自一九七一年Bretton Woods System崩潰以來，各國分分採行浮動匯率或管理浮動之 匯率政策，故本文之研究動機為在現實複雜之世界中，什麼樣的匯率政策才是最適的 ，而各國央行在外匯市場中干預、操作之技巧與有效性如何。 一、匯率管理之重要性。 二、外匯市場干預─干預之政策目標與利失、操作之技巧，與國內貨幣政策間之關係 、和總體經濟政策之配合。 三、各國匯率政策之經驗與外匯市場干預之成效─分歐洲、亞洲、美國、中南美洲加 以討論。 四、台灣匯率政策與外匯操作之沿革比較及建議，

This dissertation studies the role of sterling during the Bretton Woods period (1944-1971). The Bretton Woods system has often been described as a dollar system with sterling having lost its relevance as reserve currency. However, despite being a secondary reserve currency and having lost importance, sterling was the 'first line of defence for the dollar' as contemporaries put it. They frequently stressed the fact that a sterling crisis would have consequences on the stability of the Bretton Woods system but economic historians have never tested this empirically. This dissertation argues that sterling played an important role in the stability of the international monetary system. Foreign exchange market participants globally monitored sterling and US policymaker stepped in to avoid devaluation of the British currency. US support to sterling was mainly due to the fear of a British devaluation, which could trigger a run on the dollar. When the UK finally devalued the pound in 1967, it marked the beginning of an instable period for the international monetary system. The Gold Pool, a syndicate to defend the US gold parity, collapsed in 1968 and this prefigured the end of the Bretton Woods system. This dissertation presents new data along with novel archival material from seven archives across continents to demonstrate how contagion from sterling to the dollar occurred. Modern econometric methods are used to analyse a new dataset with over 80,000 observations of offshore exchange rates, central bank intervention and reserves. This evidence shows that a secondary reserve currency can still play a key role in the stability of the international monetary system.

I evaluate four possible approaches the United States may take to address China's practice of undervaluing the renminbi: 1) a challenge under Article XV of the GATT and the associated IMF provisions; 2) countervailing duties; 3) antidumping measures; and 4) safeguard measures. I conclude that the first three approaches are unlikely to succeed; there are a number of legal and political obstacles to the pursuit of these remedies. While the current WTO safeguards regime is likely insufficient, a new safeguards regime can--and should--be developed. I review and critique Dani Rodrik's proposal for a new safeguards regime and set out my own basic blueprint for a significantly expanded safeguards regime, emphasizing that flexibility in the realm of international trade law would help to secure overall stability in international trade itself. In order to be effective shock absorbers, safeguards must become far more flexible.

I evaluate four possible approaches the United States may take to address China's practice of undervaluing the renminbi: 1) a challenge under Article XV of the GATT and the associated IMF provisions; 2) countervailing duties; 3) antidumping measures; and 4) safeguard measures. I conclude that the first three approaches are unlikely to succeed; there are a number of legal and political obstacles to the pursuit of these remedies. While the current WTO safeguards regime is likely insufficient, a new safeguards regime can--and should--be developed. I review and critique Dani Rodrik's proposal for a new safeguards regime and set out my own basic blueprint for a significantly expanded safeguards regime, emphasizing that flexibility in the realm of international trade law would help to secure overall stability in international trade itself. In order to be effective shock absorbers, safeguards must become far more flexible.

This dissertation examines the political, social, and economic responses to the end of the Bretton Woods system from 1971-1988 in the United States. It offers a “pre-history” of globalization which focuses on a period when international economic entanglement became a question of serious political debate within the U.S., but before “globalization” became common parlance. Contemporaries referred to the world after Bretton Woods as newly characterized by “interdependence,” a concept which highlighted vulnerability to external economic forces and declining national autonomy. This dissertation argues that far from enthusiastically embracing market globalization in this period, U.S. policymakers worked to supervise and manage global integration, and insulate workers, consumers, businesses, and themselves from the full force of the world economy. Restoring domestic social conflict to the center of our understanding of international economic policy, it investigates how labor unions and federations like the UAW and the AFL-CIO, business lobbying organizations like the National Association of Manufacturers and the Chamber of Commerce, and officials in the Treasury, Congress, and the Federal Reserve conflicted over their response to growing economic entanglement deep into the 1980s. It excavates a history of protectionism, planning, subsidies, industrial policy, currency politics, and other forms of state intervention—often driven by elites in the industrial Midwest and Northeast. The result of these collisions was an ambivalent and fragmented national approach to global integration which persisted until more recently than typically assumed. Rather than being driven by a coherent ideological vision for American power, or a clear-cut embrace of neoliberal theory, foreign economic policy was propelled forward by a much more contingent, ad-hoc, and conflictual process across this period. When globalization took on truly historical force in the 1990s, it was not because social conflicts over interdependence had been resolved, but because a more reluctant and resistant approach to global integration had lost its political and institutional foothold.

布列敦森林機制的成形與運作是基於國際社會對一九三０年代經濟大恐慌所記取的歷史教訓。國際社會要捨棄「以鄰為壑」的歷史錯誤，期以國際協調與合作解決國際經濟秩序不穩定的問題。但是在建立布列敦森林機制的過程中與布列敦森林機制的運作上，顯現出國際政治權力與國家利益才是最重要的考量。美國以其在兩次世界大戰中發展出的國力，主導了布列敦森林機制的設計，將大部分的國家納入此項體系中，並以此體系中的規範、準則來約束所有成員的行為。透過此機制的槓桿運作，美國得以將其在政治上與經濟上的力量發揮到極至，從而維護美國繼續作為霸權國的國家利益。布列敦森林機制成為戰後國際合作的基礎架構，會員國所簽訂的國際貨幣基金協定條款成了體系成員的行為準則。制約條件與監督會員國的經濟政策之權是國際貨幣基金兩項最重要的武器。然而，制約條件所產生的政經效應，卻讓國際貨幣基金倍受批評。影響制約條件成效不彰的原因包含有國際貨幣基金的組織結構因素、國際環境因素與執行制約條件的國家的內部因素。國際社會將所有的責任都歸於國際貨幣基金，實在是隔靴搔癢，同時也無助於解決當今資本全球化所引發的問題。 目　　錄 序言 壹 圖表目錄 參 第一章 緒論 1 第二章 國際貨幣基金之成立 4 第一節 布列敦森林機制的起源 4 第二節 布列敦森林機制前的國際貨幣體系 9 第三節 懷特方案與凱因斯方案 12 第四節 小結 17 第三章 布列敦森林機制的制度分析 21 第一節 國際貨幣基金的制度 21 第二節 國際貨幣基金的組織 26 第三節 美國霸權與布列敦森林機制 34 第四章 國際貨幣基金角色的轉變 50 第一節 國際經濟環境的變遷 50 第二節 國際貨幣基金協定條款的修訂 54 第三節 特別提款權的運作 59 第四節 國際貨幣基金的監督功能 61 第五章 國際貨幣基金的制約條件 67 第一節 什麼是制約條件 67 第二節 制約條件的發展 71 第三節 制約條件與調整政策 76 第四節 制約條件的政經效應 79 第六章 一九八０年代的拉丁美洲債務危機 92 第一節 拉丁美洲債務危機的起源 92 第二節 處理拉丁美洲債務危機的國際行動 96 第三節 處理拉丁美洲債務危機的成效與政經意涵 102 第七章 一九九七年東亞金融危機 111 第一節 東亞金融危機的起源 111 第二節 東亞國家的政治經濟結構 117 第三節 處理東亞金融危機的國際行動 119 第四節 國際貨幣基金穩定方案的檢討 123 第五節 小結 132 第八章 結論 138 參考書目 143 圖表目錄 圖 圖3-1 國際貨幣基金組織結構圖 45 表 表6-1 拉美國家的貿易平衡、經常帳與資本基本轉移 的情況，1977—1987 105 表6-2 接受IMF融資計畫的拉美國家之經濟表現 105 表6-3 接受IMF融資計畫的拉美國家之債務情況 106 表7-1 泰國、印尼與南韓三國外匯存底的變動， （1997年6月—19982月） 112 表7-2 東亞四國的債務情況 114 表7-3 東亞四國的經濟表現，1997—1999 131

British influence on the diplomacy of WWII, as it relates to postwar planning, is underappreciated. This work explores how the use of astute tactical maneuvering allowed Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden to impact the development of the post-war world in a greater degree than is typically portrayed in the narratives of the war. Detailing how the study of business negotiations can provide new insights into diplomatic history, Yalta exposes Britain’s impact on the creation of the post-war order through analyzing the diplomacy of WWII as a negotiation. To depict WWII post-war planning diplomacy as a negotiation means that the Yalta Conference of 1945 must be the focal point of said diplomacy with all the negotiations either flowing to or from the conference. This analysis reveals that Britain harnessed the natural momentum of the negotiation process to create bilateral understandings that protected or advanced their interests in ways that should not have been afforded the weakest party in the Grand Alliance. By pursuing solutions to the major wartime issues first and most stridently through the use of age-old British diplomatic tactics, they were able to enter into understandings with another member of the Grand Alliance prior to the tripartite conferences. Creating bilateral understandings with the Americans on the direction of military operations and the Soviets over the European settlement produced the conditions under which the tripartite negotiations transpired. Options available to the excluded party were thus limited, allowing for outcomes that aligned more favorably to British interests. A synthesis of diplomatic documents, diaries, and memoirs with historical writings as well as research on business and international negotiations brings to life the diplomatic encounters that led to the creation of the post-war order. To provide the reader a basis for analysis of wartime diplomacy, this work is broken down into two parts. Part I focuses on the strategies created for Yalta. Part II (future doctoral dissertation) will use these strategies to evaluate the performances of each party. Combined the two parts expose that British diplomatic maneuverings is an undervalued aspect of wartime diplomacy.