutung sind. Anhand eines für diese Arbeit entwickelten, zweistufigen experimentellen Testszenarios wird der Entscheidungsprozess in der inversen Auktion und in der anschließenden Vertragserfüllung in der kontrollierten Laborumgebung simuliert. In einem ersten Experiment kann auf Basis dieses Untersuchungsdesigns gezeigt werden, dass die Informations- und Anreizkonstellation in Naturschutzauktionen ein erhöhtes Risiko für vorvertragliche adverse Selektion, opportunistisches Verhalten bei Vertragserfüllung und somit suboptimale Ergebnisse birgt. Das Marktversagen kann jedoch durch eine vertrauensstiftende Institution, wie zum Beispiel Kommunikation zwischen Käufern und Verkäufern, verhindert werden. Persönliche Interaktion veranlasst Marktteilnehmer ihr individuell-rationales Verhalten zugunsten einer sozial-verträglicheren Verhaltensweise zu ändern. Dabei entsteht ein erhebliches Potential für die Bilateralisierung der Vertragsbeziehungen. Ein zweites Experiment verdeutlicht jedoch, wie wichtig vertrauensbasierte Vertragsbeziehungen insbesondere in Bereitstellungsumgebungen sind, die stark von externen, stochastischen Einflüssen verzerrt werden können. Ohne das nötige Vertrauen bricht die Kooperation in einem derartigen Szenario fast vollständig zusammen. Schließlich lässt der systematische Vergleich der Ergebnisse aus beiden Experimenten in einem dritten Aufsatz keinen Zweifel daran, dass stabile Langzeitvertragsbeziehungen in auktionsbasierten Vertragsnaturschutzprogrammen gefördert und nicht verhindert werden sollten. Langzeitverträge sind randomisierten Kurzzeitverträgen aus der Perspektive des Naturschutzes aber auch hinsichtlich der Kosteneffektivität überlegen. Daher liegt eine wesentliche Herausforderung für Programmentwickler darin, einerseits die Bildung von ausreichend Sozialkapital zu ermöglichen und andererseits faire Markt- und Vergabestrukturen zu erhalten.

El enfoque experimental es el corazón de algunos de los desarrollos más interesantes de la economía. Básicamente, los experimentos se utilizan para generar datos controlados. El término "datos controlados" se refiere al hecho de que la mayoría de los factores en los que influyen las conductas se mantienen constantes, y solo un factor de interés (el "tratamiento'') cambia a la vez. Este es el punto crítico para hacer una inferencia causal. A veces, este proceso de generación ocurre de forma natural (es decir, un "experimento natural''). Sin embargo, la mayoría de las veces, el investigador es el encargado de desarrollar y controlar el proceso de generación. Todas las áreas de la ciencia (incluida la economía) deben considerar todas las metodologías que se pueden aplicar. La teoría, los experimentos de laboratorio, los experimentos de campo, los experimentos online, la neuroeconomía, la investigación observacional y social, las encuestas y más, contribuyen a nuestra comprensión del mundo. En el primer capítulo de a tesis, se presentan resultados experimentales sobre subastas. Se consideran dos tratamientos experimentales: si el comprador prefiere más la calidad a la dimensión del precio, o si este último importa más que la calidad. Los participantes se asignan al azar a uno de estos dos tratamientos y se emparejan en grupos de cinco. Juegan una subasta de períodos múltiples, donde la calidad es exógena asignada en cada ronda y los sujetos presentan una rebaja al precio base anunciado. Las pujas se transforman en puntuaciones que combinan la calidad exógena y la rebaja. El vendedor con la puntuación más alta gana la subasta. Los resultados sugieren que, cuando el peso de la rebaja es mayor, los participantes pujan más cerca del equilibrio. Sin embargo, la probabilidad de obtener un resultado eficiente es mayor cuando se pone más peso en la calidad. En el segundo capítulo analizo los resultados de un experimento en línea en el que los sujetos juegan cuatro versiones del juego Stag-Hunt. Hay tres tratamientos: línea de base, retraso de tiempo y retraso motivado. En el segundo, los sujetos deben esperar 40 segundos antes de elegir una decisión. En el tercero, deben esperar 40 segundos y escribir un texto para motivar sus decisiones. Al final del juego, los participantes informan sobre creencias, preferencias de riesgo y una medida de confianza. El resultado principal es que los sujetos optan por colaborar menos cuando deliberan más. La explicación es que este tratamiento ayuda a los sujetos a comprender que esta es la opción más segura. En el tercer capítulo, los autores estiman el impacto de un programa educativo basado en juegos destinado a promover el uso sostenible del agua. Esto se hizo en la ciudad de Lucca, con miles de alumnos de 2º a 4º de primaria. Los hallazgos indican que los estudiantes del grupo de tratamiento (participantes del programa) mostraron una mayor conciencia sobre el consumo de agua respecto a aquellos estudiantes que no participaron en el programa. Además, encuentran que el efecto positivo aún se observa después de seis meses, lo que sugiere que los programas educativos basados en juegos pueden ser un instrumento eficaz para promover comportamientos prosociales en el consumo de agua.