The United States acted unilaterally to terminate the Bretton Woods monetary system in August 1971, and international exchange rate management went from a regime of fixed to floating parities, much to the displeasure of the membership of the European Community. The Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations adopted policies that heavily benefited U.S. reform objectives and domestic economic goals, which frequently clashed with allied concerns, and damaged American monetary relations with France and West Germany. Yet, the inability of France and the Federal Republic of Germany to form cohesive economic and monetary policies throughout international negotiations or within the European Community (EC), allowed American desires to dictate the path and pace of European integration. France and Germany attempted, with limited success, to influence U.S. monetary policy through bilateral diplomacy during years of exchange rate fluctuations, dollar devaluations, oil shocks, and payments deficits. Finally, President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt created the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979, reversing the trend of half-hearted attempts at European integration so relevant the decade before. The EMS detached the EC's currencies from the dollar's control, was compatible with the reformed international monetary system, advanced a more independent European monetary identity, and formed the base for future monetary integration. As a result, the EMS, as the birthplace of the Euro, the single European currency launched in 2002, may soon rival the dollar's position as the primary reserve currency. American monetary policies designed to improve the health of the dollar during the 1970s were a catalyst for European integration. However, as the European Union deepens its economic integration and the Euro grows in strength, it seems that U.S. policies created a regime and a currency that will challenge its dominant position in international monetary affairs.

Submitted by FRANCIELI MARTINS BATISTA (franci_martins@hotmail.com) on 2018-10-01T13:16:09Z No. of bitstreams: 1 VF_francieli martins batista.pdf: 1619431 bytes, checksum: d385f7619ad6b0c65884b9880476fe25 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Satie Tagara (satie@marilia.unesp.br) on 2018-10-01T14:38:17Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 batista_fm_me_mar.pdf: 1619431 bytes, checksum: d385f7619ad6b0c65884b9880476fe25 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-10-01T14:38:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 batista_fm_me_mar.pdf: 1619431 bytes, checksum: d385f7619ad6b0c65884b9880476fe25 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-08-31 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar a crise do “milagre” no Brasil e a relação estabelecida no contexto internacional marcada pela crise de Bretton Woods. O período discutido diz respeito à trajetória da ditadura militar brasileira, entre os anos 1964 e meados da década de 1980. Observamos que as transformações ocorridas a partir da ascensão dos militares ao poder representaram um ponto de inflexão na organização política e econômica do país. As relações entre Estado e sociedade se redefiniram e foram marcadas pelo aprofundamento da autocracia burguesa dado, a destituição da institucionalidade liberal-democrática. Nesse bojo, o projeto de desenvolvimento encetado neste momento esteve amparado sob uma significativa reestruturação do sistema financeiro do país voltada para a entrada de capitais externos e, sobretudo, por medidas que ensejavam facilitar a tomada de empréstimos no mercado internacional, evidenciando novas facetas do padrão de financiamento do Brasil. O arranjo econômico encetado, acomodava-se às vicissitudes da economia internacional uma vez que, a reprodução ampliada do capital deslocava-se, cada vez mais, para a esfera financeira. Esse processo resultou em um crescimento extraordinário do país alcançado no limiar dos anos de 1960, o chamado “milagre” econômico. Entendemos, deste modo, que o bloco histórico capitaneado pelo regime militar se deu em razão do capital monopolista, cuja a fração financeira assumiu a preponderância na reprodução capitalista no Brasil. O fenômeno delineado nos permite alcançar as razões que levaram à crise do “milagre” e o intrínseco vínculo com as transformações postas à nível internacional, sucedidas pela crise de Bretton Woods e o avanço da dominação do capital financeiro. Do mesmo modo, é possível observar a notável agudização da dependência do país, subordinado à lógica de acumulação financeira. / This dissertation aims to analyze the crisis of the "miracle" in Brazil and its established the relation in the international context marked by the Bretton Woods crisis. The period under discussion concerns the trajectory of the Brazilian military dictatorship between 1964 and the mid-1980s. We observed that the transformations that occurred from the rise of the military to power represented a turning point in the political and economic organization of the country. The relations between State and society were redefined and marked by the deepening of bourgeois autocracy given the destructionof liberal-democratic institutionality. In this context, the development project lauched at that moment was supported by a significant restructuring of the country's financial system aimed at the inflow of foreign capital and, above all, by measures that facilitated the lowans in the international market, showing evidences of new facets of Brazil’s finacing patterns. The economic arrangement initiated was getting accommodated to the international economy vicissitudes once the enlarged reproduction of the capital was being deslocated, more and more, to the financial sphere. This process resulted in an extraordinary growth for the country that was reached at the threshold of the 1960s, which was called and reffered to as an economic "miracle". We understand, thus, that the historical block captained by the military regime was due to monopoly capital, and its financial fraction became preponderant on the capitalist reproduction in Brazil. The outlined phenomenon allows us to reach the reasons that led to the crisis of the "miracle" and the intrinsic link with the transformations set at the international level, succeeded by the Bretton Woods crisis and the advance of the domination of financial capital. In the same way, it is possible to observe the remarkable sharpening of the country's dependence, subordinated to the logic of financial accumulation.

O sistema de Bretton Woods 2 propõe a existência, nos dias atuais, de uma dinâmica semelhante à vigente até 1971, na qual os EUA continuam como economia central e os países asiáticos passam a ocupar o papel de nova periferia, com estratégias de desenvolvimento baseadas na competitividade de seu setor exportador de modo a construir um estoque doméstico de capital capaz de competir nos mercados internacionais. O debate sobre esse sistema ganhou relevância durante a década de 2000, associado às discussões sobre os desequilíbrios globais, e se intensificou com a crise de 2008-09. As previsões feitas pelos críticos do arranjo de Bretton Woods 2, que anteviam um movimento de fuga dos ativos denominados em dólar e a desvalorização da moeda norte-americana, não se confirmaram. Ao contrário, nos momentos de maior aversão a risco, a demanda por títulos do Tesouro dos EUA cresceu significativamente. O desempenho econômico dos países alinhados ao sistema também foi aparentemente melhor do que a média global durante a crise, com menor desaceleração e retomada mais rápida, sendo a China frequentemente destacada como exemplo de sucesso econômico no período. Este estudo tem como proposta avaliar em que medida o desempenho econômico dos países alinhados ao sistema de Bretton Woods 2 realmente diferiu daquele dos não alinhados, durante e logo após a crise. Conjuntamente, o estudo investiga se o desempenho na crise teria servido como incentivo a outros países para um alinhamento ao modelo e conclui que, embora tenha havido ações pontuais nesse sentido, as políticas que caracterizariam uma adesão mais evidente ao sistema de Bretton Woods 2 são ações de difícil compatibilização em países democráticos, com contas de capital relativamente abertas e objetivos conflitantes de política econômica, particularmente em momentos de crise. / The Bretton Woods 2 system proposes the existence, at the current time, of a system similar to that which was in force up until 1971, whereby the US remains as the central economy and the Asian countries assume the role of a new periphery, with development strategies based on their export sectors so as to build a domestic stock of capital capable of competing on the international markets. The debate over this system assumed greater importance during the 2000s, in connection with the discussions regarding global imbalances, and intensified during the financial crisis The predictions made by the critics of the Bretton Woods 2 system, who had foreseen that there would be a flight out of dollar denominated assets and a devaluation of the US currency, failed to come about. To the contrary, there was a marked increase in the demand for US treasury bills at times of increased risk aversion. The economic performance of those countries which were linked to the system was apparently better than the global average observed during the crisis, with less deceleration being registered along with faster recovery, with China frequently being pointed to as an example of economic success during this period. The aim of this study is to determine to what degree the economic performance of the countries aligned with the Bretton Woods 2 system really differed from that of countries which were not aligned, both during as well as shortly after the crisis. In addition the study examines whether the performance during the crisis encouraged other countries to align themselves with the model and concludes that, although there were specific actions in this sense, policies which would characterize a clearer compliance to the Bretton Woods 2 system would be hard to reconcile in democratic countries, with relatively open capital accounts and conflicting economic policy objectives, particularly in times of crisis.

O sistema de Bretton Woods 2 propõe a existência, nos dias atuais, de uma dinâmica semelhante à vigente até 1971, na qual os EUA continuam como economia central e os países asiáticos passam a ocupar o papel de nova periferia, com estratégias de desenvolvimento baseadas na competitividade de seu setor exportador de modo a construir um estoque doméstico de capital capaz de competir nos mercados internacionais. O debate sobre esse sistema ganhou relevância durante a década de 2000, associado às discussões sobre os desequilíbrios globais, e se intensificou com a crise de 2008-09. As previsões feitas pelos críticos do arranjo de Bretton Woods 2, que anteviam um movimento de fuga dos ativos denominados em dólar e a desvalorização da moeda norte-americana, não se confirmaram. Ao contrário, nos momentos de maior aversão a risco, a demanda por títulos do Tesouro dos EUA cresceu significativamente. O desempenho econômico dos países alinhados ao sistema também foi aparentemente melhor do que a média global durante a crise, com menor desaceleração e retomada mais rápida, sendo a China frequentemente destacada como exemplo de sucesso econômico no período. Este estudo tem como proposta avaliar em que medida o desempenho econômico dos países alinhados ao sistema de Bretton Woods 2 realmente diferiu daquele dos não alinhados, durante e logo após a crise. Conjuntamente, o estudo investiga se o desempenho na crise teria servido como incentivo a outros países para um alinhamento ao modelo e conclui que, embora tenha havido ações pontuais nesse sentido, as políticas que caracterizariam uma adesão mais evidente ao sistema de Bretton Woods 2 são ações de difícil compatibilização em países democráticos, com contas de capital relativamente abertas e objetivos conflitantes de política econômica, particularmente em momentos de crise. / The Bretton Woods 2 system proposes the existence, at the current time, of a system similar to that which was in force up until 1971, whereby the US remains as the central economy and the Asian countries assume the role of a new periphery, with development strategies based on their export sectors so as to build a domestic stock of capital capable of competing on the international markets. The debate over this system assumed greater importance during the 2000s, in connection with the discussions regarding global imbalances, and intensified during the financial crisis The predictions made by the critics of the Bretton Woods 2 system, who had foreseen that there would be a flight out of dollar denominated assets and a devaluation of the US currency, failed to come about. To the contrary, there was a marked increase in the demand for US treasury bills at times of increased risk aversion. The economic performance of those countries which were linked to the system was apparently better than the global average observed during the crisis, with less deceleration being registered along with faster recovery, with China frequently being pointed to as an example of economic success during this period. The aim of this study is to determine to what degree the economic performance of the countries aligned with the Bretton Woods 2 system really differed from that of countries which were not aligned, both during as well as shortly after the crisis. In addition the study examines whether the performance during the crisis encouraged other countries to align themselves with the model and concludes that, although there were specific actions in this sense, policies which would characterize a clearer compliance to the Bretton Woods 2 system would be hard to reconcile in democratic countries, with relatively open capital accounts and conflicting economic policy objectives, particularly in times of crisis.

In this paper I explore the causal relationship between the strategic economic interdependence advanced by Western democracies after WWII and the "puzzle of participation" in US presidential elections. More specifically, I seek to illustrate first how economic convergence within the West and then the transition from Keynesian to monetarist policy rhetoric reflexively diminish the degree to which US working class voters can realistically petition their elected officials regarding the most salient matters of economic self-interest. My results indicate that from 1948-2004, the working public became more isolated from their most salient economic decisions, voted less often due to heretofore unexplored macroeconomic indicators.

International monetary and financial crises have punctuated US hegemony since 1945. With US hegemony likely to endure and crises likely to recur, we need to understand how the US reacts to such events: benevolently or exploitatively? Using a case study of US behaviour during the 1969-76 international monetary crisis, this thesis challenges narratives that interpret events in terms of the concentration or deconcentration of power in the US hegemon, and favours an explanation of US behaviours based on the interplay of US domestic politics and international security imperatives. Using a Constructivist definition of hegemony and a neoclassical realist theoretical framework, I analyse the crisis from the perspectives of the international monetary order and system, respectively. I introduce a novel division of Strange’s concept of structural power into its negative and positive components (the power to disrupt or create international structures, respectively). Using these analytical tools, I analyse documents held in the UK and US National archives, President Nixon’s White House tapes and the Bank of England archive. Key and original findings include: - US tactics veered between hegemony by consent and, when that failed to yield the desired results, hegemony through domination; - domination tactics could be brutal, as when President Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Kissinger, tried to wreck European integration by destroying its first attempt at monetary union. Their intention was to advance the US’ security agenda by weakening EEC states; - Kissinger intervened in the Committee of Twenty’s negotiations to delay agreement on international monetary reform (despite the US being on the verge of achieving its objectives) until European states had acceded to what he wanted on security in the “Year of Europe” negotiations. Delay killed US plans to return to fixed exchange rates; - hegemonic stability theory-based explanations of events are challenged by the US terminating its Bretton Woods regime, persuading follower states to introduce generalised floating and blocking international monetary reform; - structural Realist and Marxist narratives of the crisis are challenged, inter alia, by President Ford abandoning Nixon’s attempts to strengthen US hegemony in favour of a laissez-faire solution to the international monetary crisis; - the decisions creating the basis of a neoliberal international monetary order (the introduction of floating exchange rates and free capital mobility) were taken for US international security or domestic political reasons, as neoclassical realism theory would predict. These decisions had profound economic consequences, but were not taken for economic reasons.

Submitted by Marcelo Andrade Silva (marcelo.andradesilva@ufpe.br) on 2015-03-04T13:49:46Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertacao.pdf: 3270596 bytes, checksum: 957b86e741ca226d90e4913fea8912ae (MD5) license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-04T13:49:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertacao.pdf: 3270596 bytes, checksum: 957b86e741ca226d90e4913fea8912ae (MD5) license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012 / Este trabalho pretende realizar uma análise política das orientações do Banco Mundial para a Educação Superior do Brasil, através do exame de documentos do Banco, bem como das considerações de estudiosos da área de Educação. Para isso, partiu-se de uma investigação que permitisse melhor identificar o Banco Mundial e a sua atuação nos países, principalmente os chamados “em desenvolvimento”, através de uma bibliografia crítica. Após um melhor entendimento do que é e de como atua o Banco Mundial, procedeu-se à analise de suas orientações para a Educação Superior do Brasil, tentando identificar possíveis riscos à política nacional e externa, envolvidos nessas orientações.

This thesis is focused on The World Bank, it's beginning, organisation and analysis of critique. This thesis begins with reasons for foundation, historical aspects and problems. This involved the world stage before Second World War and the beginning of the IBRD. The thesis continues with a frame look at the organization, projects, finance and the World Bank position. The study shows the righteousnees of critique, analyse it and interpret it. The remainder of the thesis is concerned about the decision power in the bank and it's consequences.

The main aim of my thesis is to describe the development of the American dollar's position within the historical background, its role in a globalized economy and analyze the current position of the dollar as the world's leading currency. The thesis is divided into three parts. First part is dedicated to the theoretical background concerning exchange rates and currency regimes. The second chapter considers the history of the international monetary system with the relation to the dollar. The third chapter analyzes the current situation and characteristics determining the role of American dollar. This chapter also describes some problems of American economy, analyses exchange rate of dollar against Euro and gives possible forecast of dollar's position for the future.

The continued funding of America's persistent trade and fiscal deficits has sparked debate among international economists. One controversial explanation argues that East Asia is pursuing "Bretton Woods II" and funding American deficits as part of a greater development policy. This paper examines the Chinese policy response to the global economic crisis and finds that China's policy actions provide evidence for "Bretton Woods II." Furthermore, the Sino-American relationship is now characterized by codependence which has implications for the policy decisions of each country.