Honors Project--Smith College, Northampton, Mass., 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 30-32).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1996. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 212-223). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Pennsylvania State University, 1993. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 65-70).

Honors Project--Smith College, Northampton, Mass., 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 23-24).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2005. / Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center; full text release delayed at author's request until 2006 Jul 29.

Thesis (D. Min.)--Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, 2007. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references.

Political success in semi-democratic countries has two aspects: shifting the balance of power in one’s favor and maintaining it. This thesis seeks to examine how the AKP has succeeded in shifting the balance of power in its favor while its predecessor the Welfare Party did not. Focusing on electoral success, existing research primarily lists center-periphery conflict, moderation, class struggle, party organization, and failures of others as the main determinants. Yet the significance of reining in the power of the Kemalist state structure has been mostly disregarded. Therefore, with a comparison of the AKP (2002-2007) and the Welfare Party (1996-1997) governments, this study tests one assertion using most-similar systems research design that in semi-democratic political settings with strong authoritarian actors, political parties that build broad coalitions via group specific policy promises will be more likely to shift the balance of power in favor of themselves than actors that lack such connections.

This thesis seeks to uncover the ways in which China has seized political control of the HKSAR with the use of patron-client politics, before ultimately examining the growth of democracy within this patron-client system of governance. This goal was pursued with the intention of shedding light on the legitimacy of Chinese rule in HK and in order to consider the extent to which the HKSAR can really be called a democracy. In answering these questions, we consider both Chinese and HK history, as to understand how each region's political history has influenced governance in modern HK. We then move on to an in-depth analysis of what pro-Beijing and pro-democracy forces have each done to further their own agendas –what political and institutional successes and failures have each had, and to what degree of significance? We ultimately conclude that although Beijing governance, and consequently patrimonialism, is here to stay, democracy certainly has room for growth –In an attempt to balance electoral competitiveness and the patrimonialism, the HKSAR will continue to grow in unique ways that perhaps the world has not yet seen before. HK's political growth should matter not only to Hong Kongers, as it represents China’s first genuine attempt at experimenting with democracy, albeit in perhaps reserved ways. Furthermore, China's operations within Hong Kong’s more democratic arena have brought to light parts of its own character that otherwise may have remained shrouded in shadows. If China is ever to follow global trends towards democracy and perhaps pave the road for more to follow, we will certainly be able to trace the roots of change back to HK.

Since the late 1990s, governments across the post-Soviet space have redefined freedom of conscience as freedom from "non-traditional" religious groups — part of a broader effort to recast pluralism as a threat to national sovereignty. This dissertation focuses on the Central Asian states of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, which have restricted such groups as the Jehovah's Witnesses, the Ahmadi Muslim community, and the Chinese spiritual movement Falun Gong. It analyzes why illiberal regimes restrict marginal and apolitical religious groups, which are often more docile than the population at large. Furthermore, it addresses why policies that infringe on civil liberties nevertheless enjoy popular support. These questions take on greater significance in the midst of the current global retreat from democratic values. Yet they cannot be answered by the prevailing instrumentalist perspective in political theory, which assumes that rational citizens should seek to maximize individual liberties. Popular support for authoritarian figures has prompted scholars to propose non-instrumental motivations, such as national and religious identity. Rather than treat “identity“ as non-instrumental, I propose a relational model of identity politics, wherein pluralism and essentialism represent opposing strategies in a competitive political field. Drawing from Bourdieu's work on public politics, I argue that essentialist claims to authority (e.g. ethnic nationalism, religious populism) appeal to strata with relatively low capacity for autonomous political mobilization. Illiberal regimes propagate essentialist claims on behalf of such strata, and repress even benign forms of pluralism as part of this essentialist social contract. I investigate these hypotheses by examining recent discourses on religious tradition in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. I employ a dataset of 5,000 public documents (legislation, court rulings, etc.), which I analyze using qualitative coding. In addition, I draw on interviews with government officials and religious leaders collected during fieldwork between 2012 and 2014, and on data from the World Values Survey. I find that the political and religious establishments of both states are erecting new orthodoxies that consecrate the will of their political bases as essential to national self-determination. Thus, illiberal democracies maintain popular support by redistributing authority (symbolic capital, per Bourdieu) to core constituencies at the expense of peripheral constituencies.

This article analyzes the factors that contributed to Cesar Alvarez’s administration stability as regional president of Ancash during almost two full consecutive terms (2006 – 2013). Thus, the research focuses on the development of clientelistic and patronage networks that strength- ened his ties with citizens, providing him with constant support. Moreover, those practices protected him from any act of fiscalization or investigation. Finally, public spending, largely financed with mining canon, made possible for Alvarez to show himself as an efficient regional president by developing major infrastructure projects in the region. / El presente artículo se centra en los factores que dieron estabilidad a la gestión del expresidente regional de Áncash,  César Álvarez,  durante casi dos periodos consecutivos (2006- 2013) y con probables miras hacia uno tercero. De esta manera, la investigación se enfoca en el desarrollo de redes clientelares y de patronazgo que fortalecieron los nexos que estableció con la ciudadanía, proporcionándole apoyo constante. Asimismo, aquellas prácticas le sirvieron de blindaje ante cualquier acto de fiscalización o investigación. Por último, el gasto público en gran parte producto del canon minero, hizo que Álvarez se demuestre como una autoridad eficiente alpromocionar grandes obras de infraestructura -sobrevaloradas- en la región.