A expansão da oferta energética frente à crescente demanda se mostra como um grande desafio para o país nas últimas décadas, tanto que para estimular os investimentos privados na área de geração de energia elétrica, o poder executivo, em 2003, iniciou as discussões de forma a apresentar seus objetivos e os pré-requisitos para alcançá-los e que mais tarde viria a se transformar na reforma do modelo institucional, introduzida no ano de 2004. Um dos marcos da reforma promovida são os leilões de compra de energia elétrica, tanto de geração existente, quanto de empreendimentos novos, sendo que a modalidades de contratação da energia pode ser por quantidade e por disponibilidade. Na modalidade de contratação por quantidade, o gerador vender um determinado montante de energia a um preço e deverá entregá-la ao comprador independentemente do seu montante de geração verificada em cada período. Na modalidade de contratação de energia por disponibilidade, o empreendedor é remunerado pelo investimento incorrido para construção e manutenção da usina, sendo ressarcido pelos compradores do contrato no custo de operação da usina incorrido, em caso de despacho da geração pelo operador do sistema elétrico. A contratação por disponibilidade é aplicada aos empreendimentos termelétricos e eólicos, cujos combustíveis podem ser desde os ventos e resíduos agrícolas de baixo custo, até óleo combustível derivado de petróleo com um alto custo e suscetível às oscilações de preço no mercado internacional. Esse custo assumido pelo comprador é um dos principais pontos de discussão desse trabalho, uma vez que por ocasião do leilão esse custo é ainda uma mera estimativa intrinsecamente relacionada com a operação eletro-energética do sistema elétrico brasileiro. Além disso, será introduzida a discussão sobre o impacto do custo da energia contratada por disponibilidade na tarifa dos consumidores, como resultado do próprio leilão associado à estratégia de cada distribuidora para contratação de seu mercado. / Electric energy supply of the fast growing demand in Brazil has been a challenge for the country in the last fifteen years. In order to stimulate power generation investments, a new institutional power sector model was introduced in 2004. This model introduced the obligation of the energy requirements acquisition by Distribution Utilities (DISCO) only through energy auctions from old and new power plants. New power plants energy auctions can be performed in two different ways: energy and capacity contracts. In the energy contracts, the energy amount is guaranteed by the seller, frequently in the case of hydro power plants. On the other hand, in the capacity arrangements the seller requires a fee, which results from the bidding process, as well as a charge defined to recover maintenance and fuel costs of thermal power plants, if the plant were requested to dispatch. Thermal power plants are dispatched by the Independent System Operator (ISO) using hydrothermal system optimization model. However, fuel costs are paid by DISCOs and will be passed-through to the end customers tariffs. The main focus of this work, is the economical and financial risks of capacity arrangement and the impact in the captive customers tariffs.

A comercialização da energia elétrica por parte de empresas geradoras que já possuem suas usinas construídas é um tema de grande relevância no setor. A dificuldade em definir a estratégia de venda desta energia, dentre as opções disponíveis no atual modelo regulatório, torna necessário o desenvolvimento de metodologias e ferramentas que auxiliem na tomada de decisão, contabilizando as expectativas e riscos destas decisões. A metodologia com ferramental associado apresentada neste trabalho foi desenvolvida com base em conceitos amplamente utilizados no mercado financeiro para a formação de portfólio de ativos, aliados ao conceito basilar de utilidade das geradoras de energia elétrica, permitindo quantificar a predisposição à tomada de risco e a estruturação de informações públicas dos agentes do setor para a definição de perfis de geradores em relação à estratégia de venda de energia. A contribuição central deste trabalho reside na proposta de uma metodologia que define a melhor estratégia de participação em leilões de energia existente para geradores. / The energy trading activity for Generation Companies (Gencos) owning operating existing power plants is a topic of great relevance in the industry. The difficulty to define the energy selling strategy, given all available options in the actual regulatory model, makes necessary the development of methodologies and tools for decision making support, accounting the expectations and risks embedded in these decisions. The methodology and associated computational tool presented in this work was developed based on concepts widely used in the financial market for assets portfolio composition, the Gencos utility, making feasible to quantify the predisposition of risktaking, and the structuring of public information from the players involved for the definition of generators profiles in relation to the strategy of selling energy. The main contribution of this work lies on the validation of one methodology that defines the Gencos best strategy participation in the auctions designed for trading the existing power plants energy production.

Neste projeto apresentamos três modelos para publicidade na Internet, e mecanismos associados a cada modelo, analisando suas propriedades como estabilidade, otimalidade, prova de estratégia, e consumo de tempo. Primeiramente apresentamos um dos primeiros artigos publicados sobre o problema de leilões para publicidade na Internet, que descreve essencialmente o funcionamento dos atuais leilões para publidade na Internet. Em seguida, apresentamos outros dois modelos. O primeiro deles permite publicidade com exclusividade. O segundo modelo permite mais opções ao leiloeiro e aos anunciantes, ao permitir preços mínimos de venda e preços máximos de compra. / In this project we present three Internet sponsored search advertising models, and mechanisms related to each model, analyzing properties such as stability, optimality, strategy-proof, and time consumption. We start presenting one of the first articles on the problem of sponsored search advertising. Next, we present other two models. The first one allows exclusivity advertising. The second model allows a wider variety of options for both the auctioneer and the bidders, including minimum selling prices and maximum buying prices.

Há dez anos, as ações do Programa Nacional de Produção e Uso de Biodiesel (PNPB) inseriram o biodiesel na matriz energética brasileira. A venda de biodiesel com a finalidade de suprir os estoques que o Governo necessita, para cumprir a exigência do porcentual de mistura obrigatória por lei, é realizada por meio de leilões e estes são regulamentados pela Agência Nacional de Petróleo, Gás Natural e Biocombustíveis (ANP). Tal regulamentação inclui e dá privilégios de participação nos leilões aos possuidores do Selo Combustível Social (SCS), que, por sua vez, é concedido às empresas que adquirem parcela de sua matéria-prima de agricultores familiares enquadrados no Programa Nacional de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar (PRONAF). Diante disso, este trabalho tem como objetivo identificar e estudar os fatores que influenciaram a evolução do mercado brasileiro de biodiesel sob a ótica da oferta deste produto nos leilões públicos realizados pela ANP. Primeiramente, buscou-se descrever a evolução da produção de biodiesel no Brasil, detalhar as principais variações comportamentais do mercado e verificar o cumprimento das principais funções do sistema. Para isso, foram feitas análises gerais acerca de volumes ofertados e arrematados, preços máximo e médio, e deságios. A análise da estrutura de mercado que melhor delineia o setor foi feita de acordo com o grau de concentração das empresas participantes dos leilões. Para isso foram utilizados o índice de Razão de Concentração (CR), o índice de Hirshman-Herfindahl (HH) e o índice de Entropia de Theil (TH). A partir do resultado desta, buscou-se detectar e quantificar os fatores que mais influenciaram tais índices. Para isso, foi utilizada a prática econométrica com um modelo de Regressão Linear Múltipla. Os dados coletados a partir do site da ANP foram analisados com a utilização do pacote estatístico StataCorp LP, versão 12.0, adotando o intervalo de confiança de 95% para a análise. Os resultados obtidos mostraram que o mercado de biodiesel no Brasil foi concentrado inicialmente, porém, a partir do aumento da quantidade de empresas participantes, do percentual de mistura obrigatório e do amadurecimento do PNPB, o mercado foi se desconcentrando e efetivando-se em moderadamente concentrado. Assim, constatou-se que o setor de biodiesel é caracterizado pelo oligopólio como estrutura de mercado. Mais especificamente, oligopólio puro. / Ten years ago, the actions of the National Program for Production and Use of Biodiesel (PNPB) inserted biodiesel in the Brazilian energy matrix. The sale of biodiesel in order to meet the stocks that the government needs to meet the requirement of mandatory blending percentage by law, is carried out through auctions and these are regulated by the National Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP). Such legislation includes and gives privileges to participate in auctions to the holders of the Social Fuel Seal (SCS), which, in turn, is granted to companies taking over part of its raw materials from family farmers framed in the National Family Farming Strengthening Program (PRONAF). Thus, this study aims to identify and study the factors that influenced the evolution of Brazilian biodiesel market from the perspective of supply of the product in public auctions held by the ANP. First, we attempted to describe the evolution of biodiesel production in Brazil, detailing the major behavioral changes in the market and verify compliance with the main system functions. For this, general analyzes were made about offered and auctioned volumes, maximum and average prices, and discounts. The analysis of the market structure that best outlines the sector was made according to the degree of concentration of the participants of the auction company. For this we used the concentration ratio index (CR), the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HH) and the entropy index of Theil (TH). From the result of this, we sought to detect and quantify the factors affecting such rates. For this, we used the econometric practice with a multiple linear regression model. The data collected from the ANP site were analyzed using the statistical package Stata Corp LP, version 12.0, adopting the 95% confidence interval for analysis. The results showed that the biodiesel market in Brazil was concentrated initially, however, from the increased amount of participating companies, the mandatory blending percentage and ripening PNPB, the market was to decentralizing and making effective in moderately concentrated . Considering the studied literature, it appears that the biodiesel industry is characterized by oligopoly as market structure. More specifically, pure oligopoly.

Chan Ying Leung. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 85-89). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Importance of Reverse Auctions --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- A Research Gap in Existing Literatures --- p.3 / Chapter 1.3 --- Research Focus --- p.4 / Chapter 1.4 --- Contributions of This Thesis --- p.5 / Chapter 1.5 --- Organization of This Thesis --- p.5 / Chapter 2 --- Background and Literature Review --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1 --- Review of Reverse Auctions --- p.6 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- Benefits of Reverse Auctions to Buyers --- p.9 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- Types of Reverse Auctions --- p.11 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- Implementation of the Entry-fee Reverse Auction --- p.13 / Chapter 2.2 --- Linkage between the Entry-fee Reverse Auction and the Multi- period Inventory Replenishment Model --- p.16 / Chapter 2.3 --- The Multi-period Inventory Replenishment Model with TOQC --- p.17 / Chapter 3 --- The Basic Models --- p.18 / Chapter 3.1 --- Strategic Sourcing Methodology - The Entry-fee Reverse Auc- tion --- p.18 / Chapter 3.1.1 --- Numerical Example --- p.26 / Chapter 3.2 --- Operational Procurement Methodology ´ؤ The Multi-period Inventory Replenishment Model with TOQC --- p.29 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Numerical Example --- p.33 / Chapter 3.3 --- Chapter Summary --- p.34 / Chapter 4 --- Modifications Required for Integrating the Entry-fee Reverse Auction and the Multi-period Replenishment Model with TOQC --- p.36 / Chapter 4.1 --- Formulation of the Buyer's Expected Profit Function in the Multi-period Setting --- p.37 / Chapter 4.2 --- The Existence of Optimal TOQC --- p.38 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- Convexity of the Last-period Optimality Equation --- p.39 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Convexity of the Two-period Problem --- p.41 / Chapter 4.2.3 --- Convexity of the N-period Problem --- p.44 / Chapter 4.3 --- The Computability of the Optimal TOQC --- p.47 / Chapter 4.4 --- Chapter Summary --- p.47 / Chapter 5 --- The Revised Model --- p.48 / Chapter 5.1 --- The Entry-fee Reverse Auction in the Multi-period Setting with TOQC --- p.48 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- Numerical Example --- p.55 / Chapter 5.2 --- Chapter Summary --- p.59 / Chapter 6 --- Numerical Analysis --- p.60 / Chapter 6.1 --- Comparison between the Fixed-quantity Reverse Auction and the Entry-fee Reverse Auction --- p.60 / Chapter 6.1.1 --- Number of Supplier --- p.63 / Chapter 6.1.2 --- Retail Price --- p.65 / Chapter 6.1.3 --- Coefficient of Variation for Demand Distribution . --- p.66 / Chapter 6.1.4 --- Average Improvement --- p.67 / Chapter 6.2 --- Duration of the Entry-fee Reverse Auction Cycle --- p.68 / Chapter 6.3 --- Chapter Summary --- p.76 / Chapter 7 --- Factors of Success for Holding the Entry-fee Reverse Auction --- p.77 / Chapter 7.1 --- Internal Organizational Infrastructure of the Buyer --- p.77 / Chapter 7.2 --- Supplier's Qualifications and Control --- p.78 / Chapter 7.3 --- Attractions of the Entry-fee Reverse Auction for Suppliers . . --- p.78 / Chapter 7.4 --- Procedural Fairness --- p.81 / Chapter 7.5 --- Total Cost Analysis --- p.81 / Chapter 7.6 --- Chapter Summary --- p.82 / Chapter 8 --- Concluding Remarks --- p.83 / Bibliography --- p.85 / Chapter A --- Order Statistics --- p.90 / Chapter B --- Conditional Order Statistics --- p.92 / Chapter C --- Virtual Marginal Cost of Procurement --- p.93

A comercialização da energia elétrica por parte de empresas geradoras que já possuem suas usinas construídas é um tema de grande relevância no setor. A dificuldade em definir a estratégia de venda desta energia, dentre as opções disponíveis no atual modelo regulatório, torna necessário o desenvolvimento de metodologias e ferramentas que auxiliem na tomada de decisão, contabilizando as expectativas e riscos destas decisões. A metodologia com ferramental associado apresentada neste trabalho foi desenvolvida com base em conceitos amplamente utilizados no mercado financeiro para a formação de portfólio de ativos, aliados ao conceito basilar de utilidade das geradoras de energia elétrica, permitindo quantificar a predisposição à tomada de risco e a estruturação de informações públicas dos agentes do setor para a definição de perfis de geradores em relação à estratégia de venda de energia. A contribuição central deste trabalho reside na proposta de uma metodologia que define a melhor estratégia de participação em leilões de energia existente para geradores. / The energy trading activity for Generation Companies (Gencos) owning operating existing power plants is a topic of great relevance in the industry. The difficulty to define the energy selling strategy, given all available options in the actual regulatory model, makes necessary the development of methodologies and tools for decision making support, accounting the expectations and risks embedded in these decisions. The methodology and associated computational tool presented in this work was developed based on concepts widely used in the financial market for assets portfolio composition, the Gencos utility, making feasible to quantify the predisposition of risktaking, and the structuring of public information from the players involved for the definition of generators profiles in relation to the strategy of selling energy. The main contribution of this work lies on the validation of one methodology that defines the Gencos best strategy participation in the auctions designed for trading the existing power plants energy production.

A expansão da oferta energética frente à crescente demanda se mostra como um grande desafio para o país nas últimas décadas, tanto que para estimular os investimentos privados na área de geração de energia elétrica, o poder executivo, em 2003, iniciou as discussões de forma a apresentar seus objetivos e os pré-requisitos para alcançá-los e que mais tarde viria a se transformar na reforma do modelo institucional, introduzida no ano de 2004. Um dos marcos da reforma promovida são os leilões de compra de energia elétrica, tanto de geração existente, quanto de empreendimentos novos, sendo que a modalidades de contratação da energia pode ser por quantidade e por disponibilidade. Na modalidade de contratação por quantidade, o gerador vender um determinado montante de energia a um preço e deverá entregá-la ao comprador independentemente do seu montante de geração verificada em cada período. Na modalidade de contratação de energia por disponibilidade, o empreendedor é remunerado pelo investimento incorrido para construção e manutenção da usina, sendo ressarcido pelos compradores do contrato no custo de operação da usina incorrido, em caso de despacho da geração pelo operador do sistema elétrico. A contratação por disponibilidade é aplicada aos empreendimentos termelétricos e eólicos, cujos combustíveis podem ser desde os ventos e resíduos agrícolas de baixo custo, até óleo combustível derivado de petróleo com um alto custo e suscetível às oscilações de preço no mercado internacional. Esse custo assumido pelo comprador é um dos principais pontos de discussão desse trabalho, uma vez que por ocasião do leilão esse custo é ainda uma mera estimativa intrinsecamente relacionada com a operação eletro-energética do sistema elétrico brasileiro. Além disso, será introduzida a discussão sobre o impacto do custo da energia contratada por disponibilidade na tarifa dos consumidores, como resultado do próprio leilão associado à estratégia de cada distribuidora para contratação de seu mercado. / Electric energy supply of the fast growing demand in Brazil has been a challenge for the country in the last fifteen years. In order to stimulate power generation investments, a new institutional power sector model was introduced in 2004. This model introduced the obligation of the energy requirements acquisition by Distribution Utilities (DISCO) only through energy auctions from old and new power plants. New power plants energy auctions can be performed in two different ways: energy and capacity contracts. In the energy contracts, the energy amount is guaranteed by the seller, frequently in the case of hydro power plants. On the other hand, in the capacity arrangements the seller requires a fee, which results from the bidding process, as well as a charge defined to recover maintenance and fuel costs of thermal power plants, if the plant were requested to dispatch. Thermal power plants are dispatched by the Independent System Operator (ISO) using hydrothermal system optimization model. However, fuel costs are paid by DISCOs and will be passed-through to the end customers tariffs. The main focus of this work, is the economical and financial risks of capacity arrangement and the impact in the captive customers tariffs.

Zhang, Nianbing. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 113-118). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Overview --- p.1 / Chapter 1.2 --- Motivation --- p.2 / Chapter 1.3 --- The Research Scope and Main Results --- p.4 / Chapter 1.3.1 --- The Mechanism --- p.4 / Chapter 1.3.2 --- Statement of Problem --- p.8 / Chapter 1.3.3 --- Main Results --- p.11 / Chapter 1.4 --- Structure of Research --- p.13 / Chapter 2 --- Survey of the Literature --- p.15 / Chapter 2.1 --- Overview --- p.15 / Chapter 2.2 --- E-business --- p.16 / Chapter 2.3 --- Auction --- p.18 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Introduction --- p.18 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Auction Theory --- p.20 / Chapter 2.3.3 --- Online Auctions --- p.21 / Chapter 2.4 --- Combination of Auction and Other Transaction Methods --- p.24 / Chapter 2.4.1 --- Auction with Posted Price --- p.24 / Chapter 2.4.2 --- Auction with Negotiation Process --- p.26 / Chapter 2.4.3 --- Auction with Noncompetitive Contract --- p.28 / Chapter 3 --- Single Unit Noncompetitive Contract --- p.29 / Chapter 3.1 --- The Model --- p.29 / Chapter 3.2 --- Strategy of Suppliers in the Auction --- p.31 / Chapter 3.3 --- Strategy of Selected Suppliers --- p.33 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Selected Supplier of No-Information Case --- p.33 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Supplier in Information Case --- p.40 / Chapter 3.4 --- Buyer´ةs Consideration --- p.44 / Chapter 3.4.1 --- Buyer's Cost in No-Information Case --- p.44 / Chapter 3.4.2 --- Buyer's Cost in Information Case --- p.45 / Chapter 3.4.3 --- Comparison of Costs in the Two Information Scenarios --- p.47 / Chapter 4 --- Buyer´ةs Strategy: Lower Cost and More Flexibility for Suppliers --- p.49 / Chapter 4.1 --- Is the Noncompetitive Contract Necessary --- p.50 / Chapter 4.1.1 --- No-Information Case --- p.50 / Chapter 4.1.2 --- Information Case --- p.52 / Chapter 4.2 --- Flexibility of Re-Entrance to Auction --- p.53 / Chapter 4.2.1 --- No-Information Case --- p.54 / Chapter 4.2.2 --- Information Case --- p.58 / Chapter 4.3 --- Flexibility of Making Decision After the Auction --- p.65 / Chapter 4.3.1 --- No-Information Case --- p.66 / Chapter 4.3.2 --- Information Case --- p.69 / Chapter 5 --- Multiple Noncompetitive Contracts --- p.73 / Chapter 5.1 --- No-Information Case --- p.74 / Chapter 5.1.1 --- Suppliers's Strategy --- p.74 / Chapter 5.1.2 --- Buyer´ةs Consideration --- p.76 / Chapter 5.2 --- Information Case --- p.78 / Chapter 5.2.1 --- Supplier's Strategy --- p.78 / Chapter 5.2.2 --- Computation of Buyer's Cost --- p.81 / Chapter 5.2.3 --- Comparison with the Case of One Noncompetitive Contract --- p.85 / Chapter 5.2.4 --- The Effect of Supplier´ةs Information --- p.89 / Chapter 5.3 --- General Number of Noncompetitive Contract --- p.91 / Chapter 5.3.1 --- No-Information Case --- p.91 / Chapter 5.3.2 --- Information Case --- p.94 / Chapter 6 --- Alternative Forms of Contracts --- p.96 / Chapter 6.1 --- SBIB Model --- p.97 / Chapter 6.2 --- SNIB Model --- p.98 / Chapter 6.2.1 --- Supplier's Strategy --- p.98 / Chapter 6.2.2 --- Buyer´ةs Cost in No-Information Case --- p.100 / Chapter 6.2.3 --- Buyer's Cost in Information Case --- p.103 / Chapter 6.2.4 --- Multiple Units Offered --- p.105 / Chapter 7 --- Conclusion --- p.110

Heterogeneous Computing (HC) systems achieve high performance by networking together computing resources of diverse nature. The issues of task assignment and scheduling are critical in the design and performance of such systems. In this thesis, an auction based game theoretic framework is developed for dynamic task scheduling in HC systems. Based on the proposed game theoretic model, a new dynamic scheduling algorithm is developed that uses auction based strategies. The dynamic scheduling algorithm yields schedules with shorter completion times than static schedulers while incurring higher scheduling overhead. Thus, a second scheduling algorithm is proposed which uses an initial schedule generated with a learning automaton based algorithm, and then heuristics are used to identify windows of tasks within the application that can be rescheduled dynamically during run time.

The modern economy includes a variety of markets, and the Internet has opened opportunities for efficient on-line trading. Researchers have developed algorithms for various auctions, which have become a popular means for on-line sales. They have also designed algorithms for exchange-based markets, similar to the traditional stock exchange, which support fast-paced trading of rigidly standardized securities. In contrast, there has been little work on exchanges for complex nonstandard commodities, such as used cars or collectible stamps. We propose a formal model for trading of complex goods, and present an automated exchange for a limited version of this model. The exchange allows the traders to describe commodities by multiple attributes; for example, a car buyer may specify a model, options, color, and other desirable properties. Furthermore, a trader may enter constraints on the acceptable items rather than a specific item; for example, a buyer may look for any car that satisfies certain constraints, rather than for one particular vehicle. We present an extensive empirical evaluation of the implemented exchange, using artificial data, and then give results for two real-world markets, used cars and commercial paper. The experiments show that the system supports markets with up to 260,000 orders, and generates one hundred to one thousand trades per second.